Ambushes

[Gaius Paulinus Maximus]

In fact, an ambush in the right place and time could easily have caused Rome a very nasty defeat. After the Varian Disaster, Arminius had the opportunity to wreak havoc on the german frontier. I suspect he didn't have enough control over the tribes to keep a coherent army together on campaign against Rome, or possibly he understood the stubborn resilience of Rome. Nonetheless, that was one ambush that really could have caused the romans a serious reverse.

 

I suppose this is one of the main reasons why Rome often lost the battle but hardly ever lost the war.

[caldrail]

One of the primary causes of roman defeat in battles as opposed to the campaign is leadership. Roman generals were often political appointees and only after their lack of military acumen came to light would the romans seek someone beter. The romans I suspect were a little overly confident of their mens ability in war. Roman soldiers were capable - they were well drilled after all and trained toward a cruel violent mindset - but badly led they were no better than anyone else. Corruption was endemic throught the legions. Although I don't know of any instance where a roman army was bribed to look the other way, there were certainly individuals within it who might. Soldiers were keen to avoid fatigues and bribing centurions was a way of life. Remember too that in many cases the legions were not acting out of patriotism. They were loyal to their commanders, not the state. Augustus in fact addressed this situation by making sure that legions remained permanent organisations, allowing the development of esprit-de-corps etc. But even then they remained first and foremost the followers of their commander, as the various rebellions and civil wars of imperial times shows us. Another aspect to this is that the roman soldier serves a long time, between 16 to 20 years depending on period plus another four or five years as a reservist. Germanicus had to put down troop rebellions, and Tacitus describes the sorry state of the infantrymen - old, toothless, scarred, clothes worn out and ragged. Ok, some of these things ere improved upon but the discipline of the legions was ferocious and potentially lethal. They had plenty of desertions, and these disaffected soldiers were sources of information to their enemies.

[Kosmo]

They had plenty of desertions, and these disaffected soldiers were sources of information to their enemies.

 

It's strange to see the emphasis that the treaties between Dacians and Rome put on the return of deserters and the war machines. It's very likely that the dacian army had lots of roman desertors in it (soldiers or civilians?) and they were maybe the ones that builded war machines for dacians.

[caldrail]

The caveat for roman deserters is that they had better be sure they were joining the winning side. Lord only knows what the roman legions would do if they found one of their former friends handing out advice to their enemies!

 

There is one classic case of desertion in roman times that I know of. At the First Battle of Cremona in AD69, the emperor sat biting his nails (I forget wich one - either Galba or Otho) and amongst his defending forces he raised a unit of gladiators. The two officers who were commanding this post clearly did not take kindly to leading a bunch of slaves - gladiators of all things, a disreputable bunch of social outcasts - and disappeared the night before an suprise attack across a river. The men had a conference when this was discovered and decided to press ahead with the attack. They were ambushed by a very prepared attacking army and beaten back very soundly. Draw your own conclusions....

[ASCLEPIADES]

There is one classic case of desertion in roman times that I know of. At the First Battle of Cremona in AD69, the emperor sat biting his nails (I forget wich one - either Galba or Otho) and amongst his defending forces he raised a unit of gladiators.

 

Salve, C!

 

That emperor was Otho.

[Spartan JKM]

Wasn't there a battle somewhere in Gaul or Britain where the Romans were defeated by warriors dropping out of the trees on them?

You might be thinking of the disaster that befell a Roman army in the winter of 216/215 B.C., Lost Warrior.

 

If Rome was ever going to lose in the Punic Wars, it was in the critical years from Cannae to Hasdrubal's defeat on the Metaurus, more so in the earlier stages. The political situation Hannibal was attemting to molest was working slowly, and Rome even had to lower the wealth-qualification by perhaps 60% for service in the army - an indication that her manpower was indeed being lessened. But even if this is accurate (see Peter Brunt's Italian Manpower 225 B.C. - A.D 14, Pgs 66-75), Rome may not have been as strained as Livy implies, whose genius was literary, not critical. But it could have been. The one event that may have altered the outcome occured in late 216 B.C. When the Roman army of Cannae was assembled, one Lucius Postumius Albinus was sent north with a legion to divert the Gauls away from Hannibal's army. It came to nothing for that purpose, but the size of Postumius' army had reached that of a standard consular army, a paper-strength of 25,000 or so men. Postumius was elected consul for 215 B.C., but sometime in the winter of 216 B.C., perhaps November (a guess), he and his force were thoroughly ambushed and cut down almost to the man by the Boii, in what Livy calls the Litana Forest, probably near modern Modena in northern Italy, just south of the Po. Livy says '10 men' escaped, an illustration of the magnitude of the disaster, despite a certain overstatement (maybe it was 15 who escaped!). It was an impressive military display by these Gauls: they had cut trees to a point so they still stood, but could be toppled upon the road with a little force. When the Romans entered the path through this wooded area, the Gauls indeed pushed the trees upon the marching column, and had surrounded the perimeter, cutting down the Romans who were trying to escape in the limited escape-routes.

 

This disaster, at least as proportionately bad as Trasimene or the Teutoburger Wald, was serious because, at this juncture, Rome had no standing army to immediately replace it. In the Senate, for the only time in the war, they had to acknowledge, following Livy, that a theater had to be shelved; the Gallic war was forced upon them to be left in abeyance - and not because they had options. Hannibal was supreme in the south, though Rome itself could certainly not be taken by assault. Livy tells us of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus' speech, Book 23.25,

 

"..."We," he said, "who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must not lose heart at smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust we shall be, in our operations against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, we can safely leave the war with the Gauls out of account for the present; the gods and the Roman people will have it in their power to avenge that act of treachery. It is with regard to the Carthaginians and the armies with which the war is to be carried on that we have now to deliberate and decide..."

 

'The gods will have it in their power'? If the Gauls, Hannibal's 'looser' allies, had swooped down from their close proximity in the regions around Rome, she would have been in deeper trouble than any time during the actual events of the war. They did it in 390 B.C. - with an open road to Rome, and would revolt again in 200 B.C. This is what makes this so peculiarly fascinating. We cannot blame the Gauls for carrying a grudge with Hannibal; they had beared the brunt of his victories, and were more interested in forage and loot. But the diversionary attempt by the Senate to deplete Hannibal of his Gauls in the south didn't even work slightly. But the Gauls in the north, surely galvanized by their crushing destruction of a Roman army, with no other one coming, did nothing; they didn't even attack the primary colonies of Placentia and Cremona. A Roman army, under one Marcus Pomponius Matho, would not arrive in Gallic territory for more than two years. The inactivity of the Gauls at this point not only enabled the Romans to concentrate fully against Hannibal in the south, where they would slowly and inexorably gain operational superiority, but Etruria and Umbria, showing signs of revolt in the years to come, were given no reason to do so now, as they could conform to Rome's war effort with no interference.

 

People don't realize (not that they should) how close Hannibal came to breaking the federation - with his political strategy. He was a lot smarter than many of his critics, including perhaps even B.H. Liddell Hart and Bernard Montgomery. Comparing Polybius' enumerations for Roman potential manpower reserves and Livy's list of defections after Cannae, we can conclude that Hannibal broke the federation by about 40% (though all the least firmly attached protectorates) by 212 B.C. The majority of Campanians, whom were calssified as citizens, were also unavailable. Again, 40% of the Latin community was bled white, and there were hints of disaffection had been growing in Etruria and Umbria since 212 B.C. Livy even tells us that, after the victory at the Metaurus, enquiries were made as to which cantons in Etruria had intended to desert to Hasdrubal as soon as he appeared, and also which of them had assisted him with supplies, or men, or in any other way (Book 28.10). I realize we must be careful with Livy: his writing is beautiful, but not Thucydidean. But still, he didn't pull his information out of the air, and he wasn't writing fiction. Hannibal, directing the entire Carthaginian war effort almost soley by himself, came darn close!

 

Rome won, for all in all, because of the sound decisions of the Senate, and the utilization of her tremendous manpower reserves - more importantly, where and when to exercise that manpower. But despite the amazing spirit of the Romans and those loyal to her, without the resources she would have perished. Hannibal tapped into this considerably, even if it meant that he didn't make use of those resources for himself. I have mentioned before about the 12 Latin colonies who would no longer, perhaps because they didn't have the capacity to do so, supply Rome with men and money; the Roman disaster at Herdonea (210 B.C.), at the hands of Hannibal's wily genius, probably had an affect on the 12 colonies - the closest of the Latin colonies surrounding Rome. Remember, the Latin colonies were the largest and most important colonies, strategically placed ringing Rome. But that's not all: including the recalcitrant 12 colonies, Livy also tells us of the critical situation, in 209 B.C., for Rome regarding her federation,

 

"The deportation of the soldiers to Sicily, most of whom belonged to the Latin and the allied nationalities, very nearly caused a great rising; so often do small occasions involve serious consequences. Meetings were held amongst the Latins and the allied communities in which they complained loudly that for ten years they had been drained by levies and war-taxes; every year they fought only to sustain a great defeat, those who were not killed in battle were carried off by sickness. A fellow-citizen who was enlisted by the Romans was more lost to them than one who had been made prisoner by the Carthaginians, for the latter was sent back to his home without ransom, the former was sent out of Italy into what was really exile rather than military service. There the men who had fought at Cannae had been for eight years wearing out their lives, and there they would die before the enemy, who had never been stronger than he was today, quitted Italian soil. If the old soldiers were not to return, and fresh ones were always being enlisted, there would soon be nobody left. They would be compelled therefore, before they reached the last stage of depopulation and famine, to refuse to Rome what the necessities of their situation would very soon make it impossible to grant. If the Romans saw that this was the unanimous determination of their allies, they would assuredly begin to think about making peace with Carthage. Otherwise Italy would never be free from war as long as Hannibal was alive. Such was the general tone of the meetings. There were at the time thirty (Latin) colonies belonging to Rome. Twelve of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Cercei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna.

 

The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. "You colonists," they said, "have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome. You must go back to your respective colonies at once, while your treason is still confined to words, and consult your people. You are not Capuans or Tarentines, but Romans, from Rome you sprang, from Rome you have been planted in colonies on land taken from the enemy, in order that you may augment her dominion. Whatever duties children owe to their parents, you owe to Rome, if indeed you feel a spark of affection for her or cherish any memories of your mother country. So you must begin your deliberations afresh, for what you are now so recklessly contemplating means the betrayal of the sovereignty of Rome and the surrender of victory into the hands of Hannibal." Such were the arguments which each of the consuls advanced at considerable length, but they produced no impression. The envoys said that there was no reply for them to take home, nor was there any other policy for their senate to consider since there was not a man left for conscription nor any money for his pay. As the consuls saw that their determination was unshaken they brought the matter before the Senate. Here such general consternation and alarm were felt that most of the senators declared that the empire was doomed, other colonies would take the same course, as would also the allies; all had agreed together to betray the City of Rome to Hannibal."

 

The fact that some senators thought this was the case reveals how serious the situation had become. But cooler heads prevailed, and the Senate was reassured by the consuls, Fabius and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, that the other 18 Latin colonies would remain loyal - Signia, Norba, Saticula, Fregellae, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Hadria, Firmum, and Ariminum; the Tyrrhenian ports of Pontia, Paestum, and Cosa; and the inland colonies of Beneventum, Aesernia, Spoletium, Placentia, and Cremona. A simple glance of a map of Roman Italy at the time shows us that the 12 colonies who could no longer furnish Rome were, for the most part, in closer proximity to Rome. Thus they beared the brunt of the strain of the war against Hannibal, and, as Excelsior told us earlier, their soldiers probably were composed of the men who fell at the recent few disasters at Hannibal's battles. If this is true, Hannibal's strategy of destroying Roman armies to detach the allies certainly showed signs of viability. But no major battle in history has been more tactically devastating then Cannae (Subotai's destruction of the Hungarians, at Mohi in 1241. comes to mind), and his great victory cemented, not detached, Rome's core allies.

 

But this all gets even more interesting: in 200 B.C., a major uprising broke out, in which all the tribes, stirred up by the Cenomani, Insubres and the Boii, sacked and burned Placentia, and then proceeded towards Cremona. They were led by a Carthaginian named Hamilcar, who had stayed in northern Italy; he is believed to have been an officer of the army of either Hasdrubal or Mago, the invaders from the previous decade. Anyway, Roman forces, though dealing now with Macedon, where readily available to deal with this threat; Livy tells us some 40,000 Gauls were under Hamilcar. The threat was ultimately dealt with by a praetor - one Lucius Furius, under, of course, decisions made by the Senate. Livy tells this tense event, Book 31.10-11, and 31.48-49.

 

Hannibal, in retirement at this time, must have been very disappointed, assuming he heard of this; why didn't they rise in late 216 B.C. Simultaneous serious threats from north and south might have doomed Rome in this critical time; operations in Spain would be forsaken, and things might have been different. Carthage could not have defeated Rome, but Rome might have been defeated by circumstances at the right ime favoring Hannibal. Much depended on the peoples of Italy, Sicily, and Spain - on whom, between Rome and Carthage, it was in their better interests to join. The Gallic threat following Postumius' destruction might have affected things greatly in Carthage's favor. Maybe he should have assigned an officer to the north to effectuate a resistence against the north, as he did in sending Muttines to Sicily in 212 B.C. Clearly, as events would show 16 years later, the Gauls coud be stirred up under a Carthaginian officer - and even when Rome had forces in the area to resist them; this wasn;t teh case in late 216 B.C.

 

We have to wonder the degree of Hannibal's understanding of the Roman federation. In a letter to the people of Larissa, Thessaly, Philip V explained the nature of Rome's ability to absorb people into her realm. If Philip V understood this, why would Hannibal not have? There was no universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' amongst the peoples under Rome's domain; what had Latins in Spoletium have in common with Greeks in Apulia and Calabria? Even though Rome overcame the Gallic threat of 390 B.C. and Pyrrhus' invasion, they were nothing to what Hannibal threw at them. Unfortunately for him, the allies who did join him proved to be of little help in the field, and his strategy ultimately didn't work. Carthage's continued commercial dominance in the western Mediterranean was not to be; but she still prospered due in large part to Hannibal's later statesmanship. The Roman body-politic was just too strong, but a severe test had to be applied for us to realize this fully. History is full of twists that have shaped our world.

 

Regarding the Battle of the Trebbia, I don't think we can call it an 'ambush'. A small but decisive part of it was. It was a major pitched battle involving more than 80,000 men. Yes, Hannibal effected a trap, as he had concealed with Mago 2,000 men in a water-course he found, one with with steep banks; after the battle began, this unti of infantry and cavalry attacked the Roman rear with precise timing, as Hannibal was destroying their flanks. This was an example of simple-bluff on the part of Hannibal. The Roman might have suspected the ambush from Mago if the terrain was more featured with wooded and hilly terrain, but none of them expected what happened (see Polybius Book 3.71). Remember, hindsight is 20/20.

 

The massive ambush at Trasimene, which nobody has yet mentioned (did I miss it?), was a display of what we may call double-bluff on the part of Hannibal. This area was 'born for an ambush', as Livy remarks (Book 22.4), but Gaius Flaminius, not an inexperienced commander, may have thought this was too obvious, and Hannibal was whetting his appettite to fight with his scorching of the lands nearby. In any case, what commander in charge of some 25,000 men expects to be ambushed? Ambushes etc. hitherto had never occured on such an unprecedented scale; imagine the control Hannibal must have needed to exercise over his motley army, now swelled to perhaps over 40,000 men, to not reveal their position while an entire army marched yards away from them.

 

It's just food for thought, though. I hope I didn't ramble too much off topic.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

Edited July 31, 2007 by Spartan JKM

[ASCLEPIADES]

It's just food for thought, though. I hope I didn't ramble too much off topic.

Gratiam habeo, S!

 

Are you kidding? Welcome the rambling!

 

That was an X-traordinary X-planation of a cardinal but not very well known episode of the Second Punic War and related events. I suppose PWII is in some way similar to WWII; you never stop learning new stuff about them.

 

Of course, it was a little too long (maybe there should have been 3 or 4 X-traordinary X-planations). This is the kind of sin that some of us can easily forgive.