Political Implications of the Head Count Army

[Publius Nonius Severus]

As we know, one of the most significant aspects of the Marian reforms of the army was the recruitment of troops from among the head count as opposed to the previous requirement to recruit from only among the propertied classes. This is one of those event-trends that would have a major impact on the remainder of the course of the Republic. Now that armies were composed of soldiers totally reliant and loyal to their generals and not to the Roman state, these generals could use "their" armies for revolutionary political purposes.

 

It was these armies that marched with Sulla across the pomerium into Rome for the first time outside of a triumph, that caused alarm amongst the Senate and people that enabled Pompey to have so many extraordinary commands, that threatened to crush any opposition to the legislative agenda of the first triumvirate, that marched with Caesar across the Rubicon. There are numerous examples that show that armies exclusively loyal to their general and not the state played a large role in bringing down the Republic.

 

What I would like to know is was the severity of the political implications of head count armies understood early on and if so when? Did Marius intend for this to be an eduring trend or merely an extraordinary measure? Were any efforts made to move away from head count armies after some of these implications came to light?

[M. Porcius Cato]

I would question the premise that the Head Count made up a significant portion of the Roman armies in the late Republic. Two cohorts, I believe, were assembled from the Head Count to fight in the Servile Wars, and they were utterly annihilated. Being viewed as indifferent soldiers, the Head Count seldom constituted much of any later army, which normally comprised Italians in great number. On this, see P. A. Brunt's enormously influential article, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," JRS, 69-86; the rejoinder in "Rome at War" by Nathan Rosenstein; and two complementary articles in the Blackwell Companion to the Roman Republic (which I'll be reviewing soon, I hope).

 

PS Gosh it would be nice if there were a way to upload Brunt's article to the UNRV site so everyone could read it!

[Publius Nonius Severus]

Hmmm...I had heard this of Brunt's view but didn't know the exact reference. It look's like he re-wrote the article in his The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays which is on Questia so I am reading it there.

 

So, assuming the army wasn't wholly or primarily head count thus implying they had land or lives to return to after campaigning, why would they still support their generals' revolutionary endeavors? Were they enticed by the same thing...more land, loot, plundering? Were there other reasons why soldier's were loyal exclusively to their generals and not to Rome herself?

[M. Porcius Cato]

So, assuming the army wasn't wholly or primarily head count thus implying they had land or lives to return to after campaigning, why would they still support their generals' revolutionary endeavors? Were they enticed by the same thing...more land, loot, plundering? Were there other reasons why soldier's were loyal exclusively to their generals and not to Rome herself?

 

In my opinion, this is a question for social psychology, not ancient history. In Caesar's case, we have a group of men whose very survival over the past 8 years depended on their cohesion and their unquestioning obedience to their officers. These officers, too, were mostly ambitious legates without better prospects, so they too had a strong motive to follow Caesar. Under similar circumstances (in any age for any leader), the pressure to conform to the group and to obey the leader is very great. Thus, it should not be surprising that it took a long time for Caesar's men to finally mutiny, and it should not be surprising that only a handful of men deserted Caesar (Labienus being one). The promise of loot and glory probably made conformity for the rest easier, but I don't think it was definitive.

[Pompieus]

One might even dare to question the traditional role accorded to the "proletarian" army in the fall of the Republic as E.S. Gruen does in "The Last Generation of the Roman Republic", and wonder whether the troops actually were loyal only to thier generals and not to the state. Only Sulla and Caesar got their armies to follow them into the political arena - Pompey discharged his army when he returned from the East, as he had when he returned from Spain, and as Crassus did after the slave war. When Sulla marched on Rome he was was still the legally elected consul; could not his troops have seen themselves as defending the state against revolutionaries who had siezed power in the capitol? Even Caesar claimed to be defending the rights bestowed upon him legally by the popular assembly against the machinations of a senatorial clique of personal enemies determined to depose the legitimate proconsul of the Republic (I'm sure Cato will "goak here"). Is it not possible that in times when whole question of "legitimate" government is at issue soldiers, like anyone else) will gravitate toward the probable winner?

[Publius Nonius Severus]

...Only Sulla and Caesar got their armies to follow them into the political arena - Pompey discharged his army when he returned from the East, as he had when he returned from Spain, and as Crassus did after the slave war....

 

Yes, Pompey dismissied his armies, but that's because he got his way before he had to use them. Also, didn't Pompey bring his soldiers into the city during Caesar's consulship?

 

You do make some very good points and both your and Cato's replies are leading me to refine my ideas, namely, perhaps loyalty to one's general does go deeper than your purse.

[caldrail]

So, assuming the army wasn't wholly or primarily head count thus implying they had land or lives to return to after campaigning, why would they still support their generals' revolutionary endeavors?

For the same reason people follow rebellious causes. They either believe they stand to gain from it or they really do believe in the cause. many of Spartacus's followers went on the campaign because Spartacus offered them the prospect of wealth as much as freedom from slavery or whatever. Then again, some people are very charismatic and others tend to follow them anyway. This is one of the characteristics of a great leader after all.

 

Were they enticed by the same thing...more land, loot, plundering? Were there other reasons why soldier's were loyal exclusively to their generals and not to Rome herself?

Land, loot, rape, pillage, glory, travel, adventure, belief, necessity, opportunism.... All sorts of reasons, depending on the character of the individual soldier and his circumstances.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Yes, Pompey dismissied his armies, but that's because he got his way before he had to use them.

 

Can you clarify what you had in mind by "his way"? It seems to me that Pompey had a long, unfinished legislative agenda when he returned from the East. Doesn't this suggest that Pompey dismissed his army before he had his way?

[Publius Nonius Severus]

Can you clarify what you had in mind by "his way"? It seems to me that Pompey had a long, unfinished legislative agenda when he returned from the East. Doesn't this suggest that Pompey dismissed his army before he had his way?

 

True, it would have been better for me to suggest that he dismissed them in a show of good intentions to the populous, further endearing him to the people, and with the confidence he didn't need them for his agendas on his return from both Spain and the Easter, but with the knowledge that they would gather again if he needed them. In either case it seemed that he had enough momentum to carry out his agenda without an army and that momentum was achieved that upon both returns the people feared he would march an assume power regardless of whether or not he did.