Past Their Best

[ASCLEPIADES]

The main point here is that there's is essentially no objective evidence of any significant decline on the Roman Army at the Late Imperial period, neither qualitative nor quantitative .

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[caldrail]

The main point here is that there's is essentially no objective evidence of any significant decline on the Roman Army at the Late Imperial period, neither qualitative nor quantitative ; in any case, quite the opposite. In fact, this army still performed impressive deeds under able commanders like Belisarius and Heraclius.

Impressive deeds which were a triumph of leadership. Under capable commanders, the men were motivated and it should be noted these deeds were not lasting. This is typical of armies. Its a mistake to assume that an army that achieves a victory is automatically at a high standard all the time because of it, and it also fails to address the circumstances in which that victor was won. More than one ancient victory was achieved by a ruse, not by great deeds.

 

It's just at the abrupt emergence of the mighty Caliphate at the VII century AD when any realistic chance to reconquest the whole Mediterranean basin was lost.

It was also due to the over-extension of the current roman capability. Justinians reforms allowed the roman army to become motivated again - to become ready for war. Thats typical of able and strong leadership but not a lasting one. Its noticeable that his army remained unwilling to campaign abroad for any length of time, nor were keen to retain that terrritory. Links to home life were much stronger in the late empires armies, the early byantines similarly so, and the use of territorial troops strengthened these links.

 

If the powerful Roman Army was not able to effectively defend the Western Empire borders from the beginning of the V century AD, we must conclude it was because it had to face even more powerful enemies.

A logical conclusion which would be correct if the situation was clear-cut. It wasn't. There was even a bizzrre situation in the late empire when the Western Empire was defended by Goths against an army of Romans. You also assume the resistance to external threat was organised and resisted in such a manner, again, this isn't entirely true. The fragmentation of the late empires defence made this difficult, the lack of authoritive governmental control made it doubly so. In your defence, we must consider a facet of human demography dealing with warrior cultures.

 

In some circumstances where tribes become involved in violent competyition, we see a warrior ethic emerging. They hone their skills and begin to violence as a desirable end in itself, that it allows rites of manhood, glory, status, and some measure of material gain when victorious. In cases where the violence is turned inward this culture would tend to remain contained, unable to expand because of distrust and vulnerability. Eventually though, a strong leader emerges and units the tribes. Their warlike instincts are now prevented from attacking each other, and inevitably the culture expands aggressively at a high peak of effectiveness through practice and atttude. It happened a few times during the ancient period. What must be noted however is that te culture is temporarily united under one mans rule, and that once he dies or victory ius achieved, the pressure to cmpete is much lessened by the extra territory and the society goes off the boil very quickly. They 'lose the sword' very readily.

 

As the contemporary demographic indicators (they are indeed hard to measure and analyze, but it has been done) suggest that the Romans were overwhelmingly more that the Germanic and related populations, many scholars consider unlikely that the latter would have been able by themselves to overcome the former.

As arminius proved, it only required clever and able leadership.

 

The main enemy of the powerful Roman Army was no other than the powerful Roman Army itself.

A bugbear of the professional period from the beginning. It was however largely driven by personal ambition of individual leaders.

 

Given the severe scarcity of documents from this period, the fact that this process was relatively well attested in Late Roman / Sub-Roman Britain is extremely valuable for us; even during the purportedly more peaceuful periods, like the Tetrarchy, Constatntius Chlorus (who was BTW the Imperial ruler of Rome itself) remained most of his reign fighting in Britannia; almost all such combat was not against barbarians, but fellow Roman soldiers.

Britain was a special place in roman eyes. Not especially valuable in itself - its resources never matched those of mainland europe and much of the island remained troublesome - but it represented the furthest extent of roman control.

 

In fact, when at the early V century AD Honorius left Britannia, that was not because the local Roman Army had been defeated, but because he required those soldiers to fight other battles.

Agreed. Notice however the legions did not return. Notice also that the withdrawal of the legions from britain across the channel was the last of such movements. Roman withdrawals had been going on for some time. Durocornovium for instance, a town grown out of a vicus along ermine street, was abandoned nearly a century before the Groan of the Britons simply because the army had left. The local markets had no buyers.

 

Even more: most Germanic tribes came across the Imperial borders originally as foederati (Imperial clients), technically becoming Roman subjects (ie, the Goths in 376 AD); so technically too, the battle of Hadrianopolis two years later was nothing more than civil struggle.

No, not quite. I understand the connection but the opposition at Adrianopolis was not from Goths involved in roman society. Possibly there elements amongst the gothic horde that had crossed over - the reverse may also have been true, but the leadership of this particular threat was not from roman society.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Impressive deeds which were a triumph of leadership. Under capable commanders, the men were motivated and it should be noted these deeds were not lasting. This is typical of armies. Its a mistake to assume that an army that achieves a victory is automatically at a high standard all the time because of it, and it also fails to address the circumstances in which that victor was won. More than one ancient victory was achieved by a ruse, not by great deeds.

Come on, I can`t believe you're seriously saying that. Impressive deeds require BOTH capable commanders and high standard soldiers. Period.

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[caldrail]

Impressive deeds which were a triumph of leadership. Under capable commanders, the men were motivated and it should be noted these deeds were not lasting. This is typical of armies. Its a mistake to assume that an army that achieves a victory is automatically at a high standard all the time because of it, and it also fails to address the circumstances in which that victor was won. More than one ancient victory was achieved by a ruse, not by great deeds.

Come on, I can`t believe you're seriously saying that. Impressive deeds require BOTH capable commanders and high standard soldiers. Period.

Not true. men of poor quality have been motivated to significant victory throughout military history.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Not true. men of poor quality have been motivated to significant victory throughout military history.

In fact, what defines any army's quality is its performance; whatever example you may imagine to try to sustain such argumentation (maybe Napoleon before the Alps?) it would imply that for whichever mechanism you may imagine such men have become high quality soldiers; period.

[caldrail]

Not true. men of poor quality have been motivated to significant victory throughout military history.

In fact, what defines any army's quality is its performance; whatever example you may imagine to try to sustain such argumentation (maybe Napoleon before the Alps?) it would imply that for whichever mechanism you may imagine such men have become high quality soldiers; period.

 

Not at all. Spartacus for instance. His army was composed of rabble with a handful of gladiators. He fought off professional roman soldiery for two years before being out-manoevered and overwhelmed by weight of numbers.

 

Or Adrianople. The goths did not have any real superiority in tactics, numbers, composition, and were not a formal army at all having gathered together immediately before the battle was fought. On paper, the romans should have romped home to an easy victory.

 

Or the rebellion of Tacfarinas, whose army of numidians was not as capable as the romans should have been despite any training they may have received.

 

Or the upsrising of Arminius, composed of rival tribes who were barely on speaking terms with each other, yet managed to ambush and destroy three roman legions over a considerable distance.

 

or any other rebel, resistance, partisan, or guerilla group that has taken on professional troops and won in the early days before they gathered enough experience to justify your comment.

 

Or perhaps you could just switch on the tv and watch the evening news.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Essentially, the following phrase is an oxymoron:

Not true. men of poor quality have been motivated to significant victory throughout military history.

Not at all. ... or any other rebel, resistance, partisan, or guerilla group that has taken on professional troops and won in the early days before they gathered enough experience to justify your comment.

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[caldrail]

Well, since I fail to attain the standard of literary and scholarly political correctness that Ascepid... Asclap... whatever your name is, I'll not bother posting.

[ASCLEPIADES]

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire - Edward Luttwak

This book is indeed a nice piece of work; Luttwak reached some pragmatical conclusions regardibg the comparison of the Roman Armies from different times in his Charter III "DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH. The Great Crisis of the Third Century and the New Strategies" (pg. 170-173):

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES