Ancient and Modern Battles and Wars

[Antiochus III]

Clearly, history repeats itself. Some ancient wars (or just single battles) played out in a very similar fashion to modern ones, one excellent exampe being the First and Second Punic wars, and the First and Second World wars. There must be many wars that have ancient counterparts, or vice versa, and I want to start the discussion of how certain things are similar, how things have changed, and what might happen in the future if we do not remember the past. Mainly though, if you know of any wars or battles that have certain things in common with ancient ones, please let us hear about them.

 

Antiochus III

[Northern Neil]

The Battle of Dieppe in 1942 reminds me a bit of the failed attempt to recapture Carthage from the Vandals in the mid-5th century. In both battles, combined forces from two or more states were roundly defeated by Germans at great cost to the allies in terms of men and material.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Salve, Amici.

Clearly, history repeats itself. Some ancient wars (or just single battles) played out in a very similar fashion to modern ones, one excellent exampe being the First and Second Punic wars, and the First and Second World wars. There must be many wars that have ancient counterparts, or vice versa, and I want to start the discussion of how certain things are similar, how things have changed, and what might happen in the future if we do not remember the past. Mainly though, if you know of any wars or battles that have certain things in common with ancient ones, please let us hear about them.

 

Antiochus III

What all battles have in common is that they are fought by and against humans; that explains most similarities from the Neolithic to the foreseeable future.

 

In his quite pragmatic Why Nations Go to War (1974, 10th ed. 2008), JG Stoessinger reached the hardly surprising conclusions that the rationale for beginning a war depends on an overly optimistic assessment of the outcome of hostilities (casualties versus costs) and that both sides will claim that morality justifies their fight. Such elementary conclusions apply both to past and present conflicts.

 

Our main problem for the fair analysis of classical wars and battles is that almost always we have only one side of the story, even regarding civil wars; therefore, most accounts are blatantly biased and jingoistic.

 

Obviously, we're far better informed on the most recent conflicts, like the World Wars; even so, the amount of existing contradictory information, facts and figures is often quite impressive.

 

Ancient battles' figures are an excellent example; the bulk of the available evidence and the most elementary common sense tell us that the majority of battles fought between similar armies are won by the biggest one. Even so, almost all Roman victories are depicted as epic triumphs over numerically vastly superior enemies. Just check on Caius Julius Caesar.

 

Generally speaking, most of the perceived parallels between classical and modern wars and battles stand only as long as you ignore the far greater differences.

 

BTW, I don't think History repeats itself.

In any case, it's hard for me to find how the study of the Punic Wars would have helped to prevent the World Wars.

Edited August 8, 2008 by ASCLEPIADES

[stormer]

Antiochus, I would say that humans repeat what some people before our time have done, some people never learn.

[caldrail]

Clearly, history repeats itself. Some ancient wars (or just single battles) played out in a very similar fashion to modern ones, one excellent exampe being the First and Second Punic wars, and the First and Second World wars. There must be many wars that have ancient counterparts, or vice versa, and I want to start the discussion of how certain things are similar, how things have changed, and what might happen in the future if we do not remember the past. Mainly though, if you know of any wars or battles that have certain things in common with ancient ones, please let us hear about them.

 

Antiochus III

to some extent warfare has remained a constant factor in human relationships. The reasons we go to war haven't changed in any major respect. The methods we use depend on fashion and current technology, and generally speaking have been fought between combatants of equivalent style, although capability and size varied considerably. In the rare situations where two completely different systems fought, the stronger and more aggressive won out, with cultures who have developed a ritualised method of fighting finding themselves flummoxed by an adversary that simply doesn't understand their rules.

 

Of course this is because human beings haven't changed since ancient times. We tend to organise ourselves and relate to others within limited parameters. That said, differences in cultures between ancient and modern are restricted to the same enviroments regarding combat. Forests, mountains, rivers, plains - none of these are any different. In desert areas for instance its easy to conquer large areas but difficult to retain them. The offensives of romans and parthians in Mesopotamia has some very interesting parallels to the much faster moving conditions experienced in the western deserts of WW2.

 

What has changed is the nature of urban warfare. In ancient times a siege or an assault was sufficient, but since the increase in urban centers the invasion of these areas has now developed into almost a campaign in itself. The specialisation of such warfare is not really a factor - modern armies know very little about siege warfare though I suspect it wouldn't take them very long to learn. Tha brings up an important factor - the ability of human beings to adapt.

 

What is significantly different between ancient and modern troops however is mobility and armour. Whole armies can be transferred to combat zones in very short periods of time, cover long distances, and outflank entire dispersed armies. You might argue the equivalence of the horse, and to a small degree, this is so, but it must be accepted that the horse was limited in numbers in the ancient world and sometimes a mark of status as much as utility. The development of air warfare has opened up a new enviroment for combat entirely, with the ability to strike the enemy at his rear - or his home and industry - with increasing precision as technology advances. The scale of warfare is of course radically larger than before. Human populations are much larger, and the increased efficiency of communications and logistics mean that armies can be numbered in millions as opposed to thousands dependent on foraging and verbal communication. There is now a directness about offensive campaigns that was not usually apparent in ancient times. The romans did however undertake some measure of amphibious warfare. Landings on the coast to attack Carthage, Caesars two landings in Britain (including fighting on the beachhead), the river invasions of Germanica by romans in the reign of Augustus, and the small unit raids made by romans on border settlements against german villages in the late empire come to mind.

 

What remains the same is infantry. The need to occupy ground is no different today than it was then. The way this is carried out has changed. Whereas in the past much of the territory captured had no strategic value nor any inherent threat, in todays world securing areas is of prime importance, since small-unit tactics made possible by the development of the firearm has meant that any habitation can harbour enemy units capable of interdicting your lines of supply. So whereas in the ancient world the focus was on besieging and capturing cities as strategic and political targets, now its much more conerned with area denial.

 

There are some parallels in troop deployment with the romans. From Hadrian onward, the use of secure frontier zones increased enormously, very reminiscent in scope to the Korean border perhaps, or the cold war borders. The action of Pompey against the cilician pirates has the same overtones as the american air raid on Libya, or the israeli raids on foreign power stations. Single heavy attacks to constrain or discontinue enemy threat.

 

So what parallels are there between us and them? Ancient and modern? Well... people. We haven't changed.

[ASCLEPIADES]

... I want to start the discussion of ... what might happen in the future if we do not remember the past.

I think modern Peace theories are a direct development of the study on ancient and modern War.

 

Verbi gratia, here come some of LH Keeley conclusions in his War Before Civilization (1996):

 

Myth 1:

Modern warfare is more deadly to the combatants than primitive warfare, because of technology.

In fact, says Keeley, the attrition rate of numerous close-quarter clashes, which characterize primitive war, produces casualty rates of up to 60%, compared to 1% of the combatants as is typical in modern warfare.

Despite the undeniable carnage and effectiveness of modern warfare, the evidence shows that primitive warfare is on average 20 times more deadly than 20th century warfare, whether calculated as a percentage of total deaths due to war or as average deaths per year from war as a percentage of the total population.

 

Myth 2:

Primitive warfare was infrequent.

In fact, Keeley says, even among the supposedly peaceful North American Indians, only 13% did not engage in wars with their neighbors at least once per year. This is about the same rate as for the most bellicose of modern states. The average modern state is at war, in contrast, only one year out of five.

 

Myth 3:

Warfare was introduced to previously peaceful primitive societies by Western colonizers.

This view is associated with scholars such as Brian Ferguson and others who argued, implausibly, that warfare was unknown until contact with the West.

Keeley shows convincingly that nothing could be farther from the truth.

 

Myth 4:

Precivilized war was conducted in a fitful, amateurish way, using ineffectual tactics, and usually ended after a handful of casualties.

This view, says Keeley, began with ethnographers such as Quincy Wright and Harry Turney-High, who created the concept of the benign primitive war distinguished as being amateurish, undisciplined and not particularly bloody.

While there was the occasional use of bizarre and quaint tactics, such as the use of giant flying whoopie cushions that the Inuit used to drive the Vikings from Vinland (page 72), in general the tactics used were brutally efficient; and because of their more precarious situation with regard to food, war often led to tribal annihilation.

 

Myth 5:

Modern organized military strategy is more effective than the guerrilla strategies employed by primitive societies. In fact, Keeley argues that the greater success of Western military campaigns has been largely due to their greater resources, not to any tactical advantages.

[DecimusCaesar]

One modern and ancient battle that has defiante comparisons is the battle on the Kuwaiti border during the First Gulf War and the battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War. The American General Norman Schwarzkopf utilised Hannibal's tactics against Saddam's army. He also says he was inspired by the Roman general Scipio Africanus.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Salve, DC

One modern and ancient battle that has defiante comparisons is the battle on the Kuwaiti border during the First Gulf War and the battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War. The American General Norman Schwarzkopf utilised Hannibal's tactics against Saddam's army. He also says he was inspired by the Roman general Scipio Africanus.

With all due respect, and judging by the power balance in both battles, I just can't disagree more with the previous statement.

 

A more apt classical comparison for the First Gulf War would be some of the Roman attacks against the native Sardinians after Punic War I.

 

The flattering of comparing Saddam's troops with Varro & Paullus' legions is just nonsense.

 

The only explanation I can imagine is that someone was trying to flatter General Schwarzkopf.

 

But again, if you decide to absolutely ignore all possible differences, you may find parallels wherever you want.

 

After all, any time a battle is won, the winning side is being "inspired" by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Maior, since he had no recorded defeat.

[caldrail]

One modern and ancient battle that has defiante comparisons is the battle on the Kuwaiti border during the First Gulf War and the battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War. The American General Norman Schwarzkopf utilised Hannibal's tactics against Saddam's army. He also says he was inspired by the Roman general Scipio Africanus.

But he did so on a strategic level, not a tactical one. In roman times, armies marched directly toward an objective or each other and the envelopment was rare. Even the entrapment of Spartacus doesn't fall into this category since his line of march was cut off by the other armies, not surrounded by them.

[caldrail]

Myth 1:

Modern warfare is more deadly to the combatants than primitive warfare, because of technology.

In fact, says Keeley, the attrition rate of numerous close-quarter clashes, which characterize primitive war, produces casualty rates of up to 60%, compared to 1% of the combatants as is typical in modern warfare.

Despite the undeniable carnage and effectiveness of modern warfare, the evidence shows that primitive warfare is on average 20 times more deadly than 20th century warfare, whether calculated as a percentage of total deaths due to war or as average deaths per year from war as a percentage of the total population.

A typical example of statistics being used to prove a point. Hand to hand combat can be deadly - there's absolutely no doubt whatsoever - but morale features very heavily, and units being cut down display a tendency to run away. In the presence of cavalry that can be disastrous too. The warrior ethic of ancient times erodes this factor somewhat since people expected to fight and it was considered normal. However, Keeley ignores the different style of combat. Granted the attrition rate may seem much less in modern times at first glance, but remember the battlefield is dispersed over a considerably larger area, and does not necessarily cease in few hours. The dispersion of troops is necessary to prevent casualties and the availability of firearms makes this 'open' warfare possible since troops can engage each other in longer range. Granted that most firefights after WW1 took place at less than 300m, but thats because of the terrain and the natural desire of troops to remain out of sight of the enemy. Potentially modern warfare is vastly more fatal than ancient times - as Saddam Hussein proved by dropping gas on his kurdish enemies. The casualty rates from weapons of mass destruction are not likely to small either.

 

Myth 2:

Primitive warfare was infrequent.

In fact, Keeley says, even among the supposedly peaceful North American Indians, only 13% did not engage in wars with their neighbors at least once per year. This is about the same rate as for the most bellicose of modern states. The average modern state is at war, in contrast, only one year out of five.

Men fight. Its an extension of the social animal instinct. Why people think it was infrequent is beyond me.

 

Myth 3:

Warfare was introduced to previously peaceful primitive societies by Western colonizers.

This view is associated with scholars such as Brian Ferguson and others who argued, implausibly, that warfare was unknown until contact with the West.

Keeley shows convincingly that nothing could be farther from the truth.

Warfare is endemic to humans as I've already said. But what Keeley fails to address is that animals often develop threat displays as a safer alternative to actual fighting. Humans do sometimes as well, resulting in strange ritualised confrontations that minimise the body count. This occurs insituations where cultures are isolated, since contact with others tends to generate territorial issues that become ever more serious.

 

Myth 4:

Precivilized war was conducted in a fitful, amateurish way, using ineffectual tactics, and usually ended after a handful of casualties.

This view, says Keeley, began with ethnographers such as Quincy Wright and Harry Turney-High, who created the concept of the benign primitive war distinguished as being amateurish, undisciplined and not particularly bloody.

While there was the occasional use of bizarre and quaint tactics, such as the use of giant flying whoopie cushions that the Inuit used to drive the Vikings from Vinland (page 72), in general the tactics used were brutally efficient; and because of their more precarious situation with regard to food, war often led to tribal annihilation.

Again I'm mystified where this myth comes from. If you're part of a primitive society thats involved in fighting, its expected, and the fighting attains a consistent level of skill - an average if you like. However, there are demonstrations of primitive warfare in New Guinea that do show an astonishing amateurism despite the endemic nature of the violence. Perhaps Mr Keeley might like to study that.

 

Myth 5:

Modern organized military strategy is more effective than the guerrilla strategies employed by primitive societies. In fact, Keeley argues that the greater success of Western military campaigns has been largely due to their greater resources, not to any tactical advantages.

Be careful here. The ability of guerilla units varies enormously with respect to their training, motivation, situation, and support. Some are no more than bandits, a criminal nuisance. At times guerillas have been almost a formal army in their own right. However, modern guerilla tactics are now commonly available in literature so a guerilla army has a head start in training. It remains a fact that such units perform badly until enough experience is gathered, assuming they survive. In the ancient world, there was no-one to teach such methodology, and it required an imaginative leader such as Spartacus to confound the organised state. Keeleys assertion also ignores the abilty of some guerilla forces to hide within their communities - a considerable advantage over an army with uniforms and heraldry displayed.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Dr Lawrence H. Keeley provides us some exceptionally rigorous archaeological analysis that can profoundly affect our overall conceptions on peace and war (probably that has just happen); of course, time only will tell the impact it might have.

 

From the back cover:"Challenging some of our most dearly held beliefs, Keeley's conclusions are bound to stir controversy".

We can only hope such controversy would be based on equally rigorous evidence.

 

Ibid:

"To support this point, Keeley provides a wide-ranging look at warfare and brutality in the prehistoric world. He reveals, for instance, that prehistorical tactics favoring raids and ambushes, as opposed to formal battles, often yielded a high death-rate; that adult males falling into the hands of their enemies were almost universally killed; and that surprise raids seldom spared even women and children. Keeley cites evidence of ancient massacres in many areas of the world, including the discovery in South Dakota of a prehistoric mass grave containing the remains of over 500 scalped and mutilated men, women, and children (a slaughter that took place a century and a half before the arrival of Columbus). In addition, Keeley surveys the prevalence of looting, destruction, and trophy-taking in all kinds of warfare and again finds little moral distinction between ancient warriors and civilized armies".

 

Judge by yourselves.

 

And Dr. Keeley's page if anyone wants to contact him.