What if the Roman Republic was invaded by Alexander the Great?

[P.Clodius]

Pyrrus was trained in the Macedonian tradition/methods and he fought against the early legions and won. However, he paid so dearly for his two victories he said something along the lines; "One more victory like that and we're screwed!"

Edited September 26, 2007 by P.Clodius

[Julius Ratus]

What would happen if Alexander the Great recovered from his illness and marched west and attacked the early Roman Republic? Would the early legions (maniples) be able to stand up against the Phalanx.

 

I think not. Alexander's advanced version of the phalanx in tandem with his intelligent use of cavalry would have caused serious problems to the incipient Roman legions, and Rome would have become a historical curiosity, like the Etruscans and the Kingdom of Pontus.

 

This is the key here. Alexander and his dad Phillip used the cavalry as the hammer, to the phalanx's anvil. Later Macedonian leaders stopped using the cavalry as the killing arm of the army, hence the legions being able to hurt Pyrrhus, and eventually defeat the Macedonians under the later Phillip.

[JP Vieira]

The sucess of the Romans was allways never to give up and the amount of human resources at their availability.

In the 4th century BC, Rome was not the power it was when Hanibal invaded...so perhaps IMO Rome would probably be a vassal state to Alexander, hat is until his death; after that i believe that Rome could have rise again.

[alea iacta est]

What would happen if Alexander the Great recovered from his illness and marched west and attacked the early Roman Republic? Would the early legions (maniples) be able to stand up against the Phalanx.

 

It is difficult to say strategicly. Obviously it would have been croosing the alps would have been and extrordinary task even for Alexander and it is questionable if he would hae made it at all. A much easier course would be to cross the adriatic sea and assault south east Italy, but as Alexander had few or no ships this would have been logistically troublesome.

Tactically however the contest is not so close. While the maniples were immensly strong the cavalry or equites were very weak. I have little doubt that the companion cavalry would sweep them aside like a cloud of dust and as the phalanx is all but invinceable from the front the Romans would stand little chance. Still bringing horses across the alps would result in a great many of them dying. Couple that with the difficulty of feeding a massive army by land across the alps once the fanatical Romans burned to crops north of the Po river and Macedon's starving troops might soon find their fantastic soldiers and their invinceable leader in a close contest with the sons of mars.

[ASCLEPIADES]

Salve, Amici! For me, the most interesting aspect of this topic is that it was indeed analyzed by no less than Titus Livius in a long atypical commentary on historical fiction inserted in the middle of his Ab Urbe Condita (Liber IX, Chapters XVI to XIX):

 

"It is beyond doubt, that during that age, than which none was ever more productive of virtuous characters, there was no man in whom the Roman affairs found a more effectual support; nay, people even marked him out, in their minds, as a match for Alexander the Great, in case that, having completed the conquest of Asia, he should have turned his arms on Europe.

Nothing can be found farther from my intention, since the commencement of this history, than to digress, more than necessity required, from the course of narration; and, by embellishing my work with variety, to seek pleasing resting-places, as it were, for my readers, and relaxation for my own mind: nevertheless, the mention of so great a king and commander, now calls forth to public view those silent reflections, whom Alexander must have fought. Manlius Torquatus, had he met him in the field, might, perhaps, have yielded to Alexander in discharging military duties in battle (for these also render him no less illustrious); and so might Valerius Corvus; men who were distinguished soldiers, before they became commanders. The same, too, might have been the case with the Decii, who, after devoting their persons, rushed upon the enemy; or of Papirius Cursor, though possessed of such powers, both of body and mind. By the counsels of one youth, it is possible the wisdom of a whole senate, not to mention individuals, might have been baffled, [consisting of such members,] that he alone, who declared that "it consisted of kings," conceived a correct idea of a Roman senate. But then the danger was, that with more judgment than any one of those whom I have named he might choose ground for an encampment, provide supplies, guard against stratagems, distinguish the season for fighting, form his line of battle, or strengthen it properly with reserves. He would have owned that he was not dealing with Darius, who drew after him a train of women and eunuchs; saw nothing about him but gold and purple; was encumbered with the trappings of his state, and should be called his prey, rather than his antagonist; whom therefore he vanquished without loss of blood and had no other merit, on the occasion, than that of showing a proper spirit in despising empty show. The aspect of Italy would have appeared to him of a quite different nature from that of India, which he traversed in the guise of a traveller, at the head of a crew of drunkards, if he had seen the forests of Apulia, and the mountains of Lucania, with the vestiges of the disasters of his house, and where his uncle Alexander, king of Epirus, had been lately cut off.

We are now speaking of Alexander not yet intoxicated by prosperity, the seductions of which no man was less capable of withstanding. But, if he is to be judged from the tenor of his conduct in the new state of his fortune, and from the new disposition, as I may say, which he put on after his successes, he would have entered Italy more like Darius than Alexander; and would have brought thither an army that had forgotten Macedonia, and were degenerating into the manners of the Persians. It is painful, in speaking of so great a king, to recite his ostentatious change of dress; of requiring that people should address him with adulation, prostrating themselves on the ground, a practice insupportable to the Macedonians, had they even been conquered, much more so when they were victorious; the shocking cruelty of his punishments; his murdering his friends in the midst of feasting and wine; with the folly of his fiction respecting his birth. What must have been the consequence, if his love of wine had daily become more intense? if his fierce and uncontrollable anger? And as I mention not any one circumstance of which there is a doubt among writers, do we consider these as no disparagements to the qualifications of a commander? But then, as is frequently repeated by the silliest of the Greeks, who are fond of exalting the reputation, even of the Parthians, at the expense of the Roman name, the danger was that the Roman people would not have had resolution to bear up against the splendour of Alexander's name, who, however, in my opinion, was not known to them even by common fame; and while, in Athens, a state reduced to weakness by the Macedonian arms, which at the very time saw the ruins of Thebes smoking in its neighbourhood, men had spirit enough to declaim with freedom against him, as is manifest from the copies of their speeches, which have been preserved; [we are to be told] that out of such a number of Roman chiefs, no one would have freely uttered his sentiments. How great soever our idea of this man's greatness may be, still it is the greatness of an individual, constituted by the successes of a little more than ten years; and those who give it pre-eminence on account that the Roman people have been defeated, though not in any entire war, yet in several battles, whereas Alexander was never once unsuccessful in a single fight, do not consider that they are comparing the actions of one man, and that a young man, with the exploits of a nation waging wars now eight hundred years. Can we wonder if, when on the one side more ages are numbered than years on the other, fortune varied more in so long a lapse of time than in the short term of thirteen years? But why not compare the success of one general with that of another? How many Roman commanders might I name who never lost a battle? In the annals of the magistrates, and the records, we may run over whole pages of consuls and dictators, with whose bravery, and successes also, the Roman people never once had reason to be dissatisfied. And what renders them more deserving of admiration than Alexander, or any king, is, that some of these acted in the office of dictator, which lasted only ten, or it might be twenty days, none, in a charge of longer duration than the consulship of a year; their levies obstructed by plebeian tribunes; often late in taking the field; recalled, before the time, on account of elections; amidst the very busiest efforts of the campaign, their year of office expired; sometimes the rashness, sometimes the perverseness of a colleague, proving an impediment or detriment; and finally succeeding to the unfortunate administration of a predecessor, with an army of raw or ill-disciplined men. But, on the other hand, kings, being not only free from every kind of impediment, but masters of circumstances and seasons, control all things in subserviency to their designs, themselves uncontrolled by any. So that Alexander, unconquered, would have encountered unconquered commanders; and would have had stakes of equal consequence pledged on the issue. Nay, the hazard had been greater on his side; because the Macedonians would have had but one Alexander, who was not only liable, but fond of exposing himself to casualties; the Romans would have had many equal to Alexander, both in renown, and in the greatness of their exploits; any one of whom might live or die according to his destiny, without any material consequence to the public.

It remains that the forces be compared together, with respect to their numbers, the quality of the men, and the supplies of auxiliaries. Now, in the general surveys of the age, there were rated two hundred and fifty thousand men, so that, on every revolt of the Latin confederates, ten legions were enlisted almost entirely in the city levy. It often happened during those years, that four or five armies were employed at a time, in Etruria, in Umbria, the Gauls too being at war, in Samnium, in Lucania. Then as to all Latium, with the Sabines, and Volscians, the Aequans, and all Campania; half of Umbria, Etruria, and the Picentians, Marsians, Pelignians, Vestinians, and Apulians; to whom may add, the whole coast of the lower sea, possessed by the Greeks, from Thurii to Neapolis and Cumae; and the Samnites from thence as far as Antium and Ostia: all these he would have found either powerful allies to the Romans or deprived of power by their arms. He would have crossed the sea with his veteran Macedonians, amounting to no more than thirty thousand infantry and four thousand horse, these mostly Thessalians. This was the whole of his strength. Had he brought with him Persians and Indians, and those other nations, it would be dragging after him an encumbrance other than a support. Add to this, that the Romans, being at home, would have had recruits at hand: Alexander, waging war in a foreign country, would have found his army worn out with long service, as happened afterwards to Hannibal. As to arms, theirs were a buckler and long spears; those of the Romans, a shield, which covered the body more effectually, and a javelin, a much more forcible weapon than the spear, either in throwing or striking. The soldiers, on both sides, were used to steady combat, and to preserve their ranks. But the Macedonian phalanx was unapt for motion, and composed of similar parts throughout: the Roman line less compact, consisting of several various parts, was easily divided as occasion required, and as easily conjoined. Then what soldier is comparable to the Roman in the throwing up of works? who better calculated to endure fatigue? Alexander, if overcome in one battle, would have been overcome in war. The Roman, whom Claudium, whom Cannae, did not crush, what line of battle could crush? In truth, even should events have been favourable to him at first, he would have often wished for the Persians, the Indians, and the effeminate tribes of Asia, as opponents; and would have acknowledged, that his wars had been waged with women, as we are told was said by Alexander, king of Epirus, after receiving his mortal wound, when comparing the wars waged in Asia by this very youth, with those in which himself had been engaged. Indeed, when I reflect that, in the first Punic war, a contest was maintained by the Romans with the Carthaginians, at sea, for twenty-four years, I can scarcely suppose that the life of Alexander would have been long enough for the finishing of one war [with either of those nations]. And perhaps, as both the Punic state was united to the Roman by ancient treaties, and as similar apprehensions might arm against a common foe those two nations the most potent of the time in arms and in men, he might have been overwhelmed in a Punic and a Roman war at once. The Romans have had experience of the boasted prowess of the Macedonians in arms, not indeed under Alexander as their general, or when their power was at the height, but in the wars against Antiochus, Philip, and Perses; and not only not with any losses, but not even with any danger to themselves. Let not my assertion give offence, nor our civil wars be brought into mention; never were we worsted by an enemy's cavalry, never by their infantry, never in open fight, never on equal ground, much less when the ground was favourable. Our soldiers, heavy laden with arms, may reasonably fear a body of cavalry, or arrows; defiles of difficult passage, and places impassable to convoys. But they have defeated, and will defeat a thousand armies, more formidable than those of Alexander and the Macedonians, provided that the same love of peace and solicitude about domestic harmony, in which we now live, continue permanent."

Edited October 7, 2007 by ASCLEPIADES

[ASCLEPIADES]

Salve iterum!

 

All that said, I must state that we may find the what-if scenarios, analyzed either by Livius, us or anyone else, amusing and entertaining , but hardly useful nor rewarding.

 

They would be little more than typical examples of the "butterfly effect", ie the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in Chaos Theory.

 

Or, in plain English, that small variations of the initial conditions of a system may produce large variations on its long term behaviour.

 

(Being the system dynamical and nonlinear, as it is almost always the case).

 

You know, as in the phrase "the flap of a butterfly

[G-Manicus]

At the time didn't Alexander have an advantage in terms of military technology? My understanding is that he was using catapults and ballistas by then and the Romans were not. Would this have impacted things in our hypothetical confrontation?

[devhyfes]

Hi, I'm new but have been studying exactly this subject for the past few months.

 

A lot of hay has been made over the Phalanx's difficulties when dealing with the Legion's flexibility and with the problems of rough ground. I think that largely, this is only accurate if you deal with the later Phalanx. Specifically, the evidence indicates that the Greeks developed an over-dependence on their phalanx, leading to specializations that ultimately made them less capable when compared against a capable commander. The sarissa (spears) were lengthened even further from the days of Alexander and the reliance on bulldozer tactics became common. There were understandable reasons for this (when Phalanx went against Phalanx, mobility was never needed, but larger spears could be decisive), but the end result was that once a battle-field innovation (the roman legions) was thrown into the equation, the highly specialized Phalanx was ill equipped.

 

On the other hand, Alexander's army was designed to fight more than the Phalanx and it was extremely good at it. Many of the drawbacks typically ascribed to the Phalanx were well mitigated by Alexander's combined-arms strategy. In fact, it was this combined strategy that allowed he and his father to defeat the phalanx-dependent armies of Greece early on.

 

Argument: Alexander's Phalanx was inflexible and un-maneuverable

 

I don't see how someone could look at (say) the battles of Issus and Guagamela (aka Arbella) and still believe this. Alexander's men were extremely well drilled on various formations that allowed them to combat all sorts of maneuvers. For example, the phalanx is able to quickly form open ranks when Darius attacks with scythe chariots. This formation created wide gaps in the ranks which the horses (choosing between spear-walls and wide-open channels) diverted through. The chariots were then picked off from the sides. Additionally, the phalanx was able to quickly form into a wedge or an inverted wedge to either drive home an attack, or to absorb a wedge and envelop its enemy. The phalanx was trained to be able to wheel on a corner, so as to out-flank a body that had been held in place by light infantry, or that had outflanked another element of the phalanx.

 

Simply put, Alexander's phalanx was well trained and veteran in its ability to deal with battle-field conditions.

 

Argument: Alexander's Phalanx could not prevail on rough terrain

 

While it is theoretically true that a phalanx is less effective in rough terrain, it is not completely useless. A veteran army can still prevail as seen by the victories at Granicus and Issus. In the former, Alexander makes a river crossing and in the latter, the phalanx fights uphill over broken ground. The point is that the Phalanx is not meant to be the decisive force, which is a lesson that is later forgotten (or others might insist was never learned) by the Greek successors. Instead, the Phalanx was the keystone to a combined-arms strategy.

 

Argument: Alexander's Phalanx was easily flanked and at that point could be defeated

 

Again, I think this argument stems from a misreading of history- ascribing traits to Alexander's army which were displayed much later when the Greeks drop their dependence on combined arms. In reality, Alexander well understood the danger of a flanking maneuver, and so often drilled his army to deal with it.

 

For example, at Guagamella (Arbella) Alexander is far, far outnumbered and at danger of a flanking maneuver. Yet he positions troops in reserve on either flank. Additionally, the echeloned staggering of troops makes it very difficult (and dangerous) to turn the flank on Alexander's army. The act of flanking the lead element in turn exposes your own flank to the next element of units. In cases of a breakthrough, Alexander had been known to plug the gap temporarily with his light reserves (who would lose in a protracted fight) and then- depending on the situation- wheel a phalanx element in to out-flank the breakthrough or alternatively bring his calvary to bear.

 

With this in mind, I think the Romans were hard pressed to resist Alexander's tender advances had he chosen to make Italy his next conquest- certainly during the early formative years around 330 - 300 BC. Perhaps had the Romans been able to raise legions comparable to their armies of 40 to 80 years later, Alexander would have had a more substantive fight on his hands. (Though again, I don't think it is a given that he would not adapt to defeat these as well. He simply did not have the same weaknesses as the Phalanx-reliant armies of later Greece.)

 

Thanks,

-Dev

[Gaius Octavius]

Welcome aboard devhyfes

[CiceroD]

A question: How many veterans do you think Alexander might have had after his historic push to India?

 

After all its generally accepted that his men were sick of fighting.

It seems that few would elect to reinlist.

 

question: Even if he did conquer Rome would have been permanent or long lasting?

 

My summation of Alexander the Great equates him to Napoleon.

Addicted to conquest. Like Bonaparte, He could easily have over-extended his empire within his lifetime and watched it come crashing down.

Then perhaps the little republic would have recovered as it did following the Gallic Sack

 

What does the forum think?

[Gaius Octavius]

Napoleon lost his empire during his lifetime; Alexander didn't.

[Julius Ratus]

Napoleon lost his empire during his lifetime; Alexander didn't.

 

Napoleon was considerable older than Alexander when he died. Besides, Alexander never invaded Russia .

[devhyfes]

Napoleon lost his empire during his lifetime; Alexander didn't.

 

Napoleon was considerable older than Alexander when he died. Besides, Alexander never invaded Russia .

 

But he did invade Afghanistan which later beat Russia. So according to College Football Rules, Alexander gets to go to the Orange Bowl.

 

Regarding some of the other questions:

 

1) Alexander's army did want to quit, and were largely disappointed that their great Macedonian king seemed to be succumbing to Persian temptations. And yet they were following him still at the end. Remember that Phalanx-heavy warfare (and most Ancient warfare in general) found the victor with relatively few casualties (usually hundreds to the loser's tens-of-thousands). So it is fair to bet that most of his army was comprised of people who started with him. Now Alexander was on his way back from the east by way of the Arabian peninsula. It is possible that after a year or two of this campaign, defeating the Arabs, he would be back at the Mediterranean looking for a fight. By this time, he had already killed a couple of generals that he claimed were allying against him.

 

2) Nevertheless, Alexander still had a good way of maintaining the stability of his empire. He made a practice of leaving despots on their throne, so long as they swore fealty to him. This generally preserved the government of each region. He also founded dozens of cities, which ultimately led to the Helenification of numerous areas. So it is likely that even for the short term, he could have gotten back to Alexandria or Macedon with his empire in tact.

 

3) If Alexander ended up returning his army in Macedon, it isn't entirely unlikely that he would expand west into Italy. His mother's home-state was on the west coast of Attica- he could likely have had an invasion fleet to get him over to Italy. His reluctance to use fleets for warfare is well known, but he did use navy for transporting half his army back from the east in the latter years.

 

I don't buy the whole "Installing a general as Consul" thing, though. Were Alexander to defeat the Roman armies, he woudn't have hesitated to march into Rome and declare himself king. Had the Romans attempted to stop that, it would have been the end of their City's culture. Tyre tried that and thousands were slaughtered or sent into slavery. Unlike Hannibal, Alexander new how to take cities and in fact, he understood their importance as anchor-points for his empire.

 

4) Had Alexander decided to house his army in Alexandria (near Egypt) instead, I think his next target would very likely have been Carthage and the string of other Phoenician colonies along the coast of North Africa. After that, Sicily. That would mean many more wars and years (10?) before Alexander would come full circle to deal with the Romans- who at that point may have been closer to him as allies lending mercenaries to his efforts.

 

We'll never know, but Rome did have a lot going for it- from its central position to the wealth of the Italian peninsula. Even if Rome had been added to his empire, it would likely have become a major kingdom of one of Alexander's generals after he finally died. Like Ptolemaic Egypt, it would have been a mix of the native culture and Greek influence, but would be its own people after a few years. Rome would likely have been ascendant at some point, though with a different culture than we know today.

[CiceroD]

Napoleon lost his empire during his lifetime; Alexander didn't.

 

Read what I wrote,

 

I'm saying that the could have lost his empire in his lifetime had he lived.

 

Also, do we really have an idea as to how durable that empire was? Isn't it plausible that he would overtax the resources of his subjects sustaining campaign after campaign?

Edited October 4, 2007 by CiceroD