Zama Anniversary

[P.Clodius]

Zama

[DecimusCaesar]

Today's the marking of the final braking of Hannibal's power. Unless you count his years travelling in the Middle East and his support of the Seleucid King.

[Antiochus of Seleucia]

Such a glorious day!

 

 

I noticed the forgot Salinator in their section about the Metaurus River...

[The Augusta]

A glorious day indeed!

 

And although I am still a novice regarding the Punic Wars, would I be correct in saying that The Metaurus marked a great turning point? Or do you think that other factors came into play? My reading of the Second Punic War is that if Hasdrubal had been able to meet up with his brother's forces, the outcome may have been very different. Did Metaurus pave the way for Hannibal's final defeat? I would love to read your thoughts.

[P.Clodius]

A glorious day indeed!

 

And although I am still a novice regarding the Punic Wars, would I be correct in saying that The Metaurus marked a great turning point? Or do you think that other factors came into play? My reading of the Second Punic War is that if Hasdrubal had been able to meet up with his brother's forces, the outcome may have been very different. Did Metaurus pave the way for Hannibal's final defeat? I would love to read your thoughts.

The Metaurus is listed as one of the key battles of history and is studied in military schools. Had it not been fought who knows what a Barca brother reunion would have brought. An assault on Rome itself? Unlikely. Did it limit Hannibal's options for further campaigns? Absolutely. Why is Metaurus studied? Hannibal was bottled up in south Italy, there were 3 roman armies in the field to keep him in check. His army was highly mobile and the key with Hannibal was knowing where he was and limiting his freedom to move. The army directly in contact with Hannibal was led by Nero. A message from Hasdrubal was intercepted and acted upon by Nero. He detached some units and proceeded to march north to linkup with Salinator, the move had to be done in secret as had Hannibal gotten wind of what was happening he would have destroyed the remainder of Nero's army piecemeal and have been free to move again. The march north was conducted over 7 days for a distance of 300+ miles, it was aided by the patriotic fervor of the populous who provided waggons, fresh horses, carried equipment, etc for the army. Thus linking up with Salinator in record time, providing timely intelligence, reinforcements for the coming battle. Deception of Hannibal in keeping him pinned, of detaching a portion of the army without the enemy knowing. Deception of Hasdrubal by the reinforcement of existing forces without alerting the enemy. Logistics for moving an army on short notice a great distance, and returning to his original position to face Hannibal once the job was done. The first thing Hasdrubal knew of what had happened was when the consular trumpet was sounded twice, and the first thing Hannibal knew of the event was when his brothers head was thrown over the ramparts. Technically, Nero broke the law by taking his command into the imperium of another consul but I'm sure they let it slide. :-).

 

I'll update with what T.A. Dodge has to say about the event when I have more time. I wrote the above from memory so please feel free to correct me anyone.

[The Augusta]

Thank you for such a full answer, Publius. I am glad I had my reading of the matter correct, as I sometimes worry that I am a little dense in the interpretation of military matters. When I read about the battle in Livy I did think it was a great tactical manoeuvre by Nero and Salinator, so I am pleased that someone with military expertise endorses my interpretation. Thank you again.

[Rameses the Great]

Looking at the casualties, it seems like the Romans did beat them pretty badly.

 

Why after Hannibal's great success in Rome, falter so easily with more men and on home soil in Carthage?

 

I suppose he liked playing that underdog role.

[P.Clodius]

Here is reproduced Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World. Its is freely available at Guttenburg...

[/i]CHAPTER IV.

 

THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS, B.C. 207.

 

Quid debeas, 0 Roma, Neronibus,

Testis Metaurum flumen, et Hasdrubal

Devictus, et pulcher fugatis

Ille dies Latio tenebris,

 

Qui primus alma risit adorea;

Dirus per urbes Afer ut Italas,

Ceu flamma per taedas, vel Eurus

Per Siculas equitavit undas.--HORATIUS, iv. Od. 4.

 

". . . The consul Nero, who made the unequalled march which

deceived Hannibal, and defeated Hasdrubal, thereby accomplishing

an achievement almost unrivalled in military annals. The first

intelligence of his return, to Hannibal, was the sight of

Hasdrubal's head thrown into his camp. When Hannibal saw this,

he exclaimed with a sigh, that 'Rome would now be the mistress of

the world.' To this victory of Nero's it might be owing that his

imperial namesake reigned at all. But the infamy of the one has

eclipsed the glory of the other. When the name of Nero is heard,

who thinks of the consul! But such are human things."--BYRON.

 

About midway between Rimini and Ancona a little river falls into

the Adriatic, after traversing one of those districts of Italy,

in which a vain attempt has lately been made to revive, after

long centuries of servitude and shame, the spirit of Italian

nationality, and the energy of free institutions. That stream is

still called the Metauro; and wakens by its name recollections of

the resolute daring of ancient Rome, and of the slaughter that

stained its current two thousand and sixty-three years ago, when

the combined consular armies of Livius and Nero encountered and

crushed near its banks the varied hosts which Hannibal's brother

was leading from the Pyrenees, the Rhone, the Alps, and the Po,

to aid the great Carthaginian in his stern struggle to annihilate

the growing might of the Roman Republic, and make the Punic power

supreme over all the nations of the world.

 

The Roman historian, who termed that struggle the most memorable

of all wars that ever were carried on, [Livy, Lib. xxi. sec. 1.]

wrote-in no spirit of exaggeration. For it is not in ancient but

in modern history, that parallels for its incidents and its

heroes are to be found. The similitude between the contest which

Rome maintained against Hannibal, and that which England was for

many years engaged in against Napoleon, has not passed unobserved

by recent historians. "Twice," says Arnold, [Vol. iii, p. 62.

See also Alison--PASSIM.] "has there been witnessed the struggle

of the highest individual genius against the resources and

institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has

been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against

Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon Bonaparte strove against

England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the

second in Waterloo." One point, however, of the similitude

between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on. That

is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally

defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave

the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and

Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance,

but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country

was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was

in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered

and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy,

before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself.

Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen's confidence

in arms, when shaken by a series of reverses. And each of them

closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming

defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe.

 

Nor is the parallel between them limited to their, military

characters and exploits. Scipio, like Wellington, became an

important leader of the aristocratic party among his countrymen,

and was exposed to the unmeasured invectives of the violent

section of his political antagonists. When, early in the last

reign, an infuriated mob assaulted the Duke of Wellington in the

streets of the English capital on the anniversary of Waterloo,

England was even more disgraced by that outrage, than Rome was by

the factious accusations which demagogues brought against Scipio,

but which he proudly repelled on the day of trial, by reminding

the assembled people that it was the anniversary of the battle of

Zama. Happily, a wiser and a better spirit has now for years

pervaded all classes of our community; and we shall be spared the

ignominy of having worked out to the end the parallel of national

iugratitude. Scipio died a voluntary exile from the malevolent

turbulence of Rome. Englishmen of all ranks and politics have

now long united in affectionate admiration of our modern Scipio:

and even those who have most widely differed from the Duke on

legislative or administrative questions, forget what they deem

the political errors of that time-honoured head, while they

gratefully call to mind the laurels that have wreathed it.

 

Scipio at Zama trampled in the dust the power of Carthage; but

that power had been already irreparably shattered in another

field, where neither Scipio nor Hannibal commanded. When the

Metaurus witnessed the defeat and death of Hasdrubal, it

witnessed the ruin of the scheme by which alone Carthage could

hope to organise decisive success,--the scheme of enveloping Rome

at once from the north and the south of Italy by chosen armies,

led by two sons of Hamilcar. [see Arnold, vol. iii, p. 387.]

That battle was the determining crisis of the contest, not merely

between Rome and Carthage, but between the two great families of

the world, which then made Italy the arena of their oft-renewed

contest for pre-eminence.

 

The French historian Michelet whose "Histoire Romaine" would have

been invaluable, if the general industry and accuracy of the

writer had in any degree equalled his originality and brilliancy,

eloquently remarks: "It is not without reason that so universal

and vivid a remembrance of the Punic wars has dwelt in the

memories of men. They formed no mere struggle to determine the

lot of two cities or two empires; but it was a strife on the

event of which depended the fate of two races of mankind, whether

the dominion of the world should belong to the Indo-Germanic or

to the Semitic family of nations. Bear in mind, that the first

of these comprises, besides the Indians and the Persians, the

Greeks, the Romans, and the Germans. In the other are ranked the

Jews and the Arabs, the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians. On

the one side is the genius of heroism, of art, and legislation:

on the other is the spirit of industry, of commerce, of

navigation. The two opposite races have everywhere come into

contact, everywhere into hostility. In the primitive history of

Persia and Chaldea, the heroes are perpetually engaged in combat

with their industrious and perfidious, neighbours. The struggle

is renewed between the Phoenicians and the Greeks on every coast

of the Mediterranean. The Greek supplants the Phoenician in all

his factories, all his colonies in the east: soon will the Roman

come, and do likewise in the west. Alexander did far more

against Tyre than Salmanasar or Nabuchodonosor had done. Not

content with crushing her, he took care that she never should

revive: for he founded Alexandria as her substitute, and changed

for ever the track of commerce of the world. There remained

Carthage--the great Carthage, and her mighty empire,--mighty in a

far different degree than Phoenicia's had been. Rome annihilated

it. Then occurred that which has no parallel in history,--an

entire civilisation perished at one blow--vanished, like a

falling star. The 'Periplus' of Hanno, a few coins, a score of

lines in Plautus, and, lo, all that remains of the Carthaginian

world!

 

"Many generations must needs pass away before the struggle

between the two races could be renewed; and the Arabs, that

formidable rear-guard of the Semitic world, dashed forth from

their deserts. The conflict between the two races then became

the conflict of two religions. Fortunate was it that those

daring Saracenic cavaliers encountered in the East the

impregnable walls of Constantinople, in the West the chivalrous

valour of Charles Martel and the sword of the Cid. The crusades

were the natural reprisals for the Arab invasions, and form the

last epoch of that great struggle between the two principal

families of the human race."

 

It is difficult amid the glimmering light supplied by the

allusions of the classical writers to gain a full idea of the

character and institutions of Rome's great rival. But we can

perceive how inferior Carthage was to her competitor in military

resources; and how far less fitted than Rome she was to become

the founder of centralized and centralizing dominion, that should

endure for centuries, and fuse into imperial unity the narrow

nationalities of the ancient races that dwelt around and near the

shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

 

Carthage was originally neither the most ancient nor the most

powerful of the numerous colonies which the Phoenicians planted

on the coast of Northern Africa. But her advantageous position,

the excellence of her constitution (of which, though ill-informed

as to its details, we know that it commanded the admiration of

Aristotle), and the commercial and political energy of her

citizens, gave her the ascendancy over Hippo, Utica, Leptis, and

her other sister Phoenician cities in those regions; and she

finally seduced them to a condition of dependency, similar to

that which the subject allies of Athens occupied relatively to

that once imperial city. When Tyre and Sidon and the other

cities of Phoenicia itself sank from independent republics into

mere vassal states of the great Asiatic monarchies and obeyed by

turns a Babylonian, a Persian, and a Macedonian master, their

power and their traffic rapidly declined; and Carthage succeeded

to the important maritime and commercial character which they had

previously maintained. The Carthaginians did not seek to compete

with the Greeks on the north-eastern shores of the Mediterranean,

or in the three inland seas which are connected with it; but they

maintained an active intercourse with the Phoenicians, and

through them with lower and Central Asia; and they, and they

alone, after the decline and fall of Tyre, navigated the waters

of the Atlantic. They had the monopoly of all the commerce of

the world that was carried on beyond the Straits of Gibraltar.

We have yet extant (in a Greek translation) the narrative of the

voyage of Hanno, one of their admirals, along the western coast

of Africa as far as Sierra Leone. And in the Latin poem of

Festus Avienus, frequent references are made to the records of

the voyages of another celebrated Carthaginian admiral, Himilco,

who had explored the north-western coast of Europe. Our own

islands are mentioned by Himilco as the lands of the Hiberni and

the Albioni. It is indeed certain that the Carthaginians

frequented the Cornish coast (as the Phoenicians had done before

them) for the purpose of procuring tin; and there is every reason

to believe that they sailed as far as the coasts of the Baltic

for amber. When it is remembered that the mariner's compass was

unknown in those ages, the boldness and skill of the seamen of

Carthage, and the enterprise of her merchants, may be paralleled

with any achievements that the history of modern navigation and

commerce can supply.

 

In their Atlantic voyages along the African shores, the

Carthaginians followed the double object of trade and

colonization. The numerous settlements that were planted by them

along the coast from Morocco to Senegal, provided for the needy

members of the constantly-increasing population of a great

commercial capital; and also strengthened the influence which

Carthage exercised among the tribes of the African coast.

Besides her fleets, her caravans gave her a large and lucrative

trade with the native Africans; nor must we limit our belief of

the extent of the Carthaginian trade with the tribes of Central

and Western Africa, by the narrowness of the commercial

intercourse which civilized nations of modern times have been

able to create in those regions.

 

Although essentially a mercantile and seafaring people, the

Carthaginians by no means neglected agriculture. On the

contrary, the whole of their territory was cultivated like a

garden. The fertility of the soil repaid the skill and toil

bestowed on it; and every invader, from Agathocles to Scipio

AEmilianus, was struck with admiration at the rich pasture-lands

carefully irrigated, the abundant harvests, the luxuriant

vineyards, the plantations of fig and olive-trees, the thriving

villages, the populous towns, and the splendid villas of the

wealthy Carthaginians, through which his march lay, as long as he

was on Carthaginian ground.

 

The Carthaginians abandoned the Aegean and the Pontus to the

Greeks, but they were by no means disposed to relinquish to those

rivals the commerce and the dominion of the coasts of the

Mediterranean westward of Italy. For centuries the Carthaginians

strove to make themselves masters of the islands that lie between

Italy and Spain. They acquired the Balearic islands, where the

principal harbour, Port Mahon, still bears the name of the

Carthaginian admiral. They succeeded in reducing the greater

part of Sardinia; but Sicily could never be brought into their

power. They repeatedly invaded that island, and nearly overran

it; but the resistance which was opposed to them by the

Syracusans under Gelon, Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathocles,

preserved the island from becoming Punic, though many of its

cities remained under the Carthaginian rule, until Rome finally

settled the question to whom Sicily was to belong, by conquering

it for herself.

 

With so many elements of success, with almost unbounded wealth

with commercial and maritime activity, with a fertile territory,

with a capital city of almost impregnable strength, with a

constitution that ensured for centuries the blessings of, social

order, with an aristocracy singularly fertile in men of the

highest genius, Carthage yet failed signally and calamitously in

her contest for power with Rome. One of the immediate causes of

this may seem to have been the want, of firmness among her

citizens, which made them terminate the first Punic war by

begging peace, sooner than endure any longer the hardships and

burdens caused by a state of warfare, although their antagonists

had suffered far more severely than themselves. Another cause

was the spirit of faction among their leading men, which

prevented Hannibal in the second war from being properly

reinforced and supported. But there were also more general

causes why Carthage proved inferior to Rome. These were her

position relatively to the mass of the inhabitants of the country

which she ruled, and her habit of trusting to mercenary armies in

her wars.

 

Our clearest information as to the different races of men in and

about Carthage is derived from Diodorus Siculus. [Vol. ii. p.

447, Wesseling's ed.] That historian enumerates four different

races: first, he mentions the Phoenicians who dwelt in Carthage:

next, he speaks of the Liby-Phoenicians; these, he tells us,

dwelt in many of the maritime cities, and were connected by

intermarriages with the Phoenicians, which was the cause of their

compound name: thirdly, he mentions the Libyans, the bulk and

the most ancient part of the population, hating the Carthaginians

intensely, on account of the oppressiveness of their domination:

lastly, he names the Numidians, the nomad tribes of the frontier.

 

It is evident, from this description, that the native Libyans

were a subject class, without franchise or political rights; and,

accordingly, we find no instance specified in history of a Libyan

holding political office or military command. The half-castes,

the Liby-Phoenicians, seem to have been sometimes sent out as

colonists; [see the "Periplus" of Hanno.] but it may be

inferred, from what Diodorus says of their residence, that they

had not the right of the citizenship of Carthage: and only a

solitary case occurs of one of this race being entrusted with

authority, and that, too, not emanating from the home government.

This is the instance of the officer sent by Hannibal to Sicily,

after the fall of Syracuse; whom Polybius [Lib. ix. 22.] calls

Myttinus the Libyan, but whom, from the fuller account in Livy,

we find to have been a Liby-Phoenician [Lib. xxv. 40.] and it is

expressly mentioned what indignation was felt by the Carthaginian

commanders in the island that this half-caste should control

their operations.

 

With respect to the composition of their armies, it is observable

that, though thirsting for extended empire, and though some of

the leading men became generals of the highest order, the

Carthaginians, as a people, were anything but personally warlike.

As long as they could hire mercenaries to fight for them, they

had little appetite for the irksome training, and they grudged

the loss of valuable time, which military service would have

entailed on themselves.

 

As Michelet remarks, "The life of an industrious merchant, of a

Carthaginian, was too precious to be risked, as long as it was

possible to substitute advantageously for it that of a barbarian

from Spain or Gaul. Carthage knew, and could tell to a drachma,

what the life of a man of each nation came to. A Greek was worth

more than a Campanian, a Campanian worth more than a Gaul or a

Spaniard. When once this tariff of blood was correctly made out,

Carthage began a war as a mercantile speculation. She tried to

make conquests in the hope of getting new mines to work, or to

open fresh markets for her exports. In one venture she could

afford to spend fifty thousand mercenaries, in another, rather

more. If the returns were good, there was no regret felt for the

capital that had been lavished in the investment; more money got

more men, and all went on well." [Histoire Romaine, vol. ii. p.

40.]

 

Armies composed of foreign mercenaries have, in all ages, been as

formidable to their employers as to the enemy against whom they

were directed. We know of one occasion (between the first and

second Punic wars) when Carthage was brought to the very brink of

destruction by a revolt of her foreign troops. Other mutinies of

the same kind must from time to time have occurred. Probably one

of these was the cause of the comparative weakness of Carthage at

the time of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse; so

different from the energy with which she attacked Gelon half a

century earlier, and Dionysius half a century later. And even

when we consider her armies with reference only to their

efficiency in warfare, we perceive at once the inferiority of

such bands of condottieri, brought together without any common

bond of origin, tactics, or cause, to the legions of Rome, which

at the time of the Punic wars were raised from the very flower of

a hardy agricultural population trained in the strictest

discipline, habituated to victory, and animated by the most

resolute patriotism. And this shows also the transcendency of

the genius of Hannibal, which could form such discordant

materials into a compact organized force, and inspire them with

the spirit of patient discipline and loyalty to their chief; so

that they were true to him in his adverse as well as in his

prosperous fortunes; and throughout the chequered series of his

campaigns no panic rout ever disgraced a division under his

command; no mutiny, or even attempt at mutiny, was ever known in

his camp; and, finally, after fifteen years of Italian warfare,

his men followed their old leader to Zama, "with no fear and

little hope;" ["We advanced to Waterloo as the Greeks did to

Thermopylae; all of us without fear and most of us without

hope."--SPEECH OF GENERAL FOY.] and there, on that disastrous

field, stood firm around him, his Old Guard, till Scipio's

Numidian allies came up on their flank; when at last, surrounded

and overpowered, the veteran battalions sealed their devotion to

their general with their blood.

 

"But if Hannibal's genius may be likened to the Homeric god, who,

in his hatred to the Trojans, rises from the deep to rally the

fainting Greeks, and to lead them against the enemy, so the calm

courage with which Hector met his more than human adversary in

his country's cause, is no unworthy image of the unyielding

magnanimity displayed by the aristocracy of Rome. As Hannibal

utterly eclipses Carthage, so, on the contrary, Fabius,

Marcellus, Claudius Nero, even Scipio himself, are as nothing

when compared to the spirit, and wisdom, and power of Rome. The

senate, which voted its thanks to its political enemy, Varro,

after his disastrous defeat, 'because he had not despaired of the

commonwealth,' and which disdained either to solicit, or to

reprove, or to threaten, or in any way to notice the twelve

colonies which had refused their customary supplies of men for

the army, is far more to be honoured than the conqueror of Zama.

This we should the more carefully bear in mind because our

tendency is to admire individual greatness far more than

national; and, as no single Roman will bear comparison to

Hannibal, we are apt to murmur at the event of the contest, and

to think that the victory was awarded to the least worthy of the

combatants. On the contrary, never was the wisdom of God's

Providence more manifest than in the issue of the struggle

between Rome and Carthage. It was clearly for the good of man

kind that Hannibal should be conquered: his triumph would have

stopped the progress of the world. For great men can only act

permanently by forming great nations; and no one man, even though

it were Hannibal himself, can in one generation effect such a

work. But where the nation has been merely enkindled for a while

by a great man's spirit, the light passes away with him who

communicated it; and the nation, when he is gone, is like a dead

body, to which magic power had, for a moment, given unnatural

life: when the charm has ceased, the body is cold and stiff as

before. He who grieves over the battle of Zama should carry on

his thoughts to a period thirty years later, when Hannibal must,

in the course of nature, have been dead, and consider how the

isolated Phoenician city of Carthage was fitted to receive and to

consolidate the civilization of Greece, or by its laws and

institutions to bind together barbarians of every race and

language into an organized empire, and prepare them for becoming,

when that empire was dissolved, the free members of the

commonwealth of Christian Europe." [Arnold, vol. iii. p. 61. The

above is one of the numerous bursts of eloquence that adorn

Arnold's third volume, and cause such deep regret that that

volume should have been the last, and its great and good author

have been cut off with his work thus incomplete.]

 

It was in the spring of 207 B.C. that Hasdrubal, after skilfully

disentangling himself from the Roman forces in Spain, and, after

a march conducted with great judgment and little loss, through

the interior of Gaul and the passes of the Alps, appeared in the

country that now is the north of Lombardy, at the head of troops

which he had partly brought out of Spain, and partly levied among

the Gauls and Ligurians on his way. At this time Hannibal with

his unconquered, and seemingly unconquerable army, had been

eleven years in Italy, executing with strenuous ferocity the vow

of hatred to Rome which had been sworn by him while yet a child

at the bidding of his father, Hamilcar; who, as he boasted, had

trained up his three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago, Like

three lion's whelps, to prey upon the Romans. But Hannibal's

latter campaigns had not been signalised by any such great

victories as marked the first years of his invasion of Italy.

The stern spirit of Roman resolution, ever highest in disaster

and danger, had neither bent nor despaired beneath the merciless

blows which "the dire African" dealt her in rapid succession at

Trebia, at Thrasymene, and at Cannae. Her population was thinned

by repeated slaughter in the field; poverty and actual scarcity

wore down the survivors, through the fearful ravages which

Hannibal's cavalry spread through their corn-fields, their

pasture-lands, and their vineyards; many of her allies went over

to the invader's side; and new clouds of foreign war threatened

her from Macedonia and Gaul. But Rome receded not. Rich and

poor among her citizens vied with each other in devotion to their

country. The wealthy placed their stores, and all placed their

lives at the state's disposal. And though Hannibal could not be

driven out of Italy, though every year brought its sufferings and

sacrifices, Rome felt that her constancy had not been exerted in

vain. If she was weakened by the continual strife, so was

Hannibal also; and it was clear that the unaided resources of his

army were unequal to the task of her destruction. The single

deer-hound could not pull down the quarry which he had so

furiously assailed. Rome not only stood fiercely at bay, but had

pressed back and gored her antagonist, that still, however,

watched her in act to spring. She was weary, and bleeding at

every pore; and there seemed to be little hope of her escape, if

the other hound of old Hamilcar's race should come up in time to

aid his brother in the death-grapple.

 

Hasdrubal had commanded the Carthaginian armies in Spain for some

time, with varying but generally unpropitious fortune. He had

not the full authority over the Punic forces in that country

which his brother and his father had previously exercised. The

faction at Carthage, which was at feud with his family, succeeded

in fettering and interfering with his power; and other generals

were from time to time sent into Spain, whose errors and

misconduct caused the reverses that Hasdrubal met with. This is

expressly attested by the Greek historian Polybius, who was the

intimate friend of the younger Africanus, and drew his

information respecting the second Punic war from the best

possible authorities. Livy gives a long narrative of campaigns

between the Roman commanders in Spain and Hasdrubal, which is so

palpably deformed by fictions and exaggerations as to be hardly

deserving of attention. [see the excellent criticisms of Sir

Walter Raleigh on this, in his "History of the World," book v.

chap. iii. sec. 11.]

 

It is clear that in the year 208 B.C., at least, Hasdrubal

outmanoeuvred Publius Scipio, who held the command of the Roman

forces in Spain; and whose object was to prevent him from passing

the Pyrenees and marching upon Italy. Scipio expected that

Hasdrubal would attempt the nearest route, along the coast of the

Mediterranean; and he therefore carefully fortified and guarded

the passes of the eastern Pyrenees. But Hasdrubal passed these

mountains near their western extremity; and then, with a

considerable force of Spanish infantry, with a small number of

African troops, with some elephants and much treasure, he

marched, not directly towards the coast of the Mediterranean, but

in a north-eastern line towards the centre of Gaul. He halted

for the winter in the territory of the Arverni, the modern

Auvergne; and conciliated or purchased the good-will of the Gauls

in that region so far, that he not only found friendly winter

quarters among them, but great numbers of them enlisted under

him, and on the approach of spring marched with him to invade

Italy.

 

By thus entering Gaul at the south-west, and avoiding its

southern maritime districts, Hasdrubal kept the Romans in

complete ignorance of his precise operations and movements in

that country; all that they knew was that Hasdrubal had baffled

Scipio's attempts to detain him in Spain; that he had crossed the

Pyrenees with soldiers, elephants, and money, and that he was

raising fresh forces among the Gauls. The spring was sure to

bring him into Italy; and then would come the real tempest of the

war, when from the north and from the south the two Carthaginian

armies, each under a son of the Thunderbolt, were to gather

together around the seven hills of Rome. [Hamilcar was surnamed

Barca, which means the Thunderbolt. Sultan Bajazet had the

similar surname of Yilderim.]

 

In this emergency the Romans looked among themselves earnestly

and anxiously for leaders fit to meet the perils of the coming

campaign.

 

The senate recommended the people to elect, as one of their

consuls, Caius Claudius Nero, a patrician of one of the families

of the great Claudian house. Nero had served during the

preceding years of the war, both against Hannibal in Italy, and

against Hasdrubal in Spain; but it is remarkable that the

histories, which we possess, record no successes as having been

achieved by him either before or after his great campaign of the

Metaurus. It proves much for the sagacity of the leading men of

the senate, that they recognised in Nero the energy and spirit

which were required at this crisis, and it is equally creditable

to the patriotism of the people, that they followed the advice of

the senate by electing a general who had no showy exploits to

recommend him to their choice.

 

It was a matter of greater difficulty to find a second consul;

the laws required that one consul should be a plebeian; and the

plebeian nobility had been fearfully thinned by the events of the

war. While the senators anxiously deliberated among themselves

what fit colleague for Nero could be nominated at the coming

comitia, and sorrowfully recalled the names of Marcellus,

Gracchus, and other plebeian generals who were no more--one

taciturn and moody old man sat in sullen apathy among the

conscript fathers. This was Marcus Livius, who had been consul

in the gear before the beginning of this war, and had then gained

a victory over the Illyrians. After his consulship he had been

impeached before the people on a charge of peculation and unfair

division of the spoils among his soldiers: the verdict was

unjustly given against him, and the sense of this wrong, and of

the indignity thus put upon him, had rankled unceasingly in the

bosom of Livius, so that for eight years after his trial he had

lived in seclusion at his country seat, taking no part in any

affairs of state. Latterly the censors had compelled him to come

to Rome and resume his place in the senate, where he used to sit

gloomily apart, giving only a silent vote. At last an unjust

accusation against one of his near kinsmen made him break

silence; and he harangued the house in words of weight and sense,

which drew attention to him, and taught the senators that a

strong spirit dwelt beneath that unimposing exterior. Now, while

they were debating on what noble of a plebeian house was fit to

assume the perilous honours of the consulate, some of the elder

of them looked on Marcus Livius, and remembered that in the very

last triumph which had been celebrated in the streets of Rome

this grim old man had sat in the car of victory; and that he had

offered the last grand thanksgiving sacrifice for the success of

the Roman arms that had bled before Capitoline Jove. There had

been no triumphs since Hannibal came into Italy. [Marcellus had

been only allowed an ovation for the conquest of Syracuse.] The

Illyrian campaign of Livius was the last that had been so

honoured; perhaps it might be destined for him now to renew the

long-interrupted series. The senators resolved that Livius

should be put in nomination as consul with Nero; the people were

willing to elect him; the only opposition came from himself. He

taunted them with their inconsistency is honouring a man they had

convicted of a base crime. "If I am innocent," said he, "why did

you place such a stain on me? If I am guilty, why am I more fit

for a second consulship than I was for my first one?" The other

senators remonstrated with him urging the example of the great

Camillus, who, after an unjust condemnation on a similar charge,

both served and saved his country. At last Livius ceased to

object; and Caius Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius were chosen

consuls of Rome.

 

A quarrel had long existed between the two consuls, and the

senators strove to effect a reconciliation between them before

the campaign. Here again Livius for a long time obstinately

resisted the wish of his fellow-senators. He said it was best

for the state that he and Nero should continue to hate one

another. Each would do his duty better, when he knew that he was

watched by an enemy in the person of his own colleague. At last

the entreaties of the senators prevailed, and Livius consented to

forego the feud, and to co-operate with Nero in preparing for the

coming struggle.

 

As soon as the winter snows were thawed, Hasdrubal commenced his

march from Auvergne to the Alps. He experienced none of the

difficulties which his brother had met with from the mountain

tribes. Hannibal's army had been the first body of regular

troops that had ever traversed the regions; and, as wild animals

assail a traveller, the natives rose against it instinctively, in

imagined defence of their own habitations, which they supposed to

be the objects of Carthaginian ambition. But the fame of the

war, with which Italy had now been convulsed for eleven years,

had penetrated into the Alpine passes; and the mountaineers

understood that a mighty city, southward of the Alps, was to be

attacked by the troops whom they saw marching among them. They

not only opposed no resistance to the passage of Hasdrubal, but

many of them, out of the love of enterprise and plunder, or

allured by the high pay that he offered, took service with him;

and thus he advanced upon Italy with an army that gathered

strength at every league. It is said, also, that some of the

most important engineering works which Hannibal had constructed,

were found by Hasdrubal still in existence, and materially

favoured the speed of his advance. He thus emerged into Italy

from the Alpine valleys much sooner than had been anticipated.

Many warriors of the Ligurian tribes joined him; and, crossing

the river Po, he marched down its southern bank to the city of

Placentia, which he wished to secure as a base for his future

operations. Placentia resisted him as bravely as it had resisted

Hannibal eleven years before; and for some time Hasdrubal was

occupied with a fruitless siege before its walls.

 

Six armies were levied for the defence of Italy when the long-

dreaded approach of Hasdrubal was announced. Seventy thousand

Romans served in the fifteen legions of which, with an equal

number of Italian allies, those armies and the garrisons were

composed. Upwards of thirty thousand more Romans were serving in

Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. The whole number of Roman citizens

of an age fit for military duty scarcely exceeded a hundred and

thirty thousand. The census taken before the war had shown a

total of two hundred and seventy thousand, which had been

diminished by more than half during twelve years. These numbers

are fearfully emphatic of the extremity to which Rome was

reduced, and of her gigantic efforts in that great agony of her

fate. Not merely men, but money and military stores, were

drained to the utmost; and if the armies of that year should be

swept off by a repetition of the slaughters of Thrasymene and

Cannae, all felt that Rome would cease to exist. Even if the

campaign were to be marked by no decisive success on either side,

her ruin seemed certain. In South Italy Hannibal had either

detached Rome's allies from her, or had impoverished them by the

ravages of his army. If Hasdrubal could have done the same in

Upper Italy; if Etruria, Umbria, and Northern Latium had either

revolted or been laid waste, Rome must have sunk beneath sheer

starvation; for the hostile or desolated territory would have

yielded no supplies of corn for her population; and money, to

purchase it from abroad, there was none. Instant victory was a

matter of life and death. Three of her six armies were ordered

to the north, but the first of these was required to overawe the

disaffected Etruscans. The second army of the north was pushed

forward, under Porcius, the praetor, to meet and keep in, check

the advanced troops of Hasdrubal; while the third, the grand army

of the north, which was to be under the immediate command of the

consul Livius, who had the chief command in all North Italy,

advanced more slowly in its support. There were similarly three

armies in the south, under the orders of the other consul

Claudius Nero.

 

The lot had decided that Livius was to be opposed to Hasdrubal,

and that Nero should face Hannibal. And "when all was ordered as

themselves thought best, the two consuls went forth of the city;

each his several way. The people of Rome were now quite

otherwise affected, than they had been, when L. AEmilius Paulus

and C. Tarentius Varro were sent against Hannibal. They did no

longer take upon them to direct their generals, or bid them

dispatch, and win the victory betimes; but rather they stood in

fear, lest all diligence, wisdom, and valour should prove too

little. For since, few years had passed, wherein some one of

their generals had not been slain; and since it was manifest,

that if either of these present consuls were defeated, or put to

the worst, the two Carthaginians would forthwith join, and make

short work with the other: it seemed a greater happiness than

could be expected, that each of them should return home victor;

and come off with honour from such mighty opposition as he was

like to find. With extreme difficulty had Rome held up her head

ever since the battle of Cannae; though it were so, that Hannibal

alone, with little help from Carthage, had continued the war in

Italy. But there was now arrived another son of Amilcar; and one

that, in his present expedition, had seemed a man of more

sufficiency than Hannibal himself. For, whereas in that long and

dangerous march through barbarous nations, over great rivers and

mountains, that were thought unpassable, Hannibal had lost a

great part of his army; this Asdrubal, in the same places, had

multiplied his numbers; and gathering the people that he found in

the way, descended from the Alps like a rolling snow-ball, far

greater than he came over the Pyrenees at his first setting out

of Spain. These considerations, and the like, of which fear

presented many unto them, caused the people of Rome to wait upon

their consuls out of the town, like a pensive train of mourners;

thinking upon Marcellus and Crispinus, upon whom, in the like

sort, they had given attendance the last year, but saw neither of

them return alive from a less dangerous war. Particularly old Q.

Fabius gave his accustomed advice to M. Livius, that he should

abstain from giving or taking battle, until he well understood

the enemies' condition. But the consul made him a froward

answer, and said, that he would fight the very first day, for

that he thought it long till he should either recover his honour

by victory, or, by seeing the overthrow of his own unjust

citizens, satisfy himself with the joy of a great, though not an

honest revenge. But his meaning was better than his words."

[sir Walter Raleigh.]

 

Hannibal at this period occupied with his veteran but much

reduced forces the extreme south of Italy. It had not been

expected either by friend or foe, that Hasdrubal would effect his

passage of the Alps so early in the year as actually occurred.

And even when Hannibal learned that his brother was in Italy, and

had advanced as far as Placentia, he was obliged to pause for

further intelligence, before he himself commenced active

operations, as he could not tell whether his brother might not be

invited into Etruria, to aid the party there that was disaffected

to Rome or whether he would march down by the Adriatic Sea.

Hannibal led his troops out of their winter quarters in Bruttium,

and marched northward as far as Canusium. Nero had his head-

quarters near Venusia, with an army which he had increased to

forty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse, by

incorporating under his own command some of the legions which had

been intended to set under other generals in the south. There

was another Roman army twenty thousand strong, south of Hannibal,

at Tarentum. The strength of that city secured this Roman force

from any attack by Hannibal, and it was a serious matter to march

northward and leave it in his rear, free to act against all his

depots and allies in the friendly part of Italy, which for the

last two or three campaigns had served him for a base of his

operations. Moreover, Nero's army was so strong that Hannibal

could not concentrate troops enough to assume the offensive

against it without weakening his garrisons, and relinquishing, at

least for a time, his grasp upon the southern provinces. To do

this before he was certainly informed of his brother's operations

would have been an useless sacrifice; as Nero could retreat

before him upon the other Roman armies near the capital, and

Hannibal knew by experience that a mere advance of his army upon

the walls of Rome would have no effect on the fortunes of the

war. In the hope, probably, of inducing Nero to follow him, and

of gaining an opportunity of outmanoeuvring the Roman consul and

attacking him on his march, Hannibal moved into Lucania, and then

back into Apulis;--he again marched down into Bruttium, and

strengthened his army by a levy of recruits in that district.

Nero followed him, but gave him no chance of assailing him at a

disadvantage. Some partial encounters seem to have taken place;

but the consul could not prevent Hannibal's junction with his

Bruttian levies, nor could Hannibal gain an opportunity of

surprising and crushing the consul. Hannibal returned to his

former head-quarters at Canusium, and halted there in expectation

of further tidings of his brother's movements. Nero also resumed

his former position in observation of the Carthaginian army.

 

[The annalists whom Livy copied, spoke of Nero's gaining repeated

victories over Hannibal, and killing; and taking his men by tens

of thousands. The falsehood of all this is self-evident. If

Nero could thus always beat Hannibal, the Romans would not have

been in such an agony of dread about Hasdrubal, as all writers

describe. Indeed, we have the express testimony of Polybius that

such statements as we read in Livy of Marcellus, Nero, and others

gaining victories over Hannibal in Italy, must be all

fabrications of Roman vanity. Polybius states (Lib. xv. sec. 16)

that Hannibal was never defeated before the battle of Zama; and

in another passage (Book ix. chap, 3) he mentions that after the

defeats which Hannibal inflicted on the Romans in the early years

of the war, they no longer dared face his army in a pitched

battle on a fair field, and yet they resolutely maintained the

war. He rightly explains this by referring to the superiority of

Hannibal's cavalry the arm which gained him all his victories.

By keeping within fortified lines, or close to the sides of the

mountains when Hannibal approached them, the Romans rendered his

cavalry ineffective; and a glance at the geography of Italy will

show how an army can traverse the greater part of that country

without venturing far from the high grounds.]

 

Meanwhile, Hasdrubal had raised the siege of Placentia, and was

advancing towards Ariminum on the Adriatic, and driving before

him the Roman army under Porcina. Nor when the consul Livius had

come up, and united the second and third armies of the north,

could he make head against the invaders. The Romans still fell

back before Hasdrubal, beyond Ariminum, beyond the Metaurus, and

as far as the little town of Sena, to the southeast of that

river. Hasdrubal was not unmindful of the necessity of acting in

concert with his brother. He sent messengers to Hannibal to

announce his own line of march and to propose that they should

unite their armies in South Umbria, and then wheel round against

Rome. Those messengers traversed the greater part of Italy in

safety; but, when close to the object of their mission, were

captured by a Roman detachment; and Hasdrubal's letter, detailing

his whole plan of the campaign, was laid, not in his brother's

hands, but in those of the commander of the Roman armies of the

south. Nero saw at once the full importance of the crisis. The

two sons of Hamilcar were now within two hundred miles of each

other, and if Rome were to be saved, the brothers must never meet

alive. Nero instantly ordered seven thousand picked men, a

thousand being cavalry, to hold themselves in readiness for a

secret expedition against one of Hannibal's garrisons; and as

soon as night had set in, he hurried forward on his bold

enterprise: but he quickly left the southern road towards

Lucania, and wheeling round, pressed northward with the utmost

rapidity towards Picenum. He had, during the preceding

afternoon, sent messengers to Rome, who were to lay Hasdrubal's

letters before the senate. There was a law forbidding a consul

to make war or to march his army beyond the limits of the

province assigned to him; but in such an emergency Nero did not

wait for the permission of the senate to execute his project, but

informed them that he was already on his march to join Livius

against Hasdrubal. He advised them to send the two legions which

formed the home garrison, on to Narnia, so as to defend that pass

of the Flaminian road against Hasdrubal, in case he should march

upon Rome before the consular armies could attack him. They were

to supply the place of those two legions at Rome by a levy

EN MASSE in the city, and by ordering up the reserve legion from

Capua. These were his communications to the senate. He also

sent horseman forward along his line of march, with orders to the

local authorities to bring stores of; provisions and refreshments

of every kind to the road-side, and to have relays of carriages

ready for the conveyance of the wearied soldiers. Such were the

precautions which he took for accelerating his march; and when he

had advanced some little distance from his camp, he briefly

informed his soldiers of the real object of their expedition. He

told them that there never was a design more seemingly audacious,

and more really safe. He said he was leading them to a certain

victory, for his colleague had an army large enough to balance

the enemy already, so that THEIR swords would decisively turn the

scale. The very rumour that a fresh consul and a fresh army had

come up, when heard on the battle-field (and he would take care

that they should not be heard of before they were seen and felt)

would settle the campaign. They would have all the credit of the

victory, and of having dealt the final decisive blow, He appealed

to the enthusiastic reception which they already met with on

their line of march as a proof and an omen of their good fortune.

[Livy. lib. xxvii. c. 45.] And, indeed, their whole path was

amidst the vows and prayers and praises of their countrymen. The

entire population of the districts through which they passed,

flocked to the road-side to see and bless the deliverers of their

country. Food, drink, and refreshments of every kind were

eagerly pressed on their acceptance. Each peasant thought a

favour was conferred on him, if one of Nero's chosen band would

accept aught at his hands. The soldiers caught the full spirit

of their leader. Night and day they marched forwards, taking

their hurried meals in the ranks and resting by relays in the

waggons which the zeal of the country-people provided, and which

followed in the rear of the column.

 

Meanwhile, at Rome, the news of Nero's expedition had caused the

greatest excitement and alarm. All men felt the full audacity of

the enterprise, but hesitated what epithet to apply to it. It

was evident that Nero's conduct would be judged of by the event,

that most unfair criterion, as the Roman historian truly terms

it. ["Adparebat (quo nihil iniquius est) ex eventu famam

habiturum."--LIVY, lib. xxvii. c. 44.] People reasoned on the

perilous state in which Nero had left the rest of his army,

without a general, and deprived of the core of its strength, in

the vicinity of the terrible Hannibal. They speculated on how

long it would take Hannibal to pursue and overtake Nero himself,

and his expeditionary force. They talked over the former

disasters of the war, and the fall of both the consuls of the

last year. All these calamities had come on them while they had

only one Carthaginian general and army to deal with in Italy.

Now they had two Punic wars at one time. They had two

Carthaginian armies; they had almost two Hannibals in Italy,

Hasdrubal was sprung from the same father; trained up in the same

hostility to Rome; equally practised in battle against its

legions; and, if the comparative speed and success with which he

had crossed the Alps was a fair test, he was even a better

general than his brother. With fear for their interpreter of

every rumour, they exaggerated the strength of their enemy's

forces in every quarter, and criticised and distrusted their own.

 

Fortunately for Rome, while she was thus a prey to terror and

anxiety, her consul's nerves were strong, and he resolutely urged

on his march towards Sena, where his colleague, Livius, and the

praetor Portius were encamped; Hasdrubal's army being in position

about half a mile to the north. Nero had sent couriers forward

to apprise his colleague of his project and of his approach; and

by the advice of Livius, Nero so timed his final march as to

reach the camp at Sena by night. According to a previous

arrangement, Nero's men were received silently into the tents of

their comrades, each according to his rank. By these means there

was no enlargement of the camp that could betray to Hasdrubal the

accession of force which the Romans had received. This was

considerable; as Nero's numbers had been increased on the march

by the volunteers, who offered themselves in crowds, and from

whom he selected the most promising men, and especially the

veterans of former campaigns. A council of war was held on the

morning after his arrival, in which some advised that time should

be given for Nero's men to refresh themselves, after the fatigue

of such a march. But Nero vehemently opposed all delay. "The

officer," said he, "who is for giving time for my men here to

rest themselves, is for giving time to Hannibal to attack my men,

whom I have left in the camp in Apulia. He is for giving time to

Hannibal and Hasdrubal to discover my march, and to manoeuvre for

a junction with each other in Cisalpine Gaul at their leisure.

We must fight instantly, while both the foe here and the foe in

the south are ignorant of our movements. We must destroy this

Hasdrubal, and I must be back In Apulia before Hannibal awakes

from his torpor." [Livy, lib. xxvii. c. 45.] Nero's advice

prevailed. It was resolved to fight directly; and before the

consuls and praetor left the tent of Livius, the red ensign,

which was the signal to prepare for immediate action, was

hoisted, and the Romans forthwith drew up in battle array outside

the camp.

 

Hasdrubal had been anxious to bring Livius and Porcius to battle,

though he had not judged it expedient to attack them in their

lines. And now, on hearing that the Romans offered battle, he

also drew up his men, and advanced towards them. No spy or

deserter had informed him of Nero's arrival; nor had he received

any direct information that he had more than his old enemies to

deal with. But as he rode forward to reconnoitre the Roman

lines, he thought that their numbers seemed to have increased,

and that the armour of some-of them was unusually dull and

stained. He noticed also that the horses of some of the cavalry

appeared to be rough and out of condition, as if they had just

come from a succession of forced marches. So also, though, owing

to the precaution of Livius, the Roman camp showed no change of

size, it had not escaped the quick ear of the Carthaginian

general, that the trumpet, which gave the signal to the Roman

legions, sounded that morning once oftener than usual, as if

directing the troops of some additional superior officer.

Hasdrubal, from his Spanish campaigns, was well acquainted with

all the sounds and signals of Roman war; and from all that he

heard and saw, he felt convinced that both the Roman consuls were

before him. In doubt and difficulty as to what might have taken

place between the armies of the south, and probably hoping that

Hannibal also was approaching, Hasdrubal determined to avoid an

encounter with the combined Roman forces, and to endeavour to

retreat upon Insubrian Gaul, where he would be in a friendly

country, and could endeavour to re-open his communications with

his brother. He therefore led his troops back into their camp;

and, as the Romans did not venture on an assault upon his

entrenchments, and Hasdrubal did not choose to commence his

retreat in their sight, the day passed away in inaction. At the

first watch of the night, Hasdrubal led his men silently out of

their camp, and moved northwards towards the Metaurus, in the

hope of placing that river between himself and the Romans before

his retreat was discovered. His guides betrayed him; and having

purposely led him away from the part of the river that was

fordable, they made their escape in the dark, and left Hasdrubal

and his army wandering in confusion along the steep bank, and

seeking in vain for a spot where the stream could be safely

crossed. At last they halted; and when day dawned on them,

Hasdrubal found that great numbers of his men, in their fatigue

and impatience, had lost all discipline and subordination, and

that many of his Gallic auxiliaries had got drunk, and were lying

helpless in their quarters. The Roman cavalry was soon seen

coming up in pursuit, followed at no great distance by the

legions, which marched in readiness for an instant engagement.

It was hopeless for Hasdrubal, to think of continuing his retreat

before them. The prospect of immediate battle might recall the

disordered part of his troops to a sense of duty, and revive the

instinct of discipline. He therefore ordered his men to prepare

for action instantly, and made the best arrangement of them that

the nature of the ground would permit.

 

Heeren has well described the general appearance of a

Carthaginian army. He says: "It was an assemblage of the most

opposite races of the human species, from the farthest parts of

the globe. Hordes of half-naked Gauls were ranged next to

companies of white clothed Iberians, and savage Ligurians next to

the far-travelled Nasamones and Lotophagi. Carthaginians and

Phoenici-Africans formed the centre; while innumerable troops of

Numidian horse-men, taken from all the tribes of the Desert,

swarmed about on unsaddled horses, and formed the wings; the van

was composed of Balearic slingers; and a line of colossal

elephants, with their Ethiopian guides, formed, as it were, a

chain of moving fortresses before the whole army. Such were the

usual materials and arrangements of the hosts that fought for

Carthage; but the troops under Hasdrubal were not in all respects

thus constituted or thus stationed. He seems to have been

especially deficient in cavalry, and he had few African troops,

though some Carthaginians of high rank were with him. His

veteran Spanish infantry, armed with helmets and shields, and

short cut-and-thrust swords, were the best part of his army.

These, and his few Africans, he drew up on his right wing, under

his own personal command. In the centre, he placed his Ligurian

infantry, and on the left wing he placed or retained the Gauls,

who were armed with long javelins and with huge broadswords and

targets. The rugged nature of the ground in front and on the

flank of this part of his line, made him hope that the Roman

right wing would be unable to come to close quarters with these

unserviceable barbarians, before he could make some impression

with his Spanish veterans on the Roman left. This was the only

chance that he had of victory or safety, and he seems to have

done everything that good generalship could do to secure it. He

placed his elephants in advance of his centre and right wing. He

had caused the driver of each of them to be provided with a sharp

iron spike and a mallet; and had given orders that every beast

that became unmanageable, and ran back upon his own ranks, should

be instantly killed, by driving the spike into the vertebra at

the junction of the head and the spine. Hasdrubal's elephants

were ten in number. We have no trustworthy information as to the

amount of his infantry, but it is quite clear that he was greatly

outnumbered by the combined Roman forces.

 

continued...

Edited October 29, 2006 by P.Clodius

[P.Clodius]

The tactic of the Roman legions had not yet acquired the

perfection which it received from the military genius of Marius,

[Most probably during the period of his prolonged consulship,

from B.C. 104 to B.C. 101, while he was training his army against

the Cimbri and the Teutons.] and which we read of in the first

chapter of Gibbon. We possess in that great work an account of

the Roman legions at the end of the commonwealth, and during the

early ages of the empire, which those alone can adequately

admire, who have attempted a similar description. We have also,

in the sixth and seventeenth books of Polybius, an elaborate

discussion on the military system of the Romans in his time,

which was not far distant from the time of the battle of the

Metaurus. But the subject is beset with difficulties: and

instead of entering into minute but inconclusive details, I would

refer to Gibbon's first chapter, as serving for a general

description of the Roman army in its period of perfection; and

remark, that the training and armour which the whole legion

received in the time of Augustus, was, two centuries earlier,

only partially introduced. Two divisions of troops, called

Hastati and Principes, formed the bulk of each Roman legion in

the second Punic war. Each of these divisions was twelve hundred

strong. The Hastatus and the Princeps legionary bore a breast-

plate or coat of mail, brazen greaves, and a brazen helmet, with

a lofty, upright crest of scarlet or black feathers. He had a

large oblong shield; and, as weapons of offence, two javelins,

one of which was light and slender, but the other was a strong

and massive weapon, with a shaft about four feet long, and an

iron head of equal length. The sword was carried on the right

thigh, and was a short cut-and thrust weapon, like that which was

used by the Spaniards. Thus armed, the Hastati formed the front

division of the legion, and the Principes the second. Each

division was drawn up about ten deep; a space of three feet being

allowed between the files as well as the ranks, so as to give

each legionary ample room for the use of his javelins, and of his

sword and shield. The men in the second rank did not stand

immediately behind those in the first rank, but the files were

alternate, like the position of the men on a draught board. This

was termed the quincunx order. Niebuhr considers that this

arrangement enabled the legion to keep up a shower of javelins on

the enemy for some considerable time. He says: "When the first

line had hurled its pila, it probably stepped back between those

who stood behind it, who with two steps forward restored the

front nearly to its first position; a movement which, on account

of the arrangement of the quincunx, could be executed without

losing a moment. Thus one line succeeded the other in the front

till it was time to draw the swords; nay, when it was found

expedient, the lines which had already been in the front might

repeat this change, since the stores of pila were surely not

confined to the two which each soldier took with him into battle.

 

"The same change must have taken place in fighting with the

sword; which, when the same tactic was adopted on both sides, was

anything but a confused MELEE; on the contrary, it was a series

of single combats." He adds, that a military man of experience

had been consulted by him on the subject, and had given it as his

opinion, "that the change of the lines as described above was by

no means impracticable; and in the absence of the deafening noise

of gunpowder, it cannot have had even any difficulty with trained

troops."

 

The third division of the legion was six hundred strong, and

acted as a reserve. It was always composed of veteran soldiers,

who were called the Triarii. Their arms were the same as those

of the Principes and Hastati; except that each Triarian carried a

spear instead of javelins. The rest of the legion consisted of

light armed troops, who acted as skirmishers. The cavalry of

each legion was at this period about three hundred strong. The

Italian allies, who were attached to the legion, seem to have

been similarly armed and equipped, but their numerical proportion

of cavalry was much larger.

 

Such was the nature of the forces that advanced on the Roman side

to the battle of the Metaurus. Nero commanded the right wing,

Livius the left, and the praetor Porcius had the command of the

centre. "Both Romans and Carthaginians well understood how much

depended upon the fortune of this day, and how little hope of

safety there was for the vanquished. Only the Romans herein

seemed to have had the better in conceit and opinion, that they

were to fight with men desirous to have fled from them. And

according to this presumption came Livius the consul, with a

proud bravery, to give charge on the Spaniards and Africans, by

whom he was so sharply entertained that victory seemed very

doubtful. The Africans and Spaniards were stout soldiers, and

well acquainted with the manner of the Roman fight. The

Ligurians, also, were a hardy nation, and not accustomed to give

ground; which they needed the less, or were able now to do, being

placed in the midst. Livius, therefore, and Porcius found great

opposition; and, with great slaughter on both sides, prevailed

little or nothing. Besides other difficulties, they were

exceedingly troubled by the elephants, that brake their first

ranks, and put them in such disorder, as the Roman ensigns were

driven to fall back; all this while Claudius Nero, labouring in

vain against a steep hill, was unable to come to blows with the

Gauls that stood opposite him, but out of danger. This made

Hasdrubal the more confident, who, seeing his own left wing safe,

did the more boldly and fiercely make impression on the other

side upon the left wing of the Romans." ["Historie of the

World," by Sir Walter Raleigh, p. 946.]

 

But at last Nero, who found that Hasdrubal refused his left wing,

and who could not overcome the difficulties of the ground in the

quarter assigned to him, decided the battle by another stroke of

that military genius which had inspired his march. Wheeling a

brigade of his best men round the rear of the rest of the Roman

army, Nero fiercely charged the flank of the Spaniards and

Africans. The charge was as successful as it was sudden. Rolled

back in disorder upon each other, and overwhelmed by numbers, the

Spaniards and Ligurians died, fighting gallantly to the last.

The Gauls, who had taken little or no part in the strife of the

day, were then surrounded, and butchered almost without

resistance. Hasdrubal, after having, by the confession of his

enemies, done all that a general could do, when he saw that the

victory was irreparably lost, scorning to survive the gallant;

host which he had led, and to gratify, as a captive, Roman

cruelty and pride, spurred his horse into the midst of a Roman

cohort; where, sword in hand, he met the death that was worthy of

the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal.

 

Success the most complete had crowned Nero's enterprise.

Returning as rapidly as he had advanced, he was again facing the

inactive enemies in the south, before they even knew of his

march. But he brought with him a ghastly trophy of what he had

done. In the true spirit of that savage brutality which deformed

the Roman national character, Nero ordered Hasdrubal's head to be

flung into his brother's camp. Eleven years had passed since

Hannibal had last gazed on those features. The sons of Hamilcar

had then planned their system of warfare against Rome, which they

had so nearly brought to successful accomplishment. Year after

year had Hannibal been struggling in Italy, in the hope of one

day hailing the arrival of him whom he had left in Spain; and of

seeing his brother's eye flash with affection and pride at the

junction of their irresistible hosts. He now saw that eye glazed

in death and, in the agony of his heart, the great Carthaginian

groaned aloud that he recognised his country's destiny.

 

[Carthagini jam non ego nuntios

Mittam superbos. Occidit, occidit

Spes omnis et fortuna nostri

Nominis, Hastrubale interemto.--HORACE.]

 

Rome was almost delirious with joy: [see the splendid

description in Livy, lib. xxvii. sec. 50, 51.] so agonising had

been the suspense with which the battle's verdict on that great

issue of a nation's life and death had been awaited; so

overpowering was the sudden reaction to the consciousness of

security, and to the full glow of glory and success. From the

time when it had been known at Rome that the armies were in

presence of each other, the people had never ceased to throng the

forum, the Conscript Fathers had been in permanent sitting at the

senate house. Ever and anon a fearful whisper crept among the

crowd of a second Cannae won by a second Hannibal. Then came

truer rumours that the day was Rome's; but the people were sick

at heart, and heeded them not. The shrines were thronged with

trembling women, who seemed to weary heaven with prayers to

shield them from the brutal Gaul and the savage African.

Presently the reports of good fortune assumed a more definite

form. It was said that two Narnian horseman had ridden from the

east into the Roman camp of observation in Umbria, and had

brought tidings of the utter slaughter of the foe. Such news

seemed too good to be true, Men tortured their neighbours and

themselves by demonstrating its improbability and by ingeniously

criticising its evidence. Soon, however, a letter came from

Lucius Manlius Acidinus, who commanded in Umbria, and who

announced the arrival of the Narnian horsemen in his camp, and

the intelligence which they brought thither. The letter was

first laid before the senate, and then before the assembly of the

people. The excitement grew more and more vehement. The letter

was read and re-read aloud to thousands. It confirmed the

previous rumour. But even this was insufficient to allay the

feverish anxiety that thrilled through every breast in Rome. The

letter might be a forgery: the Narnian horseman might be

traitors or impostors. "We must see officers from the army that

fought, or hear despatches from the consuls themselves, and then

only will we believe." Such was the public sentiment, though

some of more hopeful nature already permitted themselves a

foretaste of joy. At length came news that officers who really

had been in the battle were near at hand. Forthwith the whole

city poured forth to meet them, each person coveting to be the

first to receive with his own eyes and ears convincing proofs of

the reality of such a deliverance. One vast throng of human

beings filled the road from Rome to the Milvian bridge. The

three officers, Lucius Veturius Pollio, Publius Licinius Vasus,

and Quintus Caecilius Metellus came riding on, making their way

slowly through the living sea around them, As they advanced, each

told the successive waves of eager questioners that Rome was

victorious. "We have destroyed Hasdrubal and his army, our

legions are safe, and our consuls are unhurt." Each happy

listener, who caught the welcome sounds from their lips, retired

to communicate his own joy to others, and became himself the

centre of an anxious and inquiring group. When the officers had,

with much difficulty, reached the senate house, and the crowd was

with still greater difficulty put back from entering and mingling

with the Conscript Fathers, the despatches of Livius and Nero

were produced and read aloud. From the senate house the officers

proceeded to the public assembly, where the despatches were read

again; and then the senior officer, Lucius Veturius, gave in his

own words a fuller detail of how went the fight. When he had

done speaking to the people, an universal shout of rapture rent

the air. The vast assembly then separated: some hastening to

the temples to find in devotion a vent for the overflowing

excitement of their hearts; others seeking their homes to gladden

their wives and children with the good news, and to feast their

own eyes with the sight of the loved ones, who now, at last, were

safe from outrage and slaughter. The senate ordained a

thanksgiving of three days for the great deliverance which had

been vouchsafed to Rome; and throughout that period the temples

were incessantly crowded with exulting worshippers; and the

matrons, with their children round them, in their gayest attire,

and with joyous aspects and voices, offered grateful praises to

the immortal gods, as if all apprehension of evil were over, and

the war were already ended.

 

With the revival of confidence came also the revival of activity

in traffic and commerce, and in all the busy intercourse of daily

life. A numbing load was taken off each heart and brain, and

once more men bought and sold, and formed their plans fleely, as

had been done before the dire Carthaginians came into Italy.

Hannibal was, certainly, still in the land; but all felt that his

power to destroy was broken, and that the crisis of the war-fever

was past. The Metaurus, indeed, had not only determined the

event of the strife between Rome and Carthage, but it had ensured

to Rome two centuries more of almost unchanged conquest.

Hannibal did actually, with almost superhuman skill, retain his

hold on Southern Italy for a few years longer, but the imperial

city, and her allies, were no longer in danger from his arms;

and, after Hannibal's downfall, the great military republic of

the ancient world met in her career of conquest no other worthy

competitor. Byron has termed Nero's march "unequalled," and, in

the magnitude of its consequences, it is so. Viewed only as a

military exploit, it remains unparalleled save by Marlborough's

bold march from Flanders to the Danube, in the campaign of

Blenheim, and perhaps also by the Archduke Charles's lateral

march in 1796, by which he overwhelmed the French under Jourdain,

and then, driving Moreau through the Black Forest and across the

Rhine, for a while freed Germany from her invaders.