Did the Carthaginians really have no fleet?

[The Augusta]

Go easy on me boys and girls - as you know I am only a novice regarding the Second Punic War, and if I am posting in the wrong Forum, PP, please remove me to a more appropriate location. However, my interest has really been kindled in this period of Rome's history recently and I would welcome your opinions and expert knowledge.

 

When I read Livy's account of the Second Punic War and reached the part where Scipio sailed for Africa, a question blazed out in my mind: 'How could he just sail his ships up to the Carthaginian shore? They were at war. Didn't Hannibal have a fleet?' It would appear he didn't. And then, only last night, re-reading Grant's History of Rome, he actually states that 'Hannibal had no fleet'. Obviously this was the case, although the peace terms offered by Scipio after Zama mentioned the Carthaginians being restricted to a certain number of ships.

 

Now, my question is: How could a general of the calibre of Hannibal not have a fleet? This intrigues me, and as I am somewhat dense on the finer military points, I wonder if our experts could discuss this point and enlighten me. Do you think it was a shortcoming? Or wasn't it necessary for him to have a fleet at the start of the war?

[Hanno]

I cant give you a factual answer but I don't think it was impossible for Scipio to land in Africa even if the Carthaginians had a fleet. If (a real if, I don't know the answer) the coast of Africa has a lot of places suitable for landing it should be easy for a fleet, especially one with at least some element of surprise, to evade another ancient fleet with all it's communications and mobility problems.

[Aurelianus]

Hannibal was undeniably a general of genius, but he was not Carthage. Hannibal was merely a member of one of the great families of Carthage, with the City and its empire run by its senate, in (I understand) much the same way as Rome. After the first Punic war Hannibals father, Hamilcar, went to the Iberian Peninsular where he carved out a personal empire, although it was technically still part of Carthage. It was inherited first by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, then Hannibal.

The Carthaginian Senate was, as I understand it in the majority under the control of political rivals of the Barca's, therefore cooperation was limited. A reason why Hannibal never received reinforcements in Italy. His Invasion of Italy was in many ways a personal thing, and he didn

[Rameses the Great]

Hannibal did not have a ship but Carthage sure as heck did. Hannibal was a military commander not a naval one so he had no need for ships. If you read the Punic Wars on the forum you will see that the Carthaginian navy was very powerful. Rememeber they were descendants of Phoenicians who were excellent sailors. During the second Punic Wars the reasons why they did not send a navy to stop Scipio Africanus' fleet is numerous. Perhaps they ran out of men, trusted in Hannibal, or could not raise a fleet in time because Punic Wars took a large toll on Roman and more importantly Carthaginian resources. Also the Carthaginian nobles did not really back Hannibal somewhat skeptical, like Caesar and the Senate of Rome.

[P.Clodius]

After Punic War 1 they were limited by the terms of their surrender to 10 ships. For a trading power that had previously relied on shipping as a means of transport this was a huge blow. The consequences of this agreement were Carthage's land grab in Spain which of course led to later clashes. So in answer to RTG's post, Carthage HAD no navy.

Edited November 6, 2006 by P.Clodius

[The Augusta]

After Punic War 1 they were limited by the terms of their surrender to 10 ships. For a trading power that had previously relied on shipping as a means of transport this was a huge blow. The consequences of this agreement were Carthage's land grab in Spain which of course led to later clashes. So in answer to RTG's post, Carthage HAD no navy.

 

Ah, thank you, Publius. Now this starts to make sense. Would you say, then, that Scipio used this knowledge in his strategy? Did it perhaps colour his decision to sail to Carthage to draw Hannibal from Italy?

 

 

I apologise if these questions seem simplistic to you all, but I do want to learn the finer points. One can read and read and read, but there is nothing like other people's lively opinions to deepen the knowledge gleaned from books.

[Primus Pilus]

Carthage itself did have fleets. This is evidenced by reports of Mago sailing away from the siege of Carthago Nova only to be defeated near Liguria in northern Italy. Hannibal himself sailed from Italy back to Africa to fend off Scipio. etc.

 

The Romans were unconditionally superior to Carthage in naval matters since the end of the first Punic War, but there was definitely not a complete absence of Carthaginian fleets. Hannibal was not under supplied in Italy because Romans controlled the shipping lanes, but rather because of political enmity between he and the factions still in Carthage (largely Hanno the Great). The bulk of reinforcements and supply were routed to Hispania, which in the opinion of the anti war faction in Carthage, was a necessity to maintain control of their massively profitable colony. Clearly, any such deliveries in this case were sent via ship. Hannibal's war of aggression and conquest was simply shunned in favor of defense and consolidation of controlled territory.

 

With larger political support and backing in Carthage, resupply and reinforcement to Hannibal in Italy may or may not have altered the course of the war (presumably a more powerful Hannibal in Italy would've made the capitulation of Hispania easier for the Romans). The chance for interception and defeat would've been far greater in the lanes between Africa, Sicilia and Italia but it could have been attempted, even with limited means. Even had he built his own fleet while in Italy, manning it would've stripped his slowly shrinking army even further... and there would've been no guarantee of garnering supply when and if it arrived safely in Africa.

 

Hannibal could've built his own fleet before or after the siege of Saguntum (which sparked the war in the first place) but this was not necessary and actually counter to his agenda. His plan had always been a land march through Roman allied/controlled territory in order to ferment dissent. His supply was decent enough and the overland movement actually kept the Romans guessing. Perhaps more importantly there was no risk at losing his army in a naval battle with a superior opponent while in transport.

[P.Clodius]

It is a little simplistic, and I don't mean that in any negative fashion. Scipio's tactic wasn't new, as a roman army under Regulus had done the same in Punic War 1. It was ALWAYS Scipio's goal though. He pounded them in Spain and was determined to on Carthage's home turf, whether they had a navy or not...In the 1st punic war the romans learned very quickly about naval warfare, they dominated the experienced Carthaginian navy and to lend weight to roman determination, energy and drive, they lost 90% of a 300 ship fleet in a storm but rebuilt it within 3 months. Against such determination all the gold in Carthage couldn't buy victory.

[The Augusta]

It is a little simplistic, and I don't mean that in any negative fashion.

 

Please do not apologise, Publius. I would rather admit to ignorance on a topic than pretend to knowledge I do not have. And everyone's answers have been helpful. As I am much more Principate than Punic, I was expecting fleets to be manning coastlines against possible invasion, but you have all explained how this was not the case.

 

 

 

 

The Romans were unconditionally superior to Carthage in naval matters since the end of the first Punic War, but there was definitely not a complete absence of Carthaginian fleets. Hannibal was not under supplied in Italy because Romans controlled the shipping lanes, but rather because of political enmity between he and the factions still in Carthage (largely Hanno the Great). The bulk of reinforcements and supply were routed to Hispania, which in the opinion of the anti war faction in Carthage, was a necessity to maintain control of their massively profitable colony. Clearly, any such deliveries in this case were sent via ship. Hannibal's war of aggression and conquest was simply shunned in favor of defense and consolidation of controlled territory.

 

With larger political support and backing in Carthage, resupply and reinforcement to Hannibal in Italy may or may not have altered the course of the war (presumably a more powerful Hannibal in Italy would've made the capitulation of Hispania easier for the Romans). The chance for interception and defeat would've been far greater in the lanes between Africa, Sicilia and Italia but it could have been attempted, even with limited means. Even had he built his own fleet while in Italy, manning it would've stripped his slowly shrinking army even further... and there would've been no guarantee of garnering supply when and if it arrived safely in Africa.

 

Hannibal could've built his own fleet before or after the siege of Saguntum (which sparked the war in the first place) but this was not necessary and actually counter to his agenda. His plan had always been a land march through Roman allied/controlled territory in order to ferment dissent. His supply was decent enough and the overland movement actually kept the Romans guessing. Perhaps more importantly there was no risk at losing his army in a naval battle with a superior opponent while in transport.

 

Also fascinating, PP - and of course, we must not forget that even Hannibal and the Senate in Carthage may not have been expecting an invasion by Scipio.

[Virgil61]

...

Now, my question is: How could a general of the calibre of Hannibal not have a fleet? This intrigues me, and as I am somewhat dense on the finer military points, I wonder if our experts could discuss this point and enlighten me. Do you think it was a shortcoming? Or wasn't it necessary for him to have a fleet at the start of the war?

 

Remember Hannibal had been in Italy for several years focusing on the ground campaign there instead of naval superiority. He wasn't an overall command of the Carthaginian war effort. By the time of the landing at Utica by Scipio Carthaginian naval forces were probably on the defensive having suffered a series of defeats and may simple not have had the numbers of men and material to successfully challenge the Romans anyway. And what PP said.

[Pantagathus]

Ok my fellows and dear Lady,

 

If one pays careful attention throughout Polybius, Livy and Appian you'll see plenty of instances of the Carthaginians utilizing fleet resources during the 2nd Punic War. However, near the onset the bulk of the fleet (that by treaty they weren't supposed to have) was primarily stationed at Carthago Novo; the aforementioned military-industrial complex of the Barca's.

 

So let's start there where I point you to Polybius 3.95 where he discusses Hasdrubal's winter quarters building & repairing campaign which resulted in the at hand resources of 40 decked ships under the command of Hamilcar patroling the Spanish coast come summer 217 BC.

 

This made G. Scipio nervous so he decided against a land assult and choose a chance at the fleet. Thanks to Massalian "swift sailing" scouts, Scipio was able to fix the enemy position and suprise the Carthaginians. Polybius 3.96 explains that the Romans got the upper hand and sunk some and captured ~25 ships of the initial Carthaginian 40. However:

 

But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there...

 

But then later P.C.Scipio took Carthago Novo and according to Polybius 10.17:

 

From the remaining captives he selected the strongest, those who were in the prime of youth and physical vigour, and assigned them to serve on board ship: and having thus increased the number of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken from the enemy as well as his own; so that the number of men on board each vessel were now little short of double what it was before. For the captured ships numbered eighteen, his original fleet thirty-five. These men he also promised their freedom, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous, as soon as they had conquered the Carthaginians.

 

So by steady attrition, the Romans wittled away at the Carthaginian fleet resources during the decade and a half between the initial skirmishes of 217 BC and Zama in 202 BC. One of my favorites naval encounters being from Livy 28.30:

 

Some men had come into the Roman camp with a voluntary offer to surrender the city of Gades, but the plot was discovered before it was ripe. All the conspirators were arrested and Mago handed them over to the custody of Adherbal for conveyance to Carthage. Adherbal placed them on board a quinquereme which was sent on in advance as it was a slower vessel than the eight triremes with which he followed shortly after The quinquereme was just entering the Straits when Laelius sailed out of the harbour of Carteia in another quinquereme followed by seven triremes. He bore straight down upon Adherbal, feeling quite sure that the quinquereme could not be brought round, as it was caught by the current sweeping through the channel.

 

Surprised by this unsuspected attack, the Carthaginian general hesitated for a few moments whether to follow his quinquereme or turn his prows against the enemy. This hesitation put it out of his power to decline the contest, for they were now within range of one another's missiles, and the enemy were pressing on him on all sides. The strength of the tide prevented them from steering their ships as they wished. There was no semblance of a naval battle, no freedom of action, no room for tactics or maneuvers. The tidal currents completely dominated the action and carried the ships against their own side and against the enemy indiscriminately, in spite of all the efforts of the rowers. You might see a ship which was endeavouring to escape carried stem foremost against the victors, whilst the one pursuing it, if it got into an opposing current, was swept back as though it were the one in flight. And when they were actually engaged and one ship was making for another in order to ram it, it would swerve from its course and receive a side-blow from the other's beak, whilst the one which was coming broadside on would suddenly be swung round and present its prow. So the varying struggle of the triremes went on, directed and controlled by Chance. The Roman quinquereme answered the helm better, either because its weight made it steadier, or because it had more banks of oars to cut through the waves. It sank two triremes, and sweeping rapidly past a third sheared off all the oars on one side, and it would have disabled the rest if Adherbal had not got clear away with the remaining five, and crowding all sail reached Africa...

 

As P-P has mentioned, Mago had most of the fleet resources after the Carthaginians were ejected from Spain until he was defeated later.

[P.Clodius]

I stand corrected

[Primus Pilus]

I stand corrected

 

I was also quite convinced that the terms of the treaty following the 1st war also included a the 10 ship limit, so I was induced to do a bit of searching. Seems you were quite right regarding the 10 triremes... only that this was a condition of the second war:

 

Polybius book 15; 18

The principal points of the condition proposed were as follows. Carthage was to retain all the cities she formerly possessed in Africa before entering on the last war with Rome, all her former territory, all flocks, herds, slaves, and other property: from that day onward the Carthaginians were to suffer no injury, they were to be governed by their own laws and customs and to receive no garrison. These were the lenient conditions; the others of a contrary kind were as follows: Reparation was to be made to the Romans for all acts of injustice committed by the Carthaginians during the truce: prisoners of war and deserters who had fallen into their hands at any date were to be delivered up: they were to surrender their ships of war with the exception of ten triremes, and all their elephants: they were not to make war at all on any nation outside Africa and on no nation in Africa without consulting Rome: they were to restore to King Massanissa, within the boundaries that should subsequently be assigned, all houses, lands, and cities, and other property which had belonged to him or to his ancestors: they were to contribute ten thousand talents in fifty years, paying two hundred Euboic talents each year: finally they were to give as surety a hundred hostages chosen by the Roman general from among their young men between the age of fourteen and thirty.

 

Regardless, Carthaginian naval power was still severely restricted in comparison after the Roman victory of the first war. So, while you may be wrong in the notion that no Carthaginian fleet existed prior to the outset of Hannibal's war, I think it's still quite safe to maintain that naval transport was a dangerous proposition for the Carthaginians in the face of Roman naval superiority of the time.

[The Augusta]

May I thank you all for your wonderful, detailed replies. And now, of course, being reminded of the passages in Livy, I could kick myself! Of course there is mention of the Carthaginian fleet. I think the mistake I have made here is in reading the history purely with Scipio as my target of interest. Now that my wider interest is kindled, I will, of course, be returning to study in more depth, and no doubt all will become clear. Nor do I actually have a copy of Polybius on my shelves - a glaring omission! Thank you to Pan for highlighting the relevant passages.

 

Another mistake I have made, of course - and I thank all who have drawn my attention to it - is to assume that Hannibal was autonomous, when he was subject to similar constraints and strictures by his own government in Carthage as Scipio was at Rome. Of course, we do not get to hear who these leading politicans were - natural enough from a Roman author who is mainly concerned with the generals involved in the war. I have probably assumed that Hannibal and the Barcine party were the ruling clan and had made their own policy, when this was not the case. I can see I have much more reading ahead - and I am going to enjoy every little bit of it!

 

Thanks again, everyone.

[Guest Brennus BC]

Go easy on me boys and girls - as you know I am only a novice regarding the Second Punic War, and if I am posting in the wrong Forum, PP, please remove me to a more appropriate location. However, my interest has really been kindled in this period of Rome's history recently and I would welcome your opinions and expert knowledge.

 

When I read Livy's account of the Second Punic War and reached the part where Scipio sailed for Africa, a question blazed out in my mind: 'How could he just sail his ships up to the Carthaginian shore? They were at war. Didn't Hannibal have a fleet?' It would appear he didn't. And then, only last night, re-reading Grant's History of Rome, he actually states that 'Hannibal had no fleet'. Obviously this was the case, although the peace terms offered by Scipio after Zama mentioned the Carthaginians being restricted to a certain number of ships.

 

Now, my question is: How could a general of the calibre of Hannibal not have a fleet? This intrigues me, and as I am somewhat dense on the finer military points, I wonder if our experts could discuss this point and enlighten me. Do you think it was a shortcoming? Or wasn't it necessary for him to have a fleet at the start of the war?

 

 

 

G'day, I an certainly no expert but have recently being studying the Second Punic War; so this may be helpful. Hannibal personally had no fleet; his army was land based, and Hannibal himself had no naval experience; he was strictly a land general (arguably a brilliant one). The carthaginians did have a fleet in the Second Punic War, but it was relatively small (around 100 warships). Rome, on the other hand, had many more ships and throughout the war controlled the seas. This was one of the reasons the Carthaginians lost; Hannibal found it difficult to resupply his army in Italy because the Romans controlled the seas.

 

Having a large fleet would have helped Hannibal for sure, it would have followed Hannibal and been able to resupply him. However, Hannibal obviously thought the war would be one on land. His march across the Alps was obviously a planned move. It was totally unexpected by the Romans, who thought he would take the coastal route. Hannibal's knew that the Gauls of Northern Italy, who had recently been subjugated by the Romans, were hostile to Rome, and he rightly envisaged that many would join his army, which they did in their thousands.

 

Having a powerful fleet would have helped Hannibal enormously, if his fleet had been able to knock Rome's fleet out of the war the result could have been very different. Especially given his great successes on land (Trebia, Trasmiene, and Cannae - annihilation of main roman army.

 

That's all I have - hope it helps - is probably a bit jumbled.

P.S. Polybius's account of the war is more factual as he lived closer to the times - he actually crossed the Alps himself after the war. Livy's book is important too, but his pro-Romaness is obvious, and his battle figures are probably overemphasised for their propoganda effects.

Edited November 17, 2006 by Brennus BC