March 07 Essay Entry

[Primus Pilus]

Runner Up Entry by Aurelius.

aurelius_roman_army.doc

aurelius_roman_army_text.pdf

[Publius Nonius Severus]

An excellent essay Aurelius, well done!

 

I have a question for you: How much weight do you put on the frontier system as a serious limitation of the army? Given Delbruck's opinion that the frontier system made the army "equally weak everywhere" as referenced in your essay, did he offer an alternative? Would a larger army have helped? The answer is most likely yes, yet, a larger army meant more logistical, financial, and manpower difficulties. Would these extra burdens make a larger army worthwhile? If not more troops, did he offer any other ideas...was he against the frontier system altogether?

 

I am also intrigued by the "central reserve" concept. Were there any suggestions on how large a reserve should be? Should there have been multiple reserves or one large centrally located base? Was there any mention of where such reserves might be placed geographically taking into consideration likely threats and logistical concerns? Hindsight is always 20/20, and looking back having a reserve seems to be a good idea...is there any reason we are overlooking why the Romans didn't pursue this line of thinking as well?

 

Again, excellent work!

[M. Porcius Cato]

I agree that this was an excellent essay.

 

One question I continue to have, however, concerns the strength of mobile troops. Arguably the heavy infantry of the Roman army was better than any phalanx or warband, and strength here may be the most important factor in warfare (as Virgil has argued). However, against guerillas (e.g., Sertorius' and Hermann's) and horse archers, the Romans certainly faced difficulty. Indeed, even when Romans possessed overwhelming cavalry strength (as at Pharsalus), they didn't seem to know what to do with it. Aurelius comes down pretty hard on Fuller for expressing this view, but I'm not entirely convinced by this response to Fuller. When we look at how Roman-trained officers (again, Sertorius, Hermann, and Labienus come to mind) chose to fight against Roman armies, it seems that they often attempted to exploit the weakness the army had with fast, hard-hitting mobile troops. Wouldn't we expect Roman officers to know best what the weak spots were in their own army? If so, aren't their tactics revealing about which part of the Roman army they thought was weakest?

[The Augusta]

A brilliant essay, Aurelius. I have no deep knowledge of the military side of things, so I won't even try to comment on the content - I shall leave that to others who have the expertise. However, I must comment on the beautifully structured argument and your wide areas of research. This really is fantastic work, Aurelius. Well done!

[Aurelius]

Salve to all of you,

 

Firstly, I would like to apologise for not being able to reply quickly to your enquiries about my essay. I have been literally bogged down with work and studies so as to prevent me from responding to any forum for the past month. Secondly, I would also like to thank you for your appreciation of my work and the critical questions you have posed. Though it may be a finished product, my work certainly has some weak points in which there is limited support for my argument and some which I haven't elaborated completely. Thirdly, I will answer all of your enquiries in due time,even though if my answers are a bit late in the giving.

 

Once again, sorry for the delay, i will try to remedy it to the best of my abilities, and thank you.

[Aurelius]

To Publius Nonius Severus,

 

With regards to your first question, in my essay I placed the concept of the frontier system as one of many significant limitations of the roman army c. 1st and 2nd centuries AD. I'm not suggesting that the romans were completely wrong about the structure of the frontier system. I'm pointing to the evidence of virtually no reserves behind the lines of fortifications in the major frontiers of the roman empire. It must be remembered that I'm ascribing to the conditions of both the empire and the army that prevailed during the so-called Principate, the period from Augustan ascendancy to the Third-century crisis. In my analysis of the sources, there seemed to be only slightly limited 'reserves' stationed behind the frontiers during this period. What mention of reserves are there mainly include the emperor's Praetorian Guard, Imperial Germanic bodyguard and some 'vexillationes' or detachments from the legions on the frontier.

 

Delbruck sees this as a major deficiency in the frontier system, though he was not totally against the system. We must also consider the physical distances that traversed the breadth of the empire and the locations in which, we believe, the legions were stationed. It should be remembered that the frontiers were not totally fixed but fluid, reflecting geo-political situations around and within the empire, and that Rome had buffer states outside the frontiers. But even with its discipline, tough training and forced marches, the army could not possibly singly cope up with concentrated or simultaneous penetrations of the frontiers. Add to the equation, volatile political situations within, the distance of the executive centre of the empire to its major frontiers, the odd barbarian migration or invasion, and the probable ambitious streak of major army commanders, we would be amazed how the system even managed to survive for a considerably long period, more so how it even worked efficiently, to a degree, in the first place.

 

As to the questions of central reserves, multiple reserves or enlarging the size of the army, I would say that the romans thought over these issues quite substantially and managed to adapt their army systems through the centuries, different dynasties and administrations, and varied external and internal threats. We should always remember that the Roman army was not a static or merely reactive entity, it was frequently changing and adapting new ideas, though more so in some periods than others. Delbruck suggests that the some 9,000 strong contingent of the praetorian Guard, not to mention the imperial germanic bodyguard of the emperor, was not suitable enough to act as a central reserve. Other historians argue that a larger number of about 10,000 strong contingents be placed at strongpoints and act as multiple reserves to several frontiers in the empire. Though i am not inclined to adopt a specific scholar's idea as the ultimate suggestion, simply because it is hard to judge military matters when sitting in an armchair and not actually experiencing the strategic difficutlies of defending a vast empire with only less than one percent of that same empire's population acting as armed forces.

 

It is not only the question of numbers but the disposition of possible roman army reserves that merit attention from different scholars. As the 'number' suggestion, different theories abound as to the geographical consideration of these reserves. As Delbruck, Dobson, and Tomlin suggest, any central reserves based in Rome would have been virtually useless because they were far away from any frontier and were less likely to be mobilised. They mostly suggest different 'centres' or base of operations coinciding with the geographical layout of the empire. From what I can synthesise, they often suggest two bases of reserves for the Rhine; three or four for the Danube; two for the armenian frontier; one or two for the Syrian frontier, one in Egypt and North Africa--with one base having about 5000-6000 men and additional detachments of auxiliaries. Though it must be remembered that these were theoretical calculations and different scholars also suggested varying positions for these 'bases', usually in chokepoints or important cities.

 

Even with our gift of hindsight, I would state that the romans did eventually pursue the "line of thinking" of employing multiple reserves often suggested by scholars. This is evident in the change in the army system during and after the third-century Crisis in the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine, but more importantly the evolutionary struggles of Aurelian and Gratian. Though we are often deluded to think that the crisis faced by the Romans after the Severi was degrading, it brought about several significant changes that strengthened the Roman Empire for it to continue to exist and greatly improved its army system. I would also state that it was this formative period in rome's history that historians often overlook and usually associate with endemic civil strife and political instability. Military Historians also often fall into the trap of identifying the change in military equipment and tactics as sign of further degradation, most notably the abandoning of the lorica segmentata for the lorica hamata, the longer spatha for the gladius, and so on. We must always remember that romans were pragmatic when it came to military affairs and were able to adapt effectively to military challenges, even to go further as to adopting their enemies' tactics or equipment when they deem it much applicable. Though military strategy varied throughout the existence of the Roman Empire, it was most often a primarily defensive one, using calculated aggression to either annihilate or subdue any potential threat into total submission. The perpetual civil wars and the increasing pressure of barbarian strength and interests on the frontiers gradually made the Romans alter their military system, and in consequence bringing about political change.

 

By sheer accident or through prudence, they realised that the empire could not be defended or maintained by a single imperial army or power base effectively dividing the defence and administration of several parts of the empire (as in Postumus' gallic empire and Odenathus' Palmyrene empire). This phenomenon, combined with constant warfare, made possible the creation of large, Mobile, quick reponse, reserve units stationed behind the frontiers and less substantial frontier units. The penetrations of barbarians across the frontier,such as the Marcommani and the Quadi, which were virtually large marauding parties instead of proper army units, forced the empire to maintain a flexible frontier because it was nigh impossible to intercept every barbarian raiding party, but also to include a quick retaliatory response to any armed intrusion. Thus, the origins of the reformed army system of the roman empire, with its Comitatenses and Limitanei under Diocletian and Constantine stem from the experimentation and actual experience of the third century emperors, legates, usurpers, and their armies. This military change was also reflective and part of the broader political change of the empire, which was divided into 4 parts during Diocletian's tetrachy and later formalised into the western and eastern empires.

 

Now the question is, how could the early imperial armies and emperors fail to adopt this concept of multiple strategic reserves and consequently, a flexible frontier system. In all honesty, it would be quite difficult to wholly answer the question as it is based on variable but interconnected factors. But in my opinion, the answer lies in the combination of the political ideology of the Principate, the design of the empire's power structure, and its military applications and ramifications, and the considerable influence and power of the army itself. As it is seen in most sources of my bibliography, the position of the Princeps was a precarious one, as it was acquired through a most unconstitutional situation that was only later legitimised by Augustus through the Senate. The real basis of the emperor's power was the crucial support of the army. It was this factor that played out in favour of the Senate's approval of Augustan 'monarchy'. Woe betide the Imperator who forgot to reward his troops and thereby procure his support, as it is seen in the case of Nero and the year of the four Emperors. As an aside, Claudius used this concept to his advantage in directing military energies toward his invasion of Britain and thereby strengthening his position.

 

The emperor's precarious situation also explains how the emperors of the Principate jealously guarded the support of the troops and would not permit any successful general to become popular and to gain support and establish a local power base. (e.g. Nero's recall of Corbulo, and Domitian's recall of Agricola). The emperors were also acutely aware of the armies great potential for making or breaking emperors and thus stationed the armies away from the cores of the provinces and out into the frontiers to reduce contact with political struggles and outside influences. The political ideology of the principate also dictated that all military endeavours and triumphs should only be attributed to the emperor and the imperial family itself. These circumstances created a considerably alienated army stationed in the frontiers that stifled any potential opposition to the imperial personage. Also, the emperors were forced by necessity to disperse popular commanders and recall them, if possible, thus effectively eliminating any circumstance for the formation of large reserve armies under single individuals, who might become popular and powerful enough to usurp the imperial position. This situation changed however, when armies were largely drawn from the same provinces leading to increasing 'Sectionalism' and several legates such as Galba, Vespasian, or Septimius Severus became more permanent commanders of large army groups, which created circumstances leading to the constant usurpation of imperial power. In conclusion, I believe that the reserve system was 'overlooked' simply because it jeopardised the already insecure position of the Emperor and because it could possibly undermine the contemporary power structure and political ideology of the Principate. Though I would rather say that this explanation requires more depth, which I cannot at the moment provide, and that there also other notable factors to be considered, such as the absence of any large, impending outside threat during much of this period in which to test the frontier system's efficiency (with the exception of Parthian aggression).

 

I hope I have answered your enquiries P.N. Severus, and thank you once again for your salutations. I will answer M. Porcius Cato's questions next when i have the time.

 

Until then, cheers,

Aurelius

[Publius Nonius Severus]

Wow, that was a fantastic explanation, Aurelius. It was an essay in and of itself. Thanks!

[Aurelius]

Oops, I forgot to answer the 'army size' question. I believe the army also increased several times from Claudius down to the Severi. In the Augustan era, I believe the army was comprised of 23 legions, then it was increased by Domitian by 26, then Septimius Severus increased the number to 31. The auxiliaries were also increased similarly, probably more. I would like to think that an increase in the army would mean additional financial and logistical considerations, but somehow the emperors and the imperial bureaucracy managed it quite effectively.

 

Though, I am not sure if the numbers were always up to date, for the most part of its existence, the legions and the auxiliaries were often at half-strength or slightly above that number. I am also tempted to suggest that an increase in army size would have 'solved' some of its limitations, though by careful consideration I am led to believe that the romans valued the calibre of their troops rather than their quantity. It would be also quite problematic and unwieldy for an emperor to effectively control a large army. Also, think about the cost of supporting the legions. Most of the Empire's revenues would have gone to financing the army, not to mention the annual/periodic donatives given y emperors at their ascension or at special occasions. Without careful financial and logistical consideration, the Empire's revenues would have been consumed unnecessarily by the army. To digress further, I think it was Vegetius who said that the strength of an army lies not in its numbers but in its discipline and the bond between soldiers.