Gaius Marius-Where do we all stand?

[TheStreckfus]

Hi all! This is my first post on the forum but I have been reading these forums for quite some time now. I have noticed that one important roman figure that is seldom discussed around here is so called "Third Founder of Rome", Gaius Marius. After reading through the long discussion on Sulla, I thought a discussion on Marius would be equally interesting. Honestly, I have no clue on what to make of the man. Was he a great Roman, and a great monster? Was he a military genius or a military mediocrity? Reformer or mere manipulator of the masses? Does he deserve the praise heaped on him?

 

On the one hand he was responsible for a far reaching and sorely needed reform of the roman military, and unquestionably deserves the military credit for Aquae Sextiae. But it seems clear that the Jugurthine war was skillfully ended by Sulla. Does Marius deserve any real credit for the victory in Africa, or did he expropriation of the command just do the war harm? What about Vercellae? It seems that Catulus and Sulla are alternatively given credit for the victory and not Marius. Was he effective during the social war?

 

On the flip side there is his political career. Early on he alienated the Metelli by supporting better voting practices and he did somewhat support the radical reforms of Saturninus. He even stopped the violence when he got out of control! Did he do anything of the sort during his consulships?

 

And Finally comes the end of his career. Was he justified in stealing the command of the war against Mithradates? Was it even legal? And how does one explain the massacres at the end? Was he mad, drunk, or was it just the frustration of struggling for so many years as a novus homo against the roman elite that led him to snap and fill the streets with blood?

 

Also, what did later generations of Romans think of Marius? Did Cicero say anything of note?

 

All interesting items of discussion methinks.

[Primus Pilus]

Marius is in intriguing, in part, because he really stands a transitional figure between Republic and Empire. He was great as general and military reformer, public icon and international influence (think of his visit to Mithridates while in self imposed political exile) and terrible (as a political hack via threats of violence and illegalities and later a tyrant and butcher).

 

While much of the African victory may be accredited to the groundwork laid by Metellus, it certainly wasn't the first or last time that a secondary general finished the job or received the credit. What is important is that he did finish the job, regardless of the political wranglings that got him that job, and he did not leave Africa as an ongoing problem. Perhaps more importantly when understanding the Marian skill is his dealings with the Cimbri and Teutons. While much credit has been given to Sulla and to Catulus, there were several previous engagements with these migrating Germanics that ended in complete disaster for the Romans. It was ultimately Marius that held the commands of Sulla and Catulus together and drove the the threat away permanently.

 

As for his later career, he was without a doubt a villain. While we must not dismiss the guilt of Sulla in his fateful march on Rome, one can at least understand the actions in response to bullying politics of Marius. Without Marius, a small part of Roman greatness definitely would've been lost, but conversely, might it also have been free from the civil wars that ultimately destroyed the Republic?

[M. Porcius Cato]

This is an interesting topic, and I'd like to add more later. Just to add one point to what PP said--Marius' later career was largely a destructive one because he placed trust in a total rascal who hasn't been mentioned: Lucius Cornelius Cinna.

[TheStreckfus]

Yes, Cinna was quite the rascal. As soon as Sulla leaves, he attempts a coup! To his credit, he did stop the massacres ordered by Marius however.

[Caesar CXXXVII]

His 5 consecutive consulships is amazing and worth an explanation .

Let say the Germanic threat was huge (IMHO not big than Hannibal's or the Celtic before) and Marius was the one and only (I doubt that although he was great) - why not give him a proconsulate like many other Roman generals before ? Scipio was 10 years the no. 1 commander with only one consulate (211-201) ! Or maybe the senate would not give this novos homo a proconsulate for 5 years and the comitia gave him the command by consulates ? so the people, by their comitia were smarter than the senate ? But the upper class in Rome (including the senators and familiy members) dominated the majority of centories in the comitia - So this expalation is a paradox....

[Primus Pilus]

His 5 consecutive consulships is amazing and worth an explanation .

Let say the Germanic threat was huge (IMHO not big than Hannibal's or the Celtic before) and Marius was the one and only (I doubt that although he was great) - why not give him a proconsulate like many other Roman generals before ? Scipio was 10 years the no. 1 commander with only one consulate (211-201) ! Or maybe the senate would not give this novos homo a proconsulate for 5 years and the comitia gave him the command by consulates ? so the people, by their comitia were smarter than the senate ? But the upper class in Rome (including the senators and familiy members) dominated the majority of centories in the comitia - So this expalation is a paradox....

 

Essentially, for lack of any other evidence Marius simply wanted to be consul and wouldn't have entertained a special dispensation or his supporters would've proposed it. One might guess that at that point, Marius would've been appointed to any position he may have wanted. He was continually "elected" because the Cimbri/'Teuton threat had not yet been alleviated since they had moved on to Hispania after crushing the Romans at Aurasio, and the Roman people seemingly didn't trust any other general to deal with the threat than Marius. While this gave Marius time to prepare and recruit a new army, there was still great fear among the people that the enemy was still out there somewhere. Presumably had Marius marched north after being appointed to his second consulship in 104 and been victorious at that point, there would've been no need for further consecutive consulships. I'm not suggesting that there was any great conspiracy afoot, but their movement away from Italia made Marius' political position rather convenient. Perhaps his lack of true political acumen (including the art of compromise) along with his seemingly enormous ego is the reason he chose actual consulships rather than special pro-consulships as Scipio had done.

[Tobias]

I believe Marius was a much needed infusion of new blood into Rome. At the time, Rome was a state that had attained contact with (If not influence over or direct control over) much of the ancient world, and yet still retained the laws, traditions and mentality of a small city-state. I believe there are few greater testaments to his abilities then the fact that he managed to reform the Roman military, a central pivot of Roman society, without going the way of the Brothers Gracchi at the hands of the conservatives who believed the Capite Censi had nothing to offer Rome except children, and who would certainly not fight as well as the traditional landed soldiers who provided their own arms, armour and supplies!

 

On the reverse of the Denarius, however, is the fact that he can be said to have begun the practice of having "personal" or "client" armies that had more loyalty to the General then the state, which would become an endemic feature of the many civil wars to rock Rome over the coming times.

 

Colleen McCullough suggests that Marius suffered from several strokes in his lifetime, and yet continued on. I wonder if this is true, or has any basis of fact?

Edited February 1, 2009 by Tobias

[Primus Pilus]

Colleen McCullough suggests that Marius suffered from several strokes in his lifetime, and yet continued on. I wonder if this is true, or has any basis of fact?

 

I don't mean to disparage her, because I personally loved her books (at least the first two in the series), but I suspect that it was the most feasible way to explain him away after having made him a heroic figure for most of the work. Though I do vaguely recollect that she was basing that assessment on statues of him at different stages of his life. Not very scientific, but I suppose it's fairly practical thinking for a novelist and it does create an air of authenticity.

 

Two samples or a potential before and after if you will... http://www.vroma.org/images/raia_images/marius.jpg http://history.boisestate.edu/westciv/romanrev/marius.gif

[Kosmo]

I believe that Marius played the main role in the demise of the Republic.

First of all by his unnecessary military reform. The roman army had conquered the world as a citizen levy and could deal with some Celts and Jughurta without transforming in to a mercenary force and a political tool. The Celtic danger was overblown for propaganda reasons, Italy has never been threatened and it was shown before that it could raise huge numbers of excellent soldiers as levy, many more then mercenaries. The folly of this reform was felt extremely quickly when Sulla marched on Rome with his legions.

Secondly, he was too ambitious and resorted to illegal means to satisfy his ambition in an unprecedented manner.

He gave other ambitious man tools and justifications to gain absolute authority and if the first of them, Sulla, wanted it the Republic would have been over then.

[Pompieus]

I don't know that the military reforms of Marius were "unnecessary". By accepting volunteers in lieu of conscripts did Marius do more than Richard Nixon ?

 

There were serious problems in the Roman army in the second half of the second century BC. The property owning rural citizens (and allies too) objected to being conscripted and sent off to difficult and dangerous wars in Spain or Gaul. There were several instances of resistance to the levy in Italy, and mutinies and indiscipline in the field after 150 BC. The catalogue of disasters which occurred in Spain and Gaul prior to Numantia and Aquae Sextae show that something was wrong.

 

Isn't it likely that prosperous Roman peasants didn't like being drafted and sent off to some remote foriegn land to fight people they knew nothing about any better than middle class American college students did in 1970? Certainly they were ready and willing to defend their homeland, but wouldn't it be hard to convince them that's what they were doing in the Sierra Morena (or in Khe Sahn)?

 

Also the threat of the Cimbri and Teutones was not to be sneezed at. The fear of the "Northern Barbarians" was very real to the Romans, it harkened back all the way to the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390 and the invasion of 225.

[Kosmo]

The mercenary army showed the greatest possible level of indiscipline by ending the lawful government and creating a military dictatorship against which it rebelled constantly.

And no, roman soldiers were not hippies so the roman army fought the iberic rebellions for some 150 years.

[Tobias]

Gaius Marius' reforms were necessary in the face of the various threats from Gaul and Germania, which were not exaggerated. Rome suffered some heavy losses in this time, including the Battle of Noreia in 113 B.C, where supposedly well over 100 000 Roman soldiers were lost; a battle near Burdigala in 107 B.C where Lucius Cassius Longinus was defeated and himself killed against the Tigurini, with the remnants of his army saved by agreeing to "Pass under the Yoke" (an ultimate humiliation); and of course, the infamous Battle of Arausio, where Quintus Servilius Caepio refused to co-operate with Gnaeus Mallius, and doomed both of them to ignominious defeat and almost 100 000 casualties. The Cimbri and Teutones obviously planned to head down Italy, along with some Gallic tribes they'd gathered to their cause. They numbered (at least) in the hundreds of thousands.

 

There were only so many men in Italy at this time that met the old recruitment criteria. This group was already exhausted from the heavy losses of previous years, therefore Rome couldn't raise enough men to meet the threat head on because of the rigid criteria. It was therefore common sense to employ the Capite Censi, an abundant source of manpower, at the cost of the state. It also allowed Marius to standardise supplies, a training regimen and better organise the legions themselves into more manageable units.

 

It is true that Marius' reforms did lead to armies more loyal to the General then the State. This was, however, merely a reflection of the ailing condition of the Roman Republic at this time. The city-state mentality still persisted in what had become quite an extensive sphere of influence. Had the traditional power-brokers of the Republic opened their eyes wide enough to see this, they would probably have come up with this idea on their own. As it was, it required a full-scale barbarian invasion, a series of catastrophic defeats and a Novo Homus to wake 'em up. As it was, it was still resisted. The State should have made the changes, and retained the loyalty of their soldiers. Their conservative nature prevented this, and hugely ambitious men, some excluded from power themselves but determined to wield it, gained the loyalty of the soldiers instead.

Edited February 4, 2009 by Tobias

[Caesar CXXXVII]

His 5 consecutive consulships is amazing and worth an explanation .

Let say the Germanic threat was huge (IMHO not big than Hannibal's or the Celtic before) and Marius was the one and only (I doubt that although he was great) - why not give him a proconsulate like many other Roman generals before ? Scipio was 10 years the no. 1 commander with only one consulate (211-201) ! Or maybe the senate would not give this novos homo a proconsulate for 5 years and the comitia gave him the command by consulates ? so the people, by their comitia were smarter than the senate ? But the upper class in Rome (including the senators and familiy members) dominated the majority of centories in the comitia - So this expalation is a paradox....

 

Essentially, for lack of any other evidence Marius simply wanted to be consul and wouldn't have entertained a special dispensation or his supporters would've proposed it. One might guess that at that point, Marius would've been appointed to any position he may have wanted. He was continually "elected" because the Cimbri/'Teuton threat had not yet been alleviated since they had moved on to Hispania after crushing the Romans at Aurasio, and the Roman people seemingly didn't trust any other general to deal with the threat than Marius. While this gave Marius time to prepare and recruit a new army, there was still great fear among the people that the enemy was still out there somewhere. Presumably had Marius marched north after being appointed to his second consulship in 104 and been victorious at that point, there would've been no need for further consecutive consulships. I'm not suggesting that there was any great conspiracy afoot, but their movement away from Italia made Marius' political position rather convenient. Perhaps his lack of true political acumen (including the art of compromise) along with his seemingly enormous ego is the reason he chose actual consulships rather than special pro-consulships as Scipio had done.

 

 

Just saw history channel's episode 1 of "Rome - Rise and fall of an empire" . They had the idea that the people and the aristocracy wanted Marius generalship no matter what and that is because of the sheer terror with regard to the Cimbri and comp. Both realised that he, and just he, could have won the war against them . More than that, Marius won the consulship for 101 (and 100), that is after the defeat of the Cimbri, because the people get used to the idea of one strong man on the seat of power etc' .

So - 104, 103 and 102 for his generalship, by the people and the aristocracy

101 and 100 as a reward, for sheer political power, by the people and with no support from the aristocracy

[caldrail]

The reforms of Marius are usually looked upon as a big step forward in military terms. In some respects they were. It turned Rome's annual/campaign militia into a permanent standing army. Thing is though, this change reflects the needs of the time. Warfare was becoming more protracted and the older levy system wasn't suitable any more. The adoption of the pilum for instance was an attempt to blend the utility of the first two ranks of the older militia system. Instead of two rankls, one with javelin, the next with sword, he decided that one rank equipped with both was more adaptable.

 

One important fact to realise is that Marius based his reforms on his own experience. Having been called upon to raise a legion and not being able to levy experienced triarii, he instead decided to opt out of the traditional three tier system and instead recruited and trained swordsmen which he needed promptly. This wasn't unusual to Marius. Other generals had previously found similar difficulties in maintaining the traditional structure of a legion for no other reason than the constant recruitment that was occuring. So, in other words, in his reforms he formalised trends and changes already existing in the Roman legions by that time.

 

There's no doubt that the reforms of Marius were an important step forward. Unwieldy traditional procedures were swept away in one go. A new professional army (in terms of vocation, not ability) extended the recruitment pool even further than Rome already had available, as now the poor had access to service whereas military service had once been a privilege of Roman citizenship and wealth.

 

The standardisation of the Roman legion is also notable but again this was based on what already existed, a system known to the Romans and well tried over centuries. Therefore, the reforms of Marius were not a complete change as is sometimes suggested, but an evolution, a 'maturing', of the former system.

[Caesar CXXXVII]

Marius intentions were reforms ? Or maybe he just wanted to recruit new soldiers because of the redused Roman manpower after the battles of Arausio, Noreia etc' ?