Why was Caesar a great general?

[Neos Dionysos]

I would argue that Alexander, (except the Gedrosia incident), had well planned logistics to keep his army constantly on the move and in supply across the known and the unknown world.

 

If anyone has this off hand, perhaps it can shed light on this discussion, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. This is the only work I know of on Alexander's logistical operations, and if I recall I do not remember Arrian being ever critical of Alexander for logistical reasons, (again Gedrosia aside), and being a general himself this is one aspect he would mention if it indeed was an issue.

[Virgil61]

I would argue that Alexander, (except the Gedrosia incident), had well planned logistics to keep his army constantly on the move and in supply across the known and the unknown world.

 

If anyone has this off hand, perhaps it can shed light on this discussion, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. This is the only work I know of on Alexander's logistical operations, and if I recall I do not remember Arrian being ever critical of Alexander for logistical reasons, (again Gedrosia aside), and being a general himself this is one aspect he would mention if it indeed was an issue.

 

I've never read it, but I know it's a seminal work in the field. I'll seek it out, theres' also The Logistics of the Roman Army at War which seems to have started as a PhD dissertation.

 

There's no question that Alexander had a monumental task before him logistically. But, in commenting on this and MPC's post I'd put forth the following for discussion; Alexander's quartermasters task was made easier by the sea routes paralleling much of his expedition east and by those routes being uncontested, neither of which were replicated in Caesar's case. Even then his logistics weren't perfect, if I recall at least one poor quartermaster was put to death when supplies didn't arrive in time.

 

Caesar and Alexander had drastically different terrain (and naval) factors which count in measuring their logistical differences.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Caesar and Alexander had drastically different terrain (and naval) factors which count in measuring their logistical differences.

 

This might account for Caesar's inferiority in Gaul, but not the campaigns in Greece and Africa.

[Gaius Octavius]

There's no question that Alexander had a monumental task before him logistically. But, in commenting on this and MPC's post I'd put forth the following for discussion; Alexander's quartermasters task was made easier by the sea routes paralleling much of his expedition east and by those routes being uncontested, neither of which were replicated in Caesar's case. Even then his logistics weren't perfect, if I recall at least one poor quartermaster was put to death when supplies didn't arrive in time.

 

Caesar and Alexander had drastically different terrain (and naval) factors which count in measuring their logistical differences.

 

Correct. And on Alexanders way back. You are in agreement with Engels.

 

This might account for Caesar's inferiority in Gaul, but not the campaigns in Greece and Africa.

 

I simply can't understand why that loser Caesar's tactics are studied in all military academies, to this day, and not those of his inferior opponents! Caesar was a winner in all of his efforts.

Edited March 30, 2007 by Gaius Octavius

[Mosquito]

Caesar was outstanding in everything what he was doing, at war as well as in politics. We wouldnt talk that much about him, if he wasnt really great. So give to Caesar what is Caesar

[Virgil61]

Caesar and Alexander had drastically different terrain (and naval) factors which count in measuring their logistical differences.

 

This might account for Caesar's inferiority in Gaul, but not the campaigns in Greece and Africa.

 

In both those cases there was an enemy naval presence which Alexander's quartermasters didn't have to deal with. I recall him fretting over his ships being caught in Ruspina. Wasn't the consul who had crap poured over his head--begins with a B--giving his supply line fits in the Adriatic? And remember in Greece Pompeii had the advantage of inferior lines--support base and supply lines to his immediate rear.

 

In the end I wouldn't say Caesar was better or even the equal of Alexander logistically, but that they were dealing with drastically different issues of enemy and terrain that makes comparisons not so clear cut. I'd add that with Alexander of course we're dealing with the gold standard of generalship in the ancient world.

 

Correct. And on Alexanders way back. You are in agreement with Engels.

 

Freidrich? Oh, ok, not him.

Edited March 31, 2007 by Virgil61

[Gaius Octavius]

Correct. And on Alexanders way back. You are in agreement with Engels.

Freidrich? Oh, ok, not him.

 

My apology. Engels wrote "Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army", noted above.

[Ursus]

So give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s - as one carpenter said in the past.

 

And if one lights incense to the imperial genius of the divine Julius, one is satisfying both requirements. With all due respect to the aforementioned Carpenter and his pithy sayings, of course.

 

Anyway...

 

 

... not being much of a military man I can't comment too much in detail about the tactics of pre-industrial warfare. I will however restate what I said in my review of the Conquest of Gaul: he seems to have routinely gotten himself into trouble, and owed his hide to the bravery of his troops. But then Caesar knew how to command his troops and inspire them to great acts of courage and daring, so it evens out. He also understood the psychology and cultural values of his opponents and exploited them with effect.

 

When all is said and done, he got the job done. Case closed.

[caldrail]

Caesar was outstanding in everything what he was doing, at war as well as in politics. We wouldnt talk that much about him, if he wasnt really great. So give to Caesar what is Caesar

[Mosquito]

The expedition to britain - both of them - that were organised by Caesar were as well organised as was capable in those days. No-one had much experience of amphibious landings back then. Unfortunately, no amount of preparation back then could prepare them for sudden changes in weather, which caught Caesar on both occaisions and very nearly wrecked his plans. In fact, the invasions of britain (or at least one corner of it) were done for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it gave Caesar the glory of having gone there where no roman commander hd gone before. Britain was a mysterious land and rumours of strange monsters and inhabitants were told of it. Secondly, it helped block british support for gaul by 'gunboat diplomacy' and setting up trade links with friendly tribes. I notice that the Durotriges, very anti-roman, lost their former prosperity because new trade links with the romans bypassed them. Caesar had no intention of staying in britain. He was already at the end of a ten year campaign to conquer gaul and at some point wanted to return to Rome to pursue his political career. Having said that, I believe that at some future time Caesar intended to return and finish the job. It wasn't his priority because he was unable to find the metals and wealth he had heard of.

 

I think that the target of second expedition was to conquer Britain or at least part of it.

[Kosmo]

Caesar was good at making his men fight for him. As I don't believe the roman army was a manouvering force I see the battles as largely determined by the morale of the troops and this was a strong point of Caesar.

Caesar was quick to use his succes in battle without giving the enemies a chance to regroup and recover. After the decisive victorious battle the campaign was over.

 

I agree with MPC that he often faced supply problems, but this was maybe more because of his adventurous style that of logistic difficulties.

[M. Porcius Cato]

The expedition to britain - both of them - that were organised by Caesar were as well organised as was capable in those days. No-one had much experience of amphibious landings back then.

 

Not true--look at Marius' landing in Africa, which was better planned and organized than either Caesar's landing in Africa or his landing in Britain. In both cases, Caesar launched hastily, ill-equipped, and nearly met disaster. If you want to argue that there is a trade-off between celerity and preparations, that's fine. But let's not pretend that the Romans didn't know how to launch an amphibious landing.

[Julius Ratus]

Was Marius any less successful than Caesar? Compare their invasions of Africa, where--contrary to previous claims--Labienus had the initiative against Caesar and soundly trounced him at Ruspina.

 

Since the object of this thread is to discuss Caesar as a General, Marius was probably Caesar's equal. Caesar was a far better political player than his uncle was, that is why he was so sucessful.

 

Yes, Labienus did "slightly check" Caesar's offensive in Africa. If you are comparing the two African Campaigns, Marius started winning after a long string of failures perpetrated by his predecessors, and he built upon the sucesses of Metellus. Caesar won his African war far quicker than the Romans won the Jugurthine War.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Yes, Labienus did "slightly check" Caesar's offensive in Africa.

 

Labienus almost annihilated Caesar's whole bloody army. According to Caesar's henchmen, the only reason Caesar was let off the hook was that Labienus wanted to give Metellus Scipio the honors of finishing off the rascal.

[Primus Pilus]

Yes, Labienus did "slightly check" Caesar's offensive in Africa.

 

Labienus almost annihilated Caesar's whole bloody army. According to Caesar's henchmen, the only reason Caesar was let off the hook was that Labienus wanted to give Metellus Scipio the honors of finishing off the rascal.

 

Cato, I admire your consistency in pointing out Caesar's several "near destructions". However, he always managed to find a way to win in the end. I understand that these defeats are often ignored by those who praise Caesar, but without at least some military merit, he would not have been as consistently lucky as he was.