Optimates VS. Populares

[Gaius Octavius]

 

If a mosquito bites you once, you might get some bug spray to protect you. If it bites you again you light a citronella candle. If it bites you a third time you splatter it!

 

I wont take it personal but please dont be that brutal.

 

El wrongo! You splatter the bloody, diseased vermin right off the bat.

[M. Porcius Cato]

It was this failure to find compromise that allowed generals to dominate and doomed the republic.

 

On the contrary, it was rather one grand compromise--between Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey--that doomed the republic. If they had been more uncompromising, they never would have been able to consolidate so much power.

 

Moreover--and I can't repeat it enough--what happened with the Gracchi was not the norm. Normally, there were no dramatic showdowns between senate and people; rather, the dramatic showdowns were typically tribune vs tribune (e.g., Nepos vs Cato) and senator vs senator (e.g., Catiline vs Cicero). Why people take the atypical Gracchi as their prototype simply boggles the mind.

[theilian]

On the contrary, it was rather one grand compromise--between Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey--that doomed the republic. If they had been more uncompromising, they never would have been able to consolidate so much power.

 

But wasn't it the unwillingness of the Optimates to compromise that drove Pompey to Crassus and Caesar? And afterward, it seems that unimaginative obstructionist policy of the Optimates further escalated the situation and undermined their own position as totally ineffectual.

 

Moreover--and I can't repeat it enough--what happened with the Gracchi was not the norm. Normally, there were no dramatic showdowns between senate and people; rather, the dramatic showdowns were typically tribune vs tribune (e.g., Nepos vs Cato) and senator vs senator (e.g., Catiline vs Cicero). Why people take the atypical Gracchi as their prototype simply boggles the mind.

I think naturally the struggle is fought on the Senate and between those in magistrate offices, but surely there were forces behind them. And I think Gracchi's legacy is that they unleashed the political power of people in a way that they did not realize before.

[Publius Nonius Severus]

On the contrary, it was rather one grand compromise--between Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey--that doomed the republic. If they had been more uncompromising, they never would have been able to consolidate so much power.

 

But wasn't it the unwillingness of the Optimates to compromise that drove Pompey to Crassus and Caesar? And afterward, it seems that unimaginative obstructionist policy of the Optimates further escalated the situation and undermined their own position as totally ineffectual.

 

 

The Senate did not drive them into each other's arms...Caesar started the embrace himself. The reason the triumvirate formed was not due to the unwillingness of the Senate to compromise, it was because Caesar knew in order to get what he wanted he would have to either attach himself to Crassus or Pompey. If he endeared himself to one, he made an opponent of the other...so, he brought them together instead.

 

I do not think Senate opposition to their individual desires was completely unreasonable:

 

1)Pompey wanted ratification of his eastern settlements and land for his veterans all in one fell swoop. Of the three, I have the least amount of contempt (for his motives)...his motives were somewhat reasonable, his methods were not. Secret alliances, fast-tracked legislation, bringing his soldiers into the city to "support" Caesar's land bill...disgraceful.

 

2) Crassus' main motivation with the alteration of the tax collectors contracts were completely personal and unwarranted. I know the harmony of the equites was also at stake, but you reap what you sow. This was no "popular" measure.

 

3) Caesar wanted it his way and would stop at nothing to get it. So much for ruling collegially with one's co-consul...instead let's have his fasces broken and manure thrown at him by Pompey's mob. Then when the forum is free of his opponents he passes his laws, gets a tribune to increases his pro-consular provinces, and sets off on Mr. Toad's Wild Ride through Gaul and Britain.

 

When one discusses one of the critical steps to the demise of the republic, the triumvirate is one of the big ones. There was very little "popular" about it. Sure it may have been popular with the people, but it was in the interests of the men that formed it, not the people they "served".

[M. Porcius Cato]

But wasn't it the unwillingness of the Optimates to compromise that drove Pompey to Crassus and Caesar? And afterward, it seems that unimaginative obstructionist policy of the Optimates further escalated the situation and undermined their own position as totally ineffectual.

 

First, let's observe the vast gulf between the issues that drove Pompey and Crassus versus the issues that drove the Gracchi. The Gracchi--at least nominally--wished to enforce an existing law regarding the ager publica and to help poor landholders increase their agricultural productivity; therefore, they proposed land commissions and colonia. In contrast, Pompey wanted to reward his legions--already fat off of the spoils from the East--by essentially confiscating legally held lands in Campania; and Crassus wanted to help the rapacious tax farmers re-negotiate a contract for which they had simply overbid. In both cases, the Senate was absolutely right to resist. With respect to Pompey's demands, the lands in Campania generated 1/4 of the state revenue, and giving them away (for bargain basement prices) from their rightful owners would be disastrous for the state and totally immoral to the already settled Campanian families. With respect to Crassus' demands, the stupid tax-farmers who bid too high at the auction to beat out their competitors may have had buyer's regret, but that was their problem, not the problem of the state, and it was unfair to let them renegotiate without reopening the bidding de novo. In neither case was the Senate faced with the destitute farmers of Gracchan mythology--they were dealing with rich and powerful patrons of well-to-do, greedy clients. This was the ancient version of corporate welfare, pure and simple. No compromise with these groups was moral, and the senate was right to refuse them.

 

And I think Gracchi's legacy is that they unleashed the political power of people in a way that they did not realize before.

With respect to Crassus' demands, it was not the people who were clamoring to let the tax-farmers renegotiate their contracts--that was a special interest group that had absolutely no popular support outside a sub-group of equites. With respect to Pompey's demands, the people too were not sympathetic, which is why Caesar had to bring gladiators and other thugs to the Forum to prevent anyone from giving the opposing view. If the people had really been on the side of Crassus and Pompey, violence would not have been necessary to carry the bills. But the people were not on their side, so violence was necessary, and violence is exactly what the triumvirate brought.

 

The triumvirate was a completely un-democratic coalition that used violence to oppose free speech and private property. Morevoer, it is a complete mistake to view the agitation of the Gracchi and the program of the triumvirate as on the same page. They were completely different beasts, and calling them both "populare" obscures the massive differences between them.

Edited March 23, 2007 by M. Porcius Cato

[theilian]

First, let's observe the vast gulf between the issues that drove Pompey and Crassus versus the issues that drove the Gracchi. The Gracchi--at least nominally--wished to enforce an existing law regarding the ager publica and to help poor landholders increase their agricultural productivity

 

First of all, I was not advocating the first triumvirate. I agree with Severus that critical first triumvirate was critical step to the demise of the republic, and I also think that the comparison of Crassus and tax-farmers with special interest is very apt. But I thought the Senate should have recognized that people should have more power and spoils and as such propose their own pro-pleb policy to counter triumvirate rather than watch for the skies. And while I can't say that Pompey had right to demand land for his veterans, it must be admited that the status quo as it were was unpopular with plebs, veterans had to be compensated, land reform would have benefited the general population as well with revenues coming from the East.

Furthermore, when Caesar first proposed land law, he was apparently willing to negotiate with Senate. Campanian land was not to be touched, all the things that you mention were remvoed. When Optimates responded by sheer obstructionist tactics, it could not be anything but losing game.

And the violence, for which I fully blame triumvirate and Clodius, was not meant against urban plebs who were opposed to the land law (why would they oppose?) but to intimidate Optimates and pro-Optimate tribunes.

[Julius Ratus]

That's how votes often go, and losers need to deal with it rather than whine about how persecuted they are.

 

He did deal with it. He went to the people, and since they agreed with him, they affirmed his proposition.

 

What was most objectionable is that Ti Gracchus ignored the veto of a fellow tribune for no other ground that he, Tiberius Gracchus, believed that his own will was the true will of the people.

 

He also had the tribune de-elected first, so technically he didn't violate the sacrosanctity law. I realize that this is bending the rules terribly, but still, not illegal since there was no law prohibiting it. Also, he was never tried for this. He was never tried for anything, he was murdered in cold blood.

 

This is why he was regarded as a would-be monarch and why the senate passed the SCU against him.

 

...it was completely in line with the laudable goal of protecting the tribunes from one another.

 

The SCU was passed against Gaius Gracchus, not Tiberius. Tiberius was beaten to death by Nasca and his cronies with clubs made from broken up benches. This SCU was not called by the Senate to protect tribunes from one another, but as a result of Gaius Gracchus resorting to violent measures after loosing his bid for a third term.

 

The SCU was completely legal, and--though you might disagree about whether it was justified...

 

Against Gaius Gracchus, I agree, it was justified. He was being violent.

 

Against Tiberius it would not have been. The only ones who were being violent and totally illegal were Nasca and his thugs. The SCU was legal, and was a law. De-electing a fellow tribune was unconventional, but there were no laws specifically prohibiting it, probably because it was unforseen. Having a second term as tribune was unconvential and possibly illegal. Beating a tribune to death while he was still in office was a religious and temporal crime. Nasca should have been executed and then dumped in the Tiber.

[M. Porcius Cato]

the Senate should have recognized that people should have more power and spoils and as such propose their own pro-pleb policy to counter triumvirate rather than watch for the skies.

First, most optimates (Cato, Ahenobarbus, Bibulus, etc) were plebs. Second, once the triumvirate was formed and they began the use of violence to dominate the political scene, opposing policy proposals were worthless--all they could do was establish the legal foundations for having the triumvir's coerced legislation overturned. "Watching the skies" was an act of civil disobedience in the best spirit of Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and all the others who have opposed despotism.

 

it must be admited that the status quo as it were was unpopular with plebs, veterans had to be compensated, land reform would have benefited the general population as well with revenues coming from the East.

If we're talking about the immediate post-Sullan period, you're absolutely right that the status quo was unpopular: tribunes had lost their rights, professional bounty-hunters had grown rich from the proscriptions, wolves like Verres were sent to guard the Roman provincial flocks, the insurrection in Spain led to a tightening money supply and thus sky-high interest rates and a crisis in debt. But Roman senators responded energetically to meet all these problems. The tribunate was restored by Sulla's own henchmen Pompey and Crassus. Anti-Sullans like Cato and Caesar worked together to prosecute the bounty-hunters, restore confiscated property, and kick the civil service parasites out of the treasury. Cicero--with no resistance from High Optimates like Catulus--dragged wolves like Verres to the courts. In every one of these cases, the people expressed jubilance, rewarding Pompey, Crassus, Cato, Caesar, and Cicero with higher offices and honors, and standing by them when they faced brigands like Lepidus and Catiline. Far from the senate sitting idly by while the people suffered, senators competed with one another to gain the favor of people by pursuing policies that the people approved.

 

Furthermore, when Caesar first proposed land law, he was apparently willing to negotiate with Senate. Campanian land was not to be touched, all the things that you mention were remvoed. When Optimates responded by sheer obstructionist tactics, it could not be anything but losing game.

 

I'm so glad you brought this up.

 

First, let's be clear about the laws under question. There were two. The first was the lex Iulia agraria. The second was the lex Iulia agraria Campania. To understand the relation between the two bills, imagine that I ask you to sign a contract accepting an ostensibly free lunch (who would refuse it?), and then I demand to sleep with your wife in payment. That's the essence of the two bills, but now to the details.

 

The lex Iulia agraria was introduced to the senate on 1 or 2 January, the last day when Caesar could have had any bills sanctioned by the senate in time for the vote by the Tribal Assemblies. The bill--while needing approval almost immediately--had been crafted with care. The chief problem with most agrarian bills is that they contained hidden costs that were unacceptable, but Caesar's bill seemed to avoid all these: the land to be distributed to Pompey's veterans and 20,000 families were to be purchased with Pompey's largesse, and (more importantly) private property was to be respected--farmers weren't to be forcibly hauled off their plots of land and subjected to violence and starvation. Moreover, so that these deals didn't provide massive clientele for just one man, the bill provided for 20 commissioners (though an inner circle of 5 made most of the decisions), and Caesar specifically excluded himself from participating lest he be accused of graft and kickbacks.

 

According to Goldsworthy (who has an apparent distaste for such "cumbersome and tortuous legal prose"), "little or nothing within it could be reasonably criticized". Nothing??? In the history of republics, I know of no comparably far-reaching legislation--however reasonable--that have been passed on first reading simply because EVERYTHING can be reasonably criticized and improved, even the legislation of some darling of Venus.

 

Consider just a few problems with the bill. Which of the eligible 20,000 families were to receive this unexpected largesse? Would it be first-come-first-served, or would they be chosen by lottery, or were they to be selected by the consuls themselves? And what prices would be paid to those willing to sell to the land commissioners? Would there be a set price, no matter what the land is worth--whether it was been carefully preserved through conscientious steps and back-breaking labor or left to neglect or rendered infertile by carelessness? And if the price were not fixed, would the commission be licensed to pay any price, no matter how exorbinant? And--this is most important--what if there weren't enough money to pay the sellers or, more seriously, enough willing sellers to settle all of Pompey's vets and these 20,000 families that were chosen by who-knows-what method? What then?

 

Although we have no record of Cato's "filibuster", no doubt he (or somebody else) raised all these questions--as these are exactly the questions that any responsible statesman would ask. And for his questions, the ex-quaestor was not thanked, but hauled off to jail by that oh-so-reasonable Caesar! Let's be clear: if there is one thing that reason abhors, it is the silencing of questions. And this was too much for the senate, that one deliberative body of the republic, who walked out en masse, following the old grizzled veteran Marcus Petreius--who had by then seen more years of military service than Caesar had spent out of his diapers: "I'd rather be in jail with Cato", he shot at Caesar, "than in the Senate with you!"

 

As it turns out, Cato's concerns with the bill were entirely justified. After the bill was illegally passed through physical violence (including the smashing of the consul's fasces) and over the vetoes of three tribunes, the senators were forced to swear an oath that they would uphold the law no matter what. No matter what? What if the bill proved impossible to enforce for all the reasons I listed? What if no one was willing to sell their land to the commission? What then?

 

After one senator heroically went into exile rather than take this Oath of the Impossible, the answer to "What then?" came into sharp relief: the lex Iulia agraria Campania, which contradicted all the provisions of the first law that it seem reasonable. By the bill, private property was not respected. Instead, the Campanian lands--lands that were settled by the heroes of the Punic Wars, that had been in families for generations, that provided Rome with nearly one-fourth of her income, that had been expressly excluded by the first law precisely to gain passage of it--were to be confiscated from their rightful owners, who were to be left starving in the streets of Rome for the sake of Caesar's ambition. What a lover of the poor! What a champion of the people! What a friend of the dispossessed--that now dispossessed so many!

 

Even a Caesar-toady like Goldsworthy admits that "perhaps Caesar had always thought that its [Campanian lands'] distribution would also be necessary at some point, or maybe the realisation that his first law was on its own inadequate came more gradually. If we knew this, we would certainly have a clearer idea of whether he genuinely hoped to win over the Senate to support his first land law, or whether he had merely wanted to put them in the wrong in the eyes of the electorate." In other words, it isn't clear whether Caesar was a fool or a scoundrel. Well, in my opinion, Caesar was no fool.

 

Rather, the summative verdict of this Campanian law was best put forward by that titan of Roman history, George Long (1864), "This monstrous, this abominable crime was committed to serve a party purpose; and the criminal was a Roman consul ... too intelligent not to know what he was doing, and unscrupulous enough to do anything that would serve his own ends."

[Gaius Octavius]

the Senate should have recognized that people should have more power and spoils and as such propose their own pro-pleb policy to counter triumvirate rather than watch for the skies.

First, most optimates (Cato, Ahenobarbus, Bibulus, etc) were plebs. Second, once the triumvirate was formed and they began the use of violence to dominate the political scene, opposing policy proposals were worthless--all they could do was establish the legal foundations for having the triumvir's coerced legislation overturned. "Watching the skies" was an act of civil disobedience in the best spirit of Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and all the others who have opposed despotism. (And, certainly not an act of obstructionism.)

 

it must be admited that the status quo as it were was unpopular with plebs, veterans had to be compensated, land reform would have benefited the general population as well with revenues coming from the East.

If we're talking about the immediate post-Sullan period, you're absolutely right that the status quo was unpopular: tribunes had lost their rights, professional bounty-hunters had grown rich from the proscriptions, wolves like Verres were sent to guard the Roman provincial flocks, the insurrection in Spain led to a tightening money supply (How is this known? Did the Roman Fed scoop up the loose change?) and thus sky-high interest rates (Of course, usury by the likes of Brutus doesn't come into play here.) and a crisis in debt. But Roman senators responded energetically to meet all these problems. The tribunate was restored by Sulla's own henchmen Pompey and Crassus. Anti-Sullans like Cato and Caesar worked together to prosecute the bounty-hunters, restore confiscated property, and kick the civil service parasites out of the treasury. Cicero--with no resistance from High Optimates like Catulus--dragged wolves like Verres to the courts. In every one of these cases, the people expressed jubilance, rewarding Pompey, Crassus, Cato, Caesar, and Cicero with higher offices and honors, and standing by them when they faced brigands like Lepidus and Catiline. Far from the senate sitting idly by while the people suffered, senators competed with one another to gain the favor of people by pursuing policies that the people approved.

 

Furthermore, when Caesar first proposed land law, he was apparently willing to negotiate with Senate. Campanian land was not to be touched, all the things that you mention were remvoed. When Optimates responded by sheer obstructionist tactics, it could not be anything but losing game.

 

I'm so glad you brought this up.

 

First, let's be clear about the laws under question. There were two. The first was the lex Iulia agraria. The second was the lex Iulia agraria Campania. To understand the relation between the two bills, imagine that I ask you to sign a contract accepting an ostensibly free lunch (who would refuse it?), and then I demand to sleep with your wife in payment. That's the essence of the two bills, but now to the details.

 

The lex Iulia agraria was introduced to the senate on 1 or 2 January, the last day when Caesar could have had any bills sanctioned by the senate in time for the vote by the Tribal Assemblies. ( A perfect example of the 'People' of Rome being sovereign.) The bill--while needing approval almost immediately--had been crafted with care. The chief problem with most agrarian bills is that they contained hidden costs that were unacceptable, but Caesar's bill seemed to avoid all these: the land to be distributed to Pompey's veterans and 20,000 families were to be purchased with Pompey's largesse, and (more importantly) private property was to be respected--farmers weren't to be forcibly hauled off their plots of land and subjected to violence and starvation. (The so unfortunate magnates owned the most of the land. Weren't the 'little fish' to be compensated?)Moreover, so that these deals didn't provide massive clientele for just one man, the bill provided for 20 commissioners (though an inner circle of 5 made most of the decisions), and Caesar specifically excluded himself from participating lest he be accused of graft and kickbacks.

 

According to Goldsworthy (who has an apparent distaste for such "cumbersome and tortuous legal prose"), "little or nothing within it could be reasonably criticized". Nothing??? In the history of republics, I know of no comparably far-reaching legislation--however reasonable--that have been passed on first reading simply because EVERYTHING can be reasonably criticized and improved, even the legislation of some darling of Venus. [Dear peasants, just you wait a little longer and we will obfuscate this to death or make it come out 'right' (as usual) - for us.]

 

Consider just a few problems with the bill. Which of the eligible 20,000 families were to receive this unexpected largesse? Would it be first-come-first-served, or would they be chosen by lottery, or were they to be selected by the consuls themselves? And what prices would be paid to those willing to sell to the land commissioners? Would there be a set price, no matter what the land is worth--whether it was been carefully preserved through conscientious steps and back-breaking labor or left to neglect or rendered infertile by carelessness? And if the price were not fixed, would the commission be licensed to pay any price, no matter how exorbinant? And--this is most important--what if there weren't enough money to pay the sellers or, more seriously, enough willing sellers to settle all of Pompey's vets and these 20,000 families that were chosen by who-knows-what method? What then? ('Problems', problems!, ad nauseum.)

 

Although we have no record of Cato's "filibuster", no doubt he (or somebody else) raised all these questions--as these are exactly the questions that any responsible statesman would ask. (From supposition to fact.) And for his questions, the ex-quaestor was not thanked, but hauled off to jail by that oh-so-reasonable Caesar! Let's be clear: if there is one thing that reason abhors, it is the silencing of questions. And this was too much for the senate, that one deliberative body of the republic, who walked out en masse, following the old grizzled veteran Marcus Petreius--who had by then seen more years of military service than Caesar had spent out of his diapers: "I'd rather be in jail with Cato", he shot at Caesar, "than in the Senate with you!"Did Caesar incarcerate Petreius?)

 

As it turns out, Cato's concerns with the bill were entirely justified. After the bill was illegally passed (Truly?) through physical violence (including the smashing of the consul's fasces) and over the vetoes of three tribunes, (Do we know if these Children of the People were in the pockets of the magnates?) the senators were forced to swear an oath that they would uphold the law no matter what. No matter what? What if the bill proved impossible to enforce for all the reasons I listed? What if no one was willing to sell their land to the commission? What then? (The law is the Law.)

 

After one senator heroically went into exile rather than take this Oath of the Impossible, the answer to "What then?" came into sharp relief: the lex Iulia agraria Campania, which contradicted all the provisions of the first law that it seem reasonable. By the bill, private property was not respected. Instead, the Campanian lands--lands that were settled by the heroes of the Punic Wars, (What was left of their progeny.) that had been in families for generations, (Once again, the magnates didn't own the most of the land.) that provided Rome with nearly one-fourth of her income, that had been expressly excluded by the first law precisely to gain passage of it--were to be confiscated from their rightful owners, who were to be left starving in the streets of Rome for the sake of Caesar's ambition. What a lover of the poor! What a champion of the people! What a friend of the dispossessed--that now dispossessed so many!

 

Even a Caesar-toady (Yes, yes. Anyone who has a different view point from MPC is a 'toady' a 'water' carrier; even the 'lapdog' Petrach!) like Goldsworthy admits that "perhaps Caesar had always thought that its [Campanian lands'] distribution would also be necessary at some point, or maybe the realisation that his first law was on its own inadequate(Most laws are usually inadequate at first. That is why there is an amendment process.) came more gradually. If we knew this, we would certainly have a clearer idea of whether he genuinely hoped to win over the Senate to support his first land law, or whether he had merely wanted to put them in the wrong in the eyes of the electorate." In other words, it isn't clear whether Caesar was a fool or a scoundrel. Well, in my opinion, Caesar was no fool. (Neither was he the utter scoundrel you make him out to be.)

 

Rather, the summative verdict of this Campanian law was best put forward by that titan of Roman history, George Long (1864), "This monstrous, this abominable crime was committed to serve a party purpose; and the criminal was a Roman consul ... too intelligent not to know what he was doing, and unscrupulous enough to do anything that would serve his own ends." (Of course and perforce.)

[theilian]

First, most optimates (Cato, Ahenobarbus, Bibulus, etc) were plebs. Second, once the triumvirate was formed and they began the use of violence to dominate the political scene, opposing policy proposals were worthless--all they could do was establish the legal foundations for having the triumvir's coerced legislation overturned. "Watching the skies" was an act of civil disobedience in the best spirit of Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and all the others who have opposed despotism.

I was using a pleb in a later sense referring to middle and especially lower class. But this act of 'civil disobedience' didn't work out too well, and I don't think it requires sprecial foresight to see that.

 

The tribunate was restored by Sulla's own henchmen Pompey and Crassus. Anti-Sullans like Cato and Caesar worked together to prosecute the bounty-hunters, restore confiscated property, and kick the civil service parasites out of the treasury. Cicero--with no resistance from High Optimates like Catulus--dragged wolves like Verres to the courts. In every one of these cases, the people expressed jubilance, rewarding Pompey, Crassus, Cato, Caesar, and Cicero with higher offices and honors, and standing by them when they faced brigands like Lepidus and Catiline. Far from the senate sitting idly by while the people suffered, senators competed with one another to gain the favor of people by pursuing policies that the people approved.

 

But the thing is while the Optimates were critical of Sulla's method, they were largely supportive of substance of his actions. They were rather dragged by the populares into overturning Sulla's 'reform', and I think this put them in defensive and reactive long before first triumvirate.

 

The lex Iulia agraria was introduced to the senate on 1 or 2 January, the last day when Caesar could have had any bills sanctioned by the senate in time for the vote by the Tribal Assemblies. The bill--while needing approval almost immediately--had been crafted with care...

Consider just a few problems with the bill. Which of the eligible 20,000 families were to receive this unexpected largesse?...

But Caesar offered to address such issues if the Senate proposed them. This may have been done purely for political show. I don't deny that though I don't think there is real evidence either way. In any case, this put the Optimates in bad position, and they just had no answer. At this point, first triumvirate was not visible (and I don't think it was at this point what it came to be), so one can't say this was some 'civil disobedience' against tyranny. It was plainly obstructionist policy, which could not possibly engender good will of populus.

Now, I am not excusing Caesar here. The subsequent use of violence by Clodius escalated the situation perhaps beyond any hope. I am saying that both side contributed greatly to the final collapse.

 

the lex Iulia agraria Campania, which contradicted all the provisions of the first law that it seem reasonable.

By this time I think things escalated to such such situation that Caesar could and did abuse his power and did irreparable harm to the republic. But still, I think this law was beneficial to the common people, who were after all Caesar's power base. Also it does not mean that Caesar necessarily planned all this in advance or it would have followed original law if the latter was supported by Optimates. Optimates, by opposing the first law, were open to accusation that they were being merely obstructionist and greedy of the interests of senatorial class (which in fact they were).

 

My political inclination is with populares, but I don't think the repulblic was irredeemable. As for Caesar, I don't see him as an ogre that our dear Cato makes him out to be, and I agree with most of his social programme that he enforced once he became, let's face it, the first emperor of Rome. (Maybe his 10-year campaign in Gaul and stay with Cleopatra affected him) But for me this legacy which ended the political discourse (and populares movement as well) for over millenium in Western civilization is more significant and lasting than his populares legacy.

But It would be wrong to blame all this on Caesar, I'd say Optimates as a whole were as much responsible.

Edited March 23, 2007 by theilian

[M. Porcius Cato]

the lex Iulia agraria Campania, which contradicted all the provisions of the first law that it seem reasonable.

By this time I think things escalated to such such situation that Caesar could and did abuse his power and did irreparable harm to the republic. But still, I think this law was beneficial to the common people, who were after all Caesar's power base. Also it does not mean that Caesar necessarily planned all this in advance or it would have followed original law if the latter was supported by Optimates. Optimates, by opposing the first law, were open to accusation that they were being merely obstructionist and greedy of the interests of senatorial class (which in fact they were).

 

Come now, look at who opposed this Campanian law: Clodius! Clodius--the quintessential populare--was in fact so adamantly opposed to the law that he refused (for a time) to be reconciled to Caesar even when he needed Caesar (as Pontifex Maximus) to give him his plebeian adoption (see here).

 

The fact is that the Campanian law was a notoriously bad piece of legislation that did nothing for the people at all--and how could it: it dispossessed as many it rewarded. Rather than being a populare move, it was a political spoil for Pompey, pure and simple, and everyone from Clodius to Cicero to Cato to Catulus could see it.

[theilian]

Come now, look at who opposed this Campanian law: Clodius! Clodius--the quintessential populare--was in fact so adamantly opposed to the law that he refused (for a time) to be reconciled to Caesar even when he needed Caesar (as Pontifex Maximus) to give him his plebeian adoption (see here).

 

It's my turn to say come now, as if Clodius was the most principled politician. Though he was populare, he was opposed to both Optimates and triumvirate and changed sides when it suited him.

[Mosquito]

After reading so many of MPC's posts here in this discussion and under different topics, I couldnt loose the impression that I have read it somwhere before. Having that strange "D

Edited March 24, 2007 by Mosquito

[M. Porcius Cato]

Funny that in the 22 years after the Gracchi no fewer than five different agrarian bills were passed. The senate sure was opposed to change, huh?

[Mosquito]

Funny that in the 22 years after the Gracchi no fewer than five different agrarian bills were passed. The senate sure was opposed to change, huh?

 

Exactlly - thats what I mean. The senate had to put things on the edge of civil war and after defeating enemies was adopting some of the policies which was opposing before - only to avoid the future conflicts and even the worse conflicts - and in this way to disarm populares.

 

The same they did during social war. First they refused to give Italians roman citisenship, provoked them to bloody war which had devastating results for both Rome and Italy and after victory granted citisenship to all of them. So what was the war for if the defeated party recived this what wanted to get? Why senate didnt give it to them without war? The same was in conflict with Gracchi and in many other conflicts.

Edited March 24, 2007 by Mosquito