Hadrians Foreign Policy

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The reign of Hadrian is usually described as a turning point of the Roman Empire. From the expansionist conquests of his predecessor Trajan to the withdrawal and consolidation for which Hadrian is known. Its entirely possible to see Hadrian as something less than the energetic administrator he is usually described as. He was quick to assume power and his claim to roman domination was not necessarily legimate. Anecdotes picture him as a somewhat distant, authoritarian, vain, obstinate, overly-liberal, self important intellectual, lacking charisma, restraint, or popularity, but it should not be forgotten that he spent half his reign visiting his provinces, that he applied humane laws to slavery, reformed finance, extended latin rights, and limited the excesses of gladiators bad behaviour. He was to be deified after died at the orders of Antoninus Pius, his succesor, despite the Senates deep reluctance to accord him the honour.

 

At the start of his reign, Hadrian had many issues to deal with. Revolts in Northern Britain, Mauretania, Dacia, Judaea, and a suspected plot against him in Rome. He dealt with all them methodically, and in some respects, his decisions cost him popularity. The plot in Rome was merely a ruse to dispose of those loyal to Trajan. He certainly made use of spies to stay ahead of possible plots against him, co-opting the Frumentarii ('Corn Collectors') as his personal intelligence agency, a far greater step than the networks of informers previously encouraged by individuals in positions of influence.

 

It is true that Hadrian withdrew from Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Assyria. He even considered abandoning Dacia, although the presence of gold mines meant that contnued occupation was profitable, and only a small portion was handed over to the Roxolani. The return of eastern territory and the Dacian solution won him no friends. The Trajanic conquests had been received well by the roman public, not to mention supplying the arena for games lasting 120 days - A third of a year in public entertainment. So, with the lack of public good will, and a desire to enjoy a comfortable life, its perhaps understandable that Hadrians policies were directed inwards. The reasons given are that these trajanic conquests were untenable, that the Roman Empire had overextended itself. This is very close to the truth, particularly in the east. It has been noted that in desert warfare, its easy to conquer large swathes of territory but very difficult to retain them. In time, Rome might have extended its roads and cultural influence in later years, but these frontiers were not secure, and for the most part, there was little to gain by keeping them. All this withdrawal is credited to Hadrians commonsense as a capable administrator, yet there are indications that Trajan would eventually have done something similar had not illness overtaken him. Mesopotamia for instance had risen in revolt before the war on Parthia had been completed. Also, two of the african limes ('Limits') intended to limit the nomadic intrusion in what is now southern Tunisia were built in Trajans time.

 

Before Hadrian, the extent of roman territory relied on physical boundaries supplied by nature, such as rivers, hills, mountains, valleys, or whatever feature served the purpose. This unsophisticated demarcation nonetheless has the benefit of being readily understandable on both sides of the border. In some places it was deemed necessary to mark the border in a more finite fashion. The vallum, an earthen ditch and bank, had already been used sporadically and the first limes, a border fence, was constructed by Domitian in Germania Superior.

 

The Principate was not a completely romanised entity. Like the layers of an onion, the extent of romanisation varied according to how far away it was from Rome. Its core was a small nucleus of solidly roman territory centered around Rome itself. Next was a layer around that of romanised provinces. Then a layer of regions less romanised, and so forth. Although the frontier was guarded by a system of watchtowers and roads, entry to the empire was not actually prevented. The roman legions were essentially an internal security force when not actively engaged in military operations abroad, and the suppression of enemy incursion was treated in the same manner. Therefore an enemy could enter roman territory at will, unimpeded by frontier defenses. The repulse of that enemy would take place further inside the empire. As the enemy advanced, they would inevitably meet a blocking force of roman soldiers. If the incursion was merely a border occupation that did not strike deep, then the roman legions would eventually arrive to send them back again. Inherent in this methodology is a need for time to organise a reaction to the enemy incursion. You could describe the legions acting in a similar way to anti-bodies converging on a virus.

 

Hadrian changed this policy. Henceforth, the frontier would be actively protected as much as possible. Given the limitations of military support, a complete containment of the frontier was not a practical possibility. There is a suggestion made in recent years that Hadrian had intended that the empire would be a giant fort, a fenced-off boundary that physically prevented access. This is simply not the case. Although there were some widespread barriers constructed around the empire - Hadrians Wall, and the Limes in Europe and Africa, we must consider this as the evidence of a selective border control policy. Only those frontiers that were sensitive or a security risk were guarded in this manner. The security of the roman frontier did not rest entirely on walls and ditches. The watchtowers and military road patrols remained in place even in 'safe' border areas, but in addition, if it was considered necessary, the romans erected forts outside the empire, to act as forward bases. Hadrians Wall has two such forts to the north, constructed in Hadrians reign. These fortifications were effectively in hostile territory, and since the romans had little regard for barbarian sensibilities, having built them on their territory was of little consequence if border security was to be achieved.

 

The roman provinces and territories once considered 'foreign' but under roman control were now embraced by a secure frontier. It seems that Hadrian had intended that the entire Roman Empire within this frontier system to become romanised. As a passionate sponsor of hellenistic art and literature his focus was on stabilising his empire and providing the background for a comfortable life. With the establishment of a secure border, the 'layered' empire could be replaced by a fully romanised empire, and development of outlying areas could be entertained to the extent that 'barbarian' culture could be brushed aside. This domestic policy was nearly a disaster.

 

Hadrian had visited Judaea in AD130. A revolt had begun under Trajans reign and this was one of several that Hadrian had been forced to deal with early on. Jerusalem had been destroyed in the Jewish War and had remained a ruin since AD70. Hadrian promised the Jews that the city would be rebuilt. Unfortunately, he chose to rebuild it as a roman city, Aelia Capitolina, and this resulted in a second Jewish War. After three years of bitter fighting the Jews were defeated, and Judaea was named Syria-Palaestina thereafter. This event is significant, for whilst it represents a unique revolt against Hadrians otherwise adept rule, it also demonstrates his lack of regard for non-roman cultures, and indicates his desire for a truly roman world.

 

Hadrian was an experienced soldier. He had served as tribune with the Legio II Adiutricis in Pannonia, Legion V Macedonia in Moesia, and the Legion XXII Primiginiae in Germania Superior. He had risen to the command of the Legio I Minerva, and although his war record doesn't seem particularly brilliant he nonetheless won awards from Trajan for his service.during the Dacian War. Having been a provincial governor in Syrua, he had direct experience of the frontier and especially that of the east.

 

The most significant example of this is Parthia. Trajan had conquered a great deal of territory from the Parthians, and roman soldiers were bathing in the Caspian Sea for the first time. Unbeknown to him, Trajan had very nearly met a chinese delegation led by the exploratory general Pan Chao, and only parthian intervention had prevented it. Parthia was wealthy because it straddled the Silk Road, a major land trading route east and west, and it was this taxation of trade that was a major reason for Trajans war on Parthia. The Parthians themselves did not want to be squeezed by a chinese-roman alliance, hence their efforts to persuade Pan Chao to leave the romans alone, but there were personal reasons for Parthia to want Rome defeated.

 

During his conquest, Trajan had captured the daughter of King Osroes I of Parthia. She had become a hostage, a guarantee of good behaviour. Nonetheless, Parthia, a kingdom of enough size to challenge roman supremacy, was preparing for war. Hadrian was told this when he dealt with the Mauretainian revolt, the other side of the Roman Empire, and he set out for the Euphrates border. That the hostilities did not take place is partly due to Hadrians superior political intelligence. His network of spies and contacts he had made in the east had served him well. However, Hadrian and Osroes made a settlement in which the parthian kings daughter was returned. There is an element of placation involved. Since Parthia was given much of what it wanted to fight for, the war was defused. There's no record I know of that mentions any settlement about the Silk Road and the tolls Parthia inflicted upon it, and its an important point, because this economic obstacle was one of the reasons for Trajans invasions of the east.

 

There seems to be little or no effort made by Hadrian to improve foreign relations beyond defusing the conflict on his borders. He was almost isolationist in his stance. Certainly his actions regarding legionary discipline and standards imply an army retained in peacetime and kept busy in spite of it. Hadrian, as an experienced military officer, knew full well the hazards of an idle army. He never provoked his neighbouring states, and this reinforces the view that he was directing his efforts internally to provide secure frontiers for the first time in roman history. So what can we say about foreign policy in the Hadrianic world? Simply this - Hadrians foreign policy was to have as little to do with it as possible.

 

A History of Rome - Le Glay, Voisin, Le Bohec

 

Chronicle of the Roman Emperors - Chris Scarre

 

Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire - Edward Luttwak

 

Who's Who in the Roman World - John Hazel

 

wikipedia.com