Gaius Marius-Where do we all stand?

[caldrail]

Both. He saw the changes as introducing more efficient training and deployment, plus the opportunity for the poorest men of Rome to undertake military service, plus the availability of permanent standing legions in an enviroment of conflict inflation.

[Kosmo]

The northern invaders could not have been so many as stated. My reasons: With no roads and no supply systems an army that big would have starved quickly. Romans attacked them in Noricum but would have been more careful if they were so many. The invaders could have attacked twice roman lands but choose not to. They achieved nothing against Spanish tribes or in Gaul.

 

About the reform: the romans had permanent forces probably for ever but for sure since they set foot in Spain, roman levy had defeated Carthaginian and Hellenistic mercenary armies so they had no reason to believe that going that way was any good, the recruitment pool could have been raised by increasing the number of roman or italic citizens, standardization (if it was a goal but I doubt it) could have been achieved by the way Athenians did, that is by using state workshops to provide weapons to the citizens, but still keeping the class structure, the number of potential soldiers was huge as proved by the next century of civil wars, romans had money to recruit a larger number of foreign auxiliaries in case of a temporary shortage of man, I know no reason for a roman shortage of man as the losses from barbarians were definitely smaller then those inflicted by Hannibal.

 

Both the reform and Marius consulships had more to do with political agitation in Rome then with anything else.

[caldrail]

The northern invaders could not have been so many as stated. My reasons: With no roads and no supply systems an army that big would have starved quickly.

Ancient armies got quite big anyway as it became necessary to overwhelm the other side. The existence of roads does not, in itself, prvide enough supply for a large army, it merely facilitates the arrival of it. In any case, the majoirty of armies weren't supplied from central locations. Instead, they were foraging locally.

 

Example 1 - Hannibal, on invading Italy, had no supply base there nor was he receiving supply by sea. He therefore foraged in enemy territory without any regard of the existing road systemn whatsoever. This was in fact a major reason behind his strategy of movement, and part of the reason he ultimately failed to force the Romans to surrender.

 

Example 2 - The Goths, after their crossing of the Danube, rebelled, defeated a hastily roused Roman army under Lupicinus and Maximus, and ravaged the local area, threatening Constantinople (Famously making the excuse "We do not fight walls"). Toward the climax at Adrianople, the raiding policy of Sebastian (and the slaughter of Goths by an advance column of elite legionaries at the River Maritza) had forced the Goths to forage in strength. On the day of the battle in ad378, As much as a third of their forces were absent in this manner and their discreet arrival was a major suprise for the Roman attackers.

 

About the reform: the romans had permanent forces probably for ever

No, they didn't. They had by tradition an annual militia of two legions each headed by one of the consuls. This was a fixed size of armed men available to Rome and was considered enough in the early days when fighting with their neighbours was a small scale affair. Once the campaigning went further abroad it became necessary to keep the legions in place for the campaign rather than until winter, and thus showed the advantages of a standing army. Marius enacted the change toward permanence which provided legions during peace-time, an innovation that previously hadn't existed.

 

roman levy had defeated Carthaginian and Hellenistic mercenary armies so they had no reason to believe that going that way was any good,

They defeated thiose enemies at considerable cost in casualties and relied on wearing Hannibals forces down by attrition. The Romans were pushing poorly trained levies into the field whilst Hannibal could not replace his own losses. The Romans had every reason to believe that the traditional two-legion annual militia was not meeting their needs.

 

the recruitment pool could have been raised by increasing the number of roman or italic citizens,

Yes, they could have, but they didn't. Remember social status was extremely important to the Romans and at that stage the recruitment of the poor was not regarded as worthwhile. They couldn't afford to arm themselves and had little reason (not being landowners) to fight for Rome. The innovation of Marius, based on his own experience of hurried levies of poorer people, was to enfranchise the poor citizens by creating standing legions that equipped their men at the expense of the state, although the men did pay for their gear still, this time by stoppages in pay.

 

standardization (if it was a goal but I doubt it) could have been achieved by the way Athenians did, that is by using state workshops to provide weapons to the citizens,

Those worksghops didn't exist back then. The system of fabricae was something the late empire concerned itself with and was a major burden to the state.

 

but still keeping the class structure, the number of potential soldiers was huge as proved by the next century of civil wars, romans had money to recruit a larger number of foreign auxiliaries in case of a temporary shortage of man, I know no reason for a roman shortage of man as the losses from barbarians were definitely smaller then those inflicted by Hannibal.

But by then the poor citizens had been encouraged and enabled. The Romans didn't like mercenaries - Carthaginians relied on large scale mercenary employment but the problem there is that mercenaries are notoriously fickle, and therefore expensive. The Romans were usually cautious in warfare, they certainly preffered generals who were, and the unreliability of mercenaries wouldn't suit them. Auxillaries were kept loyal by bringing them into the Roman system and rewarding them with such things as citizenship on retirement. They were therefore second class troops rather than paid fighters.

 

There were occaisions where losses from barbarians were substantial. The Varian disaster of AD9 destroyed three legions completely. Two thirds of Valens army at Adrianople were slaughtered. I'm sure there are other examples.

Edited February 14, 2009 by caldrail

[Pompieus]

A couple of thoughts.

 

Supplying armies in the pre-industrial age was, as mentioned, mainly a matter of local foraging. Quite large armies could support themselves fairly well in populated regions PROVIDED THEY KEPT MOVING (see van Creveldt et al). An army stopped in place would quickly exhaust supplies of food and especially forage available in the area and be forced to move on. This partially explains the wanderings of the Cimbri and Teutoni. Roman commanders took great pains to establish a base to ensure the gathering and transport of supplies for their troops and animals in order to maintain the freedom to move or not as required by strategy. Roman commanders often used this advantage to force less well supplied forces to attack the Romans on favorable ground, or to afford them the time to besiege and take a fort or town.

 

The question of a "standing army" in the middle republic is also an interesting one. From 194 BC on there were always at least 2 legions in the Spanish provinces and, after 146, at least 1 in Macedonia. Certainly when new governors went to Spain or Macedonia fresh troops went with them, but these supplementa, according to Livy, were only sufficient in number to replace losses, not the entire garrison. In fact, there is some evidence that soldiers sent to Spain were expected to serve there as long as 6 or 7 years before they could expect to return to Italy with a retiring governor. And when they got home, there was no guarantee they wouldn't be conscripted again, such men had valuable experience and were liable under the law for 16 years of service. Plus the pool of available property owning citizens was in decline. Service in Spain was dangerous and unpopular, and there are reported incidents of resistance to the levy in 193, 185, 180, 172, 169, 151, and 138 (including arrest of the consuls and threats of mutiny in the field). Doesn't it It seem that for all intents and purposes there WAS a standing army, but it was still being recruited in the traditional way - from the shrinking pool of land-owning citizens - and that this was causing unrest? Wasn't this the problem Tiberius Gracchus tried to solve by increasing the size of the recruiting pool in 133? Marius' action in recruiting from the proletarii would further relieve the pressure on the land-owning peasants (possibly part of his electoral power base?) as well as increase military efficiency by taking willing volunteers instead of disgruntled conscripts. And it would create new voting clients when his veterans were rewarded with land upon discharge, placing them back in the centuries of the 5 classes where their votes would count.

 

Does current opinion consider the Cimbri and Teutons the first wave of the Germanic migrations or the last wave of the Celts?

[Caesar CXXXVII]

Does current opinion consider the Cimbri and Teutons the first wave of the Germanic migrations or the last wave of the Celts?

 

 

"Not surprisingly, most Romans in the first century BC regarded the Cimbri as Gauls...From the Augustan perios onwards, however, Roman writers always class them as Germani...No definite answer to the problem is possible...It thus seems best to accept the Roman identification (ie Germanic), while keeping in mind that it involves some unprovable and highly questionable assumptions." (Germania‏, Cornelius Tacitus, J. B. Rives, 1999) .

[caldrail]

as well as increase military efficiency by taking willing volunteers instead of disgruntled conscripts. And it would create new voting clients when his veterans were rewarded with land upon discharge, placing them back in the centuries of the 5 classes where their votes would count.

The disgruntlement was far less accentuated than in the late Republic (never mind imperial sensibilities). Serving as a legionary was considered as a public duty back then - but also one that rewarded the ex-warrior with civic integrity. I accept there must have been those who weren't keen on going to war (there always is) but their numbers were minimal untila fter the Marian Reforms. When that occured, it was a matter of vocational choice, a volunteer system, not a matter of conscription. The similar principle has occured in modern times as army recruitment has changed from draft in times of national emergency, to National Service, and to the modern volunteer service, with increasing anti-war sentiment.

 

As for the voting side of things, I can't say, but I can well imagine a Roman politican thinking in that manner.

[Pompieus]

I would argue that the sources are fairly clear that there was serious disgruntlement as early as 151 BC; and that the problem wasn't that the property-owning citizens were unwilling to serve, so much as they were unwilling to be sent to dangerous, unprofitable and remote foriegn parts for 6-7 years (or more), and to find themselves ruined economically when (IF!) they returned. I think every imperial state has found that for long-term foriegn service there is no substitute for a volunteer force.

 

As to the morale of the armies in the late republic, what do folks think of Gruens position in "Last Generation of the Roman Republic" (pg 365-384)? He questions the whole concept of "client armies" loyal to their general rather than to the state and proletarian proffessional soldiers "promoting warfare as a way of life". He says "Loyalty to the state lacked substance when the state itself was a phantom" and "Military service did not alienate the soldier from the Republic". He questions the personal quality of the military oath and argues that the soldiers of Lucullus, Cinna, Fimbria and Flaccus were not particularly loyal, and that Caesar and Pompey swapped legions without trouble. He says that soldiers often returned to civilian life with increased assets and status; and that the pre- and post-Marian army did not greatly differ in that they both consisted of rural citizens (athough laborers not farm owners) and that conscription continued along with volunteering until the end of the Republic. But mostly he argues that the civil wars were not ordinary times, and that when the general is also a magistrate or pro-magistrate it is not clear to the soldier who represents legitimacy and who represents revolution. He says of Sullas men "The soldiers took orders not from a rebel chief bent on overthrowing the Republic, but from a Roman consul, the head of state, challenging those who had usurped his authority".

Edited February 15, 2009 by Pompieus