Past Their Best

[caldrail]

Given the multiple military disaster that ensued after the defeat of Decius in 251, we may presume that by then the legions had lost their legendary efficiency. This must remain no more than a presumption, however, since we have no evidence of the magnitude of the threat, which may well have been far greater than that to which second-century legions and their predecessors had been exposed. As we have seen, the qualitative change in the threat had certainly been most adverse...

...More than a century after Diocletian, 188 "legions" of all types are listed in the Notitia Dignitatum, but this bureaucratic survival is deceptive. The large combat units of the Principate had ceased to exist. The "legions" of the late empire consisted of perhaps 1000 men in the mobile field armies, and 3000 or so in the territorial legions, perhaps fewer. Moreover, their men were not the select and highly trained heavy infantry that the original legionnaires had been, and they did not have the equipment, training, or discipline to function as combat engineers - by far the most succesful role of the legions of the Principate. Nor was artillery any longer organic. In other words, these were not legions. Instead, the units were essentially light infantry formations, equipped as the auxillia had been, with spears, bows, slings, darts, and above all, the spatha, the barbarian longsword suited for undisciplined open-order fighting. Clearly, such forces were not the superior troops that the legionary forces of the Principate had been.

 

This decline did not occur suddenly during the fourth century, though most of our evidence dates from that time. The legions that survived the deluge of the third century must have done so in form rather than content. Depleted through the succesive withdrawal of vexillationes that never returned to their parent units, weakened by breakdowns in supply and command, repeatedly over-run along with adjacent tracts of the limes (and sometimes destroyed in the process), the legions must have been drastically diminished and greatly weakened by the time of Diocletian. Aditionally, many of the auxillary units, both alae and cohortes, either disappeared or survived only as limitani, that is, purely territorial forces incapable of mobile field operations

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire - Edward Luttwak

 

The Roman legions are often thought of as a relentless military machine, composed of ruthlessly disciplined and organised troops. In their day, it certainly would have seemed that way to their enemies, and I've no doubt the Romans were happy to let their soldiers be thought of in that way. Also, its partly a modern perspective, looking back at past glories with admiration for their achievements.

 

The truth is that the enemies of Rome kept on coming. The legions, for all their effectiveness in their heyday, remained dependent on their infrastructure to retain their efficient occupation. It was precisely for that reason, aside from keeping idle soldiers busy, that the Roman legions were tasked with civil engineering. They were literally creating a suitable enviroment to wage war where-ever they went, from formal marching camps built at the end of a days march to the roads and facilities that were part of Roman military organisation. During the late empire the evaporation of this ability coincided with the general decline.

 

The oriental influence in cavalry tactics was also making itself felt with the arrival of cataphracts and clibanarii, although the roman horses were not well suited to their extra load and their heavy cavalry were not well-disposed to charging for fear of wearing out their mounts. What must be stressed is that these heavy cavalry formations were never as numerous as the standard light horsemen the Romans had always employed.

 

Nonetheless, cavalry was playing an ever more important role in warfare. A medieval source credits the military reforms of Gallienus (253-268) for the creation of cavalry units - clearly not the case - yet these reforms, which remain somewhat obscure, do indicate a formal recognition of the importance of cavalry. Up until the these changes horsemen had been used primarily to support the infantry in battle, by scouting, harassing, and pursuing. From Gallienus onward a new emphasis on cavalry tactics was taking place. In short, the infantry were beginning to be seen as 'lower status' troops as opposed to the all-important heavy infantry of former times.

 

The adoption of the spatha, the roman cavalry sword, underlines this change in emphasis. Sword lengths had shortened during the Principate, and along with a shorter point, indicated that the regimented stabbing swordplay of the republican armies had been replaced by a closer, demanding, more flexible style that ultimately had led to the common adoption of open-order fighting. Livy records that swords were swung about as much as thrusted, so by his time, these changes were already happening. The weakening of training, caused by centurional casualties as much as style, not to mention the influence of gladiatorial contests (which mirrored the shortening of sword lengths during the Principate), resulted in a situation where it became desirable to keep an enemy at a longer reach.

 

Armour too had begun to change. Vegetius complains of the risks unprotected men had to take in battle. He overstates this, and archaeological evidence clearly shows the common use of chainmail. The famous banded cuirass, the lorica segmentatae, was falling into disuse. There is here a possible indicator of the state of teamwork within the legions. In their heyday, as these banded cuirasses were difficult, if not impossible, to don without the assistance of another soldier, the conterburnii system ensured such help was readily available.

 

The foreign influence of barbarian recruitment in the late empire has often been quoted as another factor in legionary decline. In The Complete Roman Army Adrian Goldsworthy has pointed that foreign recruits were absorbed into roman military units much as they always had, so they hadn't influended the decline as much as is popularly stated. The existence of the Federatii, the allied formations which operated without roman conversion, are another matter. These men were not neccesarily loyal to Rome, but rather to its pay, and they had earned themselves a poor reputation having been billeted amongst the civilian population.

 

What matter more is the decline in roman government. Increasingly unable to control provincial regions, increasingly unable to pay for defence, whole communities began opting out and organising their own defence which inevitably involved the use of foreign mercenaries. The successes of former times were largely due to the roman ability to organise, and as that withered, so did their military capability.

Edited November 10, 2008 by caldrail

[ASCLEPIADES]

Even if I mostly agree with Luttwak's depiction of the Roman army evolution, I find many of its conclusions extremely flawed.

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[Northern Neil]

Ammianus Marcellinus writes about the Persian campaign of Julian in 360. In his work, he describes legions made up of Roman citizens from Gaul and Pannonia, and the legions he describes appear to be just as disciplined and adept at siege engineering as any from earlier periods. I go along with heather's hypothesis that things deteriorated rather quickly from about 400 onwards. The setbacks of the 3rd century underlined a need to modernise the legions, and I believe this was done perfectly adequately.

[caldrail]

Some challenging points then. Okeedokee...

 

- Even if it was integrated by smaller units, the army described by the Notitia Dignitatum was actually far bigger than during the Principate.

Only if you accept the Notitia Dignitatum as accurate. Some of the units listed are no more than ceremonial. Nor can you assume every unit listed was ready for battle or actually existing at all.

 

- Why would the developement of larger cavalry and archery units have implied decadence instead of evolution against new enemies?

Decadence? Whats decadence got to do with it? Certainly there was an evolution to meet the demands of campaigning (even for the ultra-conservative Romans) but that does not imply it worked. What you fail to grasp is that the late empire was finding it harder to pay for all this stuff. Men need pay to remain loyal, never mind donatives to bribe them, and horses are not cheap at all. By increasing the emphasis on cavalry the costs rise. Also, since this emphasis inevitably means less on infantry, it would imply they would slip in standards. Military formations do if they lose their status.

 

- Why is it so clear that heavy infantry must have been superior? For one, that's not what the battle experience of any nation against central Asia nomad warriors (eg, Huns and Mongols) tell us.

Groan. The romans emphasised heavy infantry because it worked for them. But thats not why it was superior. The actual troop type is only part of the answer. It was the roman organisation, methodology, and relentlessness of warfare that made them superior - provided the leadership capability was present. However, there is an 'elite' quality during the Principate, an esprit-de-corps, that isn't usually seen in the ancient world. They believed they were better. Thats a priceless commodity in warfare.

 

- Why would the use of "barbarian" swords have implied lack of discipline. (BTW, virtually all Roman weapons were unavoidably "barbarian" previous to being adopted from other nations).

Because of the style of swordplay and amount of training required to perform it. With the shorter sword, you need to get close in, requiring more practice and nerve. With a longer sword, the temptation is to 'hack' in exactly the same manner as the barbarian enemy. It meant the roman soldiers were no longer stabbing in close formation, but engaging in open melee. Thats not a disciplined approach.

 

In this context I'm not interested in the origin of the roman swords, only how they used them.

 

 

- How can Luttwak objectively compare the Roman soldiers training level at different periods?

Presumably he's researched it. Vegetius may have written his manual on legionary practises to impress somebody, but it also carries with it a message that this was what the legions ought to be doing, not waht was taking place. He constantly refers to traditional training methods which we know were never always carried out in full as described by him.

 

- Even more; why would the Decius' defeats of 251 be explained by the ND (no earlier than 395)?

Why is there any connection?

 

I can perfectly understand that a "weakened army" might help us explain why battles were lost and I actually think that was probably the case; now I would like to see some hard evidence of such assertion, and not just circular argumentation (ie, the defeats were a proof of the army weakness that caused such defeats)

Aha. I see the problem. What you're doing is making a simplistic assessment of the roman legions purely in terms of victory or defeat, which is often circumstantial anyway. As for hard evidence, you seem far better able to find that than me. I have limited sources as you're well aware. As for the circular argument, thats yours, not mine. I would point out that if the roman armies were still as effective as in earlier times, why did they dissipate? We know they did. The answer is that they weren't receiving the same level of funding they once had. Warfare had become too expensive. I've no doubt there were roman units in the late empire that remained effective, but then, why were communities seeking their own defence? Its all part of the general malaise affecting the western empire.

 

Ammianus Marcellinus writes about the Persian campaign of Julian in 360. In his work, he describes legions made up of Roman citizens from Gaul and Pannonia, and the legions he describes appear to be just as disciplined and adept at siege engineering as any from earlier periods.

No, they weren't. The level of civil engineering by the military almost evaporates in the late empire. And its worth remembering that a roman described the legionaries as "Desiring any fate than to stare Persians in the face".

Edited November 11, 2008 by caldrail

[ASCLEPIADES]

- Even if it was integrated by smaller units, the army described by the Notitia Dignitatum was actually far bigger than during the Principate.

Only if you accept the Notitia Dignitatum as accurate. Some of the units listed are no more than ceremonial. Nor can you assume every unit listed was ready for battle or actually existing at all.

Point taken; we actually lack any primary source summary equivalent to the Notitia Dignitatum for any other period.

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[caldrail]

The Roman republican army seems to have continously grown until the Civil Wars' aftermath, when Augustus reduced it to about half its size; thereafter the same general trend of increase would have continued at least up to the division of the Empire.

 

Estimations of the Imperial Army size (auxiliaries included) vary considerably for any period: typical ranges would be from around 250,000 for the early Principate to around 400,000 for the Theodosian army. It seems recent consensus tend to prefer more conservative figures.

The growth of the republican army wasn't exactly continuous, but expansive due to political situation. They mushroomed in size during Caesars time purely because of the need to counter the rivals forces and even gain some strategic advantage in numbers during the civil war. Marc Antony alone had more than than thirty legions plus naval forces amounting to more than 150,000 men. Thats a colossal size to command for the period and it wasn't sustainable at that time - one reason why Augustus disbanded so many.

 

Irrespectively of their baccepted absolute figures, the majority of scholars I'm aware of (it seems Luttwak would be included) consider that the peak in Roman army's occurred at the late Imperial period.

I think not. The peak was during the Principate, although the effects of peacetime cannot be ignored. Once the civil wars that brought Constantine into power had ruined what was left of legionary structure, he reduced the size of the units. The other changes, the supremacy of cavalry, the mix of mobile, territorial, and foreign troops did absolutely nothing to maintain roman military efficiency.

 

Please note that (if as some scholars believe) the population of the Empire actually contracted at the III-IV centuries AD, previous figures may actually represent a higher proportion of the working-age Roman men within the Army, relative to the Principate.

Quite possibly. Given the extent of the recruiting efforts the romans clearly needed more troops than were conveniently available. From a largely voluntary force in the Principate, it became something the average person did not find desirable at all. That cannot be ignored.

 

That was mostly a chauvinistic myth; if heavy infantry have had always worked for them, the Romans wouln't have required auxiliaries (light infantry, cavalry, archers, slingers and so on), ie half or more the actual size of their army by the late Republic and all the Principate.

False assumption. The need for auxillaries was to compensate for skills the romans didn't have, and to retain tactical flexibility. The main arm of the legions up until the late empire was heavy infantry in an offensive posture.

 

The net differences between the Augustean and the Theodosian armies lessen significantly when you consider the latter as the equivalent to the sum of regular legions plus auxiliaries from the former; it seems the distinction between both kind of units quickly disappeared after the introduction of the Constitutio Antoniana.

But the two periods have distinct qualitative differences.

 

What evidence did Luttwak show for considering that the Late Imperial Army have lost its espirit-de-corps elite quality?

The same as other commentators. Whereas the infantry was the primary arm in earlier periods, it certainly wasn't toward the end. It had reduced in scale, in effectiveness, in equipment, in training, in capability, and status. That isn't conducive to esprit-de-corps. Edited November 12, 2008 by caldrail

[Northern Neil]

What evidence did Luttwak show for considering that the Late Imperial Army have lost its espirit-de-corps elite quality?

The same as other commentators. Whereas the infantry was the primary arm in earlier periods, it certainly wasn't toward the end. It had reduced in scale, in effectiveness, in equipment, in training, in capability, and status. That isn't conducive to esprit-de-corps.

 

Are we talking late here (as in 4th century) or late - late as in Aetius / Marjorian et al? because once again I must bring us back to Ammianus Marcellinus, whose description of late - ish legions suggests tremendous esprit-de-corps, and high morale. He refers to a Gaulish legion which was told to rest because it had sustained too many casualties. The legion in question ignored this, and still demanded to be in the thick of the action.

[caldrail]

A gaulish legion. Just one? As I said, it was always likely that a unit might be as effective as in previous times, but the whole roman army was not by any means. Also, this notable example of morale is not necessarily esprit-de-corps. It certainly is evdence that this unit had a high degree of morale and motivation - so congratulations to its commander for a job well done.

 

Esprit-de-corps is something that exists on a permanent basis once established, to a greater or lesser degree. Morale is circumstantial, and even troops in bad situations have been motivated to acquit themselves beyond expectation.

 

Roman commentators aren't entirely objective. Some are worse than others - Marcellinus comes across as one of the better - but because he highlights the commendable attitude of one unit doesn't mean that entire army was so motivated, even if he means to communicate that. Also, Does Marcellinus have experience of Principatal legions? No, of course he doesn't. The old methods were well known to romans. Vegetius records them but he does so because no-one else has. His training schedules are based on what occured in earlier times, not his contemporary soldiery of which he himself had little experience.

[ASCLEPIADES]

That was mostly a chauvinistic myth; if heavy infantry have had always worked for them, the Romans wouln't have required auxiliaries (light infantry, cavalry, archers, slingers and so on), ie half or more the actual size of their army by the late Republic and all the Principate.

False assumption. The need for auxillaries was to compensate for skills the romans didn't have, and to retain tactical flexibility. The main arm of the legions up until the late empire was heavy infantry in an offensive posture.

Actually, I think we're both saying exactly the same thing.

[caldrail]

Not quite. The heavy infantry of the professional period was the primary arm. The auxillaries were there to support their work. The late imperial infantry were little different from the auxillia.

[sonic]

Not quite. The heavy infantry of the professional period was the primary arm. The auxillaries were there to support their work. The late imperial infantry were little different from the auxillia.

 

Actually, I think it fairer to say that the auxilia were little different to the legiones. I'm also slowly coming to the conclusion that, even in the earlier period, the major perceptions of differences are between those units in the auxilia that fulfilled specialised functions and the legiones. I don't think there was much difference at all between the majority of legiones and auxilia from early in the 1st century AD.

[ASCLEPIADES]

This must be new:

Not quite. The heavy infantry of the professional period was the primary arm. The auxillaries were there to support their work. The late imperial infantry were little different from the auxillia.

How can we discuss if we keep saying exactly the same?

Actually, I think it fairer to say that the auxilia were little different to the legiones. I'm also slowly coming to the conclusion that, even in the earlier period, the major perceptions of differences are between those units in the auxilia that fulfilled specialised functions and the legiones. I don't think there was much difference at all between the majority of legiones and auxilia from early in the 1st century AD.

We (S & I) entirely agree.

Edited November 13, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[caldrail]

This must be new:

Not quite. The heavy infantry of the professional period was the primary arm. The auxillaries were there to support their work. The late imperial infantry were little different from the auxillia.

How can we discuss if we keep saying exactly the same?

 

Because we're not. You're looking at the roman legionary army of the professional period and considering the whole thing as composed of units fighting on equal terms. Not so. If you investigate operational formations and battlefield descriptions, the battle is conducted with the legions as the main arm, the other troop types support their efforts and prevent them from coming to harm. Noticeably, although there are obviously accounts of auxillary action, the auxillaries themselves are not given any 'starring' role. They are technically lesser troops in roman eyes, a necessary evil, one composed of non-citizens that happen to be useful to some degree. I daresay some commanders were more enlightened than others concerning that - Caesar was one, though he remained disappointed with his Aedui allies and had his own men trained as cavalry to replace them.

 

In the late empire, the emphasis changes. Legions are not as 'elite' as they had once been, and their battlefield role was no different to any other unit in that they simply took their place in the line and fought as directed. They were no longer the 'elite' or the 'heavy hitters', and although some of the former organisation survived the late imperial armies were beginning to resemble everyone elses. This is due to the organisational changes that had seen the end of the old-style legions (the ability to organise these professional units had withered along with the loss of military and governmental expertise) but also because the late empire was using units that consisted of tribes fighting without any roman influence, as independent allies. The homogenous quality of the professional era had been lost. Units were no longer uniformly equipped, smaller, probably more adaptable, but certainly no better overall and lacking the esprit-de-corps of earlier times.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Maybe what happens is that we basically agree on hard (ie, measurable) facts and mostly differ in the subjective interpretation of what each of us educatedly guesses.

Edited December 1, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[caldrail]

Since the decline of the legion is linked to the decline of the west as a whole, the continuation of the eastern army in some semblance of its former glory isn't suprising. Nonetheless, despite the continued organisation of the succesful byzantines, we must note that the peak fine edge achieved by the empire had been lost. The Byazantine armies were not able nor inclined to conduct the civil and military engineering so fundamental to classic roman activity, and whilst they retained a high standard overall, the pre-eminence of the cavalry had arrived and that inevtiably affected the importance of infantry in eastern armies.

 

It cannot be denied that infantry was still important per se, this is attested to in more than one work on the subject, but again it cannot be denied that the Byzantine army, for all its links and traditions inherited from the west, had little more than a resemblance to the legions of old. The Byzantines themselves thought themselves rightly or wrongly as roman and the true inheritors of their tradition, perhaps a reason why their armies are seen as such more than they deserve. Thats not to decry their efforts - they maintained Byzantine security for some considerable time.

 

In the west, the failure of government was characterised by an increasing attempt to spend wealth in displays to impress rather than to underpin efficient government. Indicative of organisational failure? I would say so, and the increasing reluctance of communities to suffer their rule, pay the rising taxes, and rely on western roman security must be seen as a decay of control. This inevitably afflicted the military since the roman army and government had been two sides of the same coin since early times.

 

The late empires reorganisation into mobile and territorial troops did not meet its needs. There was a trend toward conflict on a wider front for which the new organisation was intended to meet, an attempt to revise roman response to changing conditions in military strategy. There is also concurrently a sense of desperation too. We see the empire moving its capital to Ravenna, a city surrounded by swamp with an escape route to sea. We see emperors decreeing that two men without thumbs are as good as one man fully able to hold a sword. We see press gangs enforcing recruitment by violence and ruse. We see families bereft of support by the unprecedented recruitment of all male family members.

 

In equipment too, the sense of desperation continues. Vegetius complains about many things, the lack of training for one thing, one reason why he wrote his treatise on the subject. Also, he complains that roman troops are unprotected. He exaggerates of course, since any soldier seeks self-protection where he can, but since the government had taken responsibility for the equipping of troops with the fabricae system, it was therefore a drain on governmental resources they could ill afford in the less tax-efficient regime of the late empire.

 

There has also been comment on the decline of roman population. This is difficult to quantify. It is true that disease was far more prevalent in the late empire, that the risk of death and injury from violence more accentuated, and that records of the time less accurate for the lack of reliable accounting if nothing else, but in the wake of decreased security, perhaps the main reason might be a decline in agriculture to support it, given the western empires demand for military labour. In other words, the western empire was propping up its declining armies with recruits less than willing to perform, taking them away from the 'producing' industries, and in effect, reducing the level of tax income by occupational redistribution. Not enough for a total economoc collapse, but certainly, it introduced an extra burden on the financing of military endeavour. To some extent them, the western empire was cutting its own throat. Given they were under pressure and the demands of defence required they recruit foreigners to enforce it with giftys of money, tax breaks, and land, you can see the seeds of a terminal decline in their armed forces.