Agrarian Legislation In The Late Republic

[Favonius Cornelius]

Misinterpretation? I said 'proposed' law. The first was much more reasonable was it not? But look where Cato and friends eventually got themselves.

 

To understand the relation between the two bills, imagine that I ask you to sign a contract accepting an ostensibly free lunch (who would refuse it?), and then I demand to sleep with your wife in payment. That's the essence of the two bills, but now to the details.

 

The optimates did their level best to make sure this is exactly what happened, and I'll explain why:

 

Consider just a few problems with the bill. Which of the eligible 20,000 families were to receive this unexpected largesse? Shall it be first-come-first-served, or shall they be chosen by lottery, or are they to be selected by the consuls themselves? And what prices shall be paid to those willing to sell to the land commissioners? Shall there be a set price, no matter what the land is worth--whether it was been carefully preserved through conscientious steps and back-breaking labor or left to neglect or rendered infertile by carelessness? And if the price is not fixed, shall the commission be licensed to pay any price, no matter how exorbinant? And--this is most important--what if there isn't enough money or enough willing sellers to settle all of Pompey's vets and these 20,000 families that are chosen by who-knows-what method? What then?

 

So, is all of this pure conjecture, or can you give me some proof that any one of your possible concerns of the law were actually raised by the senate? If there is no mention, and I would be surprised that there would not be if this were true, then we could just as easily speculate that the big three DID actually address these concerns.

 

I think the bottom line of the optimates' resistance to this land bill, and yes Cato's as well, is the fact that these old families had many of their clients on these lands, nice and close to Rome, close enough that an election time visit to Rome would be feasible. This first law moves out those clients to possibly (and probably likely) further areas of Italia or beyond, and replaces them with Pompey's men, who of course would be voting his way. This had nothing to do with romantic ties to the land, fair appointment or fair prices. It was politics plain and simple.

 

From the view of the whole Republic however, it was a good deal, a very good deal indeed. Not only did the previous occupiers have their land's worth which they could take somewhere else and create the same farm, but tens of thousands of men without occupation now could be landed. The Republic gains a net productivity, paid for by the money which Pompey could have otherwise hoarded like a Lucullus, and shows the people that if you fight well for the Republic you will be rewarded.

 

One does have to wonder though, if Cato thought back to these days when Pompey was calling his old veterans to the senatorial flag as Caesar marched into Italia, and actually thanked Caesar for making such a population assuredly loyal to Pompey by following through with his promises of land.

 

Although we have no record of Cato's "filibuster", no doubt he raised all these questions--as these are exactly the questions that any responsible statesman would ask. And for his questions, the ex-quaestor was not thanked, but hauled off to jail by that oh-so-reasonable Caesar! Let's be clear: if there is one thing that reason abhors, it is the silencing of questions. And this was too much for the senate, that one deliberative body of the republic, who walked out en masse, following the old grizzled veteran Marcus Petreius--who had by then seen more years of military service than Caesar had spent out of his diapers: "I'd rather be in jail with Cato", he shot at Caesar, "than in the Senate with you!"

 

No doubt? Well I doubt! Unless you can prove to me these were raised and valid concerns, then we can just as easily assume that their true opposition was as I say, about votes, and not about the law or the Republic. I could understand Caesar tossing out Cato, after rambling on and on using an underhanded political tactic, and much of the senate could follow him (en masse minus the sizable contingent of senators in the party of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar) because they shared the fear of losing their votes. It is unfortunate that Caesar, Crassus and Pompey responded with their own underhanded political tactic of violence to land Pompey's veterans, but then that was the nature of these times.

 

After one senator heroically went into exile rather than take this Oath of the Impossible, the answer to "What then?" came into sharp relief: the lex Iulia agraria Campania, which contradicted all the provisions of the first law that it seem reasonable. By the bill, private property was not respected. Instead, the Campanian lands--lands that were settled by the heroes of the Punic Wars, that had been in families for generations, that provided Rome with nearly one-fourth of her income, that had been expressly excluded by the first law precisely to gain passage of it--were to be confiscated from their rightful owners, who were to be left starving in the streets of Rome for the sake of Caesar's ambition. What a lover of the poor! What a champion of the people! What a friend of the dispossessed--that now dispossessed so many!

 

Stirring rhetoric! Cato would be proud!

 

They just don't write 'em like they used to.

 

Usually that's a sign of progress.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Had the lex Iulia agraria not been submitted at the last possible minute, there would have been plenty of time to discuss the demerits of the bill. It's simply irrational to suppose that any bill of such far-reaching import could be endorsed after a single reading or that any bill of even moderate complexity is beyond reproach. If you've ever drafted a legal contract, you know that the "devil is in the details", and at the very least there could easily be over 10 hours worth of questions to be asked. Do you have any idea how many hours of negotiation go into much less important work? My point is that whether Cato did or did not filisbuster the bill, there was no way the bill could be endorsed by the senate as soon as Caesar liked, and there was also no way that Cato could filibuster the bill to eternity.

 

The senate was the only deliberative body in the republic, and the matter of the bill should have been discussed at length. According to Goldsworthy, this is exactly what Cato proposed--that the bill be re-introduced in the following year so that it could be discusssed properly. Had Caesar really cared about the poor, he would have gladly accepted Cato's proposal. Instead, Caesar was either impatient, incompetent, or unscrupulously attempting to the get the bill blocked on an (important) technical matter so that he could make it out that the Senate had blocked his populare legislation (or all three).

 

Back to your original thesis, you maintained that the only reason that anyone could have opposed the agrarian laws was a personal animosity toward Caesar (poor Caesar! everybody out to get him!). I've given plenty of reasons for opposing the the two lex Iulia agraria, and all of these reasons have nothing to do with hatred of Caesar (though I admit familiarity with that emotion) and everything to do with making sure that the poor are given what they are promised. Had Caesar been so interested in the poor, he too would have taken the time to make sure that his bill could deliver what it promised; but it was Caesar, not Cato, who had no care for the poor, just as he had no care for the law, for morality, for human life, or for the Republic. Even if you want to maintain some admiration for the blackguard, you must admit that the lex agraria were not beyond reasonable criticism. If you do, you're simply a dogmatist.

[Pompieus]

This is a fascinating discussion, and I'd like to inject one idea.

 

Far be it from me to question the sincerity of Cato's stoicism, or his concern as quaestor for the public treasury. Nor would I question the real economic and social problems that faced the Republic in the first century BC, or that the vested interests of senators, equestrians and Italians affected their attitudes. But at the bottom of any Roman political battle is the struggle of individuals and groups of nobles for dignitas, auctoritas and honores. It is dangerous, and possibly an anachronism, to fully accept programs, principals and policies as central to these political struggles, though clearly they played a role.

 

A strong case can be made that the resistance and obstructionism of Cato and his coterie were designed to discredit the triumvirs (especially Pompey), heighten public indignation against them, divide them and weaken their position in the state, rather than any ideological opposition to the measures themselves. Actually their tactics worked pretty well. The triumvirs were very unpopular by 59 BC; they had trouble getting their supporters elected to office, Pompey was attacked in public and upset at his failures while Crassus gloated and nursed his hostility.

 

I think that Roman "politics as usual" needs always to be considered.

Edited September 14, 2006 by Pompieus

[Gaius Octavius]

"...successfully pacified by means of the dole...." Was pacification or alleviation Cato's Stoic and idealistic objective? Never, perforce, his or his class' pockets and their other interests.

 

"...elections...." Would the clients not have voted as instructed?

 

Had Caesar returned to Rome unarmed, the 'better people' would have had his head.

 

It is well known that all legislation to benefit the poor must be read and re-read ad nauseum (and certainly ad infinitum) to be absolutely certain that it really benefits the lot of the polloi. This, of course, never leads to effectively killing the bill. After all, they can wait another year. Dogmatism must prevail.

 

The evil between Caesar's ears is well known. The good between Cato's is also well known.

 

I would think that instances of Cato's efforts to give further contemplation to bills benefiting the 'right people' be supplied.

[Favonius Cornelius]

It's true that Caesar used a tactic when he choose his time to submit his bill. Why would he do that? Because he felt that the bill was somehow unreasonable? The minor talking points you have brought up on the devilish details are actually weak matters, and the man most interested in getting it approved, Pompey, would easily have supported compromise on those matters so long as the bulk of his soldiers got their land. No, they knew that the optimates would stall and bicker as they always do when a land bill comes to the floor, or the high and mighty Cato would resort to the low filibuster as he does all the time. (He might not be able to filibuster all the time, but combine that with Bibilus delay tactics and a variety of others, and you only need so many of those). Perhaps it is as I said, it is because of the votes, perhaps as our fellow forum member Pompieus has mentioned it would to knock the big three down to size (a compelling idea I haden't though of).

 

Whatever the case, it was the same old kind of stalling and pig headed stubbornness of the senate when confronted with dealing with quite necessary laws and changes of state that could not be separated from also being connected with a fellow politician, in a word jealously, which precipitated tactics like this and others in the last 50 years and years to come.

[M. Porcius Cato]

A strong case can be made that the resistance and obstructionism of Cato and his coterie were designed to discredit the triumvirs (especially Pompey), heighten public indignation against them, divide them and weaken their position in the state, rather than any ideological opposition to the measures themselves.

 

The chief problem with this hypothesis is that the triumvirate was a secret pact that was not uncovered until after January 1 or 2, when Cato opposed the lex Iulia agraria.

 

The first evidence for the triumvirate, or any coordinated actions on the part of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar, occurred in the following days, when the three spoke on behalf of the bill in the Forum, which was surrounded by Pompey's armed thugs who smashed the fasces of the opposing consul M. Calpurnius Bibulus and were apparently under Caesar's control. It was on this date that Pompey ominously declared that if anyone "took up the sword" to stop the bill, he would be "ready with his shield and sword."

 

Up until this point, Pompey and Crassus might have been suspected as in alliance with Caesar (Cicero, for example, should have known), but there was no evidence that they had formed a real coalition that needed to be discredited and weakened. Rather, Pompey and Crassus had only spoken in favor of the bill with many others, and this wasn't unusual--Crassus and Caesar had been previously united in their attempts to gain the supporters of Catiline, and Pompey obviously stood to gain from the bill.

 

Thus, until there was violence in the Forum, it did seem like politics as usual. After that, everything changed.

[M. Porcius Cato]

The minor talking points you have brought up on the devilish details are actually weak matters, and the man most interested in getting it approved, Pompey, would easily have supported compromise on those matters so long as the bulk of his soldiers got their land.

 

You needn't take my word on the issue that the first bill was insufficient to acheive its objectives. The best evidence for its inability to be carried out is provided by Caesar's own introduction of the supplementary bill, the lex Iulia agraria Campania. The initial bill provided no contingencies in case there were an insufficient number of willing sellers. Because there in fact were not a sufficient number of sellers, the confiscatory Campanian law was needed to ensure that there was enough land to settle Pompey's vets. Moreover, because the Senate had been required to take an oath that they would settle these vets, they could not oppose this second--and completely evil--bill without breaking their oaths.

 

I really do wonder if any of you have any experience in negotiating contracts. The objections I raised to the first bill are really elementary ones, and they would have been obvious to anyone with any experience. This was precisely why an experienced body of legislators SHOULD be deciding what goes to the electorate, who are as generally uninterested in the details of legislation as many historians and amateurs.

[Favonius Cornelius]

The chief problem with this hypothesis is that the triumvirate was a secret pact that was not uncovered until after January 1 or 2, when Cato opposed the lex Iulia agraria.

 

That's splitting hairs. It hardly matters if the day before no one knew. The moment the proposition is made, it was obvious to all and their usual tactics were as usual resorted to.

 

You needn't take my word on the issue that the first bill was insufficient to acheive its objectives. The best evidence for its inability to be carried out is provided by Caesar's own introduction of the supplementary bill, the lex Iulia agraria Campania. The initial bill provided no contingencies in case there were an insufficient number of willing sellers. Because there in fact were not a sufficient number of sellers, the confiscatory Campanian law was needed to ensure that there was enough land to settle Pompey's vets. Moreover, because the Senate had been required to take an oath that they would settle these vets, they could not oppose this second--and completely evil--bill without breaking their oaths.

 

You're not saying anything new here, and my response to this is the same as my points before: it would hardly matter if it was well debated or not. It would not be passed under any conditions for my stated reasons. The big three were in a position when they used their strong arm tactics to force terms, why not rob these bickering fools of their electorial support and force them to agree to it as well?

 

generally uninterested in the details of legislation as many historians and amateurs.

 

WELL thank you oh experienced expert for clarifying it all for us! Or, perhaps I just don't agree with you. It happens sometimes in debates.

 

I guess I could easily say that even the best historians allow their political stances to color their interpretation of the past to suit their beliefs.

Edited September 14, 2006 by Favonius Cornelius

[M. Porcius Cato]

"...successfully pacified by means of the dole...." Was pacification or alleviation Cato's Stoic and idealistic objective? Never, perforce, his or his class' pockets and their other interests.

Protecting unarmed farmers from having their lands stolen by force of arms, as was done by the Campanian law, was very much a part of the Stoic ideals of liberty and individual rights. I wonder what principles would justify this wholescale confiscation?

 

"...elections...." Would the clients not have voted as instructed?

Maybe, maybe not--it would be up to them. By this point, votes were conducted by secret ballot. Or don't you bother with the history of the constitution you so cavalierly criticize?

 

Had Caesar returned to Rome unarmed, the 'better people' would have had his head.

Nonsense. If Caesar had been brought to trial, his fate would have been decided by the same senate that had previously voted something like 278-22 to resolve matters peacably. It's hard to see that the same group that let Clodius off for the Bona Dea scandal and exiled Milo would have had Caesar's head. After Gaul, Caesar was richer than most of them combined, far more popular, a formidalbe orator and nearly flawless showman. It would have been the best trial in world history, and we'd have much better one-liners than that crap about casting dice around.

 

It is well known that all legislation to benefit the poor must be read and re-read ad nauseum (and certainly ad infinitum) to be absolutely certain that it really benefits the lot of the polloi.

Nobody asked for an infinity. They asked for another day. It was Caesar's fault the bill was introduced at the last minute. I'd say he was like a lazy school-boy asking for an extension, but in fact, he's even worse: he was offered an extension but he wouldn't take it.

 

The evil between Caesar's ears is well known. The good between Cato's is also well known.

Very true.

 

I would think that instances of Cato's efforts to give further contemplation to bills benefiting the 'right people' be supplied.

Cato tirelessly prosecuted the boni who supported Sulla, whose creatures in the treasury aided them in the payment of legal penalties, and who sought to renegotiate their tax-farming contracts. If you think Cato was simply a friend of the rich, then you either need to do more reading or to think more critically about simple-minded populare propaganda. The fact is that NO BILL OF SUCH WIDE-RANGING EFFECTS EVER PASSED ON FIRST READING. Caesar, as usual, expected special treatment, and he was upset he didn't get it.

[M. Porcius Cato]

it would hardly matter if it was well debated or not. It would not be passed under any conditions for my stated reasons.

 

You've made several claims that are apparently being updated on-the-fly. First, you made the claim that the agrarian laws proposed by Caesar dispossessed no one of any land. But the Campanian law most certainly did. Do you now accept that Caesar's agrarian bills did dispossess the families of Scipio's veterans?

 

You next claimed that the opposition to dispossessing the families of Scipio's vets was motivated by a desire to keep Pompey's vets from being able to travel to Rome to vote. If this were true, then you must believe that there were already occupied lands in travelling distance of Rome that were to be confiscated for Caesar's party. Is this not correct?

 

Look, let's table Cato's motivation for a minute here, and look at the issue afresh: were there or were there not legitimate objections that could be raised to the agrarian legislation that was proposed in the late republic? I maintain Yes--it's not right to steal land from one group of vets to give to another group; I have no idea anymore whether or not you agree.

[Primus Pilus]

Nonsense. If Caesar had been brought to trial, his fate would have been decided by the same senate that had previously voted something like 278-22 to resolve matters peacably. It's hard to see that the same group that let Clodius off for the Bona Dea scandal and exiled Milo would have had Caesar's head. After Gaul, Caesar was richer than most of them combined, far more popular, a formidalbe orator and nearly flawless showman. It would have been the best trial in world history, and we'd have much better one-liners than that crap about casting dice around.

 

This is usually not my cup of tea because I prefer not to come across as a defender of Caesar, but this is as much pure speculation as the comments which you criticized me for earlier. The fact is we know that Cato wished to prosecute Caesar. Whether or not Caesar, with his various oratorial and political skills coupled with his popularity, would've been enough to secure a viable future is unknown. I lean towards agreement with your assessment of how it would've played out but there's no way for us to know for sure (nor Caesar for that matter).

[M. Porcius Cato]

Nonsense. If Caesar had been brought to trial, his fate would have been decided by the same senate that had previously voted something like 278-22 to resolve matters peacably. It's hard to see that the same group that let Clodius off for the Bona Dea scandal and exiled Milo would have had Caesar's head. After Gaul, Caesar was richer than most of them combined, far more popular, a formidalbe orator and nearly flawless showman.

The fact is we know that Cato wished to prosecute Caesar. Whether or not Caesar, with his various oratorial and political skills coupled with his popularity, would've been enough to secure a viable future is unknown. I lean towards agreement with your assessment of how it would've played out but there's no way for us to know for sure (nor Caesar for that matter).

 

OK--that's true. Whenever we're engaging in counterfactual reasoning, there's an element of uncertainty, but then it must also be admitted that whether or not Caesar's enemies would have "had his head" (as an earlier poster claimed) must also be admitted as uncertain on the same premise.

[Favonius Cornelius]

Yes lets take a fresh look, but I prefer this form. In fact allow me to reference a resource available online so that all can read it and judge its content: Public Lands and Agrarian Laws of the Roman Republic by Andrew Stephenson

 

I'll even provide the details right here and express my opinions as based on the full accounting.

 

In 61 we find Cicero advocating a bill similar in nature to the one he had

so brilliantly combatted in 64. In the last instance, however, the law was

proposed by Pompey, and in favor of Pompey's soldiers and that made all

difference to a man who ever curried favor with the great. Flavius, who

proposed this law, was but the creature of Pompey. Cicero has made known

to us, in one of his letters to Atticus, the conditions of the law which

Flavius proposed and the modifications which he himself wished to apply to

it. Flavius proposed to distribute lands both to the soldiers of Pompey and

the people; to establish colonies; to use for the purchase of the lands for

colonization, the subsidies which should accrue in five years, from the

recently conquered territories.[2] The senate rejected this law entirely,

in the same spirit of opposition which it had shown to all agrarian laws,

probably thinking that Pompey would thereby obtain too great an increase of

power.[3] This was the last attempt at agrarian legislation until the year

59, when Julius Caesar enacted his famous law.

 

The problem with all land bills of any color is the fact that eventually, one way or another, no matter how fair you try to be about it, someone will gain some political benefit from it. It is a failure of the Republic to not be able to come to grips with this fact. You can blame it on the system or the senators, take your pick, the same results is fated.

 

As read above, Pompey's first attempt at getting his soldiers landed resulted in total opposition by the senate for these reasons. This is the backdrop to Caesar's later efforts, and by extension of course those of Pompey and Crassus. Already once the senate choose to say no to an effort which would have benefited the Republic for reasons of political influence, so their next attempt would have to address this fact.

 

During the first consulship of Caius Julius Caesar, he brought forward an

agrarian[1] bill at the instigation of his confederates. The main object of

this bill was to furnish land to the Asiatic army[2] of Pompey, In fine,

this bill was little more than a renewal of a bill presented by Pompey the

previous year (58), but rejected. Appian gives the following account of

this bill: "As soon as Caesar and Bibulus[3] (his colleague) entered on the

consulship, they began to quarrel and to make preparation to support their

parties by force. But Caesar who possessed great powers of dissimulation,

addressed Bibulus in the senate and urged him to unanimity on the ground

that their disputes would damage the public interests. Having in this way

obtained credit for peaceable intentions, he threw Bibulus off his guard,

who had no suspicion of what was going on, while Caesar, meanwhile, was

marshalling a strong force, and introducing into the senate laws for

favoring the poor, under which he proposed to distribute land among them

and the best land in Italy, that about[4] Capua which at the present time

was let on public account.[5] He proposed to distribute this land among

heads of families who had three children, by which measure he could gain

the good will of a large multitude, for the number of those who had three

children was 20,000. This proposal met with opposition from many of the

senators, and Caesar, pretending to be much vexed at their unfair behavior,

left the house and never called the senate together again during the

remainder of his consulship, but addressed the people from the rostra. He,

in the presence of the assembly, asked the opinion of Pompeius and Crassus,

both of them approving, and the people came to vote on them (the bills),

with concealed daggers. Now as the senate[6] was not convened, for one

consul could not summon the senate without the consent of the other consul,

the senators used to meet at the house of Bibulus, but they could make no

real opposition to Caesar's power.... Now Caesar secured the enactment of the

laws, and bound the people by an oath to the perpetual observance of them,

and he required the same oath from the senate. As many of the senators

opposed him, and among them Cato, Caesar proposed death as a penalty for not

taking the oath and the assembly ratified this proposal. Upon this all took

the oath immediately because of fear, and the tribunes also took it, for

there was no longer any use in making opposition after the proposal was

ratified."

 

Here they again they raise the land bill, this time with more amendments to strive to make it more palatable to the boni. Here again they resist. MPC you took me off balance I admit when you made your claims about Caesar waiting for the last minute to propose his bill. It looks to this account that another story is told of the timing. The truth is Caesar initiated the discussion, and the total objections made by the senate as usual despite the discussion being had. It was clear that the bill would not pass the senate no matter form, so Caesar intended to take it to the people. As I mentioned many times before, if the senators would only be a little more flexible on their stances on land bills, these extremes would not have to be taken, but that was all that was left. Were the assembly meetings completely fair on this bill? No, their circumstances were probably as fair as any land bill coming to the senate.

 

This agrarian law did not affect the existing rights of property and

heritable possession. It destined for distribution only the Italian domain

land, that is to say, merely the territory of Capua, as this was all that

belonged to the state.[7] If this was not enough to satisfy the demand,

other Italian lands were to be bought out of the revenue from the eastern

provinces at the taxable value rated in the censorial rolls. The number

of persons settled on the _Campanus ager_ is said[8] to have been 20,000

citizens who had each three children or more. The land was not distributed

by lot, but at the pleasure of the commissioners, each one receiving some

30 jugera.[9] If 20,000 heads of families with their wives and three

children in each family were settled in Campania, the whole number of

settlers would be 100,000. This great number could scarcely leave Rome at

one time, and we find that as late as 51 the land was not all assigned.[10]

While the tenor of the law does not imply that it was the intention to

reward military service with grants of land, yet we may be sure that the

veterans of Pompey were not forgotten.[11] There are no extant authorities

which speak of the settlement of the Campanian land that say any thing

about the soldiers settled there, unless it be Cicero. He speaks of the

Campanian territory being taken out of the class that contributed a revenue

to the state in order that it might be given to soldiers,[12] and he

appears to refer to this time (59). Mommsen says that "the old soldiers as

well as the temporary lessees to be ejected were simply recommended to the

special consideration of the land distributors."[13] These latter were a

commission of twenty appointed by the state. Caesar, at his own request,

was excused from serving, but Pompey and Crassus were the chief ones, thus

furnishing sufficient reason for supposing that the soldier was provided

for. The passage of this bill amounted in substance to the reestablishment

of the democratic colony founded by Marius and Cinna and afterwards

abolished by Sulla.[14] Capua now became a Roman colony after having had no

municipal constitution for one hundred and fifty-two years, when the city

with all its dependencies was made a prefecture administered by a prefect

of Rome. The revenues from this district were doubtless no longer

needed, as those from Pontus and Syria[15] supplied all the needs of the

government, but it is difficult to see what benefit could be reaped

from the ejection of the thrifty farmers who, as tenants of the state,

cultivated this territory and paid their rents regularly into the state

coffers. Wherever the new settlers were brought in, the old cultivators

were turned out. No ancient writer says anything about the condition of

these people. Cicero, in his second speech upon the land bill of Rullus,

when speaking of the consequences that would follow its enactment, declared

that if the Campanian cultivators were ejected they would have no place

to go, and he truly says that such a measure would not be a settlement of

plebeians upon the land, but an ejection and expulsion of them from it.[16]

 

Did it pay to send out a swarm of 100,000 idle paupers[17] who, for two

generations, had been fed at the public charge from the corn-bins of Rome,

simply in order that a like number of honest peasants, who had been not

only self-supporting but had paid a large part of the Roman revenue, should

be compelled to sacrifice their goods in a glutted market and become

debauched and idle?

 

The problem with the land to be allocated was the fact that the state never in the past made that ager publicus private land of those people they put on it. If the senate was soon good natured about these farmers, would they not have secured their ownership of it so that their status was not constantly an unknown? It would have been a simple matter to do this, and then to find taxation and funds from new forms and sources, but it didn't happen. Why is probably because men who's status was always in an unknown and uncertain state would be more pliable than men who were their own, on land of their own by law. If the noble Cato and others cared so much for the people and the Republic then surely they could have realized that a return to their forefather's demands that soldiery be obtained from the landed, if even in part, would have done the state a lot of good. I think the truth stinks more of politics as usual.

 

In the end, was the lex Julia and land allocation completely fair to all? No, it would never had a chance to be just like every other land bill. In the end, we see soldiers who risked their lives and with families occupying these lands, and yes the squatters who once leased this land from the state were evicted. We do not know that all of these squatters had families or just worked the land with slaves. Nor is it certain that there would not be other land even in Italia for them to work, which could easily be allocated to the ex-squatters and doubtless supported by the triumvirate who did not want to be unpopular with them.

[P.Clodius]

Caesar's land reform bill was the first piece of legislation introduced upon commencement of his consulship, not the last. Or perhaps I misread something?

[Gaius Octavius]

Primus Pilus, I feel that this thread should be removed to 'Academia'. It should be very easy for the erudite contributors to supply sources for their arguments. A competent editor could express both sides and produce a valuable contribution to UNRV. Something that is not usually found on the 'net'.

Edited September 14, 2006 by Gaius Octavius