Cannae and the Roman Republic

[marcus silanus]

Thanks for that; glad to change the subject.

...and the Senate was forced to give command to bold and capable generals by pressure from the people and also because so many of the aristocrats that may have expected political/military position had been killed...

Nope.

I'm not sure exactly who are you thinking about, but Africanus Major was as aristocrat as it can get, from the most successful noble family of the most successful Patrician Gens. The consuls and commanders after Cannae and even after Zama were from the same traditional noble families. Among the consuls for the first 30 years after Cannae, only two new men are attested, Laelius (Scipio's client) and Cato Censorius. In fact, the two new men from the beginnings of the Hannibalic War, Flamininius and Varro, faced the full responsibility for Trasimene and Cannae, respectively. The Sword of Rome was a Claudius (Marcellus), the Shield was a Fabius (Maximus) and both were veterans from long before Hannibal; the heroes of Metaurus were another Claudius (Nero) and a Livius (Salinator). Even Atilius Regulus (from the group defeated at Cannae) eventually became a Censor in 214 BC.

 

 

I am definitely not under the impression that the Roman aristocracy had been wiped out, of course not. However, the Hannibalic war did account for a large number of Senatorial casualties, not families obviously but individuals. Some of these were highly experienced and if that were not enough, conflict with the Gauls continued in the North, independent of the Carthaginian War that saw off, amongst others, L. Postumius Albinus as Praetor and the larger part of his army. He had been Consul twice and had already been elected to the position for the following year.

 

That the same families continued to dominate the magistracies is beyond question. However the casualties did present opportunities to a new generation who had reached adulthood during the the conflict. This was in a climate where the Senate itself, deprived of some of its elder statesmen and the auctoritas that they possessed had already demonstrated, at times, a less conservative and bolder approach. Perhaps a good example of this was Scipios appointment to command in Spain, following the death of his father and uncle, with full proconsular power at the age of twenty-six; a most unconventional decision.

 

The availability of experienced men of Senatorial rank had been depleted. Eighty Senators were killed at Cannae alone as were half of the military tribunes, perhaps many of whom might have been destined for high office. Commanders in the field had their offices prorogued as expediency to an extent displaced convention and that all leads to a situation that gives us the highly "professional" legions of the late third century onwards. The bitter experiences of this period, did force the Senate to change its outlook. Yes the same families appear time and time again, but the experience of the survivors of Cannae etc was more valued and contributed to the growing capabilities of the legions.

[sylla]

...Certainly the citizen militia became more and more proficient after Cannae as it learned from its errors, experienced veterans were re-enlisted and the Senate was forced to give command to bold and capable generals by pressure from the people and also because so many of the aristocrats that may have expected political/military position had been killed...

 

...I am definitely not under the impression that the Roman aristocracy had been wiped out, of course not. However, the Hannibalic war did account for a large number of Senatorial casualties, not families obviously but individuals. Some of these were highly experienced and if that were not enough, conflict with the Gauls continued in the North, independent of the Carthaginian War that saw off, amongst others, L. Postumius Albinus as Praetor and the larger part of his army. He had been Consul twice and had already been elected to the position for the following year.

 

That the same families continued to dominate the magistracies is beyond question. However the casualties did present opportunities to a new generation who had reached adulthood during the the conflict. This was in a climate where the Senate itself, deprived of some of its elder statesmen and the auctoritas that they possessed had already demonstrated, at times, a less conservative and bolder approach. Perhaps a good example of this was Scipios appointment to command in Spain, following the death of his father and uncle, with full proconsular power at the age of twenty-six; a most unconventional decision.

 

The availability of experienced men of Senatorial rank had been depleted. Eighty Senators were killed at Cannae alone as were half of the military tribunes, perhaps many of whom might have been destined for high office. Commanders in the field had their offices prorogued as expediency to an extent displaced convention and that all leads to a situation that gives us the highly "professional" legions of the late third century onwards. The bitter experiences of this period, did force the Senate to change its outlook. Yes the same families appear time and time again, but the experience of the survivors of Cannae etc was more valued and contributed to the growing capabilities of the legions.

If the general idea is that the massive onslaught of the Roman Army in the first years of Punic War II was a depuration of suboptimal elements and a chance for "experienced veterans", I don't think we may be able to find evidence to support that; in fact, the available evidence points in the opposite direction. As in most wars, the "experienced veterans" were the first who fell; they were massively massacred with those same senators and military tribunes. After Cannae, Rome was forced to recruit even slaves, hardly professional material.

 

I don't understand why do you insist in considering the legionaries and commanders that fell in Trebbia, Trasimene and Cannae as suboptimal military men; in the years previous to Punic War II, they had quite efficiently fought against the Illyrians of Teuta, Sardinians, Corsicans, Ligurians and especially the Gauls, notably the fearsome Boii and Insubres; the colossal battle of Telamon was not a picnic day by any measure (Polybius Book 2). In fact, some of those same Gauls eventually became the larger portion of Hannibal's army; it was the Insubrian Ducarius the one who killed the consul Flaminius in Trasimene.

 

It was in those same campaigns where Fabius Cunctator got his triumph and Marcellus his famous Spolia opima (the second in all Roman history after Romulus himself). If those soldiers were defeated by the Punic army, it was just because they were facing the selected troops of one of the best generals in all Universal History.

 

As far as I know, the selection of Roman commanders was made in essentially the same way before and after Cannae. Scipio Africanus Major was for many reasons an extraordinary case, including the evidently heavy bias in his favor from our available sources ; his story could hardly be considered as representative of the average cursus honorum for that period.

 

Finally, please remember that Hannibal lost the war in Italy long before Zama without having personally lost any single battle yet, a case more or less analogous to Napoleon in Russia in 1812, three years before Waterloo. Both Waterloo and Zama were just the Coup de Gr

Edited September 2, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

The Fabian Strategy was ineffective. If the idea was to avoid a confrontation and casualties, that achieved nothing. If the idea was to 'starve' Hannibals army as a force far from home and without direct support, that failed too. Hannibals campaign lasted eighteen years in which Rome's defense was trashed - only a poor strategic decision by Hannibal prevented utter Roman defeat - and reinforcements were on the way.

 

Hannibal wasn't neutralised - he lost the initiative, and that was not a Roman device.

[sylla]

The Fabian Strategy was ineffective. If the idea was to avoid a confrontation and casualties, that achieved nothing. If the idea was to 'starve' Hannibals army as a force far from home and without direct support, that failed too. Hannibals campaign lasted eighteen years in which Rome's defense was trashed - only a poor strategic decision by Hannibal prevented utter Roman defeat - and reinforcements were on the way.

 

Hannibal wasn't neutralised - he lost the initiative, and that was not a Roman device.

I really, really, really would love to check on any of your hidden evidence, at least for this last commentary.

 

Because as far as I can tell, it seems like simply unpolluted nonsense, from its first to its last word.

 

Thanks in advance.

Edited September 2, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

Unpolluted nonense? That's a little harsh Scylla. No, it isn't nonsense. Nor is it hidden. It's simply looking at the issue from first principles without all the baggage of conventional opinion.

 

Shall we try an analogy? Okay, sit comfiortably, we'll begin. Let's assume for the moment that you've just invaded these forums. That you're out to conquer this website. So how would I stop you? By folding my arms and waiting?

 

Fabian strategy was considered necessary by it's originator because he had nothing else to offer, no method of achieving a decisive victory against his invaders. Allowing Hannibal to trample over the Roman countryside for thirteen years did not bring him to his knees or force him to surrender. Despite a quick rearmament after Cannae (at least as far as they could), the four great defeats prior to that had taught the Romans theuy couldn't tackle Hannibal on the field of battle. Which incidentially makes me a little curious why you persist in regarding Rome as the masters of ancient warfare, but there you go. So what answer did they come to? They didn't. It's almost as if they just hoped Hannibal would get bored and go home, which he didn't.

 

The 2nd Punic War had therefore become a war of attrition on Roman soil. Hannibal received at least one major reinforcement and re-supply by sea, and another Carthaginian general was bringing fresh troops in through the north of Italy. Roman towns and cities had mutineed against Rome and sided with Hannibal, most notably places like Capua. It would seem then that the war of attrition was going Hannibals way. Perhaps not entirely, Hannibal had his own difficulties, but his failure to grasp the nettle after Cannae meant that Rome was not utterly defeated, but lingering on.

 

Which brings us to Scipio and his demand at sword point to the senate not to surrender. Clearly he'd lost patience with the prevarication of Roman leadership and wanted something done, especially in the face of public outcry against what was seen as some very dubious motives on the part of Roman senators. In other words, it was Scipio's grabbibng of the initiative that turned things around, not the will of the people nor the command of the Senate. Whereas Hannibal lost the initiaitve, Scipio regained it. In between, it was no more than weak leadership from a city state unable to make any decisive action to end the war in their favour.

 

You're welcome.

Edited September 3, 2009 by caldrail

[sylla]

Unpolluted nonense? That's a little harsh Scylla.

My sincere apology if you find it harsh, but as you can see here and all along this thread, it's just a factual description, not a value judgment.

Any argument is as strong as it sources; your argument simply lacks any source; period.

Please don't take it personal; it isn't.

No, it isn't nonsense. Nor is it hidden. It's simply looking at the issue from first principles without all the baggage of conventional opinion.

It's nonsense not only because your logical process is flawed at multiple points, but mainly because you're just explaining your own personal guesses, absolutely ignoring virtually all available evidence.

Your sources (actually I still can't even imagine which they may be) are still hidden; they are not mentioned in your last post, and in fact we can scarcely find a couple of instances when you actually even vaguely quoted any sources all along this long thread.

Neither first principles nor conventional opinion are nowhere to be found.

Shall we try an analogy? Okay, sit comfiortably, we'll begin. Let's assume for the moment that you've just invaded these forums. That you're out to conquer this website. So how would I stop you? By folding my arms and waiting?

We shall; comfortably sit, it's perfectly obvious that you have no idea on what on Earth the Fabian strategy may be; for that, even the Wkipeadia article should be more than enough.

Fabian strategy was considered necessary by it's originator because he had nothing else to offer, no method of achieving a decisive victory against his invaders. Allowing Hannibal to trample over the Roman countryside for thirteen years did not bring him to his knees or force him to surrender (???). Despite a quick rearmament after Cannae (at least as far as they could), the four great defeats prior to that had taught the Romans theuy couldn't tackle Hannibal on the field of battle... So what answer did they come to? They didn't. It's almost as if they just hoped Hannibal would get bored and go home, which he didn't (???).

 

The 2nd Punic War had therefore become a war of attrition on Roman soil(HINT: That is the Fabian strategy). Hannibal received at least one major reinforcement and re-supply by sea, and another Carthaginian general was bringing fresh troops in through the north of Italy. Roman towns and cities had mutineed against Rome and sided with Hannibal, most notably places like Capua. It would seem then that the war of attrition was going Hannibals way(???). Perhaps not entirely, Hannibal had his own difficulties, but his failure to grasp the nettle after Cannae meant that Rome was not utterly defeated, but lingering on.

Perhaps you should inform Polybius and Livy about your hidden sources, because the account of both of them (and Appian, and Dio ... and briefly, any available source) was entirely different from what you have already exposed.

OK, instead of imagined analogies, let's try some real life examples, shall we?

Please don't tell Mr. Washington the "first principles" of the Fabian strategy, because last time I checked, he was still trying to kick Lord Cornwallis' butt out from America with exactly that strategy.

Please don't tell Mr. Kutuzov, because he was still trying to kick Monsieur Napoleon's butt out from Russia with that same strategy.

Please don't tell Mr. Stalin, because he was still trying to kick Herr Hitler's butt out from Russia with (yes, right!) the Fabian strategy.

Uhhh, sorry... forget that; I have just updated my Databank.

Which brings us to Scipio and his demand at sword point to the senate not to surrender. Clearly he'd lost patience with the prevarication of Roman leadership and wanted something done, especially in the face of public outcry against what was seen as some very dubious motives on the part of Roman senators. In other words, it was Scipio's grabbibng of the initiative that turned things around, not the will of the people nor the command of the Senate. Whereas Hannibal lost the initiaitve, Scipio regained it. In between, it was no more than weak leadership from a city state unable to make any decisive action to end the war in their favour.

Please excuse me, but this is pure gold; wihich bring us to the fact that your "sword point" anecdote is simply unhistorical! Just pure unpolluted fantasy!!!

If by any chance you actually care on what Fabius, Scipio and the whole Senate stated on the effectiveness of the Fabian strategy in Punic War II, Livy's book 28 is a good place to begin with.

...Which incidentially makes me a little curious why you persist in regarding Rome as the masters of ancient warfare, but there you go...

Yesss! Incidentally, that's pure gold too.

You're welcome.

Honestly, I would have been more than grateful if you had actually shown us any of your hidden sources (my original request; do you remember?).

In any case, I should assume that such lack of cooperation was not due to any personal animosity, but just to the undeniable fact that such sources simply don't exist.

 

Now, a little comment on my own:

Contrary to diamonds, expert soldiers are not eternal...

Archaeological research let us know that the attrition rate for the Roman legionaries at the time was at least 5% annual. By any estimation, the attrition rate for Hannibal's army was far greater. In plain English, more than 95% of Hannibal's original veterans (Boii and Insubres included) had died out by the time the Punic army retreated from Italy.

Now consider that in spite of a couple of significant land reinforcements (not just one, as you suggested) and some minor naval contact, Hannibal's army remained essentially isolated in Italy for 17 years. Absolutely all our sources left that fact perfectly clear.

Another consistently verified fact in our available sources is that the vast majority of soldiers that Hannibal brought back from Italy to Zama were recent (and despised) Bruttian recruits...

 

Still confused? Crystal clear: the Fabian strategy not only defeated the selected Punic army of Hannibal; the Fabian strategy annihilated it.

Edited September 3, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

Thanks for that; glad to change the subject.

...and the Senate was forced to give command to bold and capable generals by pressure from the people and also because so many of the aristocrats that may have expected political/military position had been killed...

Nope.

I'm not sure exactly who are you thinking about, but Africanus Major was as aristocrat as it can get, from the most successful noble family of the most successful Patrician Gens. The consuls and commanders after Cannae and even after Zama were from the same traditional noble families. Among the consuls for the first 30 years after Cannae, only two new men are attested, Laelius (Scipio's client) and Cato Censorius. In fact, the two new men from the beginnings of the Hannibalic War, Flamininius and Varro, faced the full responsibility for Trasimene and Cannae, respectively. The Sword of Rome was a Claudius (Marcellus), the Shield was a Fabius (Maximus) and both were veterans from long before Hannibal; the heroes of Metaurus were another Claudius (Nero) and a Livius (Salinator). Even Atilius Regulus (from the group defeated at Cannae) eventually became a Censor in 214 BC.

 

 

I am definitely not under the impression that the Roman aristocracy had been wiped out, of course not. However, the Hannibalic war did account for a large number of Senatorial casualties, not families obviously but individuals. Some of these were highly experienced and if that were not enough, conflict with the Gauls continued in the North, independent of the Carthaginian War that saw off, amongst others, L. Postumius Albinus as Praetor and the larger part of his army. He had been Consul twice and had already been elected to the position for the following year.

 

That the same families continued to dominate the magistracies is beyond question. However the casualties did present opportunities to a new generation who had reached adulthood during the the conflict. This was in a climate where the Senate itself, deprived of some of its elder statesmen and the auctoritas that they possessed had already demonstrated, at times, a less conservative and bolder approach. Perhaps a good example of this was Scipios appointment to command in Spain, following the death of his father and uncle, with full proconsular power at the age of twenty-six; a most unconventional decision.

 

The availability of experienced men of Senatorial rank had been depleted. Eighty Senators were killed at Cannae alone as were half of the military tribunes, perhaps many of whom might have been destined for high office. Commanders in the field had their offices prorogued as expediency to an extent displaced convention and that all leads to a situation that gives us the highly "professional" legions of the late third century onwards. The bitter experiences of this period, did force the Senate to change its outlook. Yes the same families appear time and time again, but the experience of the survivors of Cannae etc was more valued and contributed to the growing capabilities of the legions.

 

To state my position in this debate, I have always actually been in broad agreement with you on the status of the pre-Marian legions. I don't think that there is anything in any of my comments so far that should give you a contrary impression. That is why I used the Rugby Union analogy whilst the debate was a bit fixed on the semantics of amateur and professional. This was, of course, until 1995 officially an amateur sport but played at the very highest 'professional' level. Meanwhile I take your point about payments to legionaries.

 

I think where we may differ, is that I see a variable level of proficiency within the Roman army as a whole that for me means that it couldn't have been continually optimum. Much of this may have been down to leadership, but the continued success of Roman arms over hundreds of years must invite a superlative description. The most successful of the ancient era can not be disputed.

[sylla]

To state my position in this debate, I have always actually been in broad agreement with you on the status of the pre-Marian legions. I don't think that there is anything in any of my comments so far that should give you a contrary impression. That is why I used the Rugby Union analogy whilst the debate was a bit fixed on the semantics of amateur and professional. This was, of course, until 1995 officially an amateur sport but played at the very highest 'professional' level. Meanwhile I take your point about payments to legionaries.

 

I think where we may differ, is that I see a variable level of proficiency within the Roman army as a whole that for me means that it couldn't have been continually optimum. Much of this may have been down to leadership, but the continued success of Roman arms over hundreds of years must invite a superlative description. The most successful of the ancient era can not be disputed.

We essentially agree.

The military proficiency of the Roman Republic, as any other system, obviously varied across time; however, please note that their impressive military record left little room for great quality fluctuations. This was especially noteworthy, given the nature of the Roman constitutional system; as Caldrail pointed, a far poorer performance would have been normally expected.

 

As Polybius duly noted, the checks and balances of the Republican constitution were developed to the extreme, to an almost paranoid degree. All their regular magistratures (military or civil) presented an always increasing collegiality, and most of them were constantly (annually) recycled. In fact, their Military Tribunes were democratically elected since 311 BC. Most countries and armies (ancient or modern) would find such system unbearable.

 

Just think that for a conflict as difficult and complex as the II Samnite War (late IV century BC) the Romans recycled their magistrates, officials and soldiers more than twenty times!

Just imagine how would it have been for the US to fight WWII with multiple presidents and commanders, while rotating with all their soldiers for each and every year!

 

The contributions of both brilliant and poor generals were then diluted. For example, the Dictator Fabius Cunctator applied with impressive success his eponymous Fabian strategy against Hannibal's army after Trasimene; such experience was immediately forgotten after the end of his six months, new consuls came ... and Cannae happened.

 

Therefore, the really amazing fact was not so much that the Romans frequently performed brilliantly against their enemies, but instead that the Romans never ever performed badly enough for losing absolutely any war.

 

Such unparalelled military record for so many centuries cannot be explained by the mere chance appearance of a chain of competent generals; a Cunctator and an Africanus now and then were clearly not enough.

For that unique overall performance, the permanent access to the best soldiers, the best officials and the best logistics system of their World and Era was not an option; it was an absolute requirement.

 

For the fulfillment of these requirements, an outstanding high-quality average personal military performance was absolutely indispensable.

Rome must have trusted that any of their soldiers (effectively meaning each and any Roman citizen) and any of their commanders (effectively meaning each and any Roman noble and some occasional new men) were at least up to the job.

Otherwise, the mixture of democratic and meritocratic elements present in their military personnel selection would have been fundamentally incompatible with their national military record.

Edited September 3, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

To state my position in this debate, I have always actually been in broad agreement with you on the status of the pre-Marian legions. I don't think that there is anything in any of my comments so far that should give you a contrary impression. That is why I used the Rugby Union analogy whilst the debate was a bit fixed on the semantics of amateur and professional. This was, of course, until 1995 officially an amateur sport but played at the very highest 'professional' level. Meanwhile I take your point about payments to legionaries.

 

I think where we may differ, is that I see a variable level of proficiency within the Roman army as a whole that for me means that it couldn't have been continually optimum. Much of this may have been down to leadership, but the continued success of Roman arms over hundreds of years must invite a superlative description. The most successful of the ancient era can not be disputed.

We essentially agree.

The military proficiency of the Roman Republic, as any other system, obviously varied across time; however, please note that their impressive military record left little room for great quality fluctuations. This was especially noteworthy, given the nature of the Roman constitutional system; as Caldrail pointed, a far poorer performance would have been normally expected.

 

As Polybius duly noted, the checks and balances of the Republican constitution were developed to the extreme, to an almost paranoid degree. All their regular magistratures (military or civil) presented an always increasing collegiality, and most of them were constantly (annually) recycled. In fact, their Military Tribunes were democratically elected since 311 BC. Most countries and armies (ancient or modern) would find such system unbearable.

 

Just think that for a conflict as difficult and complex as the II Samnite War (late IV century BC) the Romans recycled their magistrates, officials and soldiers more than twenty times!

Just imagine how would it have been for the US to fight WWII with multiple presidents and commanders, while rotating with all their soldiers for each and every year!

 

Then, the contribution of both brilliant and poor generals was both diluted. For example, the Dictator Fabius Cunctator applied with impressive success his eponymous Fabian strategy against Hannibal's army after Trasimene; such experience was immediately forgotten after the end of his six months, new consuls came ... and Cannae happened.

 

It is interesting also to note the effect that the annual change of magistrates effected the objectives of the individual concerned. There was by all accounts a desire to prevent the magistrates for the following year stepping in and stealing the glory due to the commander who had all but concluded a war towards the end of his period of office. Regulus, for example and understandably with his tail up after Adys and winning Tunis, saw an opportunity to impose terms on Carthage and conclude the war as the victor without having to incur further Roman losses. Had he been a little more conciliatory in the terms of surrender, he may have been responsible for the defeat of Carthage, thirteen years before the actual event.

 

Qunctius Flamininus, fifty-seven years later was given the Macedonian command, impressively at the age of only thirty. His reputation gained whilst fighting Hannibal is implied in Plutarch for this radical choice of the people. Once in situ, although he succeeded in detaching Philip from his alliance with the Achaean League, the war was heading for a negotiated settlement, much like that at the end of the First Macedonian War. He plainly wanted the reputation for concluding the war, but how that might be concluded depended on whether his command would be extended beyond 198 BCE. His friends in the Senate campaigned for his extension, against one Scipio Africanus who fancied a crack at Philip, but if they realised that this would not happen, then they would encourage a negotiated settlement, thereby ensuring that Famininus would be implementing the will of the SPQR.

 

The consuls were elected but unrest in Cisalpine Gaul was given their attention and Flamininus received letters confirming another year. So rather than being remembered as competent, the trials of Roman politics gave him the opportunity to defeat Macedon and gain great reputation amongst the Romans and initially the Greeks.

[caldrail]

No, it isn't nonsense. Nor is it hidden. It's simply looking at the issue from first principles without all the baggage of conventional opinion.

It's nonsense not only because your logical process is flawed at multiple points, but mainly because you're just explaining your own personal guesses....

What, like most historians do? Nothing wrong with my thinking process at all. I just don't agree with you, that's all, but then, why would I consider you the last word in Roman history?

 

Your sources (actually I still can't even imagine which they may be) are still hidden; they are not mentioned in your last post, and in fact we can scarcely find a couple of instances when you actually even vaguely quoted any sources all along this long thread.

 

Same sources as you more or less. Sorry, I just disagree with your interpretation. I come here to discuss Roman history, not to sit silently while Scylla lectures everybody. What's the point of an internet forum if you can't contribute? In any case it doesn;'t matter. You're just trying to browbeat me into silence for your own reasons. I suggest you cease and desist from that behaviour. Especially since you don't like quoting sources either. It's a lot of trouble to go to isn't it

 

We shall; comfortably sit, it's perfectly obvious that you have no idea on what on Earth the Fabian strategy may be; for that, even the Wkipeadia article should be more than enough....

 

From Wikipedia...

 

The Fabian strategy is a military strategy where pitched battles are avoided in favor of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition. While avoiding decisive battles, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy to cause attrition and loss of morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the weaker side believes time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised.

 

Scylla - that's exactly what I argued. I therefore submit that I do know what Fabian Strategy is and that you're doing nothing more than attempting to discredit my contribution.

 

Please excuse me, but this is pure gold; wihich bring us to the fact that your "sword point" anecdote is simply unhistorical! Just pure unpolluted fantasy!!!

 

On hearing that Lucius Caecilius Metellus and other politicians were at the point of surrender, Scipio gathered with his followers and stormed into the meeting, where at sword-point he forced all present to swear that they would continue in faithful service to Rome. Fortunately, the Roman Senate was of like mind and refused to entertain thoughts of peace despite the great losses Rome had taken in the war

Edited September 4, 2009 by caldrail

[sylla]

What, like most historians do?

Nope, like some amateurs (eg, you or me) tend to do. Historians back their theories and statements with evidence, and that's what we should at least try to do.

Nothing wrong with my thinking process at all. I just don't agree with you, that's all, but then, why would I consider you the last word in Roman history? ... Sorry, I just disagree with your interpretation. I come here to discuss Roman history, not to sit silently while Scylla lectures everybody. What's the point of an internet forum if you can't contribute? In any case it doesn;'t matter. You're just trying to browbeat me into silence for your own reasons. I suggest you cease and desist from that behaviour.

Fortunately, there's nothing like the "last word" in History.

Believe it not, I can't care less in browbeating anyone; I reserve macho displays for the Pub.

Your point is valid, and we can only hope that many more UNRV members were as little "silent" as you are; please don't desist of it.

However, just stubbornly repeating the same points without actually discussing them, ignoring all available evidence or, even worse, pretending to deny your own thinking process, is hardly going to contribute to this fora in any meningful way.

... Same sources as you more or less... Especially since you don't like quoting sources either. It's a lot of trouble to go to isn't it

Again, in this is not just another bad joke, I simply have no idea which thread have you been reading. Not even in this very post have you quoted any primary source.

Scylla - that's exactly what I argued. I therefore submit that I do know what Fabian Strategy is and that you're doing nothing more than attempting to discredit my contribution.

As I said, pretending to deny your own thinking process... Nobody can "discredit" your contributions; that's entirely up to you.

And if you check on your own previous post , you will verify (as anyone else) that your previous definition of the Fabian Strategy was ... "doing nothing" !; which BTW has nothing to do with this article of Wikipedia.

Please excuse me, but this is pure gold; wihich bring us to the fact that your "sword point" anecdote is simply unhistorical! Just pure unpolluted fantasy!!!

On hearing that Lucius Caecilius Metellus and other politicians were at the point of surrender, Scipio gathered with his followers and stormed into the meeting, where at sword-point he forced all present to swear that they would continue in faithful service to Rome. Fortunately, the Roman Senate was of like mind and refused to entertain thoughts of peace despite the great losses Rome had taken in the war

Edited September 5, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

In Florus' words:

"The first hope of the Empire, as it began to recover and, so to speak, return to life, was Fabius, who devised a new method of defeating Hannibal

Edited September 5, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

Sorry, but it looks as if I'm going to have to repeat a point or two. Roman legions of the Pre-Marian Republican era were simply not permanent institutions. They were supposed to be raised annually for the campaigning season (armies generally didn't go to war over winter though there were always exceptions). This is well attested to by various sources, please check out works by Adrian Goldsworthy or Peter Connolly, or perhaps one of the Osprey series if you need a precis. Ooops... I've clicked my fingers... Sorry about that.

 

Secondly, whilst we are blessed with Roman sources, it is noticeable that the literary quality can be fanciful at times. Cassius Dio in particular liked to relate speeches that couldn't possibly be memorised and put to parchment later. Did Livy and Polybius really know the motives of Fabius at every stage? I seriously doubt it. We are talking about a culture who gloried in war, even in their earlier stages, the Romans were always a martial society. It stands to reason then in relating the story of Fabius, they write about him in a favourable light.

 

"At first, it is true, he (Fabius) was despised for this, and gave people occasion to say that he was playing the coward and was in deadly fear of an engagement, but as time went on, he forced everyone to confess and acknowledge that it was impossible for anyone to deal with the present situation in more sensible and prudent manner. Very soon indeed facts testified to the wisdom of his conduct, and this was no wonder." (Polybius)

 

This was after all written by the man you described as a supremacist. But isn't this pretty much what I said? The Romans had no answer to Hannibals War. They had lost four battles severely and weren't willing to confront him in that manner again. Fabius was playing for time, not annihilating the enemy. Polybius has merely rationalised what was an unadventurous policy designed to minimise the damage rather than sweep it away. If Fabius was such a success, why was it necessary for Scipio to force the issue? Hannibal wasn't going away, part of the senate at least were considering surrender, a portion of Roman territory had sided with the invader, and the war was lingering on at no benefit to the Romans. Of course the Senate slapped themselves on the back and said the Fabian Strategy was the key to success - politicians always back the winning side after the event. Praise for Fabius was an indication of his political acceptance rather than any real military ability. The fact remains that Fabius didn't win the war. Hannibal lost it.

 

Fabius may have been correct in address to the senate in that he had cornered Hannibals army in one place. Fair enough. But then again, Fabius had a vested interest in reporting something positive. All Roman generals were politicians in this era, not career officers. If fabius had gone in their and shame-facedly announced he hadn't won, what was that going to do for his reputation? In short, Fabius exaggerated the success of his actions - I don't doubt Hannibal was having a hard time, invasions are not easy to sustain over long periods even in the modern day - and he could get away with that because events turned away from Italy. Granted, Hannibal may have been less able to deal with the situation than he had, but that doesn't justify a victory. Polybius was writing in such a way to accentuate the importance of Fabius, whio was very typically cautious as the Romans preferred their commanders to be.

 

lastly, Hannibal had lost the initiative after Cannae, at the very time he had the greatest opportunity. Like so many ancient commanders, Hannibal was a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy.

[sylla]

Sorry, but it looks as if I'm going to have to repeat a point or two. Roman legions of the Pre-Marian Republican era were simply not permanent institutions. They were supposed to be raised annually for the campaigning season (armies generally didn't go to war over winter though there were always exceptions). This is well attested to by various sources, please check out works by Adrian Goldsworthy or Peter Connolly, or perhaps one of the Osprey series if you need a precis. Ooops... I've clicked my fingers... Sorry about that.

Why "sorry"? You have been repeating the same bare assertions all across this thread, without any single explicit quotation of any classical source.

If by "clicking the fingers" you do mean asking me to share our sources... be my guest!!!

Goldsworthy, Connolly and Mr. "Osprey series" know perfectly well that any statement is as good as its source; if you might post the specific passage that you require from those tertiary authors, and if you might also point the primary classical sources for such quotations, your previous comments may eventually make any sense (I mean, if that is not too much "clicking the fingers" for you!)

BTW, please repeat all those years when the Roman Republic lacked this not permanent institutions (if your sources are not too hidden, of course) The answer is no mistery; the citizen army was permanent, even if each individual legion lasted only one year.

Secondly, whilst we are blessed with Roman sources, it is noticeable that the literary quality can be fanciful at times. Cassius Dio in particular liked to relate speeches that couldn't possibly be memorised and put to parchment later. Did Livy and Polybius really know the motives of Fabius at every stage? I seriously doubt it. We are talking about a culture who gloried in war, even in their earlier stages, the Romans were always a martial society. It stands to reason then in relating the story of Fabius, they write about him in a favourable light.

A nice Red Herring, if I have ever read one.

And also a fancy explanation on why you don't like (or are able to) use the blessings of our classical sources after just 2456 posts at UNRV.

I'm sure you trust your hidden sources knew better than Livy and Polybius; that may help explain your last bare assertions.

"At first, it is true, he (Fabius) was despised for this, and gave people occasion to say that he was playing the coward and was in deadly fear of an engagement, but as time went on, he forced everyone to confess and acknowledge that it was impossible for anyone to deal with the present situation in more sensible and prudent manner. Very soon indeed facts testified to the wisdom of his conduct, and this was no wonder." (Polybius)

This was after all written by the man you described as a supremacist. But isn't this pretty much what I said? The Romans had no answer to Hannibals War. They had lost four battles severely and weren't willing to confront him in that manner again. Fabius was playing for time, not annihilating the enemy. Polybius has merely rationalised what was an unadventurous policy designed to minimise the damage rather than sweep it away. If Fabius was such a success, why was it necessary for Scipio to force the issue? Hannibal wasn't going away, part of the senate at least were considering surrender, a portion of Roman territory had sided with the invader, and the war was lingering on at no benefit to the Romans. Of course the Senate slapped themselves on the back and said the Fabian Strategy was the key to success - politicians always back the winning side after the event. Praise for Fabius was an indication of his political acceptance rather than any real military ability. The fact remains that Fabius didn't win the war. Hannibal lost it.

Yes, we all would prefer your bare assertions over our primary sources any day...

It's a little depressing to corroborate that just posting some thousands times doesn't teach any critical analysis by itself; sadly, for that you have to actually read the text with care.

And just for the record; what part of his obvious supremacist agenda prevented Polybius from being the best Historian of his Era?

Fabius may have been correct in address to the senate in that he had cornered Hannibals army in one place. Fair enough. But then again, Fabius had a vested interest in reporting something positive. All Roman generals were politicians in this era, not career officers. If fabius had gone in their and shame-facedly announced he hadn't won, what was that going to do for his reputation? In short, Fabius exaggerated the success of his actions - I don't doubt Hannibal was having a hard time, invasions are not easy to sustain over long periods even in the modern day - and he could get away with that because events turned away from Italy. Granted, Hannibal may have been less able to deal with the situation than he had, but that doesn't justify a victory. Polybius was writing in such a way to accentuate the importance of Fabius, whio was very typically cautious as the Romans preferred their commanders to be.

You won't believe it, but all those reports on the extraordinary success of the Fabian Strategy (and not necessarily Cunctator per se) came not from Fabius but from absolutely all available sources (maybe even from your hidden ones!); to verify this, all you have to do is to read again my last post, this time carefully.

As anyone can see (maybe even you) after all this time you still have not the slightest idea of what on Earth the Fabian Strategy may have been (You haven't asked Mr. Washington, have you?). For that, all you need (yes, you knew it!) is to read again my last post, this time carefully.

Like so many ancient commanders, Hannibal was a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy.

I'm sure next time any of us have a strategy question, we will check on you and not poor old Hannibal.

Your last statement is not only absurd, but also a nice oxymoron (sorry, you will have to use your own dictionary).

 

 

Now, let us get a little more serious, shall we?

It is interesting also to note the effect that the annual change of magistrates effected the objectives of the individual concerned. There was by all accounts a desire to prevent the magistrates for the following year stepping in and stealing the glory due to the commander who had all but concluded a war towards the end of his period of office.

The advance of their own personal agenda instead or even at the expense of the Republican better health was indeed noteworthy, but it was the norm, not the exception, even at the Roman worst hour across Punic War II; the really amazing facts were that:

- it didn't seem to have interfered too much with the Roman World conquest;

- our sources didn't seem to care too much about it.

IRegulus, for example and understandably with his tail up after Adys and winning Tunis, saw an opportunity to impose terms on Carthage and conclude the war as the victor without having to incur further Roman losses. Had he been a little more conciliatory in the terms of surrender, he may have been responsible for the defeat of Carthage, thirteen years before the actual event.

Qunctius Flamininus, fifty-seven years later was given the Macedonian command, impressively at the age of only thirty. His reputation gained whilst fighting Hannibal is implied in Plutarch for this radical choice of the people. Once in situ, although he succeeded in detaching Philip from his alliance with the Achaean League, the war was heading for a negotiated settlement, much like that at the end of the First Macedonian War. He plainly wanted the reputation for concluding the war, but how that might be concluded depended on whether his command would be extended beyond 198 BCE. His friends in the Senate campaigned for his extension, against one Scipio Africanus who fancied a crack at Philip, but if they realised that this would not happen, then they would encourage a negotiated settlement, thereby ensuring that Famininus would be implementing the will of the SPQR.

The consuls were elected but unrest in Cisalpine Gaul was given their attention and Flamininus received letters confirming another year. So rather than being remembered as competent, the trials of Roman politics gave him the opportunity to defeat Macedon and gain great reputation amongst the Romans and initially the Greeks.

Regulus' story is evidently extremely morally edited (and therefore, unreliable), even to the level of modern Christian hagiography.

Flamininus' early age is a good evidence of the extreme attrition of the Roman nobility after Punic War II that you were talking about.

As previously stated, we have pretty nice examples from the very Hannibalic War; the most aristocratic families, like the Scipio and the Fabii, were still unshamefully advancing their own offspring.

If we should trust Livy, the struggle of the orders was still surprisingly active; just check on the experience of Flaminius and Varro.

MC Marcellus, the Sword of Rome himself, was once prevented from becoming consul just for being a plebeian!

Fabius Cunctator repeatedly tried to obstruct Africanus' advance; conversely, Scipio Africanus Major himself openly admitted that he was delaying his final battle against Hannibal just for his own chance of conquering Africa!

Finally, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, then the elected patrician consul, reportedly tried to delay the peace negotiations with Carthage, just for stealing the imminent triumph celebration from Scipio!

 

The main lesson for us is that, in spite of the unavoidable interference of such petty personal political considerations, the pre-Marian citizen army was still a military machine perfect enough for conquering the World without any single lost war across so many centuries.

 

From more than a hundred posts ago:

2. Roman legions had far superior training in comparison to Carthaginian merceneries.

The only problem for this statement was just with the "mercenaries" depiction, which under any strict definition the vast majority of the Punic soldiers clearly were not; the training comparison of Anakin was entirely precise,and it would have been so too against absolutely any other contemporary army, either citizen (eg, the Achaean and Aetolian leagues), "militia" (eg, Boii and Insubrian troops), "professional" (eg. the Hellenistic kingdoms) or even truly mercenary (eg, the Cretan archers and the Rhodian slingers). Edited September 6, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

Like so many ancient commanders, Hannibal was a brillant commander on the battlefield but not so impressive in strategy.

I'm sure next time any of us have a strategy question, we will check on you and not poor old Hannibal.

Your last statement is not only absurd, but also a nice oxymoron (sorry, you will have to use your own dictionary).

 

To be fair, the notion that Hannibal was a brilliant tactician and less than brilliant strategist is not new, unusual or at all oxymoronic. To hear the misuse of the term strategy, you only have to watch any episode of "The Apprentice" or listen to any business wanabee! There is no doubt that Hannibal was a brilliant battlefield tactician, but strategy is about ultimate objectives.

 

Warfare is roughly split into three components. The strategic level is that of the objectives set out by the policy underlying the conflict. Following the definition of strategic objectives, the operational level plans the campaigns to reach the strategic objective. Finally, the tactical level concerns the planning and conduct of the actual fighting. For example, in my business, I may set a strategic target of a certain turnover and margin and plan new media to reach certain markets to achieve that objective. On a tactical level, that concerns the way the sales people approach the prospects, how much money is quoted etc.

 

Hannibal absolutely knew how to make the best use of his resources on the battlefield; he was a great tactician. At the strategic level there is more doubt. The consensus is that he did not aim to obliterate Rome, but to reduce her to a regional power. There is further doubt as to whether his supply line could have supported a long seige of the city had his objective been total conquest. This brings us to the widely attested opinion of Marhabal.

 

He clearly believed that the victory at Cannae should have been followed up with a march on Rome, but as we all know, Hannibal hesitated. He may have believed that total victory would have involved a long seige in which case we should understand the hesitation, however the opinion of Marhabal is well known:-

 

"Truly the gods do not give everything to the same man: you know how to win a victory (tactics), Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one (strategy)."

 

There are numerous arguments as to whether Hannibal was being understandably cautious or less than astute strategically. However, even if he decided to not move on Rome at her nadir for very good reasons, his ultimate defeat must call into question his strategic sense. If he was ill prepared for a siege, then his operational abilities should be scrutinized and there is the possibility that at this stage he fully expected Rome to give up any further opposition and reach settlement in line with his expectations.