Cannae and the Roman Republic

[caldrail]

In general terms, you have essentially reversed the facts, mostly by an obvious false dilemma fallacy; the implication that the ancient soldiers and their officials were either "professional" or "amateur".

All armies are either 'professional' or 'amateur', their ability might be implied but is more often to do with leadership, motivation, and more importantly, experience. Some amateur formations are highly motivated and capable, others derisably hopeless. The same is true of otherwise professional groups. Professional is this context simply means a permanent career establishment, not necessarily the standard they worked to.

 

If you want to discuss facts, the essential point is this - Roman generals were political appointees, not career officers. Now whilst many had previous experience of command in junior roles, that merely ensured they had some idea of procedure. Generals were not chosen for military ability, but because their face fitted, or because they had no choice left but to select a certain individual however disagreeable it was to senatorial sensibilities.

 

Secondly, during the Punic Wars, the Romans were a militia. They had no standing professional army as they did later and inevitably that means that many of the procedural matters that we take for granted in the modern day such as training were not consistent or indeed evident. A man with a sword was a man with a sword, and the attitude that a man fighting for his home was a better man than a barbarian seeking to capture it isn't necessarily true and typical of leadership methods of the time. I'm curious to know where your evidence is. If it's Vegetius, we can dismiss that as a catalogue of anecdotes. If it's Polybius, surely a supremacist would proudly exaggerate his nations legions?

 

More to the point, Polybius wrote his account of the legions of his day around 150BC, shortly before Carthage was finished off. At that time, the experience gathered in the previous conflicts was current and available. So in a sense, even if Polybius is accurate in his estimations, he was describing the legions during a period when they were benefitting from the experience of campaigning. One essential point of warfare which is true of all periods is that armies often march to war assuming they'll be back within a short time (these days the phrase is 'Home by Christmas'), reflecting a naivety about what they're undertaking. Hannibals mercenaries were under no such illusions. Many were veterans of the Spanish campaigns, others blooded warriors seeking another war to fight (even in the modern day, experienced soldiers often prefer to continue their trade after leaving the services), and noticeably the majority stayed with HAnnibal during the privations of the crossing of the Alps.

 

We have plenty of evidence that the regular Caius Proletarius was subject to an intensive training across his 20 or more years of compulsory military service, and that the Roman noble elite performed a permanent Darwinian competition for the highest administrative and military positions, which in the Republican Rome were of course both the same (ie, the Consuls or equivalent).

Not during the Punic Wars Scylla. The army went home after the fight and citizens wouldn't ordinarily expect to serve for twenty years. Then again, if it took twenty years to impart training, one suspects it was rubbish to begin with. It's a fallacy to see the Roman legions of this era as a superbly trained elite corps. They simply weren't. Your evidence says very much the reverse. They were often lax, poorly trained, badly motivated, and hurriedly raised. Indeed, the reputation of later legions is exaggerated too. Sure they had successes and some legions were better than others, but really all you're trying to is perpetuate the myth of Roman invincibility. You like the legend.

 

The Republican political and military strategy was indeed uniformity; any Roman noble (and some outstanding new men) could be selected for the supreme positions,

In theory. However, a closed shop like the Senate weren't likely to back any old bod for the job. It was all about who you knew and a great deal of backscratching. In general, the outstanding new men were excluded at first because their potential ability was threatening to the old order of things. The Romans didn't want self made men returning with ideas in their head.

 

Besides, the Roman army was as permanent as it could get,

Firstly, the Romans had no national army at this time. Secondly, a legion, or levy of troops, was never intended to be permanent at all. The whole point was to fight whatever battle was needed and go home. The Romans didn't want a permanent army because they knew full well it was politically dangerous and contrary to their societal model constructed after Tarquinus was ousted, but it was the changing political situation on the larger scale that encouraged Marius to create legions as permanent military corps fifty years after Carthage had gone, not to mention a good deal of expedience and personal experience.

[sylla]

If you want to discuss facts, the essential point is this - Roman generals were political appointees, not career officers. Now whilst many had previous experience of command in junior roles, that merely ensured they had some idea of procedure. Generals were not chosen for military ability, but because their face fitted, or because they had no choice left but to select a certain individual however disagreeable it was to senatorial sensibilities.

Facts? OK; the Roman Republic never lost any war, simply because they had the best soldiers and the best officials; their high-quality uniformity was for real and their system worked for centuries of never-ending war.

Insisting in calling that "amateur" can't be any more absurd.

[marcus silanus]

It is actually quite straight forward to deal with the semantics of amateur/professional. Amateur is derived from French/Italian meaning lover and the definition that follows is one who engages in a pursuit for love and not for pay. It has also come to mean inept, but the two definitions can be easily distinguished by the intent in their use. All Rugby Union players prior to 1995 were amateurs in the context of their terms of playing the game. However, I am pretty sure that if the word had been used as a slight against the likes of Will Carling, he may well have taken issue.

 

Prior to the Marian reforms, the legions were by the first definition amateur although there was sometimes the prospect of booty and material reward. The intensity of the Hannibalic War forced the citizen militia to remain under arms to the great extent that their farms were ruined and, in time, we see the great problems of the latifundia and eventually, the land reform proposals of the Gracchi. This, I would think, would constitute a standing army in practice if not in the sense of a professional body, paid by the state.

 

After a certain point, the legions were precluded from acting as expedient and ad hoc militia, that point being the second Punic War. Veterans were re-enlisted and their hard won expertise highly valued in the growing conflicts with Macedon that followed.

[sylla]

It is actually quite straight forward to deal with the semantics of amateur/professional. Amateur is derived from French/Italian meaning lover and the definition that follows is one who engages in a pursuit for love and not for pay. It has also come to mean inept, but the two definitions can be easily distinguished by the intent in their use. All Rugby Union players prior to 1995 were amateurs in the context of their terms of playing the game. However, I am pretty sure that if the word had been used as a slight against the likes of Will Carling, he may well have taken issue.

 

Prior to the Marian reforms, the legions were by the first definition amateur although there was sometimes the prospect of booty and material reward. The intensity of the Hannibalic War forced the citizen militia to remain under arms to the great extent that their farms were ruined and, in time, we see the great problems of the latifundia and eventually, the land reform proposals of the Gracchi. This, I would think, would constitute a standing army in practice if not in the sense of a professional body, paid by the state.

 

After a certain point, the legions were precluded from acting as expedient and ad hoc militia, that point being the second Punic War. Veterans were re-enlisted and their hard won expertise highly valued in the growing conflicts with Macedon that followed.

You know, the ghost of poor old Polybius must be revolting wherever he is.

This fallacy is called a false dilemma for a reason: the "amateur"/"professional" dichotomy just didn't apply; period.

This was war, not Rugby.

 

If for the sake of the argument we imagine that the Pre-Marian legionaries were farming their land and fighting the war in alternate dates, the soldiers of most city-states (eg, Themistocles or Miltiades) must then be considered "amateurs" too; not to mention Genghis Khan troops or the Sioux of Sitting Bull... even if of course, not a single one of such soldiers was fighting "as a pastime"; they were there not just for "love", but for duty.

And if we still had any doubt about it, Polybius made this point painfully clear (6, 36-37).

 

Amazing as it may sound (and the same as in V century BC Athens, for example) the Roman citizen soldiers were payed for their service, even when stationed at home; just check once again on good old Polybius (6, 39, 12-14):

 

"As pay the foot-soldier receives two obols a day, a centurion twice as much, and a cavalry-soldier a drachma.

The allowance of corn to a foot-soldier is about two-thirds of an Attic medimnus a month, a cavalry-soldier receives seven medimni of barley and two of wheat.

Of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry one and one-third medimnus of wheat and five of barley, these rations being a free gift to the allies"...

 

...obviously with or without booty (but of course, Roman soldiers were always expecting booty; we have plenty of evidence about that).

 

Even without such evidence, the most elementary common sense tell us that the Roman, Greek, Mongol and Sioux soldiers had to be cared for by their respective states whenever they were in campaign; no regular soldier can be expected to fight on a half-time basis.

 

Naturally, that was because war has never ever been a hobby or free-time activity anywhere; and even if the Romans had oddly thought otherwise, it would have been physically impossible for their soldiers to farm their own lands whenever they were just some miles from home, even within Italy itself; ie. in Lucania, the Po valley or even Umbria (not to mention serving in the cavalry or the navy).

 

Enough on why "amateur" is an absurd term for the legionaries; regarding "professional", if you use it as "expert", the Roman soldiers and officials were the paramount military experts of their era, looong before the Marian Reforms; I sincerily hope we need no more evidence on this issue.

 

It is just in its elitist acceptation where this term didn't apply; previous to the Marian reforms, essentially all Roman citizens were expert warriors (and expert farmers too, BTW).

In modern terms, it would be as if all the citizens of a country would have studied (and excelled in) the same profession (eg, as a country with 100% of expert lawyers... and the best expert lawyers ever, we may add).

 

Relative to their predecessors, the Marian Mules and later legionaries were considered

Edited August 30, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

the Roman soldiers and officials were the paramount military experts of their era, looong before the Marian Reforms; I sincerily hope we need no more evidence on this issue.

 

Some evidence would be nice - you haven't provided any. But don't bother. I doubt many of us are interested in a debate over the meanings of the English language. The issue of how you see professional and amateur status isn't supposed to be rigidly defined - it's a loose description based on context and I'm sure if you ask most people understand perfectly well what was meant.

 

But were the Romans paramount military experts? Many people like to think so. The enduring image of a well honed military machine stirs something in our psyche, though I suspect it's little more than a romantic notion.

 

Troops at the time of Cannae were militia. That means citizens called to the field. What does it mean to be a citizen? In our modern view, rights and privileges are the first things that spring to mind. However, the Romans were keen to stress honour and obligation, particularly with regard to military duties. A citizen wasn't merely a member of the population who had a certain status, he was also expected to perform for the defence of those privileges.

 

In the modern world, we see civilians called up for war and and trained as soldiers, some having never even seen military firearms before, let alone handled them (the availability of modern media means the current generation is a little more clued up to begin with). In the Roman world, violence is more prevalent in ordinary life. Swords are commonplace. Since the Romans had no real division between civilian and soldier during the Punic Wars (apart from actually serving) the question of swordplay comes readily to mind.

 

Immediately we think of training. We know the later permanent legions established a persistent standard. That did take time to develop however, as the accounts of Roman attempts to quell a rebellion by escaped gladiators show that at first they were panicked by a suprise night time raid on their camp and simply ran off, or in the second case a legion described as unfit for battle. That was thirty years or so after the Reforms of Marius and Pompey felt obliged to decimate his troops to motivate them sufficiently.

 

We do know that Scipio introduced retraining for his experienced men in 209BC, seven years after Cannae. This has been suggested as evidence of a wider programme, but I suspect not. The argument is simple. Scipio was bringing his veterans up to speed. The description of the training accentuates 'practice', not 'instruction'. Why would veterans need swordplay lessons? They already had expeience of combatand simply needed honing to a fine edge.

 

But what of the hastatii, the front rank of newbies recently called to serve? It is generally assumedthat they received training to make them effective soldiers. Certainly they must have been drilled to a degree or their ability to hold formation would have been lousy. To what extent though would te commander hve attempted to make them capable soldiers? He already had those, the trarii, and it was Roman practice to keep these veterans in the third rank to preserve them as much as possible.

 

Inherent in that idea is the concept that the front rank were considered expendable. These were men called up, with little experience or ability at warfare, and only by survival would they progress to the back ranks. It is well known that the Romans were willing to sustain heavy casualties to achieve their objectives and to some extent the front rank must have been viewed as cannon-fodder. Would a commander invest a great deal of time in training these men to fight well?

 

Our modern hindsight immediately screams yes. Of course. But that ignores a fundamental difference between us and the Romans. We consider an infantryman an equal of another, and experience in units is a useful commodity but individuals are not segregated according to this quality. The Romans did. It was part of their legionary organisation to seperate men who had or hadn't experience of battle, and to use them accordingly.

 

Logically then a Roman commander has littl incentive to teach recruits the finer points of swordplay. Many of them had handled swords before, even if not in battle, and at its heart the act of thrusting a sword is not a matter of skill. Of course, doing so well most definitely is, but since the front rank were destined to bear the brunt of combat, to serve as a buffer between the enemy and the Roman veterans, a high degree of excellence was not required, nor was it realistic to attain without actual experience. This was the way Romans trained their troops in the manipular system - enough tuition to get them started - then hard lessons in the field. They learned by bitter experience.

 

Since their commanders had been politcally appointed there was no guarantee an individual genmeral was any good at all. He had, after all, got the job through popularity at the polls. Now it is true that such individuals would make claims about their military prowess, such was the importance of military achievement right from the earliest days of the Republic, but importantly the Romans believed such capability was inherited. A son would be a chip off the old block s it were, and to have famous war heroes in their ancestory guaranteed a certain level of respect even if the actual talent of the individual amounted to zero.

 

Were the Romans of c.200BC the paramount military experts of their era? Of course not. They weren't sufficiently coherent or persistent as a military force to achieve that accolade. Hannibal knew full well how lousy they could be, and his operational tactics revolved around exploiting the Roman weaknesses which he did effectively on four occaisions.

 

What the Romans did have however was a communal spirit - one reason whytheir militia system persisted - and a large enough empire to replace casualties however strained that capacity became. Further, they were lucky enough to find a commander, or rather, have a commander who found his voice and demanded the Senate maintain action against Carthage. Would the Romans have survived had not Scipio taken the war to Africa, motivating his troops with leadership and a sense of readiness?

 

[sylla]

the Roman soldiers and officials were the paramount military experts of their era, looong before the Marian Reforms; I sincerily hope we need no more evidence on this issue.

 

Some evidence would be nice - you haven't provided any. But don't bother. I doubt many of us are interested in a debate over the meanings of the English language. The issue of how you see professional and amateur status isn't supposed to be rigidly defined - it's a loose description based on context and I'm sure if you ask most people understand perfectly well what was meant.

Regarding the English language, I must agree; some people just don't care.

 

Regarding evidence, if this is not a bad joke, you really need to read the last posts again, this time carefully.

 

Briefly and slowly, the main evidence for the Roman Republic military expertise was that they won absolutely all their wars across several centuries and conquered their known World.

 

Please explain us how was all that possible by any big coincidence.

[caldrail]

Evidence? Snapping your fingers and telling everyone to go and read polybius book six isn't really presenting any - it's also rather arrogant to assume that everyone else will see the prose in the same light as yourself.

 

As regards conquering the known world - that wasn't done by military might alone and neither was it done as a blitzkrieg campaign. It was a series of diplomatic moves and little wars (and a few larger conflicts it must be said), and in particular, the defeat of it's largest rival opened the way. Balance of power is an important quality in politics - I would have thought the last century had made that clear.

 

There's plenty of factors involved in their success - but excellence alone? Thats a misconception, albeit a popular and romantic one. They were a society that believed in itself and as history shows, that counts for a great deal.

[sylla]

Evidence? Snapping your fingers and telling everyone to go and read polybius book six isn't really presenting any - it's also rather arrogant to assume that everyone else will see the prose in the same light as yourself.

See? Your previous post was not only a bad joke.

It's indeed already evident that snapping my fingers will not make you read the evidence before commenting it.

Would it be too arrogant to assume that one day we may be lucky enough for you to share your hidden evidence with us?

 

As regards conquering the known world - that wasn't done by military might alone and neither was it done as a blitzkrieg campaign. It was a series of diplomatic moves and little wars (and a few larger conflicts it must be said), and in particular, the defeat of it's largest rival opened the way. Balance of power is an important quality in politics - I would have thought the last century had made that clear.

 

There's plenty of factors involved in their success - but excellence alone? Thats a misconception, albeit a popular and romantic one. They were a society that believed in itself and as history shows, that counts for a great deal.

Your little irrelevant exposition is a rather tortuous way to admit that even you can't deny the "unprofessional" (sorry: "amateur") Republican Romans were the best soldiers of their time; you're already making some progress.

 

BTW: romantic again? Oh yes, I forgot; it's Caldrail dialect, not English. We can't take it literally.

 

 

PS: Admins, even if I am as eager as the next guy for sharing testosterone displays, this may be a good time to close this thread, or at least send it to the Arena.

Edited August 31, 2009 by sylla

[marcus silanus]

This thread does seem to have entered a period of trench warfare and someone needs to invent our equivalent of the tank to move it on. I genuinely feel that you have both made many valid points and are disagreeing so vehemently on the finer detail of how proficient the legions were or not as the case may be.

 

It is clear that Rome prevailed and that must be in some large part due to its military system. Certainly the citizen militia became more and more proficient after Cannae as it learned from its errors, experienced veterans were re-enlisted and the Senate was forced to give command to bold and capable generals by pressure from the people and also because so many of the aristocrats that may have expected political/military position had been killed.

 

Sylla has not said that the legions of this time were an unstoppable force, without comparison and beyond compare and Caldrail has not said that they were a hapless yeomanry. He did state that a major factor in the success of Rome was her self belief, patriotism and other aspects of her character that combined with undoubted military capability and resources carried the day.

 

Sylla has said that the evidence to support the statement that the legions were the finest fighting force of the day is the fact that Rome consistently won through. I would personally describe the legions as the most successful force which is slightly different. I don't think that anybody can dispute the success of Rome even if at times, it might have been at great cost.

 

That was actually the idea behind the original question. Losses such as those suffered by Rome at Cannae in a single days conflict, were not seen again until the carnage of The Somme. Those tens of thousands were killed, by and large, face to face, bone on metal. It is the character of Rome, that after such devastation still says carry on, that I was trying to identify. If that means that I have a romantic view, I really do not mind the accusation because I am not here to be dry and academic, but because I love the lessons that we can learn from this period in an age that suffers so greatly with short term memory loss.

[sylla]

Thanks for that; glad to change the subject.

...and the Senate was forced to give command to bold and capable generals by pressure from the people and also because so many of the aristocrats that may have expected political/military position had been killed...

Nope.

I'm not sure exactly who are you thinking about, but Africanus Major was as aristocrat as it can get, from the most successful noble family of the most successful Patrician Gens. The consuls and commanders after Cannae and even after Zama were from the same traditional noble families. Among the consuls for the first 30 years after Cannae, only two new men are attested, Laelius (Scipio's client) and Cato Censorius. In fact, the two new men from the beginnings of the Hannibalic War, Flamininius and Varro, faced the full responsibility for Trasimene and Cannae, respectively. The Sword of Rome was a Claudius (Marcellus), the Shield was a Fabius (Maximus) and both were veterans from long before Hannibal; the heroes of Metaurus were another Claudius (Nero) and a Livius (Salinator). Even Atilius Regulus (from the group defeated at Cannae) eventually became a Censor in 214 BC.

 

The Roman soldiers were defeated at Trebbia, Trasimene and Cannae because they faced one of the best Generals and Armies in History, not for being rookies or amateurs by any measure. They were expert legionaries that had repeatedly proved themselves against fierce Gauls, Ligurians, Illyrians, Sardinians and other peoples. Just remember the great battles of Telamon and Clastidium.

 

The complex and decisive battle of Telamon, greater than anything else until Cannae and fought just seven years before the Hannibalic War, should be especially interesting for all those skeptic on the tactic capabilities of the "amateur" middle Republican legions. From Polybius in his second book:

 

"The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports. For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual".

Edited September 1, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

BTW: romantic again? Oh yes, I forgot; it's Caldrail dialect, not English. We can't take it literally.

 

 

PS: Admins, even if I am as eager as the next guy for sharing testosterone displays, this may be a good time to close this thread, or at least send it to the Arena.

 

 

Testosterone? I wasn't aware that had anything to do with romanticism. Yes, romanticised. The image of Roman invincibility is simply that. An image. It's rather like those youngsters with glazed eyes every time you mention special forces, seeing muscled heroes with and supernatural invulnerability. Have you ever met a real special forces guy? They seem pretty ordinary people when they pass you in the street, with variations of character and capability like anyone else, albeit probably a tad better at soldiering than most.

 

The Republican Roman legions were militia (at least until 107BC buts outside the scope of this thread) which makes them ordinary people, not highly skilled military geniuses. To regard them as the best in the world and use that as the reason for Romes expansion is a bit simplistic and naive. It's like saying the SAS won Desert Storm. Of course they didn't, despite their useful (and romanticised) contribution. Regular troops, of varying quality, and a co-operative incisive strategy from the commanders, not to mention politics in the background prevailed.

 

The Romans of the Pre-Marian era didn't need to be brilliant. I do take on board the quote you gave above, which is interesting but not indicative of a consistent level of skill. An impressive performance at one event does not equate to the standard of the time, and one has to wary because history is written by the victor and Romans were no strangers to exaggeration or glorification of their military achievements.

 

So much is dependent on the quality of leadership. Otherwise poor troops can be galvanised and well-motivated in the presence of a more capable leader (as in the case of Spartacus), or experienced troops left confused and disorganised (as say during the Varian Disaster of a later time) by inept leadership. After all, without Scipio and his insightful command would Rome have prevailed in the 2nd Punic War? The indications are that they were close to surrendering, or at least dithering to the point that such rumours were abroad.

 

The reason is partly this romance of the Roman legion as a mighty force, which as I've mentioned is persistent and very attractive to the human psyche - we like associating with strong tribes by instinct - but also the association of the Roman legion with modern military practises. This is definitely wrong. Okay, they did some things that parallel our modern regimes and indeed it sometimes looks hauntingly familiar, but it's a mistake to assume that the regimes were identical in all but name and equipmment. Further, there is a tendency to foist the high degree of professionalism in the legions of the post-civil war era on the militia of the earlier time. There is little basis for this, since each levy was essentially created from scratch from the available volunteers and there was no standard of training at that time, which was ironically one of the lessons of the Punic Wars that eventually gave birth to the Reforms of Marius.

[sylla]

OK, let

Edited September 1, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

Briefly, a couple of issues:

 

- An easy sport analogy (believe me, it applies):

 

The soccer team of Italy is currently considered the best (ie, the World Champion) after the 2006 World Cup in Germany.

Now, here comes their secret: they didn't lose any single match.

Their trainer was obviously important and even sheer luck may have had a role; but we can safely assume that the main reason for that outcome is that they have some of the best players of the world, by any measure.

 

(Naturally, we can quote millions of these examples, but a pearl should be enough).

 

- The Roman Republic was in permanent war for all their known History (even at the only year that the Janus temple closed!), often of rather high intensity; the draft was frequently carried to the extreme, sometimes to its very biological limits, even before Cannae; for all that time "Roman citizen" and "legionary" were absolute synonyms.

Now, please, can anyone wonder where did the "standardized training" come from?

 

- The original question of this thread ("How were the Romans able to win after Cannae?") should probably be rephrased: "Why did it take so long for the Romans to defeat Carthage in Punic War II?".

 

By sheer numbers and resources, the expected outcome from 218 BC should have been a relatively quick Roman victory.

Edited September 1, 2009 by sylla

[Artimi]

Is it possible Rome won the wars despite battle losses (sometimes horrific) because some individual rose above the herd to lead? For example Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus.

Edited September 1, 2009 by Artimi

[sylla]

Is it possible Rome won the wars despite battle losses (sometimes horrific) because some individual rose above the herd to lead? For example Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus.

The Herd? You mean us, the poor defenseless mob waiting for a rescuing Messiah?

That sounds like a pretty primitive way of analyzing history, don't you think?

That