Cannae and the Roman Republic

[sylla]

That is, any levied soldier that was not a citizen was automatically considered a "mercenary"...

No. He considered foreign levies as 'mercenaries'...

Just for the record, above we are both saying exactly the same thing

 

In fact , in your whole last post we don't disagree (ergo, it seems we may agree) because your definition of "mercenary" is definitely not what I dispute from Polybius.

 

Have a nice day.

Edited June 19, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

Thank you, I will. In the meantime, I would like to point out something about Hannibals army.

 

I have mentioned that generals needed to be politicans as well as leaders and warriors. When Hannibal was voted as general, there were troops already in Spain, those who had conquered Iberian territory under Hamilcar. Now the more statute may have noticed the quote from Appian earlier and wondered if all Hannibal needed to do was take control of those soldiers already in Spain. In theory, that would be correct. However, the troops involved are not regular soldiers in a modern army. They're groups of armed men who agreed, for one reason or another, to campaign in Iberia.

 

Now it's fairly certain that Hannibal had to raise troops of his own, and the issue of mercenaries has been discussed. The available soldiers already in Spain are not part of a formal army. Some of their leaders no doubt had reasons to be loyal to Carthage, others loyal to their pay, or perhaps some had reasons to find Rome worth fighting. Many would found the prospect of looting the rich Italian interior a very tempting prospect.

 

The point is that Hannibal could not simply click his fingers and order the troops across the Alps - he needed to persuade them to undertake that endeavour with the usual promises of victory and spoils. What we have then are layers of loyalty. The individual soldiers look to their own commander for guidance, a man who in punic armies was one of their own, and that man looked to Hannibal for guidance. The Carthaginian soldiery were therefore a collection of armed groups, not an assembly of regiments in a national army. It's an important concept to grasp. In ancient times there is a co-operative aspect to handling large numbers of armed men, and generals were often men who were able to manipulate personalities as much as hand out military orders.

[sylla]

In some way a thread on Cannae has mostly derived into an analysis of what Polybius meant by Punic "mercenaries".

 

That may seem a little weird to us, but it probably wouldn't have been so to Polybius himself; after all, his panegyric on the Roman constitution, army and population came immediately after the account of Cannae (in the books related with Italian issues); he was trying to prove that, even after such debacle, his Roman patrons were inherently superior to the already disappeared Carthaginians.

 

After WWII, at least some of us tend to take with a grain of salt most supremacist asseverations.

 

All I can say is that circa August 2, 216 BC something like 30,000 non-hired Gauls, 15,000 non-citizen Punic subjects and a fistful of degenerated Punic citizens made at least 70,000 Roman and Italian

Edited June 19, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

In some way a thread on Cannae has mostly derived into an analysis of unsubstantiated statistics

 

No-one's pinning any blame as far as I can see, but we do have to realise that without the relative skills of the generals and their decisions immediately before the battle, the result could well have been very different. The influence of single commanders in ancient battles is very important, and not limited to the Punic wars.

 

The strengths and weaknesses of one side against another are all very well, but the victory at Cannae is down to one simple point - the Romans were enveloped and disordered. That was due to a crafty plan designed by Hannibal, not by quick thinking of many armed men. Even the punic cavalry knew they had to close the rear once the roman horsemen had been seen off. They rode directly there, and in no way could Hannibal have had an effective communication with them to direct them on the fly.

[sylla]

The influence of single commanders in ancient battles is very important, and not limited to the Punic wars.

Obviously; however, that hardly means their officers and soldiers were simply passive objects.

- the Romans were enveloped and disordered. That was due to a crafty plan designed by Hannibal, not by quick thinking of many armed men.

And it was performed by thousands of men, not just by a personal combat of Hannibal vs. Varro. Not all the battle events could have been predicted in advance; the officers' initiative was evidently often required.

Even the punic cavalry knew they had to close the rear once the roman horsemen had been seen off. They rode directly there, and in no way could Hannibal have had an effective communication with them to direct them on the fly.

In your own immortal words, that's nonsense.

 

As described by the available sources, Cannae can't be understood without a rather active communication between at least the Punic units.

 

For example, the long Punic center (the Gaulish-Iberian infantry) couldn't have known in advance when to stop their retreat; such maneuver must have been exquisitely synchronized with the encirclement of the Roman rear by Hasdrubal's cavalry (just check out one of my previous posts).

Edited June 19, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

- the Romans were enveloped and disordered. That was due to a crafty plan designed by Hannibal, not by quick thinking of many armed men.

And it was performed by thousands of men, not just by a personal combat of Hannibal vs. Varro. Not all the battle events could have been predicted in advance; the officers' initiative was evidently often required.

It was undertaken to a pre-arranged plan. What do you think Cannae was? A rehearsed ballet? The unit leaders had been briefed and knew what was expected before the battle began. If events went wrong... Tough. You lose. Thats how battles are fought Scylla. It's a risk, not a game of chess.

 

As described by the available sources, Cannae can't be understood without a rather active communication between at least the Punic units.

Scylla, Cannae wasn't Waterloo. There wasn't any communication system at all. Hannibal, like every other ancient general, had determined what they plan was before the battle began. He had very little means of changing his plans once battle started. This wasn't a table top wargame, nor a straight forward chess match. So yes it can be understood without the need for an "effective means to communicate with them to direct them on the fly". It helps if you understand battle communications in the first place. Ancient armies were simply not that sophisticated. Even the Romans, with their much vaunted signals, were often little better.

 

For example, the long Punic center (the Gaulish-Iberian infantry) couldn't have known in advance when to stop their retreat; such maneuver must have been exquisitely synchronized with the encirclement of the Roman rear by Hasdrubal's cavalry (just check out one of my previous posts).

Yes they did. It really is very simple. The ends of the middle formation would have known exactly where to stop because they would have reached the ends of the columns on either side. The remaining men would have seen the blocks to their side halt. Or at least their commanders would have. That's all that was needed Scylla. It didn't take a genius to sort it out although arguably one did. The return of the cavalry was well timed by "exquisitely synchronised"? How exactly can you synchronise a cavalry unit chasing another way off in the distance. Please don't shrug and say they must have had some mysterious radio set. I simply won't accept it. If you want me to check out your posts, you'll need to be much better informed about battlefield organisation than you at present. I would suggest you get hold Greek and Roman Warfare by John Drogo Montagu. It's a good deal more erudite about the circumstances and capabilities of ancient generals.

Edited June 20, 2009 by caldrail

[sylla]

Now you have made a number of good points, C.

 

However, the course of the battle was not entirely preconceived; Polybius explicitly stated Hasdrubal had to use his own initiative (3, 106, 5):

"Hasdrubal (commanding the left wing) at this juncture appears to have acted with great skill and prudence; for in view of the fact that the Numidians (the other wing) were very numerous and most efficient and formidable when in pursuit of a flying foe he left them to deal with the Roman cavalry and led his squadrons on to where the infantry were engaged with the object of supporting the Africans (from both wings)".

 

It's clear that the communication of the different units on the field was not impossible; another good example is Caesar at Pharsalus with his famous fourth line.

 

However, the more critical maneuver was at the long Punic center (commanded by Mago and Hannibal himself) because any army is as strong as it weakest link.

The weakest links here were the Iberians and especially the half-naked Gauls (some 30,000) facing the bulk of the 80,000 fully armed Roman legionaries.

By combating in ordered retreat, they had been able to drive the Romans into the trap.

 

With each step back, their line was becoming thinner and thinner.

If they had retreated too much, their line would have inevitably broken, the trap would have vanished and the Roman center would have slaughtered them.

If they had stopped too soon, the unbroken line of the vastly superior Roman heavy infantry would have easily crushed the Iberians and the lightly armed Gauls.

Then, the Punic center had to stop their retreat exactly when Hasdrubal had encircled the Roman rear and the Legions ought to break their order for facing the attacks coming from every side.

 

BTW, the way of communication was no mystery; that was one of the advantages of having the best cavalry.

[caldrail]

Now you have made a number of good points, C.

 

However, the course of the battle was not entirely preconceived;

No battle is. They simply aren't chess games, and in ancient warfare individual initiative of the unit commanders counts for a great deal. Indeed, the Romans made a virtue of it.

 

It's clear that the communication of the different units on the field was not impossible; another good example is Caesar at Pharsalus with his famous fourth line.

No, not impossible, but not present by default. Some means had to be arranged beforehand and it was far from sophisticated. Remember that Caesar was often in the front line himself and couldn't direct his troops. At other times, he was too busy rallying a wavering cohort to worry about the battle as a whole. His own description of the Gallic Wars is illuminating and represents the view of a switched on commander in a very organised army for its time.

 

BTW, the way of communication was no mystery; that was one of the advantages of having the best cavalry.

The superior cavalry was something Hannibal had already reckoned on. He knew how bad the Roman horsemen were. What he would have told them was to see of the Roman cavalry then come back and seal the gap; don't pursue the Romans over the horizon. That the punic cavalry responded as required displays a modicum of discipline and adherence to the gameplan, but their superiority does not include telepathy. Hannibal took a risk. He was hoping (and quite possibly crossing his fingers) that the Romans would behave as he predicted, and that his units would be able to manoever also. Generalship in the ancient world is as much gambling as skill, but then, generalship in war was never a sure thing.

[sylla]

We may well have been reading different posts, C.

No battle is. They simply aren't chess games....

They weren't ballet routines either.

No, not impossible, but not present by default. .

Neither was it absent by default; those may be the reasons why I didn't state either.

Remember that Caesar was often in the front line himself and couldn't direct his troops. At other times, he was too busy rallying a wavering cohort to worry about the battle as a whole.

Clearly that was not always the case; just remember what I did actually write and check on Pharsalus.

That the punic cavalry responded as required displays a modicum of discipline and adherence to the gameplan, but their superiority does not include telepathy.

Again, that may be the reason why I didn't say anything as absurd as that.

 

BTW, when I quoted Polybius on Hasdrubal, it was not so much for having taken the initiative but because in doing so the Punic commander had used information retrieved from three of four different units of the Punic army; ergo, active communication was there.

Edited June 20, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

We may well have been reading different posts, C.

No, we have differences in opinion.

 

No battle is. They simply aren't chess games....

They weren't ballet routines either.

Excellent. So no more "Exquisite synchronicity" please?

 

No, not impossible, but not present by default. .

Neither was it absent by default; those may be the reasons why I didn't state either.

Oh? And what form of communication was being used? How did Hannibal send and receive messages from fast moving cavalry hundreds of yards away from a scene of carnage and pandemonium intent on seeing off an enemy formation? Do you know? Because if such a form of communication existed in 216BC, we'd all like to know about it.

 

Do you know what a battlefield is? It's a co-operative riot. That's all. The imagery of Hollywood and imagination is all very well, but the battlefield is a place where a large group of men has met another to fight it out. For real. With all the blood, agony, and fear involved. There will always be men eager to commit violence. There will always be those who disdain violence. Most will be at the battlefield because it was expected of them, for one reason or another. Courage is a desirable asset in fighting men, but what is courage? Without fear, how can a man be courageous? He's merely confident, and very few warriors are so fully confident that they can attack without adrenalin making them brave.

 

There are no established means of communicating on the ancient battlefield that have all inclusive properties and reliability. There are practical limits to the number of men a single commander can wield during all the noise and chaos of a fight. Thats not an assertion, that's millenia of military experience and human behaviour. You might use all manner of things - flags, horns, drums, whatever... In the heat of battle, a soldiers senses are restricted by his viewpoint, his equipment, his situation. You cannot guarantee a message will be received, not even today, with all the benefits of instant telecommunications on campaign.

 

That a leader was able to enquire of three or four units is all very well, but what was the situation? Were they busy fighting or standing idle waiting for action? Were they close, in sight of the man, or far away hidden by foliage and dust? Were horsemen available to carry word? Did someone run there and back? Who responded? Was it leader or was he too busy leading the fight?

 

Leading a group of men into battle isn't a sophisticated thing. It's about leadership, or in a more primitive way, dominance and example. Riots only surge forward when a braver man rushes the police. So to a Roman centurion fights from the front, not directing his men from the rear, a task left to senior officers who might be solely occupied in ensuring the men of that unit don't turn and run.

 

The availability of message bearers isn't necessarily your means of communication. Most armies in the ancient world had hardly time to get used to fighting alongside each other. It takes experience for that army to operate efficiently. Why else was Hannibal so blessed? He was using veterans of the spanish campaign and experienced mercenaries (sorry, but he did). They understood what was required for that reason, not because some message was sent by means unknown.

 

History is about what we know. You can speculate all you want, but please don't attempt to convince me know better by suggesting something existed that left no record or mention.

 

Remember that Caesar was often in the front line himself and couldn't direct his troops. At other times, he was too busy rallying a wavering cohort to worry about the battle as a whole.

Clearly that was not always the case; just remember what I did actually write and check on Pharsalus.

Good. But study of one event does not illuminate you to the variance and averages of others. The image of ancient generals stood around a table in a breezy cool tent pointing daggers at brightly painted maps is laughable. Without the presence of that commander on the field, within reach of his men, an important factor of leadership and morale is lost. So many times armies have begun to crumble because they began to hear their leader had been cut down, only to see him reveal his presence in some way and rally them on. Would a hardened warrior, a man capable of hardship and violence, be impressed with a general stood on a hill a mile away? I don't think so.

 

Ancient armies are nothing like as sophisticated as our modern viewpoint suggests. Certainly the elements of behaviour are relatively similar, but the organisation of armies was in it's infancy, and for that matter, so was the science of communication which too often proved to lacking throughout military history, right up to the present day.

 

BTW, when I quoted Polybius on Hasdrubal, it was not so much for having taken the initiative but because in doing so the Punic commander had used information retrieved from three of four different units of the Punic army; ergo, active communication was there.

Thats an assumption. The act of communicating in one instance does not imply this was readily available on all battlefields at all times and distances. Nor does this imply active communication. It merely implies that the commander was able to retrieve information from seperate units there and then.

[Artimi]

Caldrail, Sylla.

 

 

 

Your series of posts is an wonderful example of why UNRV is so interesting. I would love to be able to write and analyze like both or either one of you. But since I cant. I read.

 

 

 

Thank you

[Artimi]

A question which goes back to the discussion of 'mercernary' what and who they were.

 

For some reason, I have the impression that the Carthaginian population was not large and that they would would have to use 'mercenaries', 'soldiers of fortune' from other populations whether they be conquered peoples or not. Unlike Rome, Carthage did not have a history of a citizen army.

 

Please comment(or maybe I should say help??). Unfortunately I have not done any reading on this subject alone, just gathered stray bits from other histories and stories.

[sylla]

We may well have been reading different posts, C.

No, we have differences in opinion.

Actually not so many (Please read below); in any case, that was not my point; my point is that you are currently "answering" statements that I have not made (please re-read your last two posts above).

 

Thats an assumption. The act of communicating in one instance does not imply this was readily available on all battlefields at all times and distances. Nor does this imply active communication. It merely implies that the commander was able to retrieve information from seperate units there and then.

Just for the record, the last two statements above are identical, as "activity" does not imply any specific frequency.

You originally stated there was no communication on the field (ie, zero activity). Now it seems we're not able to deny such communication any more; period.

The frequency of Hasdrubal's communication cannot be implied from Polybius statement; we can only assume such communication was active enough to ensure the right perfomamce of 3 or 4 different Punic units under the new conditions on the field.

Edited June 20, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

A question which goes back to the discussion of 'mercernary' what and who they were.

 

For some reason, I have the impression that the Carthaginian population was not large and that they would would have to use 'mercenaries', 'soldiers of fortune' from other populations whether they be conquered peoples or not. Unlike Rome, Carthage did not have a history of a citizen army.

 

Please comment(or maybe I should say help??). Unfortunately I have not done any reading on this subject alone, just gathered stray bits from other histories and stories.

You're welcome; however, you made a most relevant point; we should remember this thread is for all UNRV members, not just for C & S.

 

If you check on the nice AW link provided by Maty, you will find that such question remained unsettled even in their debate. However, some criteria are consistently used by virtually all contributors.

Polybius' argumentation opposed "mercenary" versus "citizen" armies; in practice there is a continuum and specific individuals may have changed theit status, even more than once. For example, Philopemen served as a "citizen soldier" in Megalopolis and a "mercenary" in Crete.

For my argumentation I have used relatively stringent criteria, all of them explained in Maty's link; "mercenaries" would then be hired foreign soldiers; no more, no less, The critical terms would then be "foreign" and "hired".

I use such criteria because that is what Polybius and other pro-Roman historians did:

For example, the Numidians under Punic command were considered "foreign" to Carthage and "hired" by the Punic commanders;

However, when exactly the same soldiers fought under Roman command, the same historians considered them now as levied non-citizen Roman subjects, so they were now called "auxiliaries".

Pretty tricky, isn't it?

C. explained his wider criteria in previous posts; I'm sure he will be more than happy to give additional details as required.

 

Unfortunately, we have no available Punic or even pro-Punic sources, and all our pro-Roman sources are heavily biased, were actually written after Carthage disappeared and they clearly have not much knowledge on the conditions of the Carthaginian army or society; not that they were particularly worried for such fact.

"Large" compared with what? Our considerations for the size of the Carthaginian population depends on both demographic estimations and the definition of which populations were actually identified as Punic at the time; estimations vary, but it is regularly admitted for the city itself at least 250,000, and for the whole Punic North Africa at least 750,000-1 million. Some of the other cities (eg, Utica, Hippo, Lepcis) presumably had at least some Punic citizens too; we simply don't know exactly which cities or how many of their men, and we may well never know. In all likelihood the vast majority (or even all) of the peasants were not Punic citizens.

Edited June 21, 2009 by sylla

[caldrail]

C. explained his wider criteria in previous posts; I'm sure he will be more than happy to give additional details as required.

You need only ask S.

 

You originally stated there was no communication on the field (ie, zero activity). Now it seems we're not able to deny such communication any more; period.

No I didn't. I said that there were no established methods of communicating that were all inclusive and reliable. There wasn't. A great deal is made of Roman signalling (which did exist in imperial times) but even that required line of sight or to be audible above the considerable tumult of tens of thousands hacking each others extremities off, and in any case, that signalling wasn't designed for the battlefield.

 

Neither do we see any evidence for widespread use of couriers or runners. No doubt such means were employed when the occaision demanded, but the formal courier organisation such as found in napoleonic battlefieds did not exist - the ancient armies weren't that sophisticated nor for that matter, so spread out as in later times.

 

For some reason, I have the impression that the Carthaginian population was not large and that they would would have to use 'mercenaries', 'soldiers of fortune' from other populations whether they be conquered peoples or not. Unlike Rome, Carthage did not have a history of a citizen army.

Unlike Rome, Carthage had no large citizen base. Plenty of people living amongst them, nominally obedient to their government, but Carthage could not raise a large enough citizen-based army because of that. Therefore they recruited anyone willing to fight, and as often happens in these xases, that meant cash incentives.

 

Carthage was after all wealthier than Rome. It's farmland was richer, it's tax base effectively larger, and in the early days close trading links with Britain meant they almost had a monopoly on the manufacture of bronze. By the time the Iberian campaign had ground to a halt, Carthage also had access to silver mines which funded Hannibals campaign in Italy.