At the Sharp End

[caldrail]

Questions have been raised about command and control in combat situations for the professional armies of the 1st century AD. I've gathered some info on this from various sources along with some notes.

 

 

In the roman army, it was the wind instruments which played the major role. Since the time of the Republic, three successive calls controlled the departure from a camp; at the first call, wake up and start the day; at the second, dress and standby; at the third, move off in the regulation fashion. Diffeerent calls, accompanied by visual signals such as raising of the standards, would sound the alarm (Caesar, B Gall, II.20), or order a retreat (B Gakk, VIII.47). Widely used in camp music, also added a stimulus to the field of battle. When troops launched their attack, the trumpet calls added to their shouts (clamor) to encourage them as well as frighten the enemy, and different calls, audible over the noise of battle, pased on the officers commands.

Weapons of the Romans - Michel Feugere

 

 

Certain procedures were adopted as routine by legionary command. Josephus and Polybius both list the same procedures two hundred years apart.

 

Each morning at daybreak the centurions still report to the tribunes tents and then go with them to receive their orders from the general. They then return to their centuries, who are assembled waiting to receive their work orders for the day. If it has been decided to to break camp, they wait for the signal to be given by the trumpeters. On the first trumpet blast the tents are struck and the soldiers gather up their equipment. On the second the tents and other surplus baggage are loaded onto the mules; the remaining wooden structures in the camp are burnt and the soldiers assemble for the march...

...On the third trumpet signal the stragglers rushed to take up their positions in the ranks. Before setting out, a herald standing to the right of the general enquired three times whether the soldiers were ready for war and three times they shouted "We are ready!"...

Greece and Rome At War - Peter Connolly

 

Legionaries are depicted on Trajans Column as marching bareheaded - Caesar had noted that in times of emergency, it was common for soldiers to be unprepared and unable to don helmets, uncover shields, and form up correctly in time to meet the enemy. Josephus also records an instance of bored soldiers getting caught unawares by jewish forays from Jerusalem and being seperated from their weapons. Despite their organisation, ambush situations were not the roman forte. It isn't suprising then that the cautious romans took care to avoid ambush - they were well aware of the risks, and a column would certainly be screened with cavalry or even infantry formations where-ever possible. If they had time, a roman army might form in a large square facing outward if the direction of the enemy attack wasn't known. Its an important point. Although the roman practice was to be aggressive, to advance where-ever possible, it was also possible that they could find themselves bogged down in confusion.

 

Its also theorised that some cockades fixed to helmets (and easily removable for marching) were functional as markers for the men to recognise and form on.

 

It was sometimes felt necessary to impose a higher level of command over the c.5000-man blocks formed by the legion. Caesar routinely divided his army into a right wing, centre, and left wing, ech under the control of one of his legati, and this appears to have been standard practice.

The Complete Roman Army - Adrian Goldsworthy

 

The division of a roman army in this way is an ad hoc affair, rather than any formal lasting appointment. Increasingly during the Republic the generals were to be found behind the lines, on higher ground where possible, in order to gain a better overview of events. This unfortunately also means the generals cannot react to situations quickly. Caesar was often found in the front line fighting with his men, an older roman practice, and one that endeared him to his men. This meant he was not always aware of changes in the flow of battle, and at least once his subordinate commanders took the initiative and saved the day.

 

Armies deployed relatively close to one another, sometimes as little as quarter of a mile apart. It wasn't unknown for ancient armies to indulge in single combats and skirmishes before the main action started, and commanders would be quick to point out any lack of courage or skill on the part of the enemy. Morale, extremely important to men about to engage in hand-to-hand combat, was bolstered at every opportunity by wise commanders. Caesar noted that troops were better motivated if they met an enemy charge whilst advancing. This does appear to be a standard tactic, although not always practible in very large formations. Whilst republican armies adopted a practice of banging their shields to intimidate the enemy (who would probably be trying something similar on the romans), the sterner discipline of the principate era meant that armies now advanced in silence, in order to hear commands the easier and avoid confusion. Its been speculated whether a silent or a noisy formation was more intimidating. The general feeling is that a noisy one is more so, and that the creation of noise aids morale, but the confidence of the advance is a subtle display often picked up intuitively by their opponents.

 

Melee was not a long drawn out fight, but a series of intense combats in which opposing units drew apart and taunted or threw missiles at the enemy, until one side was ready to push in again and the other responded.There isn't any clear indication that this was done to order, and might simply have been an impromptu 'follow the leader' situation. It is likely though that centurions were leading men back into the fray in this manner.

 

The roman style of command was highly effective, but also very dangerous. Generals were conspicuous figures, marked out by their red cloaks, and often eben more spectacular costume. Moving around only just behind the fighting line they risked being hit by missiles. There was also the danger that individual enemies would single them out in an effort to win glory by killing the enemy commander.

The Complete Roman Army - Adrian Goldsworthy

 

Officers are close to the action, moving to where they felt they were needed the most, directing efforts at close hand to the men involved. Command is therefore as direct as possible, and since most centurions were busy fighting at the front to inspire their men, a necessary element of command. Caesar records forcing men back into the line as they wavered. It also means that some units involved weren't commanded at all - they had their place in the line, the officer was elsewhere, and the men were responding directly to the exhortations of their centurions to fight on - not always by command - but by example too. There was little opportunity for individual cohort tactics hence it wasn't necessary to hold the centurion back. Centurions were vital for restoring order after combat, functioning as the lead warriors of their 'tribe' in pretty much the same way as their barbarian opponents.

 

Adrian Goldsworthy has suggested that cohorts were commanded by senior centurions, the Pilus Prior, in order to provide a chain of command. However...

 

...there is no evidence whatsoever for this. The Pilus Prior may have had seniority, but this status was not a seperate rank distinct from that of the other five centurions in the cohort. because of ancient Rome's strictly classified system of social class, centurions could not command bodies of men larger than a century. The simple fact is that the legionary cohort of late republic or early empire did not have a commander; and this is supported by the fact that neither did it have its own standard or 'genius' (spirit)...

...This seeming anomaly - the absence of 'middle management' from the legion - is logically explained in the limitations of communications on the battlefield. Once battle was joined the first battle line was often beyond the control of the general and his legates; the centurions each led as many men as could be effectively commanded by a single man in the chaos of battle.

Roman Army Battle Tactics 109BC-AD313 - Ross Cowan, Adrian Hook