Tactics

[Maty]

At Charonea, (Sulla vs Mithridates, round 1) the Pontic scythe chariots charged the Roman lines, which opened up to let them through. The chariots were then polished off by javelineers posted at the rear for just this purpose. This certainly suggests that there was a lot of space and flexibility in a Roman line, though my own belief is that the Roman ability to form a very tight front line in melee meant that even when outnumbered 3 or 4 to 1 in overall strength they still managed local superiority at the pointy bit.

 

Incidentally, I once had a go at using a 'proper' Roman sword. These things are startlingly heavy. I was quite fit at the time, but would hardly have been able to lift it after about ten minutes of hard use. I guess with trained muscles you might stretch this considerably, but my own guess is that a 20-30min melee would lead to total exhaustion for all concerned.

[caldrail]

Film and tv gloss over the sheer physical effort of fighting with sword and shield. This was another reason why romans didn't like swinging swords around, it was too tiring and using the gladius as a thrusting weapon allows a legionary to attack without interfering with his mates standing in close order, as well as allowing for greater endurance in melee. That said, the advantage wasn't great. Also, a lot of melee combat isn't sword fighting. Its pushing, shoving, taunts, feints, even glaring helplessly at your opponent ten feet away sometimes. As you correctly state, going toe to toe for an elongated period is very exhausting and a major factor in the 'breaking' of one side.

[Gaius Octavius]

Not as poor as you assume. The reason he didn't attack the city of Rome and secure final victory was because he could not afford to remain in one place. He had no supply line from Spain (nor via the sea) and he knew the romans could pull in reserves and surround him if they caught him in one place. What Hannibal was attempting was to bring Rome to its knees - and lets be honest, they were on the point of panic at one stage..

 

I think that you make my case. Scipio didn't make that blunder.

 

Panic - yes; surrender - no. Roman traders were trading the land under Hannibal's feet at that time.

Edited February 1, 2008 by Gaius Octavius

[caldrail]

Scipio had the advantage of being able to land his forces close to the carthaginian capital and attack directly. Hannibal advanced across the alps and through northern Italy without a supply line, maintaining his troops by foraging (and was subject to considerable privation). That wasn't an error, that was a deliberate risk, the idea being that he would take the war right into the heart of roman territory. In the case of Carthage, they were unable to find fresh forces numerous enough to repel roman invasion. The romans on the other hand were better able to pull reinforcements in and therefore could withstand the losses that Hannibal inflicted.

[M. Demetrius]

Incidentally, I once had a go at using a 'proper' Roman sword. These things are startlingly heavy. I was quite fit at the time, but would hardly have been able to lift it after about ten minutes of hard use. I guess with trained muscles you might stretch this considerably, but my own guess is that a 20-30min melee would lead to total exhaustion for all concerned.

Of course, I admit immediately that I'm no expert. I do Roman reenacting, however, and concur that with one exception, all the reenactor gladii I've handled are point heavy, and overweight. As best I can tell, this is because the makers of the inexpensive swords use lesser quality steel for their blades. This is primarily to keep costs down, but because the metal is of low quality, the amount of metal they must use necessarily increases. The exception sword was from a custom swordsmith, and the balance was practically perfect, the edge so sharp it was scary, and the weight possibly half the one I carry. Mine is to show people how cool a gladius looks; his could easily be used in combat successfully. Mine cost about 50 USD, finished including scabbard, his 350 (for the blade only! He had to build the grip assembly and fabricate a scabbard on his own.) Mine was made in India, his was made by Mark Morrow.

 

The Roman soldiers trained with swords and shields that weighed twice the real weight, so to them, the gladius in battle was lightweight. I'm reminded of a skinny archer who could draw a 90lb longbow...a college weight lifter, muscles bulging everywhere could only draw it back about half way, because he had not trained the specific muscle groups needed. He could lift 400+ lbs in all sorts of ways, but couldn't do that task the skinny guy could.

 

And the 20-30 minute encounter is probably about all a typical trained soldier could handle, and would necessitate some kind of changeout of front lines, or they would be at risk of collapse. Roman cohort lines were often 8 or 10 men deep (and 20 or 16 wide), so there were plenty of fresh muscles available, as has already been stated. And if fighting a barbarian horde, they would be tired also, and most likely the lines would separate and regroup. Just how that maneuver was handled is the question that we won't be able to answer successfully unless some scroll is deciphered somewhere that explains it. Perhaps an excavation at a Roman training camp will someday produce the bronze placque that elucidates all. Or perhaps not.

 

Picture this, perhaps:

The time has come for the exhausted to break off the battle and the fresh troops to move up in the ranks. The Germans, say, being aware of this, begin to drop back a few paces. This signals the centuriones to rotate the troops forward. Instead of moving their tired soldiers back, these simply take one step aside, say to their right, and the ranks behind them advance, keeping pressure on the enemy, and bringing fresh troops to bear on a line that is not as neatly ordered. A volley of pila from the 5th and 6th ranks of legionaries, thumps into the ranks of the barbarians and pins some shields together, some soldiers to the ground, and some soldiers to the soldiers behind, as they are massed together hoping to regroup. A second volley follows, producing more havoc (this would be on the order of 40 to 60 javelins per cohort involved, perhaps). The barbarian falling back turns to a retreat, and the front 3 or 4 ranks of Romans break into a trot and advance on the enemy, still holding their lines, as their brothers from behind march forward to close the gap.

 

Meanwhile, as the Roman army advances, the tired troops fall in to the ranks near the back and are able to be given water, wounded removed from the lines, etc., while the Germans have no such respite. A rising cloud of dust and the sounds of a thousand horse hooves skirting their right flank produces terror in those soldiers on that side of the line, and terror from a rain of pila and grim Roman legionaries trotting into the battle, gladii at the ready, adding a sword thrust the the wounded lying in disarray in the no man's land between the lines: fresh troops in ordered rows coming against a mass of milling wounded, frightened farmers and weavers, likely produces a rout. If not, the process repeats. Behind these first cohorts are two other long lines of similarly determined Romans. Add to that slingers, archers, and light infantry javelin troops, sending a steady spatter of missiles into the mass, and it should become evident that as long as the Romans hold the ranks and files in order, they can present a steady supply of fresh troops against a less ordered mob.

 

I'd rather be a Roman, I think.

[caldrail]

Yes, a lot of barbarians came to that conclusion!

[Gaius Octavius]

Caldrail:

 

Not securing a line of supply, in my opinion, is a blunder. Not securing your base is a blunder. The Romans, in their fear, air mailed his brother's head to him. His senate did not want that war. They weren't helping him. This was a private revenge war. Don't you think that he should have called it a day when all his victories gained him nothing but the destruction of southern Italy (to this day)? After 17 years, the only thing that he gained was the loss of his country. He needed mercenaries to conduct his private war. He didn't provide a viable fleet to resupply him. After crossing the Alps, and considering the losses he suffered, shouldn't he have thought the problem out a little further? Did he consider the well known Roman pluck or the fact that the Romans could put more fighters in the field than he could?

 

His tactics may have been brilliant, but his strategy was doomed from its inception.

Edited February 1, 2008 by Gaius Octavius

[caldrail]

These were wars fought without modern logistics. To advance without long trails of wagons wasn't unusual and in many cases the only practical way to cross what was then wilderness. The romans were unsual in their ability to organise supply. Hannibal was a daring commander well aware of the risk involved. Sure, it may have been a revenge war, but then Carthage wasn't going to be allowed to survive anyway. His strategy was a gamble, like many other strategies before and since, but in his case it did not force the romans to surrender. As for requiring mercenaries, he had no choice, the armies of carthage were reliant on such men.... http://www.unrv.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=7653

 

No, not a blunder, a gamble.

[Gaius Octavius]

P.Q. Varus and Crassus were daring commanders. In my opinion, neither gambling nor temerity are the way to win wars. A well thought out strategy is.

 

"The battle is won before it is fought." Sun Tzu. (And Nicolo Macchiavelli)

Edited February 1, 2008 by Gaius Octavius

[caldrail]

The trouble with plans is that they sometimes go wrong. Warfare in the ancient world favoured the general who could think on his feet, and many of them did. The problem the romans had generally is that at the start of a campaign the generals were often appointed for political reasons, and got into trouble out of inexperience if nothing else. The romans didn't leave generals in command for long periods either, so they could not gain this experience (for political reasons, obviously).

 

In actual fact well thought out plans are sometimes a hindrance in warfare because they inevitably constrain initiative - as at Cannae for instance - and may be based on poor intelligence of enemy positions and intentions, not to mention an invite to chaos if one part of your plan isn't carried out correctly. The ability to react and outwit are far more useful.

[Gaius Octavius]

I surrender, you Evil Eyed person!

[Antiochus III]

No. The manipular legion did not have gaps between maniples larger than six feet, for the reasons I mentioned earlier. As far as organizational matters, Roman commanders never pulled out a single maniple from combat. That would allow the surrounding maniples to have extra pressure on them, and they would probably rout. The only organizing they would do is before their troops actually engaged in hand to hand combat, which is when maniples actually had spaces between them. In the principes and triarii lines, they probably had large gaps to easily fill in or reinforce weakened sections of the line, but the main line just would not have gaps. The only thing they needed to have a slight gap for is to have a commander personally tell men orders and give them a morale boost.

 

On a completely different note, I want to discuss the battle of Magnesia, and how the Romans were able to win. I don't know how to start a thread, so it would be great if you could tell me how, or start it yourself. I find it to be an incredibly interesting battle, especially since the Roman line broke at one point. Anyone else interested?

 

Antiochus III

[Antiochus III]

P.Q. Varus and Crassus were daring commanders. In my opinion, neither gambling nor temerity are the way to win wars. A well thought out strategy is.

 

"The battle is won before it is fought." Sun Tzu. (And Nicolo Macchiavelli)

 

They were daring but incredibly stupid. Even thinking about an invasion of Parthia without absolute political support and immense resources at hand is not intelligent. What many people fail to ralize about Eastern campaigns is the amount of supplies needed, and men needed to guard supply routes. It can be compared to Germania, and this is one reason why the regions were never fully subdued.

 

Antiochus III

[caldrail]

I surrender, you Evil Eyed person!

 

Thanks, but its its not really a victory. I used to see this sort of thing on the wargames table, where one guy has it all laid out, all lined up, all prepared. The other guy shrugs and does something different, and the whole plan goes up in smoke. I've made the same mistake myself!

 

They were daring but incredibly stupid. Even thinking about an invasion of Parthia without absolute political support and immense resources at hand is not intelligent. What many people fail to ralize about Eastern campaigns is the amount of supplies needed, and men needed to guard supply routes. It can be compared to Germania, and this is one reason why the regions were never fully subdued.

 

Woooah! Not stupid at all. Alexander conquered territory as far as India without supply lines and wanted to go further but for his mens refusal. Yes, there was a lot of supply needed, but don't think in terms of modern armies. The amount of supply is far less than we see today and mostly obtainable locally. Foraging from the local population has been the main way of obtaining supply since we started clubbing each other over the head. Further, the numbers of guards required is actually quite small, since generally speaking ordinary people don't like getting involved and are too busy simply surviving, and that there's not a lot of point in attacking a few wagons if the enemy troops can raid a few farms for their needs. This is why ancient armies are so mobile - they need to move on, or they get hungry. Notice also that these armies made do with very little. Hannibals troops are a case in point. They crossed the alps willingly (they were largely mercenaries, paid to fight, not really part of carthaginian society) and at one point even considered cannabalism.

 

The reason why Parthia/Persia wasn't sundued was because they were an organised regime of a large enough size to field some competition, and notice that the romans did penetrate into the regions once or twice, even reaching the Caspian Sea in the AD90's. Further, the troop types that Rome encountered in these eastern regions were often light cavalry, perfect for covering the large distances in that terrain, and the archers of oriental origin were absolutely deadly as the romans discovered. It was a tougher campaign than they were used to, and its noticeable that the romans sometimes struggled when campaigning in wilderness.

Edited February 2, 2008 by caldrail

[CiceroD]

What many people fail to ralize about Eastern campaigns is the amount of supplies needed, and men needed to guard supply routes. It can be compared to Germania, and this is one reason why the regions were never fully subdued.

 

Antiochus III

 

The reason for Germany-Across-The-Rhine remaining free was the difficulty of defending any would-be province there.

 

In fact the size of the Rhine itself is often overlooked. It is a MAJOR river. According to wikipedia it has double both the length and discharge of the Susquehanna near where I live and that is the longest and most voluminous river on the U.S. East Coast. The Rhine was such a great natural defence that after the Teutoberg Wald upset, it was only natural in the post Republican "Every General wants a Triumph" era to stop on its banks.