Cannae and the Roman Republic

[sylla]

Like so many ancient commanders, Hannibal was a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy.

I'm sure next time any of us have a strategy question, we will check on you and not poor old Hannibal.

Your last statement is not only absurd, but also a nice oxymoron (sorry, you will have to use your own dictionary).

 

To be fair, the notion that Hannibal was a brilliant tactician and less than brilliant strategist is not new, unusual or at all oxymoronic. To hear the misuse of the term strategy, you only have to watch any episode of "The Apprentice" or listen to any business wanabee! There is no doubt that Hannibal was a brilliant battlefield tactician, but strategy is about ultimate objectives.

 

Warfare is roughly split into three components. The strategic level is that of the objectives set out by the policy underlying the conflict. Following the definition of strategic objectives, the operational level plans the campaigns to reach the strategic objective. Finally, the tactical level concerns the planning and conduct of the actual fighting. For example, in my business, I may set a strategic target of a certain turnover and margin and plan new media to reach certain markets to achieve that objective. On a tactical level, that concerns the way the sales people approach the prospects, how much money is quoted etc.

 

Hannibal absolutely knew how to make the best use of his resources on the battlefield; he was a great tactician. At the strategic level there is more doubt. The consensus is that he did not aim to obliterate Rome, but to reduce her to a regional power. There is further doubt as to whether his supply line could have supported a long seige of the city had his objective been total conquest. This brings us to the widely attested opinion of Marhabal.

 

He clearly believed that the victory at Cannae should have been followed up with a march on Rome, but as we all know, Hannibal hesitated. He may have believed that total victory would have involved a long seige in which case we should understand the hesitation, however the opinion of Marhabal is well known:-

 

"Truly the gods do not give everything to the same man: you know how to win a victory (tactics), Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one (strategy)."

 

There are numerous arguments as to whether Hannibal was being understandably cautious or less than astute strategically. However, even if he decided to not move on Rome at her nadir for very good reasons, his ultimate defeat must call into question his strategic sense. If he was ill prepared for a siege, then his operational abilities should be scrutinized and there is the possibility that at this stage he fully expected Rome to give up any further opposition and reach settlement in line with his expectations.

Definitions may vary a little bit, but if we admit that strategy is (SIC) "the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions" (Merriam-Webster) or anything similar, it's hard for me to imagine how could Hannibal have left any additional evidence of his outmost performance.

By definition, "a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy" is an oxymoron (ie, "a combination of contradictory or incongruous words" [M-W] ).

 

To be fair and as stated like a hundred posts ago, we actually don't know what on Earth was Hannibal thinking, and not because nobody wrote about it (eg, Silenus) but simply because no one of such accounts has survived; anything we discuss on Hannibal's intentions (consensus or not) is speculation.

 

I'm not sure which authors are included by the term "consensus"; in any case, most scholars I'm aware of (eg. Lazenby) considered that the Punic army had no real chance of conquering Rome even after Cannae in 216 BC; Rome was simply too strong and resourceful even after such immense casualties.

(That was in fact our main rationale behind the partial analogy with the Soviets and the Operation Barbarossa; do you remember?)

Cannae by itself was just not enough.

The Romans still had more legions than they had lost, and they were eventually able to raise a minimum of 25 legions (ie, the same as the entire Roman Empire under Tiberius) plus considerable naval forces and allies.

 

Even more, scarcely any Italian city was sieged or taken by the Punic army all along the Hannibalic War; almost all the cities occupied by Hannibal voluntarily sided with him after Trasimene or Cannae.

With so many active legions all across Italy, sieges were simply too risky for the victorious but isolated Carthaginian force, both before and after Cannae.

 

Honestly, given the available evidence, I tend to agree; in fact, I may add that the poor performance of the Carthaginians against the sieging army of Ap. Claudius Pulcher in Capua in 212-211 BC is an excellent evidence in total agreement with that argument.

 

Maharbal's statement may indeed have been historical (again, no punic accounts survived), but even if it was so, it was hardly any evidence that the Punic liuetenant may have been any better strategist than his extraordinary commander.

 

Contrary to what some people have stated, Hannibal didn't remain inactive after Cannae; with the help of his Italian allies he tried to conquer the rich Campania (the Italian barn of Rome) and Bruttium; a perfectly viable strategy, and in all likelihood the best possible one, given the circumstances.

 

Some minor towns were actually sieged and plundered, but at a great cost; Livy wrote:

"Petelia in Bruttium was taken by Himilco, one of Hannibal's lieutenants, after a siege which lasted several months.

That victory cost the Carthaginians heavy losses in both killed and wounded, for the defenders only yielded after they had been starved out.

They had consumed all their corn and eaten every kind of animal whether ordinarily used as food or not, and at last kept themselves alive by eating leather and grass and roots and the soft bark of trees and leaves picked from shrubs.

It was not until they had no longer strength to stand on the walls or to bear the weight of their armour that they were subdued."

 

The main Campanian and Bruttian cities, like:

- Neapolis (under Silanus command),

- Nola (under Marcellus),

- Beneventum (under Gracchus) and

- Rhegium

proved consistently immune to years of Punic attacks.

What real chance would then Hannibal have had against the Servian Wall, the whole Latium and the remaining active legions, without even any local ally there?

Where was the "lost great opportunity"?

When after the fall of Capua most of Hannibal's Italian allies returned to the Roman side, there was very little that the Punic army was able do about it.

 

On the other hand, the accounts of Hannibal's battles (especially Cannae) have been used as a significant inspiration by countless military experts for centuries, from his own time to the present day.

I simply can't imagine any better evidence of the consensus opinion on anyone's strategic performance.

Edited September 6, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

Like so many ancient commanders, Hannibal was a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy.

I'm sure next time any of us have a strategy question, we will check on you and not poor old Hannibal.

Your last statement is not only absurd, but also a nice oxymoron (sorry, you will have to use your own dictionary).

 

To be fair, the notion that Hannibal was a brilliant tactician and less than brilliant strategist is not new, unusual or at all oxymoronic. To hear the misuse of the term strategy, you only have to watch any episode of "The Apprentice" or listen to any business wanabee! There is no doubt that Hannibal was a brilliant battlefield tactician, but strategy is about ultimate objectives.

 

Warfare is roughly split into three components. The strategic level is that of the objectives set out by the policy underlying the conflict. Following the definition of strategic objectives, the operational level plans the campaigns to reach the strategic objective. Finally, the tactical level concerns the planning and conduct of the actual fighting. For example, in my business, I may set a strategic target of a certain turnover and margin and plan new media to reach certain markets to achieve that objective. On a tactical level, that concerns the way the sales people approach the prospects, how much money is quoted etc.

 

Hannibal absolutely knew how to make the best use of his resources on the battlefield; he was a great tactician. At the strategic level there is more doubt. The consensus is that he did not aim to obliterate Rome, but to reduce her to a regional power. There is further doubt as to whether his supply line could have supported a long seige of the city had his objective been total conquest. This brings us to the widely attested opinion of Marhabal.

 

He clearly believed that the victory at Cannae should have been followed up with a march on Rome, but as we all know, Hannibal hesitated. He may have believed that total victory would have involved a long seige in which case we should understand the hesitation, however the opinion of Marhabal is well known:-

 

"Truly the gods do not give everything to the same man: you know how to win a victory (tactics), Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one (strategy)."

 

There are numerous arguments as to whether Hannibal was being understandably cautious or less than astute strategically. However, even if he decided to not move on Rome at her nadir for very good reasons, his ultimate defeat must call into question his strategic sense. If he was ill prepared for a siege, then his operational abilities should be scrutinized and there is the possibility that at this stage he fully expected Rome to give up any further opposition and reach settlement in line with his expectations.

Definitions may vary a little bit, but if we admit that strategy is (SIC) "the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions" (Merriam-Webster) or anything similar, it's hard for me to imagine how could Hannibal have left any additional evidence of his outmost performance.

By definition, "a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy" is an oxymoron (ie, "a combination of contradictory or incongruous words" [M-W] ).

 

To be fair and as stated like a hundred posts ago, we actually don't know what on Earth was Hannibal thinking, and not because nobody wrote about it (eg, Silenus) but simply because no one of such accounts has survived; anything we discuss on Hannibal's intentions (consensus or not) is speculation.

 

I'm not sure which authors are included by the term "consensus"; in any case, most scholars I'm aware of (eg. Lazenby) considered that the Punic army had no real chance of conquering Rome even after Cannae in 216 BC; Rome was simply too strong and resourceful even after such immense casualties.

(That was in fact our main rationale behind the partial analogy with the Soviets and the Operation Barbarossa; do you remember?)

Cannae by itself was just not enough.

The Romans still had more legions than they had lost, and they were eventually able to raise a minimum of 25 legions (ie, the same as the entire Roman Empire under Tiberius) plus considerable naval forces and allies.

 

Even more, scarcely any Italian city was sieged or taken by the Punic army all along the Hannibalic War; almost all the cities occupied by Hannibal voluntarily sided with him after Trasimene or Cannae.

With so many active legions all across Italy, sieges were simply too risky for the victorious but isolated Carthaginian force, both before and after Cannae.

 

Honestly, given the available evidence, I tend to agree; in fact, I may add that the poor performance of the Carthaginians against the sieging army of Ap. Claudius Pulcher in Capua in 212-211 BC is an excellent evidence in total agreement with that argument.

 

Maharbal's statement may indeed have been historical (again, no punic accounts survived), but even if it was so, it was hardly any evidence that the Punic liuetenant may have been any better strategist than his extraordinary commander.

 

Contrary to what some people have stated, Hannibal didn't remain inactive after Cannae; with the help of his Italian allies he tried to conquer the rich Campania (the Italian barn of Rome) and Bruttium; a perfectly viable strategy, and in all likelihood the best possible one, given the circumstances.

 

Some minor towns were actually sieged and plundered, but at a great cost; Livy wrote:

"Petelia in Bruttium was taken by Himilco, one of Hannibal's lieutenants, after a siege which lasted several months.

That victory cost the Carthaginians heavy losses in both killed and wounded, for the defenders only yielded after they had been starved out.

They had consumed all their corn and eaten every kind of animal whether ordinarily used as food or not, and at last kept themselves alive by eating leather and grass and roots and the soft bark of trees and leaves picked from shrubs.

It was not until they had no longer strength to stand on the walls or to bear the weight of their armour that they were subdued."

 

The main Campanian and Bruttian cities, like:

- Neapolis (under Silanus command),

- Nola (under Marcellus),

- Beneventum (under Gracchus) and

- Rhegium

proved consistently immune to years of Punic attacks.

What real chance would then Hannibal have had against the Servian Wall, the whole Latium and the remaining active legions, without even any local ally there?

Where was the "lost great opportunity"?

When after the fall of Capua most of Hannibal's Italian allies returned to the Roman side, there was very little that the Punic army was able do about it.

 

On the other hand, the accounts of Hannibal's battles (especially Cannae) have been used as a significant inspiration by countless military experts for centuries, from his own time to the present day.

I simply can't imagine any better evidence of the consensus opinion on anyone's strategic performance.

 

Rather than getting into a debate about the difference between strategy and tactics, there is a very real distinction between Hannibal's undoubted prowess as a battlefield commander and his vision of the long term objectives of his campaigns. I would tend to agree with you that Marhabal had not in fact identified a mistake in Hannibal's decision not to march on Rome. You have identified the many impediments that would have faced him had he taken this course and therefore the question remains, what were his long term objectives? After Cannae what should he have done?

 

That nobody knows what Hannibal was thinking suggests that he did not have a clear strategic objective. If we accept all that you and others say about his supply lines and Roman manpower, the "hydra" described by Pyrrhus' commander Cineas being an apt metaphor, then Hannibal must have been rendered directionless. There was no clear way for him to use the victory at Cannae, so what was the long term plan?

 

Hannibal, of course, had already inflicted three major defeats on Rome by the time we get to Cannae. The fact that he did not march on Rome after Trasimene suggests that his strategy did not involve the destruction of the city and her total defeat. If we can accept that his objective in this whole conflict, was the reduction of Rome to a city state detached from her allies and without influence beyond central Italy then we can begin to appreciate the frustrating fix in which he found himself.

 

It was a possibility that Marhabal was right and that the very appearance of "Hannibal at the gates", may have brought about the seeking of terms. However, he knew that taking Rome by storm would be a hugely costly and uncertain venture and a siege could last months or even years. It is possible that he did not take this course because he did not believe it to be necessary. Surely after Cannae, the Romans would not blame bad planning or anything else to mitigate the result of Trasimene for instance. Surely after Cannae, Rome would accept terms dictated by the victor Hannibal. This would have meant a strategic victory for Hannibal in as much as his objective was then reached. An ambassador and representatives of the thousands of prisoners in Hannibal's hands were sent to Rome to negotiate the terms and ransom, but no discussions were allowed to take place.

 

It may be then, that if Hannibal's strategic aim was the reduction of Rome as stated above, that he was more questionable on this level because he misread the character of his enemy. Battlefield defeats were not effective in reaching this objective, because Rome did not behave in a way that he understandably expected them to do so.

[sylla]

I would tend to agree with you that Marhabal had not in fact identified a mistake in Hannibal's decision not to march on Rome. You have identified the many impediments that would have faced him had he taken this course and therefore the question remains, what were his long term objectives? After Cannae what should he have done?

 

That nobody knows what Hannibal was thinking suggests that he did not have a clear strategic objective. If we accept all that you and others say about his supply lines and Roman manpower, the "hydra" described by Pyrrhus' commander Cineas being an apt metaphor, then Hannibal must have been rendered directionless. There was no clear way for him to use the victory at Cannae, so what was the long term plan?

 

Hannibal, of course, had already inflicted three major defeats on Rome by the time we get to Cannae. The fact that he did not march on Rome after Trasimene suggests that his strategy did not involve the destruction of the city and her total defeat. If we can accept that his objective in this whole conflict, was the reduction of Rome to a city state detached from her allies and without influence beyond central Italy then we can begin to appreciate the frustrating fix in which he found himself.

 

It was a possibility that Marhabal was right and that the very appearance of "Hannibal at the gates", may have brought about the seeking of terms. However, he knew that taking Rome by storm would be a hugely costly and uncertain venture and a siege could last months or even years. It is possible that he did not take this course because he did not believe it to be necessary. Surely after Cannae, the Romans would not blame bad planning or anything else to mitigate the result of Trasimene for instance. Surely after Cannae, Rome would accept terms dictated by the victor Hannibal. This would have meant a strategic victory for Hannibal in as much as his objective was then reached. An ambassador and representatives of the thousands of prisoners in Hannibal's hands were sent to Rome to negotiate the terms and ransom, but no discussions were allowed to take place.

 

It may be then, that if Hannibal's strategic aim was the reduction of Rome as stated above, that he was more questionable on this level because he misread the character of his enemy. Battlefield defeats were not effective in reaching this objective, because Rome did not behave in a way that he understandably expected them to do so.

No, that is a faulty conclusion.

Nobody knows what Hannibal was thinking just because not a single Punic account has survived, in the same way that we don't know what the hell were Viriathus or Vercingetoryx thinking, even if all of them undoubtedly had "long term objectives".

For the same reason, any Roman quote on Maharbal or any other Punic commander, including the "Hannibal didn't know how to win wars" is unreliable; period (Surprisingly, Polybius wrote nothing about such stuff).

 

Strictly speaking, we don't even know which were the long term objectives of Hannibal and the Carthagininan goverment when Punic War II began.

Rome was already in an openly agressive policy against Carthage; the stealing of Sardinia, the Ebro treaty, the alliance with Saguntum.

In 218 BC, the Roman mobilization was absolutely offensive, necessarily planned far in advance; both consuls had huge armies and fleets already in their way to simultaneously invade Spain and Africa, when the Punic crossing of the Alps suddenly overcame all such projects.

We really don't know if the Carthaginians (even less which of the Carthaginians) just wanted Rome to stay out of their business, expected to recover their lost territories, were planning to conquer Italy or plainly tried to destroy Rome; your guess is as good as any other.

 

What we do know is the military situation in Italy before and after Cannae.

An obvious goal of Hannibal was to make the Italian cities change sides.

If the Punic army was eventually able to survive in Italy at all, it was because he impressed Capua and some other cities; the same as Caldrail and you, they concluded that after so many victories, Hannibal could easily have taken any city.

 

In Polybius' words:

"The Carthaginians by this action (CANNAE) became at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast, Tarentum immediately surrendering, while Argyrippa and some Campanian towns invited Hannibal to come to them, and the eyes of all were now turned to the Carthaginians, who had great hopes of even taking Rome itself at the first assault".

And in Livy's:

"How far that disaster (CANNAE) surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple fact.

Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken, now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they despaired of the maintenance of our empire.

The tribes who revolted to the Carthaginians were the Atellani,the Calatini, the Hirpini, a section of the Apulians, all the Samnite cantons with the exception of the Pentri, all the Bruttii and the Lucanians.

In addition to these, the Uzentini and almost the whole of the coast of Magna Graecia, the people of Tarentum Crotona and Locri, as well as all Cisalpine Gaul...

... The envoys came to Hannibal and negotiated a peace with him on the following terms:

No Carthaginian commander or magistrate was to have any jurisdiction over the citizens of Capua nor was any Campanian citizen to be obliged to serve in any military or other capacity against his will; Capua was to retain its own magistrates and its own laws; and the Carthaginian was to allow them to choose three hundred Romans out of his prisoners of war whom they were to exchange for the Campanian troopers who were serving in Sicily.

These were the terms agreed upon, but the Campanians went far beyond the stipulations in their criminal excesses.

The populace seized officers in command of our allies and other Roman citizens, some whilst occupied with their military duties, others whilst engaged in their private business, and ordered them to be shut up in the baths on the presence of keeping them in safe custody "

 

That mistake proved fatal for Capua and other defectors.

It's hard to blame them; it seems that even nowadays, some historians and UNRV members still make the same mistake.

For that goal, Hannibal recurred to all possible trick, even since Trasimene; Livy again:

"Hannibal dismissed without ransom those prisoners who belonged to the allies and threw the Romans into chains".

 

Besides, Hannibal and/or the Carthaginian government did their best to recruit any potential extra-Italian ally against Rome: the King of Macedon, the Tyrant of Syracuse, the Achaean league, the Ilergetes and other Roman Celtiberian friends, additional Gaulish tribes and so on.

 

To a large extent, the Italian campaigns after Cannae became a predominantly local war; Rome and his loyal subjects against a coalition of Italian defectors (mostly Campanians at the beginning) plus the invading Gauls and the powerful but minority properly Punic army.

However, if that coalition didn't eventually win, that was mainly because the vast majority of the Italian cities remained loyal to Rome.

Had more cities defected to the Punic side, Rome may very well have become unable to continue the war in a matter of weeks.

 

Then, what Hannibal tried was a perfectly viable strategy; instead of an useless and risky raid against Rome, he first attacked Campania, the barn of Rome in Italy, where he could terrorize and recruit many more non-Latin Italian cities; more human and material resources on his side, less for the Romans.

In fact, if Hannibal actually expected to conquer by force Rome itself or any other large Italian city, he hardly had any other choice.

Hannibal was a strategist, not a suicide bomber.

In the real world, the cleaver Cunctator proved right from the very first year of the war; without significant local support, the wonderful Punic army was utterly ineffective against fixed positions.

 

 

In conclusion, from where I am, the immediate military objectives of Hannibal were evident; the recruiting of as many Italian and extra-Italian allies as he could, making then the Roman position untenable.

Therefore, the Punic invasion of Campania was in all likelihood the most logical step after Cannae (in Apulia), ie, where the greatest benefits at the expense of the lesser risks were expected.

The long term objectives from either Hannibal or the Carthaginian government at any time of Punic War II are simply not extant; period.

Far more often than not, Hannibal did select his best available options; his problem was of course that it was just not enough; the Romans were far stronger and, at least at the critical moments, they took the right decisions too.

Edited September 10, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

Perhaps after all that has been stated, what saved Rome was her unique system of conquest followed by assimilation. The Campanians and Sabellians that moved over to Hannibal, did so out of expediency, not as he had assumed to throw off the Roman yoke. Many Capuan nobles resisted the new alliance and there was a general disapointment that one master had been exchanged for another. The Italiote Greeks and the Latins, sometimes under the most tremendous pressure, stood with Rome and deprived Hannibal of the conclusion to his grand plan and by that I mean, his objective to dismantle the Roman confederacy. In fact, after Cannae Hannibal was promised massive support from the Carthaginian senate, but the less than comprehensive desertion of allies left very few options as to which point of disembarkment could be used for the promised resources.

 

Had it not been for the loyalty of those allies, the reduction of Rome would have been complete. Their forbearance allowed the Senate to address certain key issues such as relegating popular choice for merit such as ensuring the command of Marcellus and allowing the flexibility that gave rise to Africanus.

[sylla]

Perhaps after all that has been stated, what saved Rome was her unique system of conquest followed by assimilation. The Campanians and Sabellians that moved over to Hannibal, did so out of expediency, not as he had assumed to throw off the Roman yoke. Many Capuan nobles resisted the new alliance and there was a general disapointment that one master had been exchanged for another. The Italiote Greeks and the Latins, sometimes under the most tremendous pressure, stood with Rome and deprived Hannibal of the conclusion to his grand plan and by that I mean, his objective to dismantle the Roman confederacy. In fact, after Cannae Hannibal was promised massive support from the Carthaginian senate, but the less than comprehensive desertion of allies left very few options as to which point of disembarkment could be used for the promised resources.

 

Had it not been for the loyalty of those allies, the reduction of Rome would have been complete. Their forbearance allowed the Senate to address certain key issues such as relegating popular choice for merit such as ensuring the command of Marcellus and allowing the flexibility that gave rise to Africanus.

Indeed (or at least most of it).

For some years after Cannae, the Romans presumably fought in Italy far more against other Italians than the properly Punic army or even the Gauls; Punic War II became then to a large extent an internal civil conflict for the Roman side.

 

The defectors (mere individuals or entire cities) were for most purposes Roman secpnd-class citizens (socii).

These men bore Latin Nomen and Praenomen, and had fought side-by-side with the the properly Roman Legions for decades or centuries, using their same weapons, manipular organization and tactics; for example, the famous L. Bantius of Nola "had been discovered lying half-dead on a heap of bodies on the field of Cannae".

 

Some of them were even relatives of the Roman most noble families; for example, the Capuan senator Pacuvius Calavius, the leader of the party that brought that city under Punic rule, "had children by the daughter of Appius Claudius [then the praetor in Sicily, Consul 212] and had given his own daughter in marriage to M. Livius [Consul 219 & 207]".

 

Even more, the choice of the Punic versus the Roman side frequently resulted in local civil conflicts from the populace against the aristocracy, even if affinities varied; ie, in Capua and even Nola, the common people supported the Carthaginians, while in Locri the opposite was true.

 

The Italian defectors usually fought in their own independent units, and they frequently took their own initiative, sometimes even aside from the Punic command; for example, when the Locrians attacked Rhegium.

 

Most of the defectors were Campanians, Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians and some Apulians; as far as we know, all of the Latin cities remained loyal to Rome, but the same cannot be said about the western Greeks; their largest poleis, Tarentum and even Syracuse (after the death of Hyero) came both to the Punic side.

 

Virtually no city supported Hannibal north to the Garigliano river (more or less like the German line Gustav in 1943-1944), so further Gaulish help was hardly expected.

The Spanish Saguntum had required eight months of a costly siege for being taken, and even after Thrasymene, the Punic army was utterly unable to capture the mere Latin colony of Spoletum in Umbria; the siege of fortified cities was no easy task for the Punic army, which main weapon was its speed and mobility.

Therefore, Hannibal had little choice after Cannae but going south, where in addition to the Campanian resources, he could also take some strong bases and some excellent allied Legions from the Romans for his own army; ie. defeating Rome with its own weapons.

 

Unsurprisngly, the chief activities of the Punic army for the late 216 and 215 BC were the attack to the major Campanian ports (Neapolis and Cumae) and pushing northwards (ie, the way to Rome) via Nola.

In addition to the persistent loyalty of most of the Roman allies, Hannibal was eventually unable to accomplish such goals mostly due to the prudent use of the Fabian Strategy, and the outmost exponent of the latter was the usually impetuous Marcellus, who with presumably the equivalent of two legions or less was able to definitively stop at Nola the advance of the same army that had so utterly crushed the eight legions plus auxiliaries of Varro & Paullus just some months before.

 

Naturally, the loyalty of the Italian cities to Rome need not to be explained just by pure unconditional love; the fear from both the alien multinational Punic army and the expected Roman retribution, economic factors, internal rivalities and of course the Roman hostage system must all have played a role.

After all, Capua had to ignore the fate of their own 300 selected cavalrymen who were serving in Sicily by the time of their defection.

 

As far as I know, Capua and Hannibal never defected each other; for five full years, Capua was the Jewel of the Crown for Hannibal; his preferred camp was at Tifata, overlooking Capua; the Punic commander prevented more than once the Roman capture of this city; and when such capture finally happened, the Capuans fiercely fought up to the end, in spite of the systematic accusations from our sources of "luxury and extravagance".

 

The support of the Carthaginian suffetes and senate to Hannibal is hard to evaluate in the absence of Punic sources, because the Roman and Romanophile authors systematically tried to praise this commander (the personal opponent of the heroic Scipio) at the expense of his vilified nation; it seems Carthage gave or at least tried to give far more help than our sources pretend us to believe.

In any case, we know that Bomilcar was indeed able in 215 BC to arrive "at Locri with reinforcements of men and elephants and also with supplies". That's the reason why Hannibal, essentially deprived from elephants for Thrasymene and Cannae, was still able to use them against Marcellus.

 

Whatever you may understand as "popular choice", it was indeed relegated after Cannae; in fact, the fourth consulate of Fabius Cunctator (with Marcellus for 214 BC) was literally a coup d'

Edited September 14, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

Perhaps after all that has been stated, what saved Rome was her unique system of conquest followed by assimilation. The Campanians and Sabellians that moved over to Hannibal, did so out of expediency, not as he had assumed to throw off the Roman yoke. Many Capuan nobles resisted the new alliance and there was a general disapointment that one master had been exchanged for another. The Italiote Greeks and the Latins, sometimes under the most tremendous pressure, stood with Rome and deprived Hannibal of the conclusion to his grand plan and by that I mean, his objective to dismantle the Roman confederacy. In fact, after Cannae Hannibal was promised massive support from the Carthaginian senate, but the less than comprehensive desertion of allies left very few options as to which point of disembarkment could be used for the promised resources.

 

Had it not been for the loyalty of those allies, the reduction of Rome would have been complete. Their forbearance allowed the Senate to address certain key issues such as relegating popular choice for merit such as ensuring the command of Marcellus and allowing the flexibility that gave rise to Africanus.

 

 

Most of the defectors were Campanians, Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians and some Apulians; as far as we know, all of the Latin cities remained loyal to Rome, but the same cannot be said about the western Greeks; their largest poleis, Tarentum and even Syracuse (after the death of Hyero) came both to the Punic side.

 

Virtually no city supported Hannibal north to the Garigliano river (more or less like the German line Gustav in 1943-1944), so further Gaulish help was hardly expected.

The Spanish Saguntum had required eight months of a costly siege for being taken, and even after Thrasymene, the Punic army was utterly unable to capture the mere Latin colony of Spoletum in Umbria; the siege of fortified cities was no easy task for the Punic army, which main weapon was its speed and mobility.

Therefore, Hannibal had little choice after Cannae but going south, where in addition to the Campanian resources, he could also take some strong bases and some excellent allied Legions from the Romans for his own army; ie. defeating Rome with its own weapons.

 

Unsurprisngly, the chief activities of the Punic army for the late 216 and 215 BC were the attack to the major Campanian ports (Neapolis and Cumae) and pushing northwards (ie, the way to Rome) via Nola.

In addition to the persistent loyalty of most of the Roman allies, Hannibal was eventually unable to accomplish such goals mostly due to the prudent use of the Fabian Strategy, and the outmost exponent of the latter was the usually impetuous Marcellus, who with presumably the equivalent of two legions or less was able to definitively stop at Nola the advance of the same army that had so utterly crushed the eight legions plus auxiliaries of Varro & Paullus just some months before.

 

Naturally, the loyalty of the Italian cities to Rome need not to be explained just by pure unconditional love; the fear from both the alien multinational Punic army and the expected Roman retribution, economic factors, internal rivalities and of course the Roman hostage system must all have played a role.

After all, Capua had to ignore the fate of their own 300 selected cavalrymen who were serving in Sicily by the time of their defection.

 

As far as I know, Capua and Hannibal never defected each other; for five full years, Capua was the Jewel of the Crown for Hannibal; his preferred camp was at Tifata, overlooking Capua; the Punic commander prevented more than once the Roman capture of this city; and when such capture finally happened, the Capuans fiercely fought up to the end, in spite of the systematic accusations from our sources of "luxury and extravagance".

 

The support of the Carthaginian suffetes and senate to Hannibal is hard to evaluate in the absence of Punic sources, because the Roman and Romanophile authors systematically tried to praise this commander (the personal opponent of the heroic Scipio) at the expense of his vilified nation; it seems Carthage gave or at least tried to give far more help than our sources pretend us to believe.

In any case, we know that Bomilcar was indeed able in 215 BC to arrive "at Locri with reinforcements of men and elephants and also with supplies". That's the reason why Hannibal, essentially deprived from elephants for Thrasymene and Cannae, was still able to use them against Marcellus.

 

Whatever you may understand as "popular choice", it was indeed relegated after Cannae; in fact, the fourth consulate of Fabius Cunctator (with Marcellus for 214 BC) was literally a coup d'

Edited September 21, 2009 by marcus silanus

[sylla]

Just a point of order; according to Mommsen, Tarentum remained loyal throughout

Not in my copy of the III Book of his R Edited September 23, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

Just a point of order; according to Mommsen, Tarentum remained loyal throughout

Not in my copy of the III Book of his R

Edited September 23, 2009 by marcus silanus

[sylla]

I'll re-read the passage that I was refering to and make sure that I haven't been a bloody fool and mis-read. Before I do that, it was the piece referring to the immediate aftermath of Cannae.

That's exact and in total agreement with my original statement (post # 125 from this same thread); I defined both Syracuse and Tarentum as Roman defectors for Punic War II as a whole, not specifically at 216 BC; in Mommsen's words (3:5:608-609):

"...the south Italian Greeks adhered to the Roman alliance--a result to which the Roman garrisons no doubt contributed ... Thus the Campanian Greeks, particularly Neapolis, courageously withstood the attack of Hannibal in person: in Magna Graecia Rhegium, Thurii, Metapontum, and Tarentum did the same notwithstanding their very perilous position..."

 

Tarentum was in fact the port where Varro concentrated the remains of his army after Cannae (presumably like the equivalent of two legions) for being exchanged for the fresh legions from Sicily commanded by the praetor Valerius Laevinus, who additionally had "a fleet of twenty-five vessels ... for the protection of the coast between Brundisium and Tarentum" (Livy), not to talk of course about the Tarentine hostages already mentioned in my previous post.

 

Syracuse defected to the Punic side in 214 BC, Tarentum in 212 BC. Together with Capua, they were the greatest allies of Hannibal within the Roman territory until they were both utterly crushed by the Legions (Syracuse far worse than Tarentum).

Edited September 23, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

I'll re-read the passage that I was refering to and make sure that I haven't been a bloody fool and mis-read. Before I do that, it was the piece referring to the immediate aftermath of Cannae.

That's exact and in total agreement with my original statement (post # 125 from this same thread); I defined both Syracuse and Tarentum as Roman defectors for Punic War II as a whole, not specifically at 216 BC; in Mommsen's words (3:5:608-609):

"...the south Italian Greeks adhered to the Roman alliance--a result to which the Roman garrisons no doubt contributed ... Thus the Campanian Greeks, particularly Neapolis, courageously withstood the attack of Hannibal in person: in Magna Graecia Rhegium, Thurii, Metapontum, and Tarentum did the same notwithstanding their very perilous position..."

 

Tarentum was in fact the port where Varro concentrated the remains of his army after Cannae (presumably like the equivalent of two legions) for being exchanged for the fresh legions from Sicily commanded by the praetor Valerius Laevinus, who additionally had "a fleet of twenty-five vessels ... for the protection of the coast between Brundisium and Tarentum" (Livy), not to talk of course about the Tarentine hostages already mentioned in my previous post.

 

Syracuse defected to the Punic side in 214 BC, Tarentum in 212 BC. Together with Capua, they were the greatest allies of Hannibal within the Roman territory until they were both utterly crushed by the Legions (Syracuse far worse than Tarentum).

 

Thanks for that. That was exactly what I was looking at and apologies for not looking properly at the whole picture. I stand corrected.