Punic Mercenaries

[caldrail]

...the Carthaginian Empire was almost entirely dependent on mercenary troops and saw both the benefits and the costs. At the conclusion of the First Punic War (264-241 BC), the hired army, which had not been paid and was threatened with disbandment, revolted, in what was known as the Mercenary War. The rebels were only put down when the Carthaginians were able to hire other mercenary units. In the next war however, the Carthaginians returned to a contracted force with great success. Hannibals army of hired, expert soldiers crossed the Alps and dominated the Roman citizen army in the Second Punic War (218-202 BC). It was never defeated in battle but ultimately was unable to overcome Carthages inferior material position. The war was essentially lost when Rome took Carthage's silver mines in Spain, meaning that the city-state could no longer afford to maintain a large hired army.

 

Corporate Warriors P.W.Singer

 

Aside from the relative merits of the commanders involved, we have here one of the primary reasons for the ultimate defeat of Carthage. Rome could call upon a larger recruitment pool, whereas Carthage relied on hiring a largely mercenary army to fight for them. This did not imply any lack of expertise. Far from it, Hannibals army were remarkably successful in winning victories on roman soil.

 

Mercenaries are nothing new - Indeed, there have men willing to fight for hire and reward rather than patriotism or necessity since warfare began. Compared to mercenaries of later era's however, these earlier troops demonstrate a level of commitment to their cause that contrasts with the greedy fickleness more usually expected. These men fought on campaigns that involved some considerable privation. There is a story of Hannibals crossing of the Alps that when the men were desperately short of food, one of Hannibals officers suggested that the men should be taught to eat human flesh and enjoy it, a suggestion which Hannibal would not consider under any circumstance. Despite this, the mercenaries did not abscond in any great numbers. Was this due to a potential financial reward if they stayed, or was Hannibals qualities as a leader sufficient to retain discipline?

 

During the First Punic War, the romans had put Carthage on the defensive with the war degenerating into a series of sieges. Regulus, the roman commander, defeated the Carthaginian army twice on their own doorstep and had them on the point of surrender. The terms laid out by Regulus were so bad that Carthage turned to a spartan soldier named Xanthippus, who trained the Carthaginian troops with such capability that he was rewarded with command of the entire army. The romans, in sight of victory, were repulsed with appalling losses. From this we can see the power of leadership confirmed as an important factor of victory in battle. Undoubtedly, with troops only there for a bag of coins, strong leadership must have been essential.

 

Hannibal now assembled a vast army of 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and about 40 elephants, and prepared to bulldoze his way through northern Spain. Polybius does not give a breakdown of this army but it contained the nucleus of the troops with which Hannibal intended to invade Italy, the remainder must have been expendable. It can therefore be calculated with reasonable assurance that that Hannibals army was made up of 20,000 African infantry, 70,000 Spanish infantry, 6,000 Numidian cavalry, and 6,000 Spanish cavalry, the expendable elements being the Spanish...

 

...The bulk of the Carthaginian army was made up of foreign mercenaries. They came from many sources: Celts, Spaniards, Balearic Islanders (famous for their slingers), Ligurians, half caste Greeks (mainly deserters and runaway slaves), and the largest element, the North Africans. Carthaginian discipline must have been imposed on these troops and one would have expected them to serve under Carthaginian officers. However, it is clear from Polybius' account of the siege of Lilybaeum, in the First Punic War, that the mercenaries served under their own officers, as the superior mercenary officers tried to betray the town to the Romans....

 

...No attempt was made at conformity; each native group fought in its own way and had to be used to its best advantage...

 

Greece And Rome At War Peter Connolly

 

We have then a confederate army composed of largely hired troops equipped predominantly in hellenistic fashion, at least as far as the current evidence suggests, and in any case Carthage was unwilling to risk its small citizen base in warfare. Adrian Goldsworthy however has pointed out that some contingents were not hired, but provided by neighbouring kingdoms as part of their treaty obligations. This appears to be particularly true of Numidian troops and certain tribes, Celts and Spanish, were also formally allied to Carthage.

 

...Even the troops clearly hired as mercenaries were not all recruited in the same manner. In some cases these men were hired as a group, a leader or chieftan offering his own and his warbands services for hire. The leader received payment for his services and then supported, and distributed rewards amongst, his followers much as any chieftan would do. In the tribal societies of Europe there was a strong tradition of warriors seeking service with the leaders who could support, and give them wealth and glory, for a martial reputation was highly valued wherever it was attained. The bond between a chieftan and his followers was intensely personal. They fought for him and would just as happily fight with or against Carthage as their leader chose. We hear of one group of Gauls led by a chieftan who served several masters in succession and proved of dubious loyalty to each of them. The loyalty of such soldiers must have been significantly different from that of men who had been directly recruited and were directly paid by their carthaginian leaders. Presumably some units, especially those which included Roman and Italian deserters and escaped slaves, were of mixed nationality...

 

The Punic Wars Adrian Goldsworthy

 

Given the range of nationalities, there must have been difficulties in translating orders. It's almost impossible to describe a typical Carthaginian army, since each was composed of whatever troops could be found at the time without regard to any standard of type, equipment, or formation. The success of Carthaginian leaders in presenting a threat to Roman armies is clearly a remarkable effort, and it comes as no suprise that Carthage was usually hesitant in committing itself to battle. Although the hired units came for the cash, its obvious under closer inspection that many Punic mercenaries took part in campaigns simply because they wanted to fight.

 

[Andreas]

All Carthaginian mercenaries, or at least their officers, were probably acquainted with the Punic language as it was alongside Latin and Greek the most prevalent trade language in the Western Mediterranean Basin.

 

Most hailed from areas of long time Carthaginian/Punic presence like the southern coast of Spain, North Africa and the Mediterranean islands.

 

So predominantly Punic and subsequently Greek and Latin were more than enough to keep the chain of command going.

 

And the total war mindset of the Romans was what really set them apart from the Carthaginians. They would take on any loss and keep on trucking.

 

Before the clash with them and even for long stretches of the first two wars pitched battles were a rarity and being a Carthaginian mercenary was a sensible choice of profession promising loot and quite possibly a less risky and brutish life than a subsistence farming/hunting existence in some dirt poor region.