Cannae and the Roman Republic

[sylla]

You know, if we are constantly talking on the same uncomfortable issues again and again, maybe they are not so uncomfortable after all; if this trend goes on, we may require even another thread.

Webster's Seventh New College Dictionary defines genocide as :

Edited June 26, 2009 by sylla

[Formosus Viriustus]

I was referring to the 1948 UN Treaty on the subject. I'll admit I am a bit loose in my references from time to time but any sensible person should have understood what I'm talking about : every child knows that 'genocide' is a crime that justifies supranational prosecutions. In fact, several cases have been brought already before the Belgian courts for alleged crimes in which Belgium or Belgians had no involvement whatsoever, including one against an Israeli PM for 'genocide' on the Palestinians.

I hope you don't pretend you are completely ignorant of the The Hague Court.

 

Correct me if I am wrong but is it your intention that the conquest of America should be condemned as a 'genocide' ? So why not Cannae ? Those Romans were slaughtered on the battlefield. Does it matter much to a dead man whether he is slaughtered on the battlefield or in his home during a raid ? Those Romans were in their own country. They had a right to be there and they had a right to defend it. They were slaughtered by an enemy who had come specifically to their country to either subject then or annihilate them. If that doesn't fit the quasi all-encompassing use you give the term, what is your criterium for that than ?

 

It is not a neutral word. It is a political word. Nothing else. Applying that word to all kinds of events going back four five centuries and further - as I predicted - is politicizing history. The 'Armenian case' as I'll call it is the perfect example. Are you denying that the application of the term 'genocide' to that event was solely politically inspired and has serious political consequences ?

 

Yes, I had hoped to participate in the real debate somewhat, though I must admit my appetite has been spoiled somewhat. Not that I pretend to have sufficient knowledge on the subject to bring up anything really revealing. I have read both Livius and Polybius. But that was some years back already, I don't have them at hand. And looking up quotes on the internet only goes so far. If, for every single statement or suggestion 'original' sources are required then you are pretty much excluding everybody who isn't or doesn't pretend to be a professional scholar.

If the only object of the forum discussions was to create some scientifically justified body of research on the subject, I coud agree with that, but I don't think that is the case.

But then, I guess that would mean that the debate would inevitably deterriorate into mindless drivel, not even worthy of the History Channel, right ?

 

And yes, there is only one human race. Nobody agrees with you more than I. I have stated that very clearly at least once somewhere else on this site rather recently, but fair enough, not everybody is to know that, so I'm glad you correct me there. I was again being a bit sloppy, using the language that is most commonly used.

There is only one human race. But again, our laws proclaim that it is not so.

 

Formosus

[sylla]

I was referring to the 1948 UN Treaty on the subject. I'll admit I am a bit loose in my references from time to time but any sensible person should have understood what I'm talking about : every child knows that 'genocide' is a crime that justifies supranational prosecutions. In fact, several cases have been brought already before the Belgian courts for alleged crimes in which Belgium or Belgians had no involvement whatsoever, including one against an Israeli PM for 'genocide' on the Palestinians.

I hope you don't pretend you are completely ignorant of the The Hague Court.

 

Correct me if I am wrong but is it your intention that the conquest of America should be condemned as a 'genocide' ? So why not Cannae ? Those Romans were slaughtered on the battlefield. Does it matter much to a dead man whether he is slaughtered on the battlefield or in his home during a raid ? Those Romans were in their own country. They had a right to be there and they had a right to defend it. They were slaughtered by an enemy who had come specifically to their country to either subject then or annihilate them. If that doesn't fit the quasi all-encompassing use you give the term, what is your criterium for that than ?

 

It is not a neutral word. It is a political word. Nothing else. Applying that word to all kinds of events going back four five centuries and further - as I predicted - is politicizing history. The 'Armenian case' as I'll call it is the perfect example. Are you denying that the application of the term 'genocide' to that event was solely politically inspired and has serious political consequences ?

 

Yes, I had hoped to participate in the real debate somewhat, though I must admit my appetite has been spoiled somewhat. Not that I pretend to have sufficient knowledge on the subject to bring up anything really revealing. I have read both Livius and Polybius. But that was some years back already, I don't have them at hand. And looking up quotes on the internet only goes so far. If, for every single statement or suggestion 'original' sources are required then you are pretty much excluding everybody who isn't or doesn't pretend to be a professional scholar.

If the only object of the forum discussions was to create some scientifically justified body of research on the subject, I coud agree with that, but I don't think that is the case.

But then, I guess that would mean that the debate would inevitably deterriorate into mindless drivel, not even worthy of the History Channel, right ?

 

And yes, there is only one human race. Nobody agrees with you more than I. I have stated that very clearly at least once somewhere else on this site rather recently, but fair enough, not everybody is to know that, so I'm glad you correct me there. I was again being a bit sloppy, using the language that is most commonly used.

There is only one human race. But again, our laws proclaim that it is not so.

 

Formosus

I can't speak for History Channel, but from where I am you're doing a nice job and I have learned a lot; you have all: knowledge, humor, curiosity, patience, responsibility, respect; you actually use original sources; what else can we ask for?

And for the record, if anybody ask, please tell them I am no scholar and I have never pretended to be one.

 

I think our problem is that you insist on seeing a complex social issue exclusively from the legal standpoint; social acts like homicide and genocide had existed arguably as long as man is man, and certainly long before any law was written or any court had condemned any perpetrator.

The convention of 1948 developed the law; the social problem of genocide has been there for a long time.

When a Neanderthal killed another Neanderthal, that was homicide.

When a Neolithic society deliberately exterminated another society, that was genocide.

 

Thanks for that specific reference, FV:

The Convention of the United Nations on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (New York, 9 December 1948) explicitly defined Genocide as:

"any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group".

As you can see, the same as the Webster-7th, this definition is not restricted to racial issues or to any specific timeframe, and the term is not political by itself; however, its context most usually is (as previously stated) simply because it is only natural that any country considers its friends as innocent and its enemies as guilty of such actions.

 

For better or for worse, we're dealing here with History, ie. the remote past. The parties' political opinion is hardly a concern for us, because for some time they all have already been ... well, History.

 

Under both Webster-7th and UN definitions (and any other I'm aware of) there were myriad examples of genocide (or "mass extermination" if you like the rose by another name) all along Classical History, and they were hardly restricted to the Romans; the annihilation of Sybaris by Crotona, of Thebes by Macedon, of Nineveh by the Medes and Babylonians are only some of the most conspicuous examples.

 

Please verify it for yourself; the previous statement has not "politicized" history any more than it already was; my description of such objective facts didn't imply that I am for or against any of the involved opponents.

 

An analogy: Caesar was killed by Brutus and the other Liberatores; that was an homicide (ie, it was not a "natural" death) and stating such objective fact doesn't imply we are for or against any of both sides.

 

On the other hand, we have already explained why not all battles are genocide (if that was really ever required) in my previous post.

 

Regarding our main topic, the most closely related Mass Extermination would be the fall of Capua, the second city of Italy which, even if remaining loyal to Rome after Trebbia and Thrasimene, defected to Hannibal after Cannae; it's hard to blame them for underestimating the Roman reserves.

In any case, five years later (211 BC) the Fabian strategy has succeeded, the Punic army was unable to protect Capua any longer and it had to pay the price; all the Capuan senators and hundreds of other prominent citizens were beheaded by the consul Fulvius; all the survivors were sold as slaves (Livy 26, 15-16).

Edited June 27, 2009 by sylla

[Formosus Viriustus]

Thank you for your very friendly compliments, sylla, you are giving me far too much credit. I certainly wouldn't dare or even want to lay claim to the last three qualities you attribute to me.

 

As to the use of quotes : I am not against them of course, but I have always had

[Artimi]

FV

Your last analysis is the reason enough to study history and try to read the originals.

I have only tried 2 times to read translations of the originals and find the language often difficult to wrap my mind around the ideas.

 

Now is maybe the time to try for umpteenth time learn Latin again.

 

Sylla

 

Your writing and FV,s have such different flavours, I wonder what this reflection of? I sense more emotion in yours, which maybe just a bias on my part.

 

 

 

thank you both and keep writing!

Edited June 27, 2009 by Artimi

[sylla]

I can't remember who it was that said it exactly, nor the precise wording, but someone once said :

Edited June 28, 2009 by sylla

[Antiochus III]

The mind boggling thing is that the Romans still had the courage to fight on after Cannae.

They had already lost about 40 000 men in the battles of Trebia and Lake Trasimene. And then about another 50 000 at Cannae.

The losses are appalling in bare numbers. Set off against the total population of the Roman Republic at the time it's even more amazing.

 

Formosus

 

That's what made Rome perhaps the greatest civilisation in history: their dogged persistence and their refusal to accept defeat.

 

A number of other factors also contributed to Rome's eventual success and annihilation of Carthage:

 

1. Rome had access to a large pool of men which allowed them to raise troops faster than the Carthaginians could. To put things in perspective Carthage was fighting Rome in the Italian Peninsula and the Iberian Peninsula, Rome was not only fighting Carthage, but also the Seleucid Empire, the Macedonian and the Celts and despite massive losses in Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae they were still able to field well trained legions with great support auxilary units supplied by their allies.

 

2. Roman legions had far superior training in comparison to Carthaginian merceneries. Carthage's successes in my point of view was thanks to their heavy infantry and Massinissa's Numidians forces. When Massinissa allied himself with Scipio Carthage lacked the cavalry support they were used to and this is evident in the Zama. The Roman quickly became accustomed to Hannibal's elephants and I believe he would have still achieved victory without them but what was key to his success was the cavalry.

 

3. Carthage could not supply Hannibal with relief forces. Focus was to strengthen forces in the Iberian Peninsula. The task was further complicated when Carthage lost supremacy of the sea.

 

But the biggest reason why I believe Carthage eventually lost the war was because their generals simply did not receive the kind of support the consuls did during the Punic War. Regardless of what defeat the Romans were dealt with, regardless of fighting on other fronts, the Senate's focus was the greater glory of Rome.

 

1. Rome may have been hostile to other kingdoms, but they devoted the vast majority of their resources to the eradication of Hannibal from Italy and the other Carthaginian armies from Iberia.

 

2. There was some uniformity to training and ability of troops within the Roman citizen legions. The same cannot be said of Hannibal's mercenaries; there was an incredible amount of variation in the skill level and fighting experience among the mercenaries and other troops in Hannibal's army. That makes it difficult to make such generalized comparisons between the two. I think that the high maneuverability amongst the units in the Carthaginian army along with Hannibal's prowess as a commander and ability to successfully counter the strengths of the Romans had more to do with his success than the simple inclusion of heavy infantry.

 

3. Wasn't the reason Hannibal crossed the Alps in the first place because of Rome's naval supremacy even before the war? Also, the government in Carthage itself was not entirely supportive of Hannibal and thus even if it was possible for them aid troops, it may never have come to pass.

 

I fully support (no pun intended) your final comment, however. Hannibal was definitely seen as a threatening figure political leaders in Carthage, and the tension there contributed to the weakness of the Carthaginian state. It is important to keep in mind that Carthage had already lost to Rome, and Rome

s government was very supportive of its armed forces.

[Centurion-Macro]

Hannibals attempt to take on Rome was in effect a 'bltizkrieg' in ancient times. Such fast attacks have always relied on achieving a knock-out blow, because once the war becomes drawn out, the isolation of your troops becomes a significant disadvantage.

 

This is what happened to Hannibal. Notice that he remains mobile. His army is always on the move. Despite his string of victories he does not indulge in capturing cities. Although the Romans panicked with cires of "Hannibal at the gates", the carthaginian general had little opportunity to lay siege. Had he done so, he would have been trapped in situ, and he knew it. His forces were mercenaries by and large but make no mistake, these were men happy to earn a living from violence and had joined Hannibal for the express purpose of going to war.

 

Even the hardships of the alpine crossing hadn't deterred the majority. The story goes that whilst desperately short of food, one his generals suggested that his men should learn to enjoy human meat, something Hannibal wouldn't entertain. Apocryphal? Possibly, but there's no doubt the Carthaginian army was not having a good time. Unlike the Romans, Hannibals army had no supply line. His men would have to forage for food and water as they went. It was therefore important to remain mobile because to do otherwise would reduce his army to starvation once they had cleaned out the immediate area.

 

So Hannibal attempts three things.

 

1 - Outflank and suprise the Romans. He achieved a success. His march over the Alps was unexpected and although he suffered cobsiderable losses en route, he did suprise Rome who hadn't planned on such a large force attacking from that direction.

 

2 - To whittle down Roman forces for eventual victory. In this he came so tantalisingly close. The Roman defeats such as Trasimene and Cannae caused huge losses to the legions, such that 'green' troops were being hurriedly raised and sent to plug the gaps. Hannibals failure of course was that the Roman recruitment pool was large enough to withstand these losses - but it must be noted they were becoming desperate for soldiers at short notice.

 

3 - To attempt to intimidate the Romans into surrender. The Romans are losing battles, they fear for the worse, and Hannibal is marching across Italy at whim. Sooner or later he would surely turn on Rome itself? Hannibal was gambling that the Roman senate would seek peace terms if he created enough havoc. No doubt there were some senators who would have considered such a choice - historically, they had once before during the sack of Rome in 392BC - but in that case, the gauls had strode into the senate house itself. Rome in Hannibals day was a tougher nut to crack, and he was hoping to achieve a similar result without raising a siege to the city, thus tying down his forces and making them more vulnerable to Roman counterattack. In short, Hannibal failed in this objective.

I agree, Hannibal was trying to get the Romans to surrender by destroying their armies and creating fear in all the Romans. I also did surprise Rome a lot by outflanking them, athough I lost almost half his force doing so.

[sylla]

... There was some uniformity to training and ability of troops within the Roman citizen legions. The same cannot be said of Hannibal's mercenaries...

... Hannibal was definitely seen as a threatening figure political leaders in Carthage, and the tension there contributed to the weakness of the Carthaginian state...

Both statements clearly have a grain of salt, but hardly to the extent implied by our available sources.

Recently some fellow UNRV members were complaining about the absolute lack of non-Romanophile narrative for the III Servile War; actually, such deficiency was prevalent along all Roman History and it was particularly painful for the narrative of the Punic Wars.

 

The first- and second-hand sources of Polybius, the Annalists used by Livy and the unindentified independent sources for Appian and Dio were all used for primarily civic narratives, deliberately intended to nurture the Roman national pride; Roman defeats, no matter how absolute, couldn't have been explained (Gods forbid!) just by the even transient comparable or plainly superior performance of alien populations or armies.

For justifying such Roman failures, an heroic supra-human Hannibal was an absolute requirement; the fact that he was on the Punic side would then have been just Roman bad luck.

Otherwise, the Romans couldn't have even pretended that their own heroic deeds were comparable (if not superior) to those from the Homeric sagas, the Hellenic Medic Wars or the Macedonian expedition commanded by Alexander III.

Hannibal's literary glorification was hardly an isolated case; something similar happened to the Homeric Hector, Spartacus and even Xanthippus for the first Punic War.

 

Additionally, our main sources had their own propagandistic agendas:

On one hand, Polybius wrote an apology for his patron Scipio clan, presumably supporting their return to the main scenario, after their political disaster of 183 BC.

On the other, Livy made an exemplary praise of the good old Roman virtues at their best hour, clearly supporting the pretended moral justification of the Augustan Revolution.

 

Therefore, a word of caution; the factual accounts are generally far less biased than the value judgments from these same authors.

After all, the best quarterback is not enough by itself for getting the Superbowl, and the best general has never been enough for winning wars alone; trained soldiers, able officials and logistic support are absolute requirements, then, now and ever.

- Enough was discussed some posts above within this same thread on the controversial description of the vast majority of Punic soldiers as

Edited August 14, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

... There was some uniformity to training and ability of troops within the Roman citizen legions. The same cannot be said of Hannibal's mercenaries...

Sorry to butt in to the debate, but this statement doesn't sound right to me. There were no standardised training schemes within the Roman legions at this time (and even in the Principate, training wasn't entirely consistent). In fact, training was largely 'on the job'. The organisation of three ranks of hastatii, principes, and Triarii was a system used to preserve those who had gained experience. The hastatii at the front were novices who were to some extent considered expendable. The rear rank, the triarii, were veterans.

 

As regards ability, I don't think the legions raised to tackle Hannibal in 216BC were high quality at all. They were new recruits and many wouldn't have had any experience of combat at all.

 

The segregation of troops according to age and experience suggests training wasn't widely available. I've no doubt that commanders with any foresight ensured their men were practised before the battle, but are fencing and drills any replacement for the real thing? Certainly there weren't any formal training schemes in the modern sense.

 

As for mercenaries, these tend to be seen in either as top notch specialists or the dregs of war. This has always been the case and the truth is that mercenaries vary in quality considerably and always have. Hannibals troops however followed him across the Alps and a lengthy campaign in Italy, so it would appear these were men who knew what war was and wanted to fight enough to tolerate the privations they endured, recruited largely from men who had sought a conflict to occupy their time. They were tough fighters to begin with, men who had learned their vocation already.

Edited August 15, 2009 by caldrail

[Antiochus III]

... There was some uniformity to training and ability of troops within the Roman citizen legions. The same cannot be said of Hannibal's mercenaries...

Sorry to butt in to the debate, but this statement doesn't sound right to me. There were no standardised training schemes within the Roman legions at this time (and even in the Principate, training wasn't entirely consistent). In fact, training was largely 'on the job'. The organisation of three ranks of hastatii, principes, and Triarii was a system used to preserve those who had gained experience. The hastatii at the front were novices who were to some extent considered expendable. The rear rank, the triarii, were veterans.

 

As regards ability, I don't think the legions raised to tackle Hannibal in 216BC were high quality at all. They were new recruits and many wouldn't have had any experience of combat at all.

 

The segregation of troops according to age and experience suggests training wasn't widely available. I've no doubt that commanders with any foresight ensured their men were practised before the battle, but are fencing and drills any replacement for the real thing? Certainly there weren't any formal training schemes in the modern sense.

 

As for mercenaries, these tend to be seen in either as top notch specialists or the dregs of war. This has always been the case and the truth is that mercenaries vary in quality considerably and always have. Hannibals troops however followed him across the Alps and a lengthy campaign in Italy, so it would appear these were men who knew what war was and wanted to fight enough to tolerate the privations they endured, recruited largely from men who had sought a conflict to occupy their time. They were tough fighters to begin with, men who had learned their vocation already.

 

 

I guess this post was a bit to ambiguous. I simply meant that the mercenaries employed by Hannibal were from many different backgrounds with different equipment and even different languages. I was not implying that the legions of Rome in 216 were high quality at all; however they did have some training, though most had not seen combat. I meant that it is very difficult to compare the training of one man to the next, for all of the reasons that have been mentioned.

 

On another note, I would like to thank caldrail for providing his views on all of these military topics. It is great to have someone with his level of knowledge to keep us all in check and to help us learn more. When I first joined on UNRV he had like 800 posts and now he's got much more than double that!

 

ATG

[caldrail]

Thank you, but please realise that I'm not an expert. What I do find though however is many people have a preconception of what the Roman legions must have been like. I did too in my younger days, but my experiences of dealing with modern servicemen have made me realise that there's a human element missing from the depiction of ordered ranks marching across the map of the known world.

 

As I see it (and you are welcome to debate the point) there are a number of issues when considering the Roman legions at the time of Cannae

 

1 - They were a temporary militia, not a permanent professional standing army. Legions were raised according to custom, for defence, or to meet the needs of circumstance.

 

2 - Training was not standardised in the modern manner. Certainly troops were drilled at first - how else could initiates perform unit manoevers? - but do we reallty expext such novices to march like they were on a parade ground? The more experienced parts of the legion would of course have a better idea. This was a time when people wielded swords as a matter of course whether they were any good at it or not.

 

3 - Cultural expectations - The legions at that time were organised in accordance with the expectations of Roman culture - in other words, the ever present need for status to be observed is part and parcel of the unit organisation,. The Romans were a warrior people (despite however many had since opted for peaceful occupations) and their society reflected that even during its more advanced stages.

 

4 - Lack of Communication - A great deal is made of Roman signalling but a lot of this belongs to a later era when the legions were permanent and therefore permanent solutions to the problems of battlefield communication could be addressed. Individual centurions, both as the dominant warrior of their manipular/cohortal 'pack', and as junior officers of the levy as a whole, were expected to show intiative and act on their own cognizance. This means that central control on the battlefield wasn't all encompassing as we meet believe. In any event, ancient armies conducted battles to a plan set before the confrontation began. Hannibal used those factors to his advantage when enveloping the Roman legions at Cannae - the Romans were acting to a poorly conceived operational plan and having to turn to face the enemy forces either sde disrupted their formation. Certainly the bulk of the Roman army had no idea what was going on even after it was too late.

 

5 - Order of Battle - We tend to see the Roman legions as part olf a formal state army - thats understandable and natural to us because we have an intuitive appreciation of how things are done in the modern day. We recognise parallels in the Roman methods and tend to push that analogy too far, foisting modern sensibilities on the Roman world as Adrian Goldsworthy might put it. Indeed, one member of this forum used to assume that the latin word for army (Agmen) was a unit definition in its own right, when in fact it was merely a word describing a gathering of legions and other formations under one command. A legion of the time was a levy of men (that's what the word means) intended to prosecute warfare on behalf of Roman interests, not a regiment in a state army.

 

6 - Leadership - Here the Romans always had difficulties. Because of their societal need to encompass status amongst the community based on military reputation, generals of the time were amateur leaders given control of the legions by political assignment - they were not career officers and many had little experience (or proven ability) of command. This was the time of the 'consular army', in which the two democratically elected senior politicians of Rome were also leaders of their levied troops. In modern terms, it was like having two Prime Ministers acting as generals of troops raised by recruiting campaigns. you just know it will all end it tears! But of course the Romans were living in an age when warfare was an unsophisticated (albeit crafty) business and one in which at this time the professional soldier as we understand it did not exist.

[marcus silanus]

Thank you, but please realise that I'm not an expert. What I do find though however is many people have a preconception of what the Roman legions must have been like. I did too in my younger days, but my experiences of dealing with modern servicemen have made me realise that there's a human element missing from the depiction of ordered ranks marching across the map of the known world.

 

As I see it (and you are welcome to debate the point) there are a number of issues when considering the Roman legions at the time of Cannae

 

 

6 - Leadership - Here the Romans always had difficulties. Because of their societal need to encompass status amongst the community based on military reputation, generals of the time were amateur leaders given control of the legions by political assignment - they were not career officers and many had little experience (or proven ability) of command. This was the time of the 'consular army', in which the two democratically elected senior politicians of Rome were also leaders of their levied troops. In modern terms, it was like having two Prime Ministers acting as generals of troops raised by recruiting campaigns. you just know it will all end it tears! But of course the Romans were living in an age when warfare was an unsophisticated (albeit crafty) business and one in which at this time the professional soldier as we understand it did not exist.

 

I can't resist the link between the empires of Rome and Britain here as alluded to by Goldsworthy - introduction to "In The Name Of Rome". As much as the Roman system placed command in to the hands of the often mediocre or even incompetent, it also produced Scipio for example. The maintenance and expansion of the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries was often in the hands of the foppish or foolish but then there was Wellington.

 

Before the victories of these respective commanders the fortunes of both Rome and Britain were by no means assured. After Zama and Waterloo, although each suffered defeats in various theatres, no ultimate threat to Roman power was manifest until the 4th century and to that of the British until the aftermath of WWII.

 

There was at Rome, certainly at the time of Cannae, a system where the people had a say in who was elevated or re-elected to the Consulship, that the ordinary British subject didn't have. It was largely required that a candidate had successful predecessors, the assumption being that positive characteristics were inherited. However flawed the aristocratic dominance of both Rome and Britain was, both were highly successful enterprises leaving huge legacies to the world.

 

Therefore, to re-iterate the original question in this thread, which aspects of the national character of Rome allowed her to recover from such catastrophe as Cannae? There must have been something above and beyond pure resources and luck!

[caldrail]

I can't resist the link between the empires of Rome and Britain here as alluded to by Goldsworthy - introduction to "In The Name Of Rome". As much as the Roman system placed command in to the hands of the often mediocre or even incompetent, it also produced Scipio for example. The maintenance and expansion of the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries was often in the hands of the foppish or foolish but then there was Wellington.

 

On hearing that Lucius Caecilius Metellus and other politicians were at the point of surrender, Scipio gathered with his followers and stormed into the meeting, where at sword-point he forced all present to swear that they would continue in faithful service to Rome. Fortunately, the Roman Senate was of like mind and refused to entertain thoughts of peace despite the great losses Rome had taken in the war

[sylla]

As I see it (and you are welcome to debate the point) there are a number of issues when considering the Roman legions at the time of Cannae

Thanks; the honor is all mine.

In general terms, you have essentially reversed the facts, mostly by an obvious false dilemma fallacy; the implication that the ancient soldiers and their officials were either