Napoleons Retreat From Moscow

[caldrail]

Just lately I've been reading the translated memoirs of one Lt. H A Vossler, a cavalryman of the 'Duke Louis' Chasseurs of Wurttemburg. Its an interesting tale. He starts as a frustrated young man at his home town, forced by circumstance to work as a lowly clerk but with the urge to follow the colours not far away. He gets his chance, and wangles a transfer to the cavalry regiment. Some action against rebels merely wets his appetite. Then comes the orders from Emperor Napoleon, and eastward he must go. In fact, he relishes the opportunity and there's a bizarre holiday-like atmosphere as the regiment marches across germany. Once in Poland, the land becomes rougher and the inhabitants less to his liking. Seeking comfortable billets and entertainment for the evening is almost a chore now, rather than something enjoyable. Its noticeable that even though he faces a journey of 1200 miles before he returns, he doesn't think about the coming battles. He seems to enjoy campaigning for its own sake, the sense of regimental belonging, a cause to follow. In fact, his men have been warned to avoid contact with french troops because they tend to be an argumentative lot who look down their noses at their european allies, yet Lt Vossler feels in no way inferior to the french line. Although he stays at places that offer friendly comfort and hospitality, his unit must continue forward because of the french units following a day behind.

 

This is as excellent glimpse into the mindset of the period, and I'm looking forward to reading what happens when the russian winter sets in, and that long terrible retreat begins.

[caldrail]

Now Lt Vossler crosses the Niemen River into Russian Poland. Russian cavalry patrols mount skirmishes but refuse to fight head on. The french army is becoming tired. Even as early as August the roads are turning into muddy quagmires. Horses are no longer fed oats but must subsist on green rye, and many of these hardworked animals are left dying from exhaustion by the roadside. Frighteningly, so are some of the men. Vossler loses horse after horse to exhaustion, eventually relying on a tough captured cossack pony. The hot-heads are getting frustrated because the enemy retreat before them, abandoning or burning villages as they go.

 

Finally, Vossler hears a communique read out by his commander. Napoleon says that at last a batlle is to be fought and let it be said that they were there at the gates of moscow. Its well received, although witnesses claim that Napoleon himself seemed cold and distant to passers-by. Vossler enters the battle apparently unaware of its scale. He doesn't even mention the name of the place (presumably Borodino). The Duke Louis Chasseurs are in trouble, encountering russian cavalry that far outnumber them, only to be saved by the timely intervention of friendly artillery. Vossler receives a head wound from a stray bullet and thats his contribution over - he's out of it.

 

Vossler describes the field hospital. Dead, dying, injured, amd maimed soldiers everywhere in primitive conditions. Russian cossacks threaten their security so they must move, retreat. It becomes clear the entire army is retreating. The french army has looted everything they can find and its astonishing how complete the disintegration of the grande armee has become. General officers travel with lowly privates with no regard to rank, unit, or nationality. They all know that russian peasants are murdering stragglers at every opportunity. Vossler witnesses them picking up abandoned muskets and shooting at the french. In fact, Vosslers servant has been told his master was killed by them and leaves for home, taking the horses with him.

 

The roads are frozen and difficult to traverse, littered with abandoned goods and equipment, not to mention frequent ravines. There's a traumatic incident at the River Berezina, a bottleneck with a narrow bridge. The russians know it and ambush the french retreat there, and at dusk, french engineers dismantle the bridge stranding many men, wagons, and horses behind.

 

Vossler is a man of some determination. He mentions the privations of cold and hunger but doesn't dwell on it. What absolutely disgusts him is the french foraging parties, which he must take part in, ransacking civilian homes and farms to provide provisions for the march. He regarded that as something akin to brigandage, especially since the Old Guard receive full rations that were sometimes intended for other units. He even accuses the french commisariat of selling forage for profit. He is undeterred by the risks and even after his injury, he attempts to return to the line. Unfortunately, it becomes clear the game is up and his only recourse is to make his way westward with everyone else. There is no longer any organisation - it would be every man for himself but those russian peasants pick off unwary individuals, never mind the constant harrasing actions by cossacks - including artillery fire in some places.

 

Thats approaching the end of part one - his unit reforms for campaigning the next year. Even after that terrible experience he is willing to take up arms again.

 

Absolutely fascinating stuff.

[Gaius Paulinus Maximus]

Absolutely fascinating stuff.

 

It certainly is!

 

Can't wait for the next installment!

[ASCLEPIADES]

Here is some information and pictures of flags of Wurttemburg Infantry. I still haven't been able to find a good link for the cavalry of that kingdom.

[caldrail]

I wonder how much of that colourful unifrorm and bright heraldry was still recognisable at Borodino? Actually one point I hadn't brought up was disease. Nearly four-fifths of napoleons army was affected by various complaints, mostly to do with contaminated food and water. Also, the army thast crossed the Niemen river lost a quarter of its effective strength by the time it reached moscow due to those cavalry skirmishes laid on by the russians, desertions, disease, and sheer exhaustion.

Edited July 9, 2007 by caldrail

[caldrail]

Ahh now this is more like it. Vossler has dedicated a section of text to his memories of the march home. Most of the army struggled homeward in large groups of mixed type and nation, since the risk of stragglers being picked off was very real. So was the cold. Vossler witnesses many people with exposed fingers and toes suffering frostbite and amputation because of it. Very unpleasant, and the worst side of human nature soon emerges. Some soldiers take clothes off the dead as you might expect, but they also do this to others they deem as unable to stop them, leaving them for dead. Any source of food is pounced on and no living (or even dead in some cases) beast escapes the cooking fire. Vossler doesn't say it, but the text suggests that a small minority were resorting to cannabalism. Dead soldiers are used as seats around the fire - there's no longer any room for sentimentality. Villages offered valuable shelter and everyone crowds into whatever buildings they can find. Stronger men form gangs and evict the weaker. Sometimes buildings are simply set on fire to provide warmth.

 

There you have it. The winter of 1812 was no worse than anything normal experienced in russia, but not the sort of place to be caught without protection.

[caldrail]

It is interesting to compare Napoleons experience with Hitlers. In 1812, La Grande Armee advanced along a narrow corridor with at least 100,000 men, with Moscow as the military objective to force russian capitulation. Hitler unleashed three million troops plus modern arms and logistics on a broad front, occupying territory and with oil as a major objective. In 1812, the russians harassed the advance but refused to commit to battle until the gates of Moscow were in sight. In 1941, the russians defended every inch as best they could. For these reasons the campaigns were very different.

 

 

 

In terms of weather, there are obvious similarities. Neither the french nor the german invasions had planned or equipped for cold weather. Whereas the french advance was difficult, the failure of modern transport in russian conditions brought the german advance almost to a standstill, requiring the requisition of civilian horses and carts.

 

 

 

Another point about advancing into russia is the experience of german soldiers, who recorded in interviews filmed in the 70's that the endless flatttened terrain of russia was both difficult to navigate and extremely depressing since after you reached the next hill there was only another in the distance. Vosslers account doesn't mention this malaise, and I'm not sure why.

[Antiochus III]

Hitler, however, had his troops divided into three major groups, Army Group North(AGN), Army Group South (AGS), and Army Group Central (AGC). Only AGC was actually going for Moscow. That being said, the number of men under Napoleon and hitler were relatively similar-600,000 for Napoleon, about a million for Hitler. Also, Napoleon's troops actually occupied Moscow, while the Germans never did. Napoleon's force took casualties consistently throughout his campaign, while Hitler inflicted unbelievably huge defeats on the red army in the beginning while taking relativle few casualties(look at Kiev-600,000 russians killed or captured. Did I see that number somewhere else?). It wasn't until later on when major battles like kursk(largest tank battle in history) went the way of the russians. Part of the reason for that is because of Stalin letting his commanders retreat, so as not to be surrounded, unlike early on. Also, there were some other major differences in the two campaigns. Napoleon had to move much slower though Russia than hitler's panzer divisions did.

To add to that, German forces swept across all of th ussr, not just a skinny strip like napoleon. That may seem like it doesn't matter-just the decisive battles make the difference right?-however, it was easier for hitler to protect supply lines, and bring reinforcements, which in turn made it easier to bring around flankers and such. This idea also helped the Romans use their discipline to win battles even though they were outnumbered. As you look at it in more depth, there are many differences between the two campaigns, and not too many similarities.

 

Antiochus III

[caldrail]

I wasn't actually comparing the style of campaign, and I've no arguement with the points you raise. What I was comparing was the experience of the soldiers of both campaigns. Forgetting for a moment the scale of Barbarossa, which was intentionally massive both to occupy territory and 'kick over the whole rotten edifice' of the russian defence, we see similarities in the weather and conditions experienced by both eras.

 

Naturally Napoleon did not have access to the men and materiel that Hitler was able to assemble, and yes, conducted his campaign according to the fashion and capability of the time. The advance on Moscow was natural since this was the primary strategic target. Hitler had other targets commensurate with the requirements of a modern industrial society in an expansive period.

 

Stalin had no choice but to retreat, it wasn't a simple decision as such. The russian army had been purged of supposed dissent a few years before, with huge swathes of senior officers (and many junior ones) executed out of political paranoia. The red army was therefore nowhere near as able to defend its soil as it might have been. Further, the crude aircraft of the opening campaign available to the russians weren't able to stem the german advance nor achieve air superiority, although it must be said the russian airmen made gallant efforts to do so.

 

There is however a difference in tactics employed by the russians in these campaigns. In 1812, the russians deliberately refused to attack the invasion and allowed them to wear themselves out on the long march to Moscow whilst keeping them busy with nuisance raids by cavalry. In 1941, the russians were attempting to stem german advance over a wide front by every means at their disposal. They simply could not do that because the germans were employing blitzkrieg tactics with full air support.

 

I might also point out that Hitler ordered one group to turn north toward moscow as the campaign drew toward the infamous russian winter rather than continuing its advance eastward in support of other objectives. He did this to ensure that Moscow fell before winter set in (an impossibility as it turned out) and thus achieve a potential surrender of russian forces, much the same way as Napoloen had intended.

 

Lets not forget how hard pressed the russians were. The arctic warfare divisions were rushed back from siberia to defend Moscow leaving their japanese frontier dangerously unprotected. The whole population of Moscow was employed to dig defences, and interestingly, churches were reopened for business to maintain morale amongst the populace.

 

As regards the speed of advance, the modern technology and strategic thinking that made the blitzkrieg possible obviously meant the advance was rapid, and when the breakthroughs were made, german forces swept into russia very quickly. Then again, with so much territory to defend, those russians who stood in their positions were enveloped (they were not ordered to retreat). However, the important point is that the autumn rains turned russian roads into muddy quagmires, which effectively reduced the advance to walking pace. When the tempertaure plunged later in the year, the german equipment was woefully unable to cope and in fact the germans were obtaining horses and donkeys from civilians just to get around. For Napolen, the occupation of territory as such served no useful purpose. He wanted a political victory by capturing Moscow and therefore persuading the russians to admit defeat. The russians however had intended all along to mass their forces at Moscow for an all out counter attack which is pretty much what they did.

 

Another point of comparison is the 1812 retreat from Moscow and the horrors experienced, as opposed to the fighting withdrawal of the 1943-45 era.

[Antiochus III]

Great ideas. I actually compared the german invasion of the ussr to Crassus invading Parthia in a research paper because of the great purge, and the moderate instability of Pathia at the time. After carrhae in 53, the commander that dfeated crassus was executed. It just shows that in some cases the terrain/adaptation of troops affects overall outcomes more than strength of armies. Hey, never start a land war in Asia. Ha ha ha.

 

Antiochus the Great

[caldrail]

The main difference with Crassus vs Parthia and Operation Barbarossa is of course territory. Its important to understand this. Modern armies seek to take objectives (which is essentially no different from roman methods) but they alsoneed to occupy their captured ground and suppress resistance behind the lines, somthing which generally didn't happen in ancient warfare, since most civilians were too hard pressed to feed themselves rather than attack foreign soldiers who would simply butcher them if caught. Also, I notice that the romans made a number of forays into Asia against the Parthians/Persians, and that although they achieved objectives and won battles these territorial gains were soon relinquished. The campaigns of Trajan are a case in point since he did actually reach the Caspian Sea and annexed large territories for Rome, soon to be discarded by Hadrian as of no value as provinces. During the Palmyran Revolt, troops marched back and forth across syria and mesopotamia in the same manner that armoured divisions would do in the western desert of 1941-43. Climatically however there is no comparison. The russian winter is infamous and both Napoloen and Hitler believed they could secure victory before the worst of it arrived, neglecting to appreciate the true scale of the land the were attempting to cover and that weather effects before the freeze sets in were no less difficult.

[Antiochus III]

Hmm. Yes. Keep in mind that was a very loose comparison.

 

Antiochus III