Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq

[Virgil61]

I just finished Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks. Ricks is a veteran correspondent for the Washington Post who covers the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Pentagon. As such he's developed over the years a close relationship with military and civilian personnel in DOD. It's done him well.

 

Rick's book functions to a large extent, as a checklist of how to screw up the occupation of a country. Dispensing with whether the invasion was wise or not he deals directly with how the chief architects of the invasion ignored a large number of mainly Army general's advice. Initial advice briefed by the Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki was brushed aside by an energetic and arrogant Sec of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, whose dislike for the Army generals he found was barely hidden. They were 'Clinton's generals' in his mind, even though the former president generally had little to do with the majority of internal army promotions. This disaffection and lack of engagement with military professionals in favor of picked men and civilian led military planning would lead to laying the groundwork for further disasters down the line.

 

General Tommy Franks, the chief of CENTCOM (in charge of the region containing Afghanistan and Iraq), also comes under fire. Most officers who knew or worked with him considered him energetic but not the strategic thinker needed for the job. His short-sightedness went so far that he considered his role over after the capture of Baghdad and 'disengaged' from day-to-day leadership as he prepared for retirement, even planning on a vacation in the Bahamas two weeks after Baghdad's capture.

 

Frank's eyes off the ball and Rumsfeld's optimism that Iraq would right itself resulted in a series of misplaced personnel appointments. A large number of old-guard generals with years of experience and who'd learned lessons of Vietnam resigned since they'd fallen out of favor with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Pipes (W and P being protagonists of the invasion and optimists that post-war Iraq could be 'righted' by proper civilian guidance). In a few months the US Army lost a reservoir of talented leaders whose experience would be lost in the upcoming months and years. Rumsfelds lieutenants like Wolfowitz, Pipes and others are addressed mainly through the eyes of senior Marine and army officers who disdained their views and lack of realism.

 

Paul Bremer's appointment as the head of the Civilian Provisional Authority highlighted the lack of planning or approach to the post-war occupation of Iraq. Without a plan and with young inexperience political appointees one of whom described his favorite previous job as 'ice-cream truck driver' he pushed forth several wrong-headed and disasterous orders. The worst being the disbandment of the Iraqi army followed by the discharge of hundreds of thousands of factory employees subsidized by the government as well as the firing of anyone with mid level or higher Baathist party connections. The insurgency's pool of prospects was expanded by countless degrees with these decisions.

 

Even some units of the Army, especially the 4th Infantry Division, misunderstood the nature of the occupation with heavy-handed approaches towards civilians. Worse still, the general appointed to oversee Iraq, Sanchez, was the lowest ranking 3 star in the Army and a logistics expert who clashed with Bremer.

 

It's not happy reading. The civilian leadership, led by the Rumsfelds and Wolfowitzes, guided by ideology refused face the realistic challenges ahead of it and with little guidance from Middle Eastern experts, bypassing Army generals who cautioned them and refusing to see the reality of post-war Iraq laid the groundwork for the current ongoing conflict. It's ugly, but it is riveting. Rick's sources are often named and he names names without hesitation. If I could recommend only one book on the subject and one that espouses my own views and experiences from Iraq and goes beyond them it would be Fiasco. I can't recommend it highly enough.

[Ludovicus]

Not only a fiasco, but a tragedy any way you look at it. There are some lessons here. One being that you can't export democracy at the point of a gun, especially when the opposition within never asked you to invade it for that purpose. With this defeat, maybe the US will get back to being a republic.

Edited November 28, 2006 by Ludovicus

[Virgil61]

Not only a fiasco, but a tragedy any way you look at it. There are some lessons here. One being that you can't export democracy at the point of a gun, especially when the victim country never asked you to invade it for that purpose.

 

I'm not sure that's the lesson of Fiasco. I agree the invasion was an idiotic decision in my opinion but having said that the occupation had a healthy shot at some measure of success in the first year ruined by ideological incompetence and the ignoring of Army and Marine advice which was suppressed in favor of political ideology and civilian insistence on operational norms.

 

I saw Baghdad descend into anarchy because we didn't have enough troops to occupy and secure the city contrary to the advice of Gen Shinseki who insisted the force package be three times what was on the ground and paid for it with his career courtesy of Rumsfeld. I saw the window of opportunity being steadily eroded while I was there by Paul Bremer and his incompetent CPA staff who ignored military advice not to disband the army or put thousands out of work.

 

With this defeat, maybe the US will get back to being a republic.

 

'Defeat' isn't a healthy option here on several levels and certainly not something I think will be beneficial or have anything to do with our existence as a republic. We leave and the present nascent civil war erupts in a bloodbath of huge proportions. We created this mess and we've an obligation to try and fix it. Perhaps now that ideological idiots like Wolfowitz and arrogant sh*ts like Rummy are gone we may have a small chance to save it although I fear it's to little to late.

 

The point of Fiasco is that political ideology, ignoring regional expertise and the dismissal of military leadership's POV is a recipe for disaster no matter what the justification for the invasion in the first place.

[M. Porcius Cato]

I agree the invasion was an idiotic decision in my opinion but having said that the occupation had a healthy shot at some measure of success in the first year ruined by ideological incompetence and the ignoring of Army and Marine advice which was suppressed in favor of political ideology and civilian insistence on operational norms.

What political ideology was behind Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi Army and fire former Baathists? It seems to me that this decision was simply following the example of de-Nazification that Truman followed to much success. Are Truman and Bremer ideological bed-mates? Not that I can tell.

 

I saw Baghdad descend into anarchy because we didn't have enough troops to occupy and secure the city contrary to the advice of Gen Shinseki who insisted the force package be three times what was on the ground and paid for it with his career courtesy of Rumsfeld.

Clearly Shinseki was right, and Rumsfeld was wrong. But I don't see how this disagreement has a basis in political ideology. As I understood it, Rumsfeld was a champion of the apolitical notion that low numbers of high-tech forces were more effective than high numbers of low-tech forces. This is surely a debatable issue, but isn't this a purely military debate? I don't see why Wilsonian idealists or Kissingerian realists would necessarily have opposing views on this matter.

 

The point of Fiasco is that political ideology, ignoring regional expertise and the dismissal of military leadership's POV is a recipe for disaster no matter what the justification for the invasion in the first place.

Again, I don't see the relevance of political ideology here. I completely agree that ignoring regional expertise and dismissing military advice is a recipe for disaster, but given these two ingredients in the recipe for disaster, the political ideology was just for garnishing the dish!

 

FWIW, I do think that a wrongheaded political ideology--namely, the notion that democracy cures all ills--is responsible for some the mess that's going on in Iraq. In my opinion, popular support for Sadr should not have prevented the US from trying the firebrad cleric for his murdering political rivals, and his ability to act unchecked and with legitimacy has been the source of remarkable instability to this day. To my mind, letting popular criminals go unpunished is a clear example of political ideology getting in the way of reconstruction. Much of the rest of the disaster can also be explained by bad ideas (like our needing only 130k troops), but those bad ideas are no more consistent with one political ideology than another. Simply put, incompetence always enjoys widespread bipartisan support.

 

I've not read Fiasco, but from your review, it sounds like the author dislikes Wolfowitz and Pipes, and he wants to discredit them on the basis of what Bremer and Franks did. That's not fair. Pipes, for example, isn't anywhere in the chain of command.

[Virgil61]

What political ideology was behind Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi Army and fire former Baathists? It seems to me that this decision was simply following the example of de-Nazification that Truman followed to much success. Are Truman and Bremer ideological bed-mates? Not that I can tell.

 

Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi army wasn't so much ideologically driven as much as an example of his ineptness. Time and lack of focus kept me from a play-by-play in identifying what was ideological and what was incompetence--my error. I think the situation in Germany was dramatically different; many of the old guard Nazis were kept in positions of power for years after the occupation--an occurrence which has been subjected to a lot of criticism. Also, in the first year after the war, 45-46, there are many examples of Wehrmacht and US troops conducting traffic stops and patrols together--forgive me for not having the sources readily available but I've read first-person and official accounts of it happening. While not kept at massive troop levels the Wehrmacht for at least a time was used for population control.

 

On the other hand there are dozens of examples of the nitwits at CPA arbitrarily making decisions on purely ideological basis. While the Iraqi Army decision might be discounted, the fact that tens or hundreds of thousands of bread winners were put out of work because cement-heads like Michael Fliescher decided government subsidies were counter to free market reforms. A nice way to create both a dislike of the occupation and a pool of recruits for the insurgency.

 

I saw Baghdad descend into anarchy because we didn't have enough troops to occupy and secure the city contrary to the advice of Gen Shinseki who insisted the force package be three times what was on the ground and paid for it with his career courtesy of Rumsfeld.

 

Clearly Shinseki was right, and Rumsfeld was wrong. But I don't see how this disagreement has a basis in political ideology. As I understood it, Rumsfeld was a champion of the apolitical notion that low numbers of high-tech forces were more effective than high numbers of low-tech forces. This is surely a debatable issue, but isn't this a purely military debate? I don't see why Wilsonian idealists or Kissingerian realists would necessarily have opposing views on this matter.

 

Again you're correct it is a military debate not an ideological one or more precisely as I noted, a civilian insistence on operational norms with little input from the military command. I suppose there's an argument if you cherry-pick commanders who either agree with you or are compliant with your whims there's military input.

 

The point of Fiasco is that political ideology, ignoring regional expertise and the dismissal of military leadership's POV is a recipe for disaster no matter what the justification for the invasion in the first place.

 

Again, I don't see the relevance of political ideology here. I completely agree that ignoring regional expertise and dismissing military advice is a recipe for disaster, but given these two ingredients in the recipe for disaster, the political ideology was just for garnishing the dish!

 

I think I gave short-shrift to the counter-arguments and warnings given of post-occupation difficulties that were discounted by Wolfowitz, Cheney and co. The discounting was certainly ideologically driven I believe.

 

FWIW, I do think that a wrongheaded political ideology--namely, the notion that democracy cures all ills--is responsible for some the mess that's going on in Iraq. In my opinion, popular support for Sadr should not have prevented the US from trying the firebrad cleric for his murdering political rivals, and his ability to act unchecked and with legitimacy has been the source of remarkable instability to this day. To my mind, letting popular criminals go unpunished is a clear example of political ideology getting in the way of reconstruction. Much of the rest of the disaster can also be explained by bad ideas (like our needing only 130k troops), but those bad ideas are no more consistent with one political ideology than another. Simply put, incompetence always enjoys widespread bipartisan support.

 

I've not read Fiasco, but from your review, it sounds like the author dislikes Wolfowitz and Pipes, and he wants to discredit them on the basis of what Bremer and Franks did. That's not fair. Pipes, for example, isn't anywhere in the chain of command.

 

It should've been Feith not Pipes (got my Middle East Daniels mixed up). Wolfowitz and Feith were both integral to committing for war on mainly ideological grounds. Both were largely responsible for post-war Iraq planning and discounted much of whatever countered their own view that democracy and free markets would be welcomed with open arms. In the best quote of the book one Army officer calls Wolfowitz dangerously idealistic and 'crack-smoking' stupid when it came to Iraq. This is of course separate to Bremer and Franks on the ground in Iraq.

 

I'm not sure the author really had an axe to grind w/Wolfowitz, he compliments his abilities often. Ricks has been a veteran commentator on the Pentagon and most of Fiasco is sourced from mid to high level military and civilian members of DoD. Perhaps he may have become co-opted by their opinions, but then again much of what he writes I have some knowledge of as being truth.

 

Read it if you get a chance sometime, I'd like to get your take on it.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Read it if you get a chance sometime, I'd like to get your take on it.

 

It sounds interesting--I'll post back when I get a chance to read it. (Also, glad to hear that Pipes--a Harvard historian--wasn't involved!)

[Horatius]

I read this column a little while ago and saved it http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na...-home-headlines . I really think it has gone beyond the point of fiasco now and is just an unmitigated disaster. We can't leave and we can't stay but either way I doubt Iraq will survive as a country. I remember reading somewhere how when the Mongols sacked Baghdad in the 13th century they set the Christians and Shiites against the Sunnis with much the same results. Ultimately dividing the Mongols and leading to civil war.

[Ludovicus]

Why should the US stay when a recent University of Maryland poll revealed that

71% of all Iraqis want the US out now and that 61% support insurgent attacks on US military? From the University of Maryland website on the polling:

http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/news/PIPA.htm

[Moonlapse]

Because now it's humanitarian, and that's the noble specialty of the US. You know... like Colombia, Bosnia, Turkey, East Timor, Somalia...

[M. Porcius Cato]

Why should the US stay when a recent University of Maryland poll revealed that

71% of all Iraqis want the US out now and that 61% support insurgent attacks on US military? From the University of Maryland website on the polling:

http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/news/PIPA.htm

 

Why are you misstating the results of the very poll to which you link? At least 63% of Iraqi are OPPOSED to the US withdrawing now.

 

Iraqis were asked, "Which of the following would you like the Iraqi government to ask the US-led forces to do? Withdraw within: 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, only reduce as security situation improves". Overall, only 37% said Americans should leave within 6 months. The remaining 63% said that Americans should remain longer than 6 months, but leave within 1 year (34%), 2 years (20%), or only when the security situation improves (9%). How you get that "71% of all Iraqis want the US out now" is beyond me--wishful thinking perhaps?

 

Moreover, as the Maryland researchers clearly state, the poll deliberately over-sampled Sunni Arabs rather than collecting a true probability sample (i.e., one that is representative of the nation). This is important because there are vast differences among Iraqis on whether the US should stay. For example, 91% of Sunnis would like the US to leave within a year, whereas only 35% of Kurds would like us to leave within a year (about as many as who favor an open-ended commitment from the US).

 

The same disagreement among Iraqis is also evident regarding attacks on US troops: only 8% of Sunnis oppose attacks on US troops, whereas 85% of Kurds oppose attacks on US troops. (The 'good' news is that the number of Sunnis who "strongly support" attacks on US troops has fallen from 77% in January to 55% today.)

 

In any case, the majority of Iraqis are opposed to US troops leaving any sooner than 6 months from now.

[Ludovicus]

I quote from the summary of the poll from the World Public Opinion Organization (WPO) website found here. The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland conducted the poll for the WPO in September of this year.

 

http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/art...50&lb=hmpg2

 

"A new WPO poll of the Iraqi public finds that seven in ten Iraqis want U.S.-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year. An overwhelming majority believes that the U.S. military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is preventing and there is growing confidence in the Iraqi army. If the United States made a commitment to withdraw, a majority believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Support for attacks on U.S.-led forces has grown to a majority position

[M. Porcius Cato]

You do realize Ludovicus that there is an enormous difference between your previous claim "71% of all Iraqis want the US out now" and your new claim "71% of surveyed Iraqis want the US out within a year"? If your wife moans "Kiss me now", she doesn't mean "Kiss me within a year".

Edited November 29, 2006 by M. Porcius Cato

[Julius Ratus]

I have heard from a number of US vets from that war that the country should be turned over to the Kurds. The Kurds are the only group in Iraq that is friendly to the US. They also are not dominated by Islam. They make it fit their needs and are capable of operating in the modern world.

[Ludovicus]

Perhaps the more relevant and louder "now" comes from another group polled earlier this year in February--US troops.

 

"An overwhelming majority of 72% of American troops serving in Iraq think the U.S. should exit the country within the next year, and more than one in four say the troops should leave immediately, a new Le Moyne College/Zogby International survey shows."

 

Click here for the Zogby/Le Moyne College results:

http://www.zogby.com/NEWS/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1075

 

I don't have a wife. My boyfriend and I don't have any problems scheduling our kisses.

Edited November 29, 2006 by Ludovicus

[Virgil61]

Perhaps the more relevant and louder "now" comes from another group polled earlier this year in February--US troops.

 

"An overwhelming majority of 72% of American troops serving in Iraq think the U.S. should exit the country within the next year, and more than one in four say the troops should leave immediately, a new Le Moyne College/Zogby International survey shows."

 

Click here for the Zogby/Le Moyne College results:

http://www.zogby.com/NEWS/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1075

 

I don't have a wife. My boyfriend and I don't have any problems scheduling our kisses.

 

I didn't support the invasion though I took part in it, but I support military action by polling privates, corporals and Reservist/Guardsman even less. Rather stupid way to run a military.

 

It still doesn't answer the challenge to your original statement, which was incorrect, stating Iraqis want us out now. What of previous polls that show Iraqis wanted us to stay? What if, when we leave and the country goes even further into sh*t--which it will--and the polls change again--do we re-enter?

 

Polls are nice, fine and all. They're a poor substitute as the sole rationale for foreign or military policy.