caldrail

As much as the RAF defence was determined, well flown, and kept Britain in the war, I have to point out that wasn't the worst bugbear facing a German invasion - the English Channel with its notoriously fickle waters and the Royal Navy Home Fleet waiting at Scapa Flow to intervene were both well known to Germany and why Hitler stressed secure ownership of the Channel as the basis of three of his requirements before he would authorise the operation. Everyone seems to suggest the Luftwaffe gave up - they didn't - time was against them. Because the RAF fended them off long enough the window of opportunity was closing, one reason why Germany turned to strategic bombing rather than focused attacks on the RAF, and another reason why the offensive was put on low priority. However, the Blitz continued - there was no cessation of bombing although they turned to night operations, and fighter strength was already being conserved for Hitler's desire to expand eastward having realised the Soviet Union was a 'Rotten Edifice'.

Rome couldn't defeat Scotland because it wouldn't exist until nine hundred years later. They had however defeated the assembled army of Picts at Mons Graupius, but annexation didn't happen - Agricola was recalled before any political settlement and tested for loyalty.

Guy, it was British airspace. Of course we had air superiority over it in 1939, what the heck do you imagine the RAF was for? The whole point of the Luftwaffe campaign was to challenge that air superiority and suppress the RAF over SE England. This is kindergarten stuff.

But we didn't 'win' air superiority - we already had it and retained it. Had we lost that as the German initially wanted, then the threat of invasion escalated. That did not guarantee it would happen because there were three other clauses relating to the security of the English Channel before Hitler would authorise the operation. Germany knew full well the Royal Navy was waiting in the wings. However - the defence by the RAF delayed the situation long enough for the window of opportunity to close - the English Channel is a wayward bit of sea often enough and weather in the winter would have effectively made supplying an invasion force impractical. So unlike the many who thing the Luftwaffe 'gave up', I'm pointing out that Germany made a conscious decision to change strategy, besides being angry that the RAF had bombed Berlin in response to a ad hoc attack on London. The objective of air superiority had lost impetus both because of the timing. Besides, with Hitler thinking of eastward ambitions, the Luftwaffe needed to conserve their forces for the coming attack on the Soviet Union. After all, surely Britain would finally accepot defeat if the U-Boat blockade forced them to? But to clarify a point, the British in the Channel Islands were not required to speak German or eat sausages - not that they had many of those available anyway.

I've had a somewhat emotive and quite bitter debate on another site concerning the Battle of Britain. There's a lesson to learn about being objective and analytical in the face of legend and popular preconception, so I'm going to take a little time out here to discuss the subject and why my standpoint was not conventional. Let's establish something before we get into details. The RAF fought a three month air campaign against the Luftwaffe. The commitment and skills of the RAF pilots, whether British, Empire, Commonwealth, or foreign volunteer, is not contested. It is of course politically incorrect to mention the Luftwaffe's efforts, but I can't ignore that they were fighting the campaign too. I could delve into the mass of statistics to make some halfway objective point but that's not my purpose here. Instead, I ask the question - was the Battle of Britain actually a victory or not? Heresy, how could I doubt it? But you can from a wider perspective. The Battle of Britain was fought by the RAF to defend against the Luftwaffe attacks. Initially these attacks were made to suppress or destroy RAF air superiority over SE England as Goering's contribution to complying with the four clauses made by Hitler before he would authorise an invasion of Britain. Of course Goering was not just trying to do his part, he also had political reasons to please his boss - that's why he volunteered to undertake the mission to break RAF Fighter Command. German intelligence was woeful and inconsistent. Despite being told the RAF was almost destroyed, it wasn't lost on Luftwaffe personnel that British fighters kept coming at them. Quite an achievement because in order to maintain this resistance, the RAF were forced to put young men into combat with a bare minimum of training, and the gradually increasing RAF losses resulted. The first contentious point is what the RAF had achieved by this. The British were well aware of the threat waiting in French Channel ports, even conducting some little known bombing raids in return, but the Germans were also well aware the Royal Navy was waiting. Three of Hitler's clauses concern themselves with securing the Channel crossing. Fighting to defend Britain? The RAF pilots certainly thought so with good reason, but to begin with, they were actually defending themselves. Luftwaffe attacks were made against them directly. The second contentious point is to ask if the Luftwaffe gave up. Conventional thinking is that they did. But the reality is that the German command foisted a new strategic mission on the Luftwaffe. Attacks against the RAF were shelved in favour of bombing London and other targets to reduce British morale and bring them to the negotiating table faster. This is a fundamental change in strategy. The Luftwaffe had not given up attacking the RAF, they were given a new task to perform halfway through the battle. Even after the battle was said to have concluded, the bombing raids continued at night under the a campaign we call the Blitz. A victory for the RAF? British propaganda was quick to declare it as such, and we British love the legend of the Battle of Britain. Eighty years on, with almost no veterans left, the sight and sound of a Spitfire in British skies is still emotive. But there are other aspects. Hitler had lost interest in the Battle of Britain. He was never keen on an invasion anyway, the idea was caused by pressure from public expectation and the hopes of lower ranking servicemen. In fact, late in 1940 Hitler realised he had been wrong about the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union was the 'rotten edifice' that would collapse. He had written about Germany's destiny in the East, lebensraum (living space) and so forth. Whilst the original plan was to attack the Soviet Union in 1944, the year after German re-armament was scheduled to be complete, Hitler wanted to invade in Winter 1940. His generals persuaded him it was not a good idea, but Hitler insisted an invasion would go ahead in the Spring. A third contentious point is that Operation Sealion was cancelled. But it wasn't. On September 17th Hitler postponed the operation indefinitely. There was no actual cancellation and troops allocated for the invasion were still in place until 1942, when they were redeployed to the Eastern Front. To Hitler, the war in the west was already won, it was merely a matter of time before Britain gave up and asked to negotiate. He had good reasons to believe that - Britain had a great many people in high places that didn't want a war with Germany and Lord Halifax had stormed out of the War Council in May 1940 because Winston Churchill refused to ask Mussolini to intercede on their behalf. A fourth contention is the idea the Battle of Britain was a German stunt to persuade the UK to give up, and that the invasion threat was a bluff. Really? The Germans had lost a great many aeroplanes and experienced personnel and with troops and equipment waiting to go in Channel ports, one has to question the idea they were bluffing. They couldn't put themselves in a position to actually begin, due credit to the RAF's efforts, but the potential invasion had been reduced in priority when the Luftwaffe turned on London. A tacit admission of defeat? The Germans would not have said so, they had merely adopted a different strategy with the weather window in the English Channel coming perilously to a close. So was the Battle of Britain a victory for the RAF? Objectively, no, but it was a success. No air superiority was lost by either side, no territory was exchanged, nobody had withdrawn their forces. However, the RAF had defended themselves and prevented any risk of the invasion threat escalating. A close run thing in some ways. The Luftwaffe had not succeeded in their initial aim to suppress the RAF but they were not allowed to complete the task, because German strategy was changed due to political pressure.

It's known that Egyptians used drugs for relaxation, based on a particular flower, and modern experiments have shown it was possible but not perhaps as bad as the effects of modern drugs. I don't really know much about the Roman use of such things, but I was once informed that Roman legionaries had witnessed the Celtic substances used to induce battle fury and adopted the same substances. How true that is I have no idea, the Romans don't talk about getting high on anything other than raw sex.

This popped up in my news feed. It seems we have yet another Roman fort in Britain.. Interesting how much of this stuff lies buried and forgotten because on Facebook just today somebody was going misty eyed about the enormous legacy the Romans left in Britannia. Seems we haven't found all of it yet. Possible 'mega' fort found in Wales hints at tension between Romans and Celtics (msn.com)

Crikey, that's one exposed site. I can just imagine a centurion gritting his teeth as soldiers moaned about the cold wind.

Most of the crush injuries were due to the weight of pumice on the roofs of buildings where people sheltered. I would also add that Pompeii had been severely hit by earthquakes ten years before the eruption, they were still rebuilding during the event.

I see history was put back on the shelf.

I stumbled across this video that takes a look at an oddity in Britain, the Fosse Way. For those who don't know of it, it's a Roman era route from SW to NE England - but incredibly straight. Yes, I know, Roman roads are supposed to be straight aren't they? Yes, but only between settlements. The Fosse Way is simply a line on the map, and perhaps it's a sign of something we've forgotten?

This came up in my news feed... The last home of Caesar Augustus. https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/archaeologists-discover-lost-home-of-rome-s-first-emperor/ar-AA1nRBQ8?ocid=socialshare

I live not too far from Avebury, the largest Neolithic stone circle in the world though precious little of it is left. I've walked down there once or twice, a hike across the Marlborough Downs of a respectable but practical length, so I'm not unfamiliar with it. Like most people, I simply see the ring and surviving stones as is, pondering their mysteries but I guess not looking too deeply at them. Here's a thought provoking video from a guy who does a bit of alternate thinking. I have no idea if he's right, but it shows Avebury and some surrounding areas in a very different light than I expected. Decide for yourself....

A bit of light relief - I came across this cartoon on the SPQR Facebook page. So true!

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