Had Carthage ever a chance?

[Viggen]

Now that we finished the Punic War Section, it is time to reflect and one has to wonder how much "luck" the Romans actually had to not only survive this period, but to come out stronger then ever and started to dominating the european continent.

 

Please cast your vote, and add your comments.

 

cheers

viggen

[Primus Pilus]

The end result, of course, was a Roman victory. Both the first and second punic wars were both highly contested wars that could've gone either way. The first resulted in gains for Rome in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, but also led to Carthaginian expansion in Spain. The third was really only a late continuation of the second war, in which Rome decided to put an end to any potential new threat. By that time, Carthage indeed, did not have a chance.

 

The Second Punic War was, in my opinion, one of the great pivotal events in world history. Hannibal laid waste to the Romans in Italy, but they proved their resiliency over and over again. If not for Roman successes in Spain, Phoenician, just possibly, could've very well been the dominate culture of ancient Europe. However, Rome was never really in a position to be completely destroyed or dominated. At best, Carthage could hope for a reversed outcome where Rome was a client state to Carthage. Alternatively, Carthage faced the very real threat of total destruction, as eventually happened later. Some argue that had Hannibal only sieged Rome itself, the Romans would've been forced to sue for peace, but in reality, I think Hannibal was smarter than most, and he realized that the cost of that siege would've hurt him more than the Romans.

 

I voted that it took a monumental effort by Rome to win, because it did. However, I think the successes of Hannibal were even more monumental. Even had the Romans 'lost' the war, I don't think they would've disappeared from history as Carthage did. It just would've taken longer for their eventual emergence, or their role in European domination would've been slightly reduced.

[Crag]

I chose option 3...

 

The Punic Wars did shape the future of the world and set Rome on the road to Empire although many at the time failed to realised it. I won't go into all the "what if" scenarios, just the fact that so many possible turning points exist amply prove the victory of Rome was far from assured.

 

The one turning point I feel is often minimized despite it's tremendous impact is the loss of the mediterranean in the first punic war due because of a shipwrecked Carthagian warship. This loss of mobility and freedom of action would hamstring Hannibals efforts time and again during the second war as his war strategy took a back seat to supply problems and Carthage failed often to reinforce their forces in Spain and Italy because of the fear of a possible roman assault on north africa. The roman control of the sea also had enormous psychological impact, to put it simply Carthage once it lost the mediterranean could only hope for a negotiated peace. While the romans had the freedom of action that bolstered their morale.

 

As commented elsewhere the famous "what if" was hannibals failure to march on rome after Cannae, hannibal could not successfully besiege rome lacking seige weapons but given the shock in rome due to numerous losses would a "peace party" in rome come to power, we will never know because hannibal was forced by his ever present supply problems to march into southern italy in search of food.

 

Despite his military genius hannibal, he had no military chance to conquer the fortified cities of italy, sadly his impressive campaign truthfully amounted militarily to a massive raid to force a favorable peace not a conquest of Rome itself.

[Julian]

I replied that it took a monumental effort for Rome to win. I also don't think Carthage could have won outright. At best they may have been able to negotiate a peace that may have served some of their interests. However I see their role as being similar to that of the Japanese in WWII after the Coral sea and Midway battles. All out victory being beyond their grasp, but negotiated terms not. Whether the Roman's would have been prepared to accept any terms from their main rival in the area is speculative.

[Primus Pilus]

Welcome to the forum Julian. It seems we are building a general consenus opinion here.

 

One of the reasons Hannibal is faulted for his campaign is that he didn't force the Roman's to make the decision on settling or continuing to fight. By not threatening Rome directly (until it was too late), the Romans were never in a position to feel all could be lost. (Well I'm sure some felt that way, but the state as a whole managed to resist.) Had he taken he fateful plunge of besieging Rome, the world would know whether Rome would've negotiated or not. As he didn't, the conclusions we all have regarding Carthage will likely be similar.

[Julian]

Welcome to the forum Julian.

Thanks very much. Although I joined a while ago, I've not had time to post.

 

I must say I agree with you. It is very difficult to judge what would have happened from our time.

[Zeke]

In my view Carthage had such a close chance to win that instead of Latin all Romanc Launguages would be derived from Phonecian. It wouldn't be called "Romanc" it would be called "Phoneco-Cartho or something and all laugnues would be simpler.

 

Anyway the reason I think Hannibal had such a close chance to win was the fact that after the battle of Canne, Hannibal could have marched on Rome and laid seige to it mabey starve it for years. The Roman Generals in Spain would have to get back to their great city and Hannibal would have destoryed them. After the battle of Canne many of the Italian city states came over to Carthigian side they could have sent supplies and troops. Moments after Hannibal's troops slaughtered 70,000 Romans on a field the size of centeral park, Marhabal the Carthigian who commanded the Nubians said to Hannibal with great haste

 

"Let me take a command of troops to Rome and destroyed it" Hannibal stunned at the slaughter just stared off into the massive spree. He simply replied "No" And then Marhabal said with disgust the most famous words that changed the world as we know it;

 

"Truly the Gods have not bestowed all things upon the same person, You know how to counqer Hannibal; but you do not know how to make use of your victory.

Epic isns't it?

Zeke

[Viggen]

Ont thing that hasn't been mentioned here is the lack of support Hannibal received from his own politicians, I believe if the phonician senate would have stood full behind him, he had a much better chance....

 

cheers

viggen

[Legate of XVPrimigenia]

It WAS close at times but Carthage just could not stand against the might of the Roman Leigions, in fact the only smart generals who went against Rome were mainly hit and run

[Spartan JKM]

Outstanding hypothesis. I chose option 3 - but with a specific point (if I may); Carthage would not have been standing centuries after a Hannibalic victory. It still would have been Rome.

 

Rome's innovations in naval warfare, specifically the corvus (basically, a boarding plank that couldn't be detached immediately), in the 1st Punic War illustrated she was the more martial of the two powers. In the 2nd Punic War, Carthage failed almost exclusively where Hannibal was not present.

 

It's possible the Carthaginian Suffete never wanted all-out wars with Rome. They allowed Hannibal to involve them in what they possibly believed would be a defensive war for the protection of their monetary interests in Iberia, with the further likelihood of regaining Sardinia and even Sicily. However, to the Romans, any conflict was a life and death struggle; not only were they much superior in manpower and resources, but also resolve. It was but the genius of Hannibal that prolonged the struggle.

 

As brilliant a commander Hannibal was, it's possible his initial whirlwind string of victories had the long term effect of welding the majority of Rome's allies closer to her.

 

It seems that Carthage was not willing to make the necessary sacrifices, physical and economic, to come close for Rome to aquiesce. It is possible that Hannibal's immediate advance on Rome after Cannae might have punctuated their indomitable will just enough to tip the balance in his favor. He certainly couldn't have taken the city by force.

 

I am inclined to think they would not have given up with his arrival at the gates of Rome in september 216 B.C., as an assault on the city would have obviously been plain suicidal, coupled with the fact they knew, as he did, he couldn't have taken the city by besiegement either. There were still plenty of Roman troops all over Italy, thus he would have been shut in. There were also no inside collaborators, so treachery or subterfuge was out of the question.

 

Moreover, a march on Rome would have involved a complete reversal to his long-term strategy; if he impetuously marched away from the areas he would likely get support, as happened after Cannae, into the heartland of the Roman federation, where he previously had no luck gaining any defections, he would have risked throwing everything away, most notably the psychological effect of his great victory. The strategic purpose of his march on Rome 5 years later was entirely different, not to mention an excellent attempt - to draw the Romans away from Capua. It worked partially, as he was screened to the west by a force under Fulvius Centumalus. But the Romans didn't budge, to their credit. Fulvius' army would be destroyed by Hannibal a year later at Herdonea, the same town he defeated a Roman army under Fulvius Flaccus in 212 B.C., according to Livy. Livy was not known for sharp accuracy, but I don't think he would exaggerate anything that would favor Hannibal's image. It's difficult to say, but think Hannibal applied the most viable strategy; it seems nothing was going to work without the more assistance from his allies. In 209 B.C., 12 of the 30 socii announced they could not provide Rome of material and men. His plan was bearing fruit, but Rome could sustain their war effort at 60% strenght.

 

Much of what weighed against Hannibal was circumstantial and beyond his control, and the oeprtaions under his control with his forces was sublime, but one problem that has always stuck in my head of Hannibal's strategy of breaking the Roman confederation was his incorporation of so many Celts and Numidians into his army. True - he transcended their traditional abilities, and under him they were as great as they ever were. They were also utilized brilliantly under his tactical wizardry against a foe that was stronger as a group. But beyond the battle victories, why would the peoples of Italy leave Rome for a 'liberating' army composed of 'barbarians' who had been plundering Italy for previous generations. The Numidians were notoriously cruel, and their reputation preceded them in their conduct when Hannibal ordered them to appropriate and destroy property which was valuable to Rome's lifeline. But who else could he incorporate into his army? 'Civilized' Latins and Greeks? he was able to levy with success in Bruttium. His entire grandiose attempt makes for fascinating study.

 

Basically, the Romans simply beat Carthage where Hannibal had no control of events. Events in Sardinia and Sicily were instrumental, and the Romans bested the Carthaginians on both islands. In 215 B.C. Titus Manlius Torquatus repulsed a revolt in Sardinia before the locals could link up with a Carthaginian landing force, which he also overwhelmed. Sardinia would have been paramount to the Carthaginians at this time. Roman control of the island remained intact for the rest of the war. Marcus Marcellus attacked Syracuse before the Carthaginians could take advantage of the pro-Carthaginian faction that had taken control of the city when Hiero, a longtime Roman ally, died. After Syracuse was taken by the Romans, Hannibal had sent a small number of reinforcements under Muttines, a superb cavalry leader, to help some 11,000 Carthaginian forces who had just landed in Sicily. Muttines wrought havoc on Roman outposts, who were mostly the exiled Cannae and Herdonia legions. Hanno, the commander in Sicily, relieved Muttines of command and replaced the Liby/Phoenician officer with his son. Muttines joined the Romans, which facilitated ultimate Roman victory in Sicily. This was pure foolishness on the Carthaginian side. The very reason why the Mongols of the 13th century were probably the most efficient fighting force ever was Chinggis Khan's policy of his chain of command being distributed by ability, not blood.

 

Philip V was checked in Illyria by Roman forces in 215 B.C., and he was out of the picture very quickly. He opted to attack his Greek enemies than apply pressure on Rome in the Adriatic, which would ahve helped the Carthagininas in Sicily. Hey, to each their own. The Romans acted quickly, not waiting for anything that would render them in a defensive position, which they had against Hannibal a this time.

 

Gnaeus Scipio's defeat of Hasdrubal Barca at Dertosa (Ibera), near Tarraco, in 215 B.C. was huge! Hasdrubal was trying to break through to Italy, and surely would have linked up with Hannibal at this time, being the route was established, and the Gauls had recently ambushed and destroyed the sole consular army in northern Italy. Reinforcements intended for Hannibal in Italy went to Iberia instead because of this reversal for the Carthaginians.

 

The Scipio brothers cut their way into a good position into Iberia, gaining many allies, and though they were defeated and killed (due to treachery), a certain Lucius Marcius saved the Romans cause in Iberia by skillfuly maintaining his position just north of the Ebro with less than 10,000 men. The 3 Carthaginian armies, numbering maybe 50,000, should have, in theory, rid iberia of Roman presence in 211 B.C. Each commander had to hold his region, but they certainly could have combined to vanquish Marcius. There seemed to be much dissension and a lack of co-operation amongst the Carthaginian armies. Hannibal must have been fumed when he learned of these events. The brief but clear opportunity for the Carthaginians to recover the invaluable north-eastern section of Iberia cama and went, as Nero arrived with some 12,000 foot and 2,000 horse. The Roman lines were strengthened and Nero crossed the Ebro and inflicted a minor defeat on Hasdrubal. At the end of 210 B.C. Scipio, later Africanus, took over in Iberia with a solid base, and went to work. His campaigns here and in Africa were among history's most efficient and decisive.

 

Aside from Hannibal's part, Carthage dispathed some 80,000 troops throughout the war. Only 4,000 reached him, when Bomilcar sailed into Locri in 214 B.C. The Roman navy prevented a huge landing force from reaching him, but 'control of the sea' was not the same as today; ships could not intercept others in a time with primitive technology (looking back, of course). Moreover, Mago sailed to Genoa from Iberia with about 15,000 men (via the Baleairic Islands) in 205 B.C., and Hannibal was able to reach Africa in 203 B.C. from Bruttium. This clearly shows Italy could be reached in detachments. The war in Italy was the primary theater of the conflict, and more attempts should have been undertaken to help him from Carthage. They possibly thought the war was won after Cannae, and that he didn't need the troops, which could be used to protect their monetary interests in Iberia. It is possible they never wanted this all-out war he engineered. He must be held accountable, though almost every Carthaginian setback was out of his direct control.

 

Compared witht the other greats of history, Hannibal seemed to never have had an Antipitar, a Chepe (or Subotai), or a Davout. His officers were probably capable, but we don't have anyhting on record of their adeptness, a we do of Scipio's lieutenants in Gaius Laelius and Marcus Silanus. Julius Caesar had Titus Labienus, who was instrumental during the great conquest of Gaul. Excuses can go only so far, though, in my opinion. Hannibal knew the nature of the attitude of many of the Carthaginian aristocrats, who preferred a policy of appeasement, toward his family. He knew his attack on Italy was a gamble. No matter how we spin it, he lost in the end.

 

Even if Rome agreed to terms with Hannibal, Rome would have simply won the next war, as Carthage had nothing as durable or resilient. They were an oligarchical plutocracy, which will always lose a protracted war with a state with stronger bonds with her subjects and a better system for nationhood.

 

I hope my lack of succinctness wasn't too overbearing; to answer the direct question posed by Viggen with my view, the answer is yes - Carthage had a golden opportunity in 216 - 212 B.C. But only to prolong Roman hegemony of the Mediterranean. 'Prolong' could mean a century. I don't think there ever would have been Mediterranean and European basin derived from a Carthaginian/Phoenician inheritance. Carthage was not a nation-state, in terms of manpower, and was always dependent on others to fight her wars. I don't think the Carthaginians were an imperial-minded people. They were superb at what they did and cared for - they were merchants, craftsmen, and seafarers, who prospered from their talents in these endeavors. They did not care for other territories to colonize. Their venture in Iberia under Hamilcar was to gain the valuable mines for their economy. It was Hamilcar, Hasdrubal 'the Handsome', and Hannibal who developed their own kingdom (somewhat) and engineered the great conflict. I agree with Primus Pilus' opinion, and Julian's excellent assessment.

 

If Rome had cracked and sought peace in the dark days of 216 B.C. (many in the Senate wanted this), I think it is almost a certainty that that the terms imposed upon her would have been sufficient only to ensure a situation which would resemble what had existed right before the 1st Punic War. Carthage, with the possible nominal heading of Capua, certainly would have exploited the trade etc. in southern Italy, and I am certain things might have been a little different in the short term, but Carthage could ahve never defeated Rome, especially after it reached a point when Rome wanted to completely destroy her.

 

The Carthaginians were not some 'bad people', as the Romans would like us to believe. Remeber, we have no native accounts of Carthage and her history. Everyhting comes from the people that didn't like them. They had a stable government which, like Rome, eradicated the monarchy system early in her history, and they were brilliant entrepreneurs and middlemen, but had nothing as durable or resilient as Rome, and they had little to offer other races.

 

On the flip side, if I may keep an open mind, it is possible Roman dominance would not have necessarily been for the better. Some feel it was one of the greatest tragedies in human history (in 3 acts) that Rome, and not Carthage, prevailed in this critical struggle. If the commercial and mercantile legacy of Carthage had set the foundations of future civilizations in Europe (with its stress on negotiation and compromise over war and empire), instead of the militarism of Rome, perhaps instead of a millennia of bloodshed and warfare we might have enjoyed a lot more peace and prosperity. The Greek cultural achievements would have been transmitted by the Carthaginians, too, as they had been influenced by the Greeks. Hannibal was a highly cultivated man immersed in Greek culture. Scipio was too, and is said to have admired his great adversary. However, I think we can safely say, for all its sharp-edges, especially that of imperialism, Rome layed down some wonderful achievements (the 12 Tables for eg) for the posterity of civilization.

 

Thanks, Spartan JKM

[Felix Marcellus]

Carthage is proof that liberalism on the homefront can destroy the war effort abroad. Had Hannibal the full support of the homebodies, he may well have. But I doubt it. He needed siege machinery. Even when he had support from home he couldn't manage to get his hands on any siege machinery. Therefore, he likely would've never taken Rome. So, my final answer is the man didn't have a prayer.

[Tobias]

It certainly was close. Obviously the Fabian tactics were the best course of action until a competent enough general could found to be sent against Hannibal. Hannibal did not always make use of his opprtunities however, and was perhaps bound to be beaten or at least called away from Italy.

I agree with most said above, especially that of the senate not supporting him.

[marcus brutus]

im young so forgive me if this is stupid, but if i were hannibel i would have built up my navy and land my troops near the port of capua.instead of sending them to there deaths in the alps

[Primus Pilus]

You're not stupid Brutus, and its encouraging to see young people with an interest in ancient history.

 

Part of the problem for Hannibal and Carthage was that after the 1st Punic War, Rome completely dominated the sea and the once proud and might fleet of carthage was no more. Attempts to land on the Italian mainland could have very well been repulsed at sea, ending the war before he even started. He could've built up a fleet surely, but despite his successes in Italy, Rome was still dominant on the sea. Yes, once could argue that he could've turned the tables as Rome did in the first war, but it would've taken valuable resources away from the ground effort.

[marcus brutus]

You're not stupid Brutus, and its encouraging to see young people with an interest in ancient history.

 

Part of the problem for Hannibal and Carthage was that after the 1st Punic War, Rome completely dominated the sea and the once proud and might fleet of carthage was no more. Attempts to land on the Italian mainland could have very well been repulsed at sea, ending the war before he even started. He could've built up a fleet surely, but despite his successes in Italy, Rome was still dominant on the sea. Yes, once could argue that he could've turned the tables as Rome did in the first war, but it would've taken valuable resources away from the ground effort.

very true. but what bout a landing in sicaly its not far from carthege