Tactics

[Gaius Octavius]

The Rhine was of no particular concern to the Romans. Caesar built a bridge across it in (12?) days. Engineers recently attempted to match this feat. Failed. Had their been a profit to be found in Germany, the Romans would have taken it - easily. Teutoborg notwithstanding. At this time, the Germans were eating soup out of their hands. The only temptation for Rome would have been the amber of the Baltic, but this they got through trade via the Danube.

[CiceroD]

Im not saying that the Rhine couldn't be crossed, its just that the Augustus's policy changed after Teutoberg.

 

The assertion that their was no value in conquering Germany begs the question. Was Gaul any more fertile? Did it have more mineral wealth? Think of all the lands Augustus could give to his legionaries to retire on had Varus carried on with his province building and the Empire went to the Elbe or the Oder.

 

To say that Rome was simply disinterested turns historical convention on its head.

[caldrail]

No. The manipular legion did not have gaps between maniples larger than six feet, for the reasons I mentioned earlier. As far as organizational matters, Roman commanders never pulled out a single maniple from combat. That would allow the surrounding maniples to have extra pressure on them, and they would probably rout.

Nonsense. The whole point of a maniple was that it was the basic combat unit before the reorganisation of Marius. As such, it was intended that a maniple could be used independently if required. To have to use a legion entirely is too restricting and does not not allow for tactical necessity. As for pressure, in some circumstances, perhaps. But that pressure isn't a sliding scale, and simply becaue one maniple has something else to do doesn't automatically mean the rest of the legion are going to be standing there knocking knees and soiling their sublagaria. Units rout because of the human instinct for self-preservation. Since there's safety in numbers, as long as a soldier remains part of a group, he feels psychologically safer (and usually safer in reality too!). If one other maniple goes elsewhere, that soldier is still part of his group and his sense of safety is unchanged. Now if this manoever means the unit is under pressure from an enemy, surely the commander wouldn't have split his forces in the first place? Or perhaps he has no choice but to. Warfare is all about necessity - you do what you have to.

 

Roman commanders used maniples as they needed to. Generally speaking they would have fought together - that was the whole point of the quincunx formation - in order to retain command and control, to support each other, to prevent the enemy from outflanking the front line.

 

The only organizing they would do is before their troops actually engaged in hand to hand combat, which is when maniples actually had spaces between them.

Again, thats wrong. I accept that agreed plans and manoevers were organised before the battle where-ever possible, but any army that can't manoever to regain the initiative or prevent enemy initiative is going to lose. Cannae is the case in point, and you might want to read Caesars accounts of battle - he mentions having to reorganise the line at the last minute or face defeat.

 

In the principes and triarii lines, they probably had large gaps to easily fill in or reinforce weakened sections of the line, but the main line just would not have gaps. The only thing they needed to have a slight gap for is to have a commander personally tell men orders and give them a morale boost.

There are advantages to a consistent melee line, just as there are disadvantages. If the line is immobile, in a defensive stance, then a gapless line makes sense. If the romans mean to attack, that also means they intend marching forward, and since they will be organised in blocks of men (not in long thin ranks as the firearm would favour) to advance forward over rough ground means that there will be units that swerve, or slow, for all sorts of reasons. For a consistent line, this completely ruins the whole point, since the line inevitably forms gaps (disorganised ones) of its own accord. By marching in semi-independent blocks of maniples, the troops would find it easier to retain formation and all the advantages thereof, plus the maniple commanders would also find command easier. These gaps are supported in the quincunx formation by overlapping the line behind, which therefore confirms that these gaps existed.

[M. Demetrius]

Roman commanders used maniples as they needed to. Generally speaking they would have fought together - that was the whole point of the quincunx formation - in order to retain command and control, to support each other, to prevent the enemy from outflanking the front line.

 

This is precisely what J. Caesar did when his army faced Pompey for their final encounter. He created an "invisible fourth line" in his battle array. These men (iirc two or three cohorts) had the task of suddenly appearing in front of Pompey's cavalry during their attempt at flanking on Caesar's right. At the right time, if we can believe Caesar's narrative, they were ordered to drop out and reform on the right, stopped and routed Pompey's cavalry, and the confusion in his lines caused by retreating cavalry produced just the right effect to win the day.

 

The maniple/cohort functional maneuverability helped the Romans work out some larger battles (can't remember the name right now, and breakfast is ready, so I'm scramming) but in that battle against barbarians, the Roman center gradually retreated into a "C" shape and the two wings then surrounded the penetrating enemy, and destroyed the center of their line. The victory was total. But these maneuvers only happened because the specific subsets of the army could be ordered independantly, presumably by officers observing the whole battle line. A soldier would be very limited in his awareness of the rest of the line beyond a couple of men in either direction.

[caldrail]

The officers weren't always aware either. Centurions had a higher casualty rate than common soldiers because in order to inspire and lead their men, they often led from the front - which in roman times meant at the sharp end. That was why the romans developed a more flexible command system in the field.

[caldrail]

The Rhine was of no particular concern to the Romans. Caesar built a bridge across it in (12?) days. Engineers recently attempted to match this feat. Failed. Had their been a profit to be found in Germany, the Romans would have taken it - easily. Teutoborg notwithstanding. At this time, the Germans were eating soup out of their hands. The only temptation for Rome would have been the amber of the Baltic, but this they got through trade via the Danube.

 

No, the Rhine was important to Rome. It was a natural barrier and frontier line, it was also a trade route given that water-borne trade was far easier than overland (roads didn't always go where traders wanted to and in any case, roads were primarily for administration and military use). There were many tempatations for Rome north of the Rhine. Taxation for instance, the primary motive of Augustus's early attempt to colonise the germanian wilderness. Also, there was that unknown factor. Sure, for most romans the germanian forests were nothing but 'fearful forest and stinking bog' - or was it? Curiosity of the unknown breeds all kind of stories of wealth in hidden places and even Julius Caesar was tempted by this sort of thing - notice how disappointed he was that he never found the sources of precious metals in Britain that he'd heard of.

[Gaius Octavius]

"The Rhine was of no particular concern to the Romans."

 

"No, the Rhine was important to Rome."

 

The point I was trying to make, apparently unsuccessfully, was that crossing the Rhine was not a problem to the Romans.

[Antiochus III]

I knowCaesar formed a fourth line, as I said, the Roman quincunx allowed for troops in the rear to reform quite well, but when troops were acutally engaged the amount of maneuvring was minimal.

 

Antiochus III

[M. Demetrius]

I knowCaesar formed a fourth line, as I said, the Roman quincunx allowed for troops in the rear to reform quite well, but when troops were acutally engaged the amount of maneuvring was minimal.

 

Antiochus III

We may be saying the same thing, but we may not. Caesar saw the situation and gave orders for a line to be made and hidden behind his cavalry. When Pompey's greater numbers began to push Caesar's cavalry back, they retreated on signal, drawing the enemy cavalry into the waiting infantry, where they were stopped, repelled, then routed, throwing Pompeys entire flank into utter disorder.

 

There were ways that the units could be reorganized, moved up, back, ordered to flank, encircle, etc., and these were most likely done by trumpets of different pitches, (lituus, tuba, cornicen) inclination of standards, hand signals, and maybe other means we don't fully understand. But the lines didn't just become automatons, they were kept in order by the command structure, and were maneuvered by those who could see a larger picture than the men on the front line.

[Horatius]

There were ways that the units could be reorganized, moved up, back, ordered to flank, encircle, etc., and these were most likely done by trumpets of different pitches, (lituus, tuba, cornicen) inclination of standards, hand signals, and maybe other means we don't fully understand. But the lines didn't just become automatons, they were kept in order by the command structure, and were maneuvered by those who could see a larger picture than the men on the front line.

Or perhaps a Whistle! I won't give up on the HBO recreation lol ROMAN LEGIONARY WHISTLE Material: Bronze Era: 1st to 3rd Century AD Culture: Roman Style: Roman Origin: An Antiquities Dealer in Las Vegas http://www.romanofficer.com/images/whistle-2.jpg This looks intriguing wonder if it is genuine? http://cgi.ebay.com/549d-Roman-Bronze-Legi...7QQcmdZViewItem " "Every 60 sec they would blow a whistle. The man in front of the line would turn and walk to the back while the guy behind him took his position. This way the enemy, every minute or so would fight a fresh soldier. An those injured in battle can have wounds treated in back of the line.One of the tactics they would try was to thrust their shield upward pushing up the enemy's arms so they can slip their short swords under their shields and up in their rib cage. Or they would cut the back of their legs, preventing the enemy from standing." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xODx3UJ7W7I Sorry to interrupt but I like it !

[caldrail]

The romans are credited with all sorts of clever sword moves, but the fact is, with a legionary trying to stand shoulder to shoulder with his mates, a large heavy shield in one hand restricting his movements, there really isn't an awful lot you can do that is anything as fancy as claimed. Most of the classic roman swordplay is very direct and unfussy - you see a gap - you stab it.

 

However, once the sword begins to change during the principate there is an increasing emphasis on more florid styles of swordplay (at least in training). By the early 3rd century the gladius has become a different sword to those used in Caesars time. Shorter, straighter, and a less pronounced point, indicating a move away from stabbing as the primary attack. However, the skill required to use a short sword like this in a duelling style of melee requires practice, not to mention the nerve to toe to toe up close, so much so that the gladius begins to be abandoned in favour of a longer spatha, the cavalry sword, a weapon which the barbarian recruits would be more familar with and one that can be used with less training (and you keep further away from your opponent - a definite advantage to a newbie legionary)

[Kosmo]

Many accounts of battles point to romans having a looser line. That was that the maniple was designed for and that's why a maniple had 2 centuria. If you have a line you don't need a unit higher then the centuria.

If the enemy enters the gap beetwen maniples this could be solved by a centurion (and a maniple had 2 centurions while one would have been enough for the front) ordering a "face right/left" order for the soldiers on the flank leving the enemy in a pocket with romans on three sides.

A reason for the depth of roman lines (the other being change of lines within the centuria) could be this move, because a line four deep cannot create a significant gap.

 

What Caesar did at Pharsalus it's called refusing the flank, creating a line on a straight angle of the first line.

 

The Rhine, as GO rightly points (strange to say that ) was not a serious obstacle for romans. Danube it's bigger, but did not stopped them (or many others) from expanding over it .

[caldrail]

In pre-marius organisation the maniple was the basic combat unit - at that time the century was an administrative unit and the reason it became the base unit instead of the maniple in later times was because it was found that it was more convenient. Now Marius didn't introduce these changes off the top of his head, he formalised across the board certain trends that were already appearing in the roman military. So therefore, against normal procedures, commanders must have been increasingly using centuries instead of the more unwieldy maniple.

 

The reason why troops in the legions formed up in blocks is that it allows for support and 'impact' value in melee. A thin line is fine for missile fire but hopeless under attack and extremely vulnerable to cavalry action. A block has the advantage of being able to turn or reverse direction easily with disrupting the formation, something almost impossible with a thin line to all practical purposes.

 

Caesar refused his flanks more than once, he was forced to do so against a gaulish attack.

 

So the Rhine isn't a barrier? Lets get real. Drop by the biggest river in your neighbourhood. Notice the width of water you have to cross, the unknown depth, the strength of the current. The Rhine is a big river and yes, it is a formidable barrier unless you can build boats or bridges. If you doubt me, try crossing it without the aid of modern infrastructure. My guess is that you'll think twice.

[Kosmo]

So the Rhine isn't a barrier? Lets get real. Drop by the biggest river in your neighbourhood. Notice the width of water you have to cross, the unknown depth, the strength of the current. The Rhine is a big river and yes, it is a formidable barrier unless you can build boats or bridges. If you doubt me, try crossing it without the aid of modern infrastructure. My guess is that you'll think twice.

 

First of all the romans had no reason to cross the Rhine where it's the largest. They had land acces to Germany from Rhaetia, the famed Agri Decumani area. They could also easily cross the small Upper Rhine and Danube or where the Rhine it's divided in many arms.

Crossing a river was not as difficult then. The enemy could not know where an army will cross to concentrate at that point. Fishing and river trade made boats readily available. Simple boats could be made on the spot and the crossing was done quickly.The rivers were not high beetwen dams like today, so fords were available in places especially during summer. During winter the Danube was usually coverd with ice like it happened when vandals crossed the Rhine.

Many states/tribes carried campaigns over Low Danube (bigger then Rhine) in recorded history and many of them did it dozens of times.

 

The reasons why romans choosed the great rivers as borders were: a clear demarcation to barbarians, easy supply for garrisons with the river transport, a natural obstacle.

 

A roman fortress on Rhine could be supplied cheaper in peace times and more safely in war time then an inland one.

[caldrail]

I still think you underestimate the difficulty of crossing rivers. This is why fords are so important. I'm also thinking of the campaigns in Germania led by Germanicus, when roman soldiers had to route march in flooded terrain.

 

http://www.unrv.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=7350

 

Also, its notable that the biggest migration of germans into roman territory happened when the Rhine froze over, making the crossing somewhat easier. Further, although it may be easier to cross in some places than others, if you have to travel to another area to do so you may well run into a territorial dispute with the locals, who might not appreciate armed men roaming across their lands on the excuse of finding a crossing point.

 

Another interesting restriction is religion. Now I don't know if this affected the germans at all (I somehow doubt it) but certainly the romans were very superstitious about crossing rivers. The reason of course is that it angered the local gods if crossed without the proper observances, and the river would claim lives in payment of that offence. That of course highlights the risk of men weighed down with equipment getting swept away.

 

Finally, notice that in the accounts of battles the river is always a constriction to movement. We don't read of troops crossing rivers during the action (apart from those crossing bridges, using boats, or simply too scared to care whether the gods would get annoyed). Even cavalry doesn't generally take to the water either.

 

You've highlighted the easier travel by water than dry land. Agreed. But the placement of fortresses was made for other reasons too, and roman policy of ortress placement was either behind the frontier as a support base or well across the frontier, as a forward stronghold.