3rd Punic War

[Cassius Loginus]

In Appian's, History of Rome, we can read the event when Rome wanted to destroy Carthage completely.

 

The Carthaginians wanted peace and Rome accepted under these conditions:

 

1. surrender 300 hostages of sons of the noblest families

2. surrender 200,000 set of armour with 2000 catapults

3. the city of Carthage had to be placed 16km inland. (this condition was the most hypocritical of the Romans: stating that Rome is also inland and became prosperous so Carthage has to do likewise. This inland replacement meant the end of Carthage.)

 

 

I have great regard of the Pax Romana and the Roman values but I think Rome in the last condition of surrender was inhumane and cruel.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Αππιανος (Appian) was an Alexandrian civis (probably an equestrian) active during the Antonine period; he was probably very well aware of the implicit irony of the curious epilogue of his account of the III Punic War (Libri XX, Ch. CXXXVI):

 

" Some time later, in the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus (DCXXXI AUC / 123 BC), uprisings occurred in Rome on account of scarcity, and it was decided to send 6,000 colonists into Africa. When they were laying out the land for this purpose in the vicinity of Carthage, all the boundary lines were torn down and obliterated by wolves. Then the Senate put a stop to the settlement.

 

At a still later time (DCCVIII AUC / 46 BC) it is said that Caesar, who afterwards became dictator for life, when he had pursued Pompey to Egypt, and Pompey's friends from thence into Africa, and was encamped near the site of Carthage, was troubled by a dream in which he saw a whole army weeping, and that he immediately made a memorandum in writing that Carthage should be colonized. Returning to Rome not long after, and while making a distribution of lands to the poor, he arranged to send some of them to Carthage and some to Corinth (destroyed almost simultaneously with Carthage).

 

But he was assassinated shortly afterward by his enemies in the Roman Senate, and his son Augustus, finding this memorandum, built the present Carthage, not on the site of the old one, but very near it, in order to avoid the ancient curse. I have ascertained that he sent some 3,000 colonists from Rome and that the rest came from the neighboring country.

 

And thus the Romans took Africa away from the Carthaginians, destroyed Carthage, and repeopled it again 102 years after its destruction."

 

Caesar's dream was evidently more powerful than the Senate's curse that defeated Gracchus.

[Ingsoc]

Destroying a city wasn't something unusuall for a conquerer to do in ancient times, thought in Carthago case it's seem to be motivated by the memories of the 2nd Punic war.

[Primus Pilus]

3. the city of Carthage had to be placed 16km inland. (this condition was the most hypocritical of the Romans: stating that Rome is also inland and became prosperous so Carthage has to do likewise. This inland replacement meant the end of Carthage.)

 

I have great regard of the Pax Romana and the Roman values but I think Rome in the last condition of surrender was inhumane and cruel.

 

Cruel and inhumane? Perhaps, but this is just one example of a nation preserving their pre-eminence over a once mighty foe. Despite Rome's dominance after the 2nd Punic War, the potential reemergence of Carthage was still a real fear. I'd rather be forced to move than be sold into slavery or simply butchered.

[Vibius Tiberius Costa]

Why did the senate suddenly agree with Catos phrase, "Furthermore, Carthage must be destroyed" And why ask them to move the city. That's ridiculously devious, If they had complied do you lot think they would still have been butchered?

 

vtc

[Kosmo]

If carthaginians destroyed their city themselves there was no reason for romans to do it.

I think PP has a good point. Destroy the opposition while it's down because you don't know what will happen tomorrow. And of course the memories and propaganda of the two punic wars made them less nice towards a hated foe.

Not that the romans were very kind towards other people. The fate of the rodhian allies after they were no longer needed it's telling of the way roman idealism influnced their foreign policy

[Gaius Octavius]

In Appian's, History of Rome, we can read the event when Rome wanted to destroy Carthage completely.

 

The Carthaginians wanted peace and Rome accepted under these conditions:

 

1. surrender 300 hostages of sons of the noblest families

2. surrender 200,000 set of armour with 2000 catapults

3. the city of Carthage had to be placed 16km inland. (this condition was the most hypocritical of the Romans: stating that Rome is also inland and became prosperous so Carthage has to do likewise. This inland replacement meant the end of Carthage.)

 

 

I have great regard of the Pax Romana and the Roman values but I think Rome in the last condition of surrender was inhumane and cruel.

 

Had Carthage won the Second Punic War, do you think that it would have been humane and kind to Rome?

Cato was spot on.

Edited September 25, 2007 by Gaius Octavius

[WotWotius]

If carthaginians destroyed their city themselves there was no reason for romans to do it.

I think PP has a good point. Destroy the opposition while it's down because you don't know what will happen tomorrow. And of course the memories and propaganda of the two punic wars made them less nice towards a hated foe.

Not that the romans were very kind towards other people. The fate of the rodhian allies after they were no longer needed it's telling of the way roman idealism influnced their foreign policy

 

 

Fear as an incentive for war forever present in the minds of many Romans. Even when an enemy was of little threat to Rome, fear of what they may become was seemly a good reason to wage war on them; this militaristic incentive is most obvious when looking at Carthage

[Ingsoc]

I'd rather be forced to move than be sold into slavery or simply butchered.

 

True, however it's unlikely that Rome would left the Cartagians even if they would agree to relocate, this condition was simply a way to provoke Cartago to open hostilities and if they would agree to it the Romans would find another condition that would do that.

[M. Porcius Cato]

I have a hard time believing that Carthago's wealth is what motivated Rome to destroy her. Rome never destroyed wealthy cities like Alexandreia, Delos, Palmyra, Sidon, Tyre, and Athenae. Even cities that had been allied with Carthago, like Emporion and Utica, were spared, so the motivation wasn't simply cultural either.

 

My theory is that the problem, as far as the Romans were concerned, was that Carthago failed to submit to Roman rule: they did not accept that their entire foreign policy was to be dictated by Rome through her patrons in the Roman senate. When Carthaginian interests were threatened, she didn't ask Rome for permission to defend herself: she acted independently. Had Carthago instead played the same political game that had been played by all the Hellenistic has-beens of the Mediterranean, by guess is that Rome would have been perfectly content to have Carthago rise to be First Lapdog.

 

Granted, this isn't a perfectly benevolent solution, but after the Hanno faction failed to restrain Hannibal, Roman paranoia wasn't entirely irrational, and Carthago's self-preservation required a generation or two of kissing Rome's ... ring.

[Primus Pilus]

I have a hard time believing that Carthago's wealth is what motivated Rome to destroy her. Rome never destroyed wealthy cities like Alexandreia, Delos, Palmyra, Sidon, Tyre, and Athenae. Even cities that had been allied with Carthago, like Emporion and Utica, were spared, so the motivation wasn't simply cultural either.

 

My theory is that the problem, as far as the Romans were concerned, was that Carthago failed to submit to Roman rule: they did not accept that their entire foreign policy was to be dictated by Rome through her patrons in the Roman senate. When Carthaginian interests were threatened, she didn't ask Rome for permission to defend herself: she acted independently. Had Carthago instead played the same political game that had been played by all the Hellenistic has-beens of the Mediterranean, by guess is that Rome would have been perfectly content to have Carthago rise to be First Lapdog.

 

Granted, this isn't a perfectly benevolent solution, but after the Hanno faction failed to restrain Hannibal, Roman paranoia wasn't entirely irrational, and Carthago's self-preservation required a generation or two of kissing Rome's ... ring.

 

The nastiness with Masinissa, who even the Roman historians agree was supported by Rome, is further proof that the Romans goaded the Carthaginians into another war.

[M. Porcius Cato]

The nastiness with Masinissa, who even the Roman historians agree was supported by Rome, is further proof that the Romans goaded the Carthaginians into another war.

 

But why destroy Carthage while leaving so many other wealthy cities intact?

[Primus Pilus]

The nastiness with Masinissa, who even the Roman historians agree was supported by Rome, is further proof that the Romans goaded the Carthaginians into another war.

 

But why destroy Carthage while leaving so many other wealthy cities intact?

 

It certainly boggles the typical sensibilities, but it seems to have far less to do with wealth than the symbolic nature of permanently eliminating the threat of a great rival. I suppose it's prudent simply to quote Cato Major via Plutarch...

 

Cato, however, found the city by no means in a poor and lowly state, as the Romans supposed, but rather teeming with vigorous fighting men, overflowing with enormous wealth, filled with arms of every sort and with military supplies, and not a little puffed up by all this. He therefore it no time for the Romans to be ordering and arranging the affairs of Masinissa and the Numidians, but that unless they should repress a city which had always been their malignant foe, now that its power was so incredibly grown, they would be involved again in dangers as great as before. Accordingly, he returned with speed to Rome, and advised the Senate that the former calamitous defeats of the Carthaginians had diminished not so much their power as their foolhardiness, and were likely to render them in the end not weaker, but more expert in war; their present contest with Numidia was but a prelude to a contest with Rome, while peace and treaty were mere names wherewith to cover their postponement of war till a fit occasion offered.

 

Simply, the fear of a resurgent Carthage was a legitimate concern. It is interesting though that very few eastern cities were razed in comparison to Carthage and yet many of these continued to fight Rome (Macedonia, Mithridates, etc.). Perhaps Rome never truly felt as threatened by these later opponents as they did by Carthage. Oddly enough, it's quite possible that if they employed the same methods that they did with Carthage such repeat military actions could've been avoided, despite the financial disadvantage of destroying important port/trade cities in the east.

[M. Porcius Cato]

It looks to me like Massinissa didn't need any goading from Rome, that Carthage was just as "puffed up" as Cato reported, and that while Rome was guilty of favoritism, politics in Carthage were turning anti-Roman and belligerent, which led to Roman demands becoming successively more strict and unacceptable, until at last Carthage declared war on Rome.

 

Writing of the events of 153, Appian relates

By and by (as frequently happens in periods of prosperity) factions arose [in Carthage]. There was a Roman party, a democratic party, and a party which favored Massinissa as king. Each had leaders of eminence in position and in bravery. Hanno the Great was the leader of the pro-Roman faction; Hannibal, surnamed the Starling, was the chief of those who favored Massinissa; and Hamilcar, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo, of the democrats.

 

The latter party, watching their opportunity while the Romans were at war with the Celtiberians, and Massinissa was marching to the aid of his son, who was surrounded by other Spanish forces, persuaded Carthalo (the commander of auxiliaries and in discharge of that office going about the country) to attack the subjects of Massinissa, whose tents were on disputed territory. Accordingly he slew some of them, carried off booty, and incited the rural Africans against the Numidians. Many other hostile acts took place on both sides, until the Romans again sent envoys to restore peace, telling them as before to help Massinissa secretly. They artfully confirmed Massinissa in the possession of what he had taken before, in this way. They would neither say anything nor listen to anything, so that Massinissa might not be worsted in the controversy, but they passed between the two litigants with outstretched hands, and this was their way of commanding both to keep the peace.

 

Not long afterward Massinissa raised a dispute about the land known as the "big fields" and the country belonging to fifty towns, which is called Tysca. Again the Carthaginians had recourse to the Romans. Again the latter promised to send envoys to arbitrate the matter, but they delayed until it seemed probable that the Carthaginian interests would be utterly ruined.

 

At length they sent the envoys, and among others [Marcus Porcius] Cato. These went to the disputed territory and they asked that both parties should submit all their differences to them. Massinissa, who was grabbing more than his share and who had confidence in the Romans, consented. The Carthaginians hesitated, because their former experience had led them to fear that they should not receive justice. They said therefore that it was of no use to have a new dispute and a correction of the treaty made with [Publius Cornelius] Scipio, they only complained about transgressions of the treaty. As the envoys would not consent to arbitrate on the controversy in parts, they returned home.

 

But they carefully observed the country; they saw how diligently it was cultivated, and what great estates it possessed. They entered the city and saw how greatly it had increased in wealth and population since its overthrow by Scipio not long before. When they returned to Rome they declared that Carthage was to them an object of apprehension rather than of jealousy, the city being so ill affected, so near them, and growing so rapidly. Cato especially said that even the liberty of Rome would never be secure until Carthage was destroyed.

 

Livy then writes:

It was said that a very large Numidian army, commanded by Arcobarzanes, son of Syphax, was on Carthaginian soil, and Marcus Porcius Cato argued that although this force was ostensibly directed against Massinissa, it was in fact against the Romans, and that consequently, war had to be declared. Publius Cornelius Nasica defended the opposite, and it was agreed that envoys were to be sent to Carthage, to see what was going on. They rebuked the Carthaginian Senate because it had, contrary to the treaty, collected an army and timber to build ships, and proposed to make peace between Carthage and Massinissa, because Masinissa was evacuating the contested piece of land. But Hamilcar's son Gesco, a riotous man who occupied an office, provoked the populace to wage war against the Romans, so that when the [Carthaginian] Senate announced it would comply with the Roman wishes, the envoys had to flee to escape violence. When they told this, they made the [Roman] Senate, already hostile towards the Carthaginians, even more hostile. [...]

 

Gulussa, the son of Massinissa, told that a levy was conducted in Carthage, a navy was being built, and that without any doubt, they were preparing for war. When Cato argued that war should be declared, and Publius Cornelius Nasica said that it was better to do nothing too fast, it was decided to send ten investigators. [...]

 

The envoys returned from Africa with Carthaginian ambassadors and Massinissa's son Gulussa, saying they had seen how an army and navy were built in Carthage, and it was decided to ask for opinions [of all senators]. While Cato and other influential senators argued that an army should immediately be sent to Africa, Cornelius Nasica said that it still did not seem to be a justified war, and it was agreed to refrain from war if the Carthaginians would burn their ships and dismiss their army; if they did less, the next pair of consuls should put the Punic War on the agenda. [...]

 

Between Marcus Porcius Cato and Scipio Nasica, of which the former was the most intelligent man in the city and the latter considered to be the best man in the Senate, was a debate of opposing opinions, in which Cato argued for and Nasica against war and the removal and sack of Carthage. It was decided to declare war on Carthage, because the Carthaginians had, contrary to the treaty, ships, because they had sent an army outside their territory, because they had waged war against Massinissa, an ally and friend of the Roman people, and because they had refused to receive in their city Massinissa's son Gulussa (who had been with the Roman envoys). [...]

 

Thirty envoys came to Rome to surrender Carthage. Cato's opinion prevailed that the declaration of war was to be maintained and that the consuls, as had been agreed, would proceed to the front. When they had crossed into Africa, they received the three hundred hostages they had demanded and all the weapons and war engines that were in Carthage, and demanded on the authority of the Senate that the Carthaginians rebuilt their city on another site, which was to be no less than 15 kilometers from the sea. These offensive demands forced the Carthaginians to war.

[Primus Pilus]

It looks to me like Massinissa didn't need any goading from Rome

 

I agree there, I only meant that Massinissa felt comfortable that Rome would not challenge his border transgressions with Carthage, and that Carthage did not expect fair arbitration. Clearly something made both sides feel the way they did. My use of the word "supported" is probably not the best choice in this context, though.