Pompeius Magnus - A thief ?

[Caesar CXXXVII]

I alwayes believed in the notion that Pompey steal "his victories" from others , Wisdom or luck ?

A very good (lllooonnnggg) survey -

 

 

Pompey was born in 106 B.C. and the first forty two years of his life were characterized by uniform good fortune. Oh, I dare say he stubbed his toe now and then and got attacks of indigestion at inconvenient times and lost money on the gladiatorial contests but in the major aspects of life, he remained always on the winning side.

Pompey was born at a time when Rome was torn by civil war and social turmoil. The Italian allies, who were not Roman citizens, rose in rebellion against a Roman aristocracy who wouldn't extend the franchise. The lower classes, who were feeling the pinch of a tightening economy, now that Rome had completed the looting of most of the Mediterranean area, were struggling against the senators, who had kept most of the loot.

When Pompey was in his teens, his father was trying to walk the tightrope. The elder Pompey had been a general who had served as consul in 89 B.C., and had defeated the Italian non citizens and celebrated a triumph. But he was not an aristocrat by birth and he tried to make a deal with the radicals. This might have gotten him in real trouble, for he had worked himself into a spot where neither side trusted him, but in 87 B.C. he died in the course of an epidemic that swept his army.

That left young Pompey as a fatherless nineteen year old who had inherited enemies on both sides of the civil war.

He had to choose and he had to choose carefully. The radicals were in control of Rome, but off in Asia Minor fighting a war against Rome's enemies, was the reactionary general Lucius Cornelius Sulla.

Pompey, uncertain as to which side would win, lay low and out of sight. When he heard that Sulla was returning, victorious, from Asia Minor, he made his decision. He chose Sulla as probable victor. At once, he scrabbled together an army from among those soldiers who had fought for his father, loudly proclaimed himself on Sulla's side, and took the field against the radicals.

There was his first stroke of fortune. He had backed the right man. Sulla arrived in Italy in 83 B.C. and began winning at once. By 82 B.C. he had wiped out the last opposition in Italy and at once made himself dictator. For three years he was absolute ruler of Rome. He reorganized the government and placed the senatorial aristocrats firmly in control.

Pompey benefited, for Sulla was properly grateful to him Sulla sent Pompey to Sicily, then to Africa, to wipe out the disorganized forces that still clung to the radical side there, and this was done without trouble.

The victories were cheap and Pompey's troops were so pleased that they acclaimed Pompey as "the Great," so that he became Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus the only Roman to bear this utterly un Roman cognomen. Later accounts say that he received this name because of a striking physical resemblance between himself and Alexander the Great, but such a resemblance could have existed only in Pompey's own imagination.

Sulla ordered Pompey to disband his army after his African victories but Pompey refused to do so, preferring to stay surrounded by his loyal men. Ordinarily, one did not lightly cross Sulfa, who had no compunctions whatever about ordering a few dozen executions before breakfast. Pompey, however, proceeded to marry Sulla's daughter. Apparently, this won Sulla over to the point of not only accepting the title of "the Great" for the young man, but also to the point of allowing him to celebrate a triumph in 79 B.C. even though he was below the minimum age at which triumphs were permitted.

Almost immediately thereafter, Sulla resigned the dictatorship, feeling his work was done, but Pompey's career never as much as stumbled. He now had a considerable reputation (based on his easy victories). What's more, he was greedy for further easy victories.

For instance, after Sulla's death, a Roman general, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, turned against Sulla's policies. The reactionary Senate at once sent an army against him. The senatorial army was led by Quintus Catulus, with Pompey as second in command. Until then, Pompey had supported Lepidus, but again he guessed the winning side in time. Catulus easily defeated Lepidus, and Pompey managed to get most of the credit.There was trouble in Spain at this time, for it was the last stronghold of radicalism. In Spain, a radical general, Quintus Sertorius, maintained himself. Under him, Spain was virtually independent of Rome and was blessed with an enlightened government, for Sertorius was an efficient and liberal administrator. He treated the native Spaniards well, set up a Senate into which they were admitted, and established schools where their young men were trained in Roman style.

Naturally, the Spaniards, who for some centuries had had a reputation as fierce and resolute warriors, fought heart and soul on the side of Sertorius. When Sulla sent Roman armies into Spain, they were defeated.

So, in 77 B.C. Pompey, all in a glow over Catulus' easy victory over Lepidus, offered to go to Spain to take care of Sertorius. The Senate was willing and off to Spain marched Pompey and his army. On his way through Gaul, he found the dispirited remnants of Lepidus' old army. Lepidus himself was dead by now but what was left of his men were under Marcus Brutus (whose son would, one day, be a famous assassin).

There was no trouble in handling the broken army and Pompey offered Brutus his life if he would surrender. Brutus surrendered and Pompey promptly had him executed. One more easy victory, topped by treachery, and Pompey's reputation increased.

On to Spain went Pompey. In Spain, a sturdy old Roman general, Metellus Pius, was unsuccessfully trying to cope with Sertorius. Vaingloriously, Pompey advanced on his own to take over the job and Sertorius, who was the first good general Pompey had yet encountered, promptly gave the young man a first class drubbing. Pompey's reputation might have withered then and there, but just in time, Metellus approached with reinforcements and Sertorius had to withdraw. At once, Pompey called it a victory, and, of course, got the credit for it. His luck held.

For five years, Pompey remained in Spain, trying to handle Sertorius, and for five years he failed. And then he had a stroke of luck, the luck that never failed Pompey, for Sertorius was assassinated.

With Sertorius gone, the resistance movement in Spain collapsed. Pompey could at once win another of his easy victories and could then return to Rome in 71 B.C., claiming to have cleaned up the Spanish mess.

But couldn't Rome have seen it took him five years?

No, Rome couldn't, for all the time Pompey had been in Spain, Italy itself had been going through a terrible time and there had been no chance of keeping an eye on Spain.

A band of gladiators, under Spartacus, had revolted. Many dispossessed flocked to Spartacus' side and for two years, Spartacus (a skillful fighter) destroyed every Roman army sent out against him and struck terror into the heart of every aristocrat. At the height of his power he had 90,000 men under his command and controlled almost all of southern Italy.

In 72 B.C., Spartacus fought his way northward to the Alps, intending to leave Italy and gain permanent freedom in the barbarian regions to the north. His men, however, misled by their initial victories, preferred to remain in Italy in reach of more loot. Spartacus turned south again.

The senators now placed an army under Marcus Licinius Crassus, Rome's richest and most crooked businessman. In two battles, Crassus managed to defeat the gladiatorial army and in the second one, Spartacus was killed. Then, just as Crassus had finished the hard work, Pompey returned with his Spanish army and hastily swept up the demoralized remnants. He immediately represented himself, successfully, as the man who had cleaned up the gladiatorial mess after having taken care of Spain. The result was that Pompey was allowed to celebrate a triumph, but poor Crassus wasn't.

The Senate, though, was growing nervous. They were not sure they trusted Pompey. He had won too many victories and was becoming entirely too popular.

Nor did they like Crassus (no one did). For all his wealth, Crassus was not a member of the aristocratic families and he grew angry at being snubbed by the socially superior Senate. Crassus began to court favor with the people with well placed philanthropies. He also began to court Pompey.

Pompey always responded to courting and, besides, had an unfailing nose for the winning side. He and Crassus ran for the consulate in 70 B.C. (two consuls were elected each year), and they won. Once consul, Crassus began to undo Sulla's reforms of a decade earlier in order to weaken the hold of the senatorial aristocracy on the government. Pompey, who had been heart and soul with Sulla when that had been the politic thing to do, turned about and went along with Crassus, though not always happily.

But Rome was still in trouble. The West had been entirely pacified, but there was mischief at sea. Roman conquests had broken down the older stable governments in the East without having, as yet, established anything quite as stable in their place. The result was that piracy was rife throughout the eastern Mediterranean. It was a rare ship that could get through safely and, in particular, the grain supply to Rome itself had become so precarious that the price of food skyrocketed.

Roman attempts to clear out the pirates failed, partly because the generals sent to do the job were never given enough power. In 67 B.C. Pompey maneuvered to have himself appointed to the task but under favorable conditions. The Senate, in a panic over the food supply, leaped at the bait.

Pompey was given dictatorial powers over the entire Mediterranean coast to a distance of fifty miles inland for three years and was told to use that time and the entire Roman fleet to destroy the pirates. So great was Roman confidence in Pompey that food prices fell as soon as news of his appointment was made public.

Pompey was lucky enough to have what no previous Roman had adequate forces and adequate power. Nevertheless one must admit that he did well. In three months, not three years, he scoured the Mediterranean clear of piracy.

If he had been popular before, he was Rome's hero now.

The only place where Rome still faced trouble was in eastern Asia Minor, where the kingdom of Pontus had been fighting Rome with varying success for over twenty years. It had been against Pontus that Sulla had won victories in the East, yet Pontus kept fighting on. Now a Roman general, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, had almost finished the job, but he was a hard driving martinet, hated by his soldiers.

When Lucullus' army began to mutiny in 66 B.C., just when one more drive would finish Pontus, he was recalled and good old Pompey was sent eastward to replace him. Pompey's reputation preceded him; Locullus' men cheered him madly and for him did what they wouldn't do for Lucullus. They marched against Pontus and beat it. Pompey supplied the one last push and, as always, demanded and accepted credit for the whole thing.

All of Asia Minor was now either Roman outright or was under the control of Roman puppet governments. Pompey therefore decided to clean up the East altogether. He marched southward and around Antioch found the last

remnant of the Seleucid Empire, established after the death of Alexander the Great two and a half centuries before. It was now ruled by a nonentity called Antiochus XIII. Pompey deposed him, and annexed the empire to Rome as the province of Syria.

Still further south was the kingdom of Judea. It had been independent for less than a century, under the rule of a line of kings of the Maccabean family. Two of the Maccabeans were now fighting over the throne and one appealed to Pompey.

Pompey at once marched into Judea and laid siege to Jerusalem. Ordinarily, Jerusalem was a hard nut to crack, for it was built on a rocky prominence with a reliable water supply; it had good walls; and it was usually defended with fanatic vigor.

Pompey, however, noticed that every seven days things were quiet. Someone explained to him that on the Sabbath, the Jews wouldn't fight unless attacked and even then fought without real conviction. It must have taken quite a while to convince Pompey of such a ridiculous thing but, once convinced, be used a few Sabbaths to bring up his siege machinery without interference, and finally attacked on another Sabbath. No problem.

Pompey ended the Maccabean kingdom and annexed Judea to Rome while allowing the Jews to keep their religious freedom, their Temple, their high priests, and their peculiar, but useful, Sabbath.

Pompey was forty two years old at this time, and success had smiled at him without interruption. I now skip a single small event in Pompey's life and represent it by a line of asterisks: one apparently unimportant circumstance.

Pompey returned to Italy in 61 B.C. absolutely on top of the world, boasting (with considerable exaggeration) that what he had found as the eastern border of the realm be had left at its center. He received the most magnificent triumph Rome had ever seen up to that time.

The Senate was in terror lest Pompey make himself a dictator and turn to the radicals. This Pompey did not do. Once, twenty years before, when he had an army, he kept that army even at the risk of Sulla's displeasure. Now, something impelled him to give up his army, disband it, and assume a role as a private citizen. Perhaps he was convinced that he had reached a point where the sheer magic of his name would allow him to dominate the republic.

At last, though, his nose for the right action failed him. And once having failed him, it failed him forever after.

To begin with, Pompey asked the Senate to approve everything he had done in the East, his victories, his treaties, his depositions of kings, his establishment of provinces. He also asked the Senate to distribute land to his soldiers, for he himself had promised them land. He was sure that he had but to ask and he would be given.

Not at all. Pompey was now a man without an army and the Senate insisted on considering each individual act separately and nit pickingly. As for land grants, that was rejected.

What's more, Pompey found that he had no one on his side within the government. All his vast popularity suddenly seemed to count for nothing as all parties turned against him for no discernible reason. What's more, Pompey could do nothing about it. Something had happened, and he was no longer the clever, golden boy Pompey he had been before 64 B.C. Now he was uncertain, vacillating, and weak.

Even Crassus was no longer his friend. Crassus had found someone else: a handsome, charming individual with a silver tongue and a genius for intrigue a man named Julius Caesar. Caesar was a playboy aristocrat but Crassus paid off the young man's enormous debts and Caesar served him well in return.

While Pompey was struggling with the Senate, Caesar was off in Spain, winning some small victories against rebellious tribes and gathering enough ill gotten wealth (as Roman generals usually did) to pay off Crassus and make himself independent. When, he returned to Italy and found Pompey furious with the Senate, he arranged a kind of treaty of alliance between himself, Crassus, and Pompey the "First Triumvirate."

But it was Caesar and not Pompey who profited from this. It was Caesar who used the alliance to get himself elected consul in 59 B.C. Once consul, Caesar controlled the Senate with almost contemptuous ease, driving the other consul, a reactionary, into house arrest.

One thing Caesar did was to force the aristocrats of the Senate to grant all of Pompey's demands. Pompey got the ratification of all of his acts and he got the land for his soldiers and yet he did not profit from this. Indeed, he suffered humiliation, for it was quite clear that he was standing, hat in hand, while Caesar graciously bestowed largesse on him.

Yet Pompey could do nothing, for he had married Julia, Caesar's daughter. She was beautiful and winning and Pompey was crazy about her. While he had her, he could do nothing to cross Caesar.

Caesar was running everything now. In 58 B.C. he sug

Edited January 14, 2007 by Caesar CXXXVII

[M. Porcius Cato]

Caesar137, are you seriously suggesting that the god of the Jews punished Pompey and played a causal role in history?

[Pompieus]

One can belittle Pompeys victories...but (like Sam Spade said) look at the number of them. Also, Pompey defeated two of the greatest generals in Roman history in Sertorius and Caesar (at Dyrrachium). He was probably the finest strategist and logistician of them all - these are talents that do not stand out like Caesar's impetuosity, but it was these abilities that made his successes seem so easy. Also the literary tradition is uniformly hostile- the aristocrats always hated him (the young butcher).

[Caesar CXXXVII]

Caesar137, are you seriously suggesting that the god of the Jews punished Pompey and played a causal role in history?

 

 

Are you seriously asking me this question ?

[Tobias]

Pompey was undoubtedly one of the greatest organisers in military history, and he certainly had an eye as to where the prize was, at least initially. He was granted extraordinary command after extraordinary command because of his popularity and his army. He was also adept in taking the credit that other Generals deserved.

 

Sertorius had little to fear from Pompey, as was demonstrated on several occasions, such as at Saguntum. It was Metellus Pius who essentially won the wars in Spain, not Pompey.

 

Now, i'm not saying he wasn't a competent general at times. He had his good points. But to put him on the same level as generals such as Alexander, Scipio Africanus or Caesar is laughable. Crassus and co. were the ones who inflicted the brunt of the damage on Spartacus, but Pompey's luck put him in a position to almost literally run into Spartacus' fleeing remnants and to rout these pitiful remains.

Lucullus did the hard yards in the East, and again, Pompey was able to have the credit given to himself.

 

When he finally came up against another more than competent general (someone who really was on the same level as the greatest generals of all time), Caesar, he was placed back in the boots of the young man who had been dumbfounded by his defeats at the hands of Sertorius. He retreated down Italy in the face of Caesar's one Legion, and eventually fled to Greece.

 

Here, he showed scraps of the immense organisational ability he did possess, especially at Dyrrachium. But he lacked that special something that would have enabled him to strike the final blow and defeat Caesar, who was on the ropes in the face of Pompey's organisation and superior numbers. His lack of confidence led him to engage in Fabian tactics, allowing Caesar to regroup. When he had vacillated long enough to allow Caesar to rebuild his position, he committed the ultimate folly - he listened to the "Senate" and engaged in a pitched battle against Caesar. Here he was soundly defeated because of his reliance on his cavalry. From there on, it's history.

 

I am a Caesar supporter, but i have to admit that i like Pompey; he was initially lucky, he was a competent, or maybe "adequate" general. He certainly gained a large amount of credit that he didn't deserve, but he wasn't a terribly bad general or man. He just backed the wrong horse by joining the Optimates and thinking himself better than a man who outclassed him in almost every way; Caesar.

Edited January 15, 2007 by Tobias

[L. Quintus Sertorius]

One can belittle Pompeys victories...but (like Sam Spade said) look at the number of them.

 

Quality is more important than quantity.

 

Also, Pompey defeated two of the greatest generals in Roman history in Sertorius and Caesar (at Dyrrachium)

 

When did Pompey ever best Sertorius? Surely not at the field of Sucro, where he himself was nearly captured? Surely not the siege of Lauron, which Pompey was forced to watch burn? Surely not Saguntum, where Sertorius sacked Pompey's camp and baggage so thoroughly that the Pompeian army nearly starved?

 

In fact, I'm hard pressed to remember any success of Pompey against Sertorius, either strategically or tactically.

 

He was probably the finest strategist and logistician of them all - these are talents that do not stand out like Caesar's impetuosity, but it was these abilities that made his successes seem so easy.

 

His successes were great because he didn't really have much work to do. His great Eastern triumph was stolen from the hands of Lucullus, who had done all the real work at Tigranocirta. His "triumph" against Spartacus was hollow, Crassus having defeated and dispersed the slave army prior to Pompey's arrival. And when he finally had the chance to prove himself as the greatest general of his age at Pharsalus, he went for a quick victory and wasted his strategic superiority. Caesar needed a battle then and there - Pompey could have afforded to wait.

 

Also the literary tradition is uniformly hostile- the aristocrats always hated him (the young butcher).

 

Would you care to quote those "uniformly hostile" writers? I seem to recall a rather genial portrait of Pompeius.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Caesar137, are you seriously suggesting that the god of the Jews punished Pompey and played a causal role in history?

Are you seriously asking me this question ?

I am.

[M. Porcius Cato]

When he finally came up against another more than competent general (someone who really was on the same level as the greatest generals of all time), Caesar, he was placed back in the boots of the young man who had been dumbfounded by his defeats at the hands of Sertorius. He retreated down Italy in the face of Caesar's one Legion, and eventually fled to Greece.

Come now, this is like crediting the Japanese for their spectacular defeat of the Americans at Pearl Harbor. Pompey was taken by surprise because he didn't believe that anyone sober would attempt to seize the republic.

 

His lack of confidence led him to engage in Fabian tactics, allowing Caesar to regroup. When he had vacillated long enough to allow Caesar to rebuild his position, he committed the ultimate folly - he listened to the "Senate" and engaged in a pitched battle against Caesar. Here he was soundly defeated because of his reliance on his cavalry. From there on, it's history.

 

First, Pompey's "Fabian tactics" were the very tactics that gave him an overwhelming numerical superiority: he used the time not only to wear down the starving Caesarian army but also to bring in fresh levies. Second, Pompey's reliance on the cavalry per se was not the problem at Pharsalus. The problem was that the cavalry was so ineptly handled by Labienus that it stampeded in retreat over Pompey's missle troops, which should have given him an immense advantage even without the cavalry.

 

Moreover, I'd also point out that Pompey's handling of the Cilician pirates was masterful and possibly a useful model for future wars against loosely organized bands of terrorists (which is what they were).

 

Nevertheless, I agree that Pompey was no Alexander, whatever his flatterers (like Caesar at one point) would have had us believe.

[Caesar CXXXVII]

Nevertheless, I agree that Pompey was no Alexander, whatever his flatterers (like Caesar at one point) would have had us believe.

 

And Sulla who crowned him "Imperator" when he was a private man and a "Magnus" when he smashed "Marian" "generals" ?

[Tobias]

First, Pompey's "Fabian tactics" were the very tactics that gave him an overwhelming numerical superiority: he used the time not only to wear down the starving Caesarian army but also to bring in fresh levies.

 

I'm not saying Pompey's strategy was a bad or inept one when he was fighting this way - as i said, it was really only because he committed himself to a pitched battle with Caesar that he brought himself undone.

 

Second, Pompey's reliance on the cavalry per se was not the problem at Pharsalus.

 

Give credit where it's due; Caesar's using his picked soldiers as a phalanx against Labienus was quite effective. I was led to believe that after defeating the cavalry, Caesar was able to throw the soldiers he had committed to facing the cavalry against Pompey's flank, which was the beginning of the end, as Pompey had not the ability or confidence to salvage the situation. Although, as you said, i daresay that the running down of the "Missile Troops" by their own cavalry can't have helped.

[Primus Pilus]

The story would seem to suggest that Pompey's disregard of the Jewish deity played a role in his own ultimate demise. If this is what is being suggested than I'll go on record as saying that I think the story is completely ridiculous. If that's not the point, then clearly I am missing whatever the point may be.

[Caesar CXXXVII]

The story would seem to suggest that Pompey's disregard of the Jewish deity played a role in his own ultimate demise. If this is what is being suggested than I'll go on record as saying that I think the story is completely ridiculous. If that's not the point, then clearly I am missing whatever the point may be.

 

 

95 % of the article is about Pompey's luck , wisdom , reputation and so on , and you are reffering to the last 5% ? The point is very simple - He (who wrote the article) is showing that Pompey was not so great , it is written in every line . Now about the last 5% - The writer is trying to be cynical , that's all .

I hope I cleared it .

[Primus Pilus]

The story would seem to suggest that Pompey's disregard of the Jewish deity played a role in his own ultimate demise. If this is what is being suggested than I'll go on record as saying that I think the story is completely ridiculous. If that's not the point, then clearly I am missing whatever the point may be.

 

 

95 % of the article is about Pompey's luck , wisdom , reputation and so on , and you are reffering to the last 5% ? The point is very simple - He (who wrote the article) is showing that Pompey was not so great , it is written in every line . Now about the last 5% - The writer is trying to be cynical , that's all .

I hope I cleared it .

 

I understand that, but the writer could've made that very suggestion without the inclusion of supernatural influences. Otherwise I tend to agree that Pompey's career included a rather fortuitous sequence of events. However, I also believe that one makes his own luck through proactive advancement of one's own agenda. He benefited from such circumstances, but he had to be in a position to do so in the first place.

 

It wasn't luck that Pompey chose to raise an illegal army of his father's veterans in support of Sulla, but rather a calculated gamble that he helped make a reality. It wasn't luck that gave him the command in Hispania opposite of Sertorius, but rather the weak position of Lepidus and the resulting existence of Pompey's unopposed army. Sertorius didn't die simply as a lucky boon to aid Pompey but rather because of Sertorius' own seemingly inflated ego and the jealousy of his subordinates. Was this lucky for Pompey or the simple underestimation of circumstances by Sertorius' rivals.

 

I suppose such things can be interpreted however people like to, but in my opinion the proverb "audentes fortuna iuvat" (fortune favors the bold) was not intended to glorify the role of luck.

[Caesar CXXXVII]

Otherwise I tend to agree that Pompey's career included a rather fortuitous sequence of events. However, I also believe that one makes his own luck through proactive advancement of one's own agenda. He benefited from such circumstances, but he had to be in a position to do so in the first place.

 

Agreed .

 

Yet , Perpenna killed a Sertorius that was not going to be defeated even if Pompey was still fighting against him today.......A lucky guy Pompey...It is all because he had an onion in his shoes and a star of David in his bottom

[M. Porcius Cato]

Up to the age of forty two he had been uniformly successful; nothing he tried to do failed. After the age of fortytwo he had been uniformly unsuccessful; nothing he tried to do succeeded.

What happened at the age of forty two?

 

Apparently the unnamed, uncredited author of this story would have us believe that Pompey's change of fortune was caused by the god of the Jews. The theory is patent nonsense.

 

The only thing worthwhile to learn from this nonsense is the fallacy of post hoc reasoning, which is the bread-and-butter of the superstitious. By the same line of thinking, we should believe that since the sun rises after the rooster crows, the sun rises because the rooster crows.