Scipio Africanus, Julius Caesar or Constantine the great

[sylla]

My choice would have to go to fighting with Caesar at Pharsalus, based on two factors:

 

- The fact that I admire Caesar, and think he was in the right in fighting the Civil War

 

- I'm less likely to get killed. Only some 200 Caesarians died at Pharsalus to 15,000 of the enemy. Sounds like good odds to me

Analogous to the Soviets in WWII, Roman casualties reports were essentially propaganda and almost always totally unrealistic .

[Divus Julius]

My choice would have to go to fighting with Caesar at Pharsalus, based on two factors:

 

- The fact that I admire Caesar, and think he was in the right in fighting the Civil War

 

- I'm less likely to get killed. Only some 200 Caesarians died at Pharsalus to 15,000 of the enemy. Sounds like good odds to me

Analogous to the Soviets in WWII, Roman casualties reports were essentially propaganda and almost always totally unrealistic .

 

Granted, the numbers are probably bumped down and up respectively (another estimate is 6000 pompeian dead and 1200 Caesarians, another still is that there is confusion betweenb the two sources - 6000 pompeian legionaires died and 9000 auxillaries while 200 caesarians died and 1000 were badly wound, all sources agreeing that 24,000 pompeians were captured alive), but it still gives an indication of the massive imbalance of the casualties, which is very consistent with the way ancient battles were fought - the vast, vast majority of the casualties occured in defeat ie when one force broke and ran, to be hunted down; Caesar's Gallic veterans would have given him an advantage in what fighting actually took place, and by all accounts the battle was over very quickly, all of these lending credence to the numbers we have, which as they are the only ones we have we really have no choice but to accept, especially as they do make sense considering what we know of the battle. There's also the argument that Caesar really could not afford to make great falsifications in his accounts, but suffice to say that we can be confident that Caesar suffered relatively light casualties at the battle of Pharsalus, while those of Pompey were heavy indeed.

[Formosus Viriustus]

Salve Sylla,

 

Analogous to the Soviets in WWII, Roman casualties reports were essentially propaganda and almost always totally unrealistic .

 

 

I see. That explains why they supposedly lost only 48.000 men at Cannae.

 

 

Vale bene et nil desperandum,

[sylla]

Salve Sylla,

 

Analogous to the Soviets in WWII, Roman casualties reports were essentially propaganda and almost always totally unrealistic .

 

 

I see. That explains why they supposedly lost only 48.000 men at Cannae.

 

 

Vale bene et nil desperandum,

Salve, FV

 

Analogous to the Soviets in 1941, the Romans acknowledged huge casualties only when they had no alternative, ie facing total disaster, like Carrhae or Arausio; in such scenario, there's clearly no place for propaganda.

 

If you have read Caesar's battle reports, you know better than that; there's virtually no reliable casualty figure within his accounts, with the relative exception of Dyrrhachium (relative, because ha pretended that of his almost one thousand casualties "the greatest part of all these perished without a wound, being trodden to death ... by reason of the terror and flight of their own men").

 

Vale bene et nil desperandum

[Formosus Viriustus]

Salvete Sylla et Omnes,

 

Well, I think that the Soviets claimed up to 20 million casualties during WW II. Military and civilians includes. That doesn't seem like 'minimizing casualties' much to me. Now it may well be that for certain batlles or fronts they downsized the numbers for some reasons while the war was still going on : you don't want to demoralize new recruits (and their families) by making it all too plain that they are going to a certain death. Stalin might well have done that. Seems reasonable to me. But it's my opinion that in almost all catastrophic events, be it wars or natural disasters or epidemics, casualty figures are far more often exagerated than minimized. (The Acient Greeks being notable exceptions - they hardly ever lost a man; except those 300 - which were more like a couple of thousand - that one time.) But I'll leave that subject to rest, otherwise we might get into very muddy waters.

 

Yes, I have read 'de Bello Gallico', I think three times now, over the years ( last time several years back ) and I have read his book on the Civil War once. But I must say : I read those books as much for their litterary value as for their historical content. That is to say : I have read dBG three times because it is a litterary masterpiece in my view. His book on the Civil war otoh is sketchy and unfinished, as I remember. So I might read it once again maybe (it's not such a large volume) or I might not.

 

Then, the 1000 man trampled to death. Is that impossible ? I'd rather have a ten tonner truck coming at me (I might have a chance to get out of the way), than say 2 roman legions, 12000 heavily armoured and armed men who are running for their life. All in all I have the impression that Caesar is not a wholy untrustworthy author. Of course embellished things every now and then. You'll have to take him 'cum grano salis', I guess, but I think that's true for most if not all things. Certainly with me : I love my history, I love talking with other people about these kind of subjects but I'm not an expert or a scholar or anything like that.

 

Look at it this way : I am also very passionate about music, but I can't read a note and I can't play one on any instrument. But I might occasionally mention an 'Andante' or even 'Counterpoint' because I less or more know what those words mean. Doesn't make me a musician, does it ?

 

Anyways, nice meeting you. May the gods smile on you and may we both live to fight another day.

 

Valete optime !

[Divus Julius]

On the continuing subject of Caesar's Commentaries, I've always wondered why the fact that he wrote them himself makes them so much more untrustworthy than other sources of Ancient History. Granted, they might be slightly more difficult to gauge, but from the opinion some people express about them, you'd think that Caesar's reports made other accounts look like gospel truth by comparison. The fact is that while most other commanders did not right up their reports themselves, their creatures did, and it is from these that we get our numbers. Pompey the Great's lackeys composed the accounts of his campaigns under his supervision. Our most reliable accounts of Scipio Africanus's numbers come from information from his own archives. For most of the ancient writers writing about Alexander the Great, his own journals, surviving in the Library of Alexandria, were a primary source. And so it goes. Caesar's numbers are no less trustworthy than those of any other battle we have records of, and possibly slightly more. He based his Commentaries off reports that he had already sent back to Rome, at a time when he could not afford to overly falsify events owing to the fact that reports of anything he ommited would almost certainly find their way back to his enemies, ever keen to discredit him. His account of the events can thus be mostly trusted, and his casualty numbers too to an extent, with a few exceptions (notably his numbers for his battles in Gaul match calculations of the population at the time, and the capabilities of the Gauls). When he says he was outnumbered, it is reasonable to go with him on being outnumbered, and when he says he suffered light casualties to heavy enemy losses, that too is acceptable.

[caldrail]

Yes, but think if the fellow roman was a bad ruler, as Maxentius, perhaps the bad treated people gladly would have fighted against him

 

The ruler might be bad, but the legionaries would still be forced to cut up their comrades who probably had absolutely no say in the politics of the time. That probably was not a pleasant experience.

 

Roman legionaries ('legionaires' is a modern french word) were loyal to their legion. They had their own religious cults, as the legion and the centuries within it had a 'spirit' that was venerated. Furthermmore, since the legionary commander was their patron, the soldiers were usually loyal to him, although I have to concede that modern standards of discipline don't apply to Roman legionaries, who were very quick to rebel and and mutiny if faced with poor leadership.

 

This all means that when facing Roman legions in battle, they were simply facing another enemy. There's an account of two Roman formations fighting each other during a civil war. They simply went head to head with no quarter given. The others were fighting against their cause and therefore as an enemy received no emotional affiliation amongst the troops ordered into battle against them. They were the enemy, not comrades.

 

The concept of a 'just war' didn't arrive until the late empire under Christian influence. Before that, a war was simply necessary. I've no doubt that commanders would make speeches justifying their cause and denigrating the enemies - that is after all required to motivate your trrops - but the fact that the opposing commander was a 'bad man' wasn't the primary justification. Remember that troops stood to gain if they followed their own leader into battle and won. It was therefore up to the commander to prove he was a worthier man than his enemy, someone worth fighting for, someone you could believe in.

 

The three victories listed in the original question are all significant victories, but I would imagine that for the men who fought and won, a certain pride in the victory of any battle was something they would feel pride in.

[sylla]

Granted, the numbers are probably bumped down and up respectively (another estimate is 6000 pompeian dead and 1200 Caesarians, another still is that there is confusion betweenb the two sources - 6000 pompeian legionaires died and 9000 auxillaries while 200 caesarians died and 1000 were badly wound, all sources agreeing that 24,000 pompeians were captured alive), but it still gives an indication of the massive imbalance of the casualties, which is very consistent with the way ancient battles were fought - the vast, vast majority of the casualties occured in defeat ie when one force broke and ran, to be hunted down; Caesar's Gallic veterans would have given him an advantage in what fighting actually took place, and by all accounts the battle was over very quickly, all of these lending credence to the numbers we have, which as they are the only ones we have we really have no choice but to accept, especially as they do make sense considering what we know of the battle. There's also the argument that Caesar really could not afford to make great falsifications in his accounts, but suffice to say that we can be confident that Caesar suffered relatively light casualties at the battle of Pharsalus, while those of Pompey were heavy indeed.

All sources were Caesarian; no Pompeian account survived, and there's a reason for that.

 

There were new recruits, auxiliaries and Gallic veterans in both sides (Labienus was the obvious example). In fact, Caesar frequently stressed his relative lack of veterans as an additional handicap; Thapsus was an excellent example, which BTW didn't prevent Caesar from the regular favorably unbalanced casualty report.

 

However, my favorite would be Munda (presumably Hirtius' narrative); we're supossed to believe that:

- After ruling for years 90% or more of the Roman world, the Dictator Caesar was unable to match the legionaires from the single rebel province of Hispania Ulterior (13 Pompeian legions versus 8 Caesarian).

- Even so, the casualties balance was like 30:1 (please don't ask me which side was favored).

 

Naturally, Caesar was not particularly original; the same applies to Scipio, Constantine and most Roman generals. There was a reason behind publicizing (and bumping up & down) battle reports: basic propaganda. We're dealing here with a literary heroic archetype older than History, analogous to the biblical Samson against the Philistines.

Edited April 18, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

Salvete Sylla et Omnes,

Then, the 1000 man trampled to death. Is that impossible ? I'd rather have a ten tonner truck coming at me (I might have a chance to get out of the way), than say 2 roman legions, 12000 heavily armoured and armed men who are running for their life. color]

You missed the point; Caesar was here so reluctant to admit the other side's merit (even in defeat) that he attributed most of his casualties to an accident (an Act of God, if you like).

If any claims were absolutely impossible, they would hardly make good propaganda.

Historical texts and figures are no dogma; we

Edited April 18, 2009 by sylla

[sylla]

Regarding Cannae and similar cases, and at the risk of overstating the obvious, big Roman casualties' figures can also have been used as Roman propaganda, irrespectively of their reliability; certainly not for Varro here, but via Hannibal for Scipio, magnifying then the magnitude of the latter's victory over the former.

Edited April 18, 2009 by sylla

[Gaius Julius Camillus]

Caesar of course.

[Antiochus III]

Salvete Sylla et Omnes,

 

Well, I think that the Soviets claimed up to 20 million casualties during WW II. Military and civilians includes. That doesn't seem like 'minimizing casualties' much to me.

 

Well obviously after the war they gave much more accurate figures. However, at the start of the war when Operation Barbossa was so successful, Stalin would not tell Soviet citizens the real numbers for fear of mass panic.

 

ATG

[Kosmo]

In antiquity history was one of the arts not a science. It's purpose was to thrill not to create a realistic picture.

Today, the "science" of history it's used to victimize yourself in a ridiculous competition of Who Suffered Most.

99% of what historians write it's crap, especially because of ideological bias but sometimes this crap it's the law.

[sylla]

Salvete Sylla et Omnes,

 

Well, I think that the Soviets claimed up to 20 million casualties during WW II. Military and civilians includes. That doesn't seem like 'minimizing casualties' much to me.

 

Well obviously after the war they gave much more accurate figures. However, at the start of the war when Operation Barbossa was so successful, Stalin would not tell Soviet citizens the real numbers for fear of mass panic.

 

ATG

The Sovietic example was quoted here because it was paramount and undisputable; the shameless manipulation of their casualty figures was standard practice and it's easy to check it out; for example, within the memoirs of marshall Konstantin Rokossovskiy.

 

At the end of the Great Patriotic War (WWII) Stalin was in Postdam looking for the payment of reparations and was undertandably trying to maximize his casualty figures (up to 20-23 millions); even so, it was most likely an underestimation, mostly explained by faulty registration. The current estination is around 26,600,000.

[Divus Julius]

Granted, the numbers are probably bumped down and up respectively (another estimate is 6000 pompeian dead and 1200 Caesarians, another still is that there is confusion betweenb the two sources - 6000 pompeian legionaires died and 9000 auxillaries while 200 caesarians died and 1000 were badly wound, all sources agreeing that 24,000 pompeians were captured alive), but it still gives an indication of the massive imbalance of the casualties, which is very consistent with the way ancient battles were fought - the vast, vast majority of the casualties occured in defeat ie when one force broke and ran, to be hunted down; Caesar's Gallic veterans would have given him an advantage in what fighting actually took place, and by all accounts the battle was over very quickly, all of these lending credence to the numbers we have, which as they are the only ones we have we really have no choice but to accept, especially as they do make sense considering what we know of the battle. There's also the argument that Caesar really could not afford to make great falsifications in his accounts, but suffice to say that we can be confident that Caesar suffered relatively light casualties at the battle of Pharsalus, while those of Pompey were heavy indeed.

All sources were Caesarian; no Pompeian account survived, and there's a reason for that.

 

There were new recruits, auxiliaries and Gallic veterans in both sides (Labienus was the obvious example). In fact, Caesar frequently stressed his relative lack of veterans as an additional handicap; Thapsus was an excellent example, which BTW didn't prevent Caesar from the regular favorably unbalanced casualty report.

 

However, my favorite would be Munda (presumably Hirtius' narrative); we're supossed to believe that:

- After ruling for years 90% or more of the Roman world, the Dictator Caesar was unable to match the legionaires from the single rebel province of Hispania Ulterior (13 Pompeian legions versus 8 Caesarian).

- Even so, the casualties balance was like 30:1 (please don't ask me which side was favored).

 

Naturally, Caesar was not particularly original; the same applies to Scipio, Constantine and most Roman generals. There was a reason behind publicizing (and bumping up & down) battle reports: basic propaganda. We're dealing here with a literary heroic archetype older than History, analogous to the biblical Samson against the Philistines.

 

*shrug*

 

You're entitled to your own opinion, but I'm going with what most historians say about battles of the ancient world: contrary to the movie depiction where the two forces slam together and remain locked in combat for the entirety of the battle (usually a few minutes) until everyone on one side is slaughtered, the battle was far more likely to consist of small groups of men who would clash, fight furiously for a few inutes, break apart and withdraw slightly to catch their breath, and then repeat. Eventually (in theory) one side vreaks and runs, and the winner can hunt them down. This is where the vast majority of the casualties occur.

 

Let's take the battle of Munda. It's quite natural that Caesar should have had a signifigantly smalller amount of soldiers. Many of the soldiers had been retired, a lot of others were dead or tied up in garrison duty (Africa, recently reconquered needed to be watched closely, and there was still a rather nasty situation in the East that tied up many legions). The 6 legions that Caesar gathered then had to march some 1500 miles at a cracking pace of around 60 miles a day, to arrive in Hispania in 24 - 27 days (the sources disagree), long before the Pompeians were ready (considering the incredible logistics that must have been involved to move a force of some 30,000 men that far, that fast, it really isn't surprising the force may even have been kept down). In any case, going to engage the enemy with only small bodies of men is quite consistent with Caesar. He crossed into Greece to face Pompey with only half his army rather than wait for more ships to be built. He launched a lightning campaign against Pharnaces with only 1000 odd veterans and three legions of recently defeated new recruits. He sailed to Africa with only a tiny portion of his army. Caesar consistently showed a preference for taking what was at hand to confront the enemy immediatly rather than giving them time to continue prepartaions while he gathered a stronger force. Some have criticzed him for it, others have praised him for it. Either way he still won.

 

Getting back to the topic at hand, Munda follows the general pattern of ancient battles. Initially thanks to the disadvanatage of the ground the Caesarians lose slightly more men, but make up for it by Caesar's action on the right wing and the Cavalry Envelopement of the enemy right wing that this allows. The result is that when the enemy break and run, it is thought by most that their casualties were more or less equal - both sides losing about a thousand or so men. The Caesarians then inflict a further 29,000 casualties in the pursuit (it is also in the pursuit that all 13 of the enemy eagles are captured).

 

Pharsalus also fits the pattern, Thapsus slightly different. At Thapsus by all accounts Scipio's men broke and ran extremely soon after engaging with Caesar's men (understandable with their own elephants stampeding through their flanks, their cavalry deserted and Caesar's also flanking them, Caesar's 4th lines having captured the fortified positions behind them, troops from ships he had sent around to demonstrate against them from behind making a show, and Caesar himself leading an attack on the front) only to retreat around the lake to what they thought was their own camps, only to find these too in Caesar's hands and surrender. Most of the casualties seem to have come upon a slaughter carried out by the Caesarian soldiers after the surrender, and there seems to have been very little actual fighting ergo very low casualties for Caesar.

 

At Pharsalus too all the facts point to the general pattern being followed, but even more so than usual. When the line was halted halfway through the charge Pompey's plan to tire his opponents out was ruined. As per Caesar's oders the first two lines rushed in to throw their pilla at close range before charging in immediatly afterwards, throwing the enemy back a bit, and giving the Caesarians the momentum in the scuffle that followed. Many of Caesar's veterans were gone, but he makes it clear in his own acount that there were enough of them left to form a a deadly nucleus of that likely played a part in the combat favoring the Caesarians thus far. Meanwhile Caesar's brilliant creation of a 4th line on the right wing, and the special orders he had given them (to weild their pilla like bayonets and aim for the faces of the Pompeian cavalry) had seen said cavalry routed and the the archers and light troops screening the Pompeian left slaughtered. Then at the same time as the Pompeians left is enveloped, Caesar orders in the 3rd line that he left in reserve. The above discussed nature of ancient battles is critical in understanding that this, just as much as the envelopement by the 4th line, was critical in causing the enemy to break up: with both sides having just broken apart from their struggling to catch their breath and regather their will to throw themselves back into the struggle the Caesarian lines part and the Pompeians, expecting to be able to rest for a bit standing and glaring at their opponents, instead find themselves attacked by a wave of fresh troops. Once the first few lines of Pompeians break and run, it soon turns into a complete rout, and this is where the vast majority of the casualties happen. Although a description of the battle of Pharsalus and the key parts of it is relatively long (in comparison to anumber of other ancient battles), the battle itself was over extremely quickly, and this helped the tactics Caesar used: to overwhelm the enemy quickly. In the pursuit that follows the majority of the casualties occur.

 

All in all everything we know fits what is put down: the Caesarians suffer very light casualties, the Pompeians heavy. Great reason to fight for Caesar