Agrarian Legislation In The Late Republic

[M. Porcius Cato]

Cato the Younger and countless boni constantly blocked land grants to the poor...men with families who just wanted a chance to earn their keep...

 

In a republic that is governed by laws, it is important to distinguish between opposition based on the content of legislation and opposition based on the means by which legislation is passed. Cato the Younger did not constantly block land grants to the poor. Quite the opposite, as tribune, Cato sponsored a decree in the senate wherein state funds would be used to make an annual purchase of grain that would be distributed to the populace. (1, 2). What made this an "optimate" as opposed to "populare" move was that Cato Uticensis had proposed the bill in the senate, which had traditionarl jurisdiction over state funds (3). Unlike his maternal grandfather, who had proposed rival demogogic laws to contest Gaius Gracchus, Cato Uticensis saw the role of tribune as being primarily to obstruct bills that were against the interest of the people; as a senator, however, he could also sponsor decrees in the senate that could alleviate suffering while simultaneously upholding the constitution (4).

 

 

1. Plut, Cat. Min., 26.1

2. Plut, Caes, 8.4

3. Lintott, A. (1999). The Constitution of the Roman Republic. New York: Oxford University Press.

4. Taylor, L. R. (1971). Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. University of California Press.

[Primus Pilus]

Indeed, but as Plutarch plainly states in both books (Caesar and Cato Minor), this was done to prevent a riot in support of Caesar rather than some great act of constitutional kindness.

 

Plutarch, Caesar 8.6

It was for this reason, too, that Cato, fearing above all things a revolutionary movement set on foot by the poorer classes, who were setting the whole multitude on fire with the hopes which they fixed upon Caesar, persuaded the senate to assign them a monthly alliance of grain,

 

I'm not denying that what Cato proposed was lawful and done with good reason, only that we should also understand the environment in which it was done.

[Favonius Cornelius]

That's all well and good Cato, but giving out grain to the poor rather than empowering them, be it through the senate or assemblies, still flies in the face of what Cato seemed to stand for as a man and politician.

 

At least publicly. I use to think Cato was genuine, but the more I reinvestigate the period the more I believe that he was just another fat cat aristocrat who had a gimmick to use in politics (his Catoness adopted from the elder Cato).

 

Fact is, many people tried to get land back into the hands of citizens through the senate first, but were always blocked by jealous and greedy senators, then these people had to go through the assemblies and cause a scene.

 

In the end, the senate should have allocated that land to the citizens, because then it would be occupied and later generals would not become kings in their own right by being able to give all this extra available land to their soldiers.

[M. Porcius Cato]

That's all well and good Cato, but giving out grain to the poor rather than empowering them, be it through the senate or assemblies, still flies in the face of what Cato seemed to stand for as a man and politician. At least publicly. I use to think Cato was genuine, but the more I reinvestigate the period the more I believe that he was just another fat cat aristocrat who had a gimmick to use in politics (his Catoness adopted from the elder Cato).

 

Then I don't think you know what Cato stood for either as a man or as a politician. To me the key insight into Cato comes from the doctrines of Stoicism itself, which Cato studied (paraphrasing Cicero) 'as a guide to life rather than as an object of study itself'. If you study Stoicism with an eye to understanding Cato, everything makes sense, including why an obstinate conservative enjoyed such a great reputation among even his adversaries (such as Sallust and--according to Dio Cassius--Caesar himself) while also irritating the hell out of his allies as well (Cicero included). This idealistic (and perhaps quixotic) devotion to Greek Stoicism was the essence of Cato the Younger, and it set him off markedly from his crabby, anti-Hellenic, anti-intellectual, uber-pragmatic ancestor Cato the Elder.

 

Aside from this also being the universal contemporary opinion of Cato, there was plenty of evidence for the same opinion from the facts we have, including his energetic reform of the treasury (where he refused to play along with the "fat cats" that held sway there), his lifelong and constant entourage of Stoic philosophers from Greece, his reputed habits of reading Stoic philosophy in the Senate (arriving early, he spent his time reading while awaiting for the other senators to arrive), the correspondence between Cato and Cicero, and Cicero's side of the argument in pro Murena, which is mostly devoted to Cato's interpretation of Stoic doctrine.

 

To my mind, it is the height of anachronism and simple-mindedness to attempt to shoe-horn Cato and all the opponents of the triumvirate into the Gracchi-vs-the-Senate template. Believe it or not, over a period of nearly 100 years, politics in Rome changed quite a bit, and there was much much more to poltical disputes than the grain dole. Many of the "land grants" that were being proposed in later years--including the ones opposed by Cato and others--involved forcibly evicting poor and middle income farmers from lands that they had been leasing for generations--not to help "the poor", but to further enrich booty-engorged veterans of foreign wars who wouldn't be satisfied by non-Italian lands.

 

EDIT: I should also add that while Cato was a somewhat quixotic Stoic, Cicero's charge that he acted 'as if were living in Plato's republic rather than among the dregs of Romulus' (paraphrase) misses the fact that Cato apparently learned to pick his battles more carefully than Don Quixote. Cato efforts against Catiline show this in two ways. First, he accurately predicted that by killing the conspirators, most of Catiline's adherents would desert him (which indeed they did once the conspirators were slain). Second, he realized that what the rank-and-file really wanted was relief rather than revolution, which he successfully pacified by means of the dole. This strikes me as sound, prudential judgment rather than wild-eyed idealism, or--more exactly--it puts the lie to the myth that its impossible to be idealistic *and* practical. If your ideals are just, practical goods do follow: as any Stoic would be happy to tell you.

Edited September 12, 2006 by M. Porcius Cato

[M. Porcius Cato]

In the end, the senate should have allocated that land to the citizens, because then it would be occupied and later generals would not become kings in their own right by being able to give all this extra available land to their soldiers.

 

What land are you talking about? The land that was ALREADY occupied but that Caesar wanted to seize for Pompey's vets???

[Favonius Cornelius]

MPC, I'll have to get back to you tonight on the land reform and some points I have on it, but you make some very interesting comments. I do have two things to add though which you can dwell on in the mean time:

 

1. I'm not going to let you get away with explaining Cato's actions as a Stoic without explaining exactly how his actions reflect the beliefs of Stoicism!

 

2. Cato both made fruitless efforts and/or a bad situation worse during Caesar's consulship, which make me question your assertion of picking battles.

[M. Porcius Cato]

1. I'm not going to let you get away with explaining Cato's actions as a Stoic without explaining exactly how his actions reflect the beliefs of Stoicism!

This is quite beyond this thread, but I'm working on an article on Cato, and the influence of Stoicism on Cato's politics is very much the theme of the piece.

 

2. Cato both made fruitless efforts and/or a bad situation worse during Caesar's consulship, which make me question your assertion of picking battles.

 

Bad situtation worse? From whose perspective? I'd call it almost a complete victory--Cato managed to turn almost the whole Pompeian camp against the triumvirate, ultimately including Pompey himself. Between the consulship of Caesar and his march on Rome, some member of the new anti-triumviral party won a consulship in almost every election. By the time Caesar was declared hostis, the three-headed beast was left with only two heads attempting to bite each other off. Anyone looking forward from the time when dung was dumped on Bibulus' head would have said that the triumvirs had made political violence a permanent fixture of Roman politics and would henceforth have their way in all things--yet Cato's opposition changed all that. Now I'd call that political marksmanship. Alas, it wasn't enough.

[Primus Pilus]

I'd call it almost a complete victory--Cato managed to turn almost the whole Pompeian camp against the triumvirate, ultimately including Pompey himself. Between the consulship of Caesar and his march on Rome, some member of the new anti-triumviral party won a consulship in almost every election. By the time Caesar was declared hostis, the three-headed beast was left with only two heads attempting to bite each other off. Anyone looking forward from the time when dung was dumped on Bibulus' head would have said that the triumvirs had made political violence a permanent fixture of Roman politics and would henceforth have their way in all things--yet Cato's opposition changed all that. Now I'd call that political marksmanship. Alas, it wasn't enough.

 

Perhaps it could be viewed in another manner. By regaining some semblance of power within the government, the optimates failed to understand the need to still compromise with Caesar. Their own position seemingly bolstered in strength, underestimation ruled the day. Perhaps had Cato not had so much competitive success in the absence of the triumviri, Caesar would've returned to Rome in triumph from Gaul, continued the political battles that were the status quo, and eventually faded into history to let the next generation continue the struggle.

 

Caveat... I am not blaming Cato's political success here (part of a politician's very nature has always included attempting to increase the viability of his own faction), I'm just pointing out the devastating irony.

[M. Porcius Cato]

By regaining some semblance of power within the government, the optimates failed to understand the need to still compromise with Caesar. Their own position seemingly bolstered in strength, underestimation ruled the day. Perhaps had Cato not had so much competitive success in the absence of the triumviri, Caesar would've returned to Rome in triumph from Gaul, continued the political battles that were the status quo, and eventually faded into history to let the next generation continue the struggle.

 

Is this offered in the same spirit as, "Maybe Antinous was really Hadrian's prospective heir?" Otherwise, I'm somewhat at a loss to know what exactly would constitute effective opposition from nearly total political annihilation than what Cato did. In any case, we're trailing back again into the hypothetical quicksands of "What could the optimates have done to avert civil war?" Since I'm not on the premise that "it was they who would have had it so" ("they" offered peace repeatedly, "they" voted overwhelmingly for Caesar and Pompey to lay down their arms, and "they" asked nothing but that Caesar lay down his arms before returning to Rome), I think Caesar and only Caesar could have averted civil war--and Caesar would not have it so.

[Primus Pilus]

By regaining some semblance of power within the government, the optimates failed to understand the need to still compromise with Caesar. Their own position seemingly bolstered in strength, underestimation ruled the day. Perhaps had Cato not had so much competitive success in the absence of the triumviri, Caesar would've returned to Rome in triumph from Gaul, continued the political battles that were the status quo, and eventually faded into history to let the next generation continue the struggle.

 

Is this offered in the same spirit as, "Maybe Antinous was really Hadrian's prospective heir?"

 

No, its quite serious and shouldn't be all that astonishing of an observation really. However, as it is purely speculation, in which I apologize for simply finding interesting, I'll concede further discussion.

 

As for the original premise of the agrarian bill, I find no evidence of some grand stoic scheme in Cato's proposal but rather a logical response to a dangerous political threat. If not for Caesar and the mob, there seems to have been little reason for the bill to have been introduced.

[M. Porcius Cato]

As for the original premise of the agrarian bill, I find no evidence of some grand stoic scheme in Cato's proposal but rather a logical response to a dangerous political threat. If not for Caesar and the mob, there seems to have been little reason for the bill to have been introduced.

 

Yes, I agree that there was no grand stoic scheme in this particular action. It was an expedient.

[Favonius Cornelius]

To my mind, it is the height of anachronism and simple-mindedness to attempt to shoe-horn Cato and all the opponents of the triumvirate into the Gracchi-vs-the-Senate template. Believe it or not, over a period of nearly 100 years, politics in Rome changed quite a bit, and there was much much more to poltical disputes than the grain dole. Many of the "land grants" that were being proposed in later years--including the ones opposed by Cato and others--involved forcibly evicting poor and middle income farmers from lands that they had been leasing for generations--not to help "the poor", but to further enrich booty-engorged veterans of foreign wars who wouldn't be satisfied by non-Italian lands.

 

I never said that he fitted into a "Gracchi-vs-the-Senate template" of any kind, but simply made it clear that in this particular instance he was an optimate to the point that it conflicted with what would be good for the Republic. Until the end, he allowed his personal hatred of Caesar to get in the way of that, and it was exactly his obstance which probably formed the hard core which led to the final showdown, and the true death of the Republic.

 

As far as the land bill proposed during Caesar's consulship, you have it wrong I believe. The land was to be purchased with Pompey's eastern money (1. the treasury was swelled with most of it), so depriving such a powerful man of money and distributing it to the poor (most soldiers) could not have been a bad thing for the Republic. Additionally this land was to be purchased from willing land sellers, who could apparently then afford and be willing to buy more of their own land elsewhere. The clauses of Caesar's law expressly prohibited the aquisition of land of people who did not want to be moved so I fail to see where you are getting the eviction idea. Ager publicus would remain with the state. The law even was to assign 20 commissioners to distribute the land, specifically forbidding Caesar himself from being one of them, to avoid the concept of personal loyalties forming from the newly landed.

 

How any of that is unreasonable is beyond me, and Cato's objections were just personal. If he had a mind of keeping men from becoming too powerful, he only succeeded in forcing powerful men to thwart the system and continue to provide a lawless precident, and you know where that went. Cato's heart was in the right place, and he had many admirable personal qualities and a unique political persona, but as a Roman politician he was pretty much a failure for not coming to grips with the reality of it all.

[M. Porcius Cato]

As far as the land bill proposed during Caesar's consulship, you have it wrong I believe. The land was to be purchased with Pompey's eastern money (1. the treasury was swelled with most of it), so depriving such a powerful man of money and distributing it to the poor (most soldiers) could not have been a bad thing for the Republic. Additionally this land was to be purchased from willing land sellers, who could apparently then afford and be willing to buy more of their own land elsewhere. The clauses of Caesar's law expressly prohibited the aquisition of land of people who did not want to be moved so I fail to see where you are getting the eviction idea. Ager publicus would remain with the state. The law even was to assign 20 commissioners to distribute the land, specifically forbidding Caesar himself from being one of them, to avoid the concept of personal loyalties forming from the newly landed.

 

source?

[Favonius Cornelius]

source?

 

Firstly:

 

'Caesar' by Adrian Goldsworthy (2006) pg. 164-170

 

And this section mostly references:

 

Dio 38. 1. 1-7

Suetonius, Caesar 20. 1

'The Dating of Major Legislation and Elections in Caesar's First Consulship,' Historia 17 (1968), pP. 173-193

Gelzer (1968), pp. 71-74

Meier (1996), pp. 207-213

Seager (2002), pp. 86-87

Cicero, ad Att. 2. 7.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Thanks to our sponsors, I just happen to have a copy of Goldsworthy's Caesar, and I'm very glad of it too, because Goldsworthy's coverage of Caesar's agrarian laws easily lends itself to FC's misinterpretation (perhaps deliberately so on Goldsworthy's part, though if carelessly so--so much the worse).

 

First, let's be clear about the laws under question. There were two. The first was the lex Iulia agraria. The second was the lex Iulia agraria Campania. To understand the relation between the two bills, imagine that I ask you to sign a contract accepting an ostensibly free lunch (who would refuse it?), and then I demand to sleep with your wife in payment. That's the essence of the two bills, but now to the details.

 

The lex Iulia agraria was introduced to the senate on 1 or 2 January, the last day when Caesar could have had any bills sanctioned by the senate in time for the vote by the Tribal Assemblies. The bill--while needing approval almost immediately--had been crafted with care. The chief problem with most agrarian bills is that they contained hidden costs that were unacceptable, but Caesar's bill seemed to avoid all these: the land to be distributed to Pompey's veterans and 20,000 families were to be purchased with Pompey's largesse, and (more importantly) private property was to be respected--farmers weren't to be forcibly hauled off their plots of land and subjected to violence and starvation. Moreover, so that these deals didn't provide massive clientele for just one man, the bill provided for 20 commissioners (though an inner circle of 5 made most of the decisions), and Caesar specifically excluded himself from participating lest he be accused of graft and kickbacks.

 

According to Goldsworthy (who has an apparent distaste for such "cumbersome and tortuous legal prose"), "little or nothing within it could be reasonably criticized". Nothing??? In the history of republics, I know of no comparably far-reaching legislation--however reasonable--that have been passed on first reading simply because EVERYTHING can be reasonably criticized and improved, even the legislation of (dare I say it?) some darling of Venus.

 

Consider just a few problems with the bill. Which of the eligible 20,000 families were to receive this unexpected largesse? Shall it be first-come-first-served, or shall they be chosen by lottery, or are they to be selected by the consuls themselves? And what prices shall be paid to those willing to sell to the land commissioners? Shall there be a set price, no matter what the land is worth--whether it was been carefully preserved through conscientious steps and back-breaking labor or left to neglect or rendered infertile by carelessness? And if the price is not fixed, shall the commission be licensed to pay any price, no matter how exorbinant? And--this is most important--what if there isn't enough money or enough willing sellers to settle all of Pompey's vets and these 20,000 families that are chosen by who-knows-what method? What then?

 

Although we have no record of Cato's "filibuster", no doubt he raised all these questions--as these are exactly the questions that any responsible statesman would ask. And for his questions, the ex-quaestor was not thanked, but hauled off to jail by that oh-so-reasonable Caesar! Let's be clear: if there is one thing that reason abhors, it is the silencing of questions. And this was too much for the senate, that one deliberative body of the republic, who walked out en masse, following the old grizzled veteran Marcus Petreius--who had by then seen more years of military service than Caesar had spent out of his diapers: "I'd rather be in jail with Cato", he shot at Caesar, "than in the Senate with you!"

 

As it turns out, Cato's concerns with the bill were entirely justified. After the bill was illegally passed through physical violence (including the smashing of the consul's fasces) and over the vetoes of three tribunes, the senators were forced to swear an oath that they would uphold the law no matter what. No matter what? What if the bill proved impossible to enforce for all the reasons I listed? What if no one was willing to sell their land to the commission? What then?

 

After one senator heroically went into exile rather than take this Oath of the Impossible, the answer to "What then?" came into sharp relief: the lex Iulia agraria Campania, which contradicted all the provisions of the first law that it seem reasonable. By the bill, private property was not respected. Instead, the Campanian lands--lands that were settled by the heroes of the Punic Wars, that had been in families for generations, that provided Rome with nearly one-fourth of her income, that had been expressly excluded by the first law precisely to gain passage of it--were to be confiscated from their rightful owners, who were to be left starving in the streets of Rome for the sake of Caesar's ambition. What a lover of the poor! What a champion of the people! What a friend of the dispossessed--that now dispossessed so many!

 

As for Goldsworthy's verdict, the Campanian law is barely mentioned. He admits, of course, that "perhaps Caesar had always thought that its [Campanian lands'] distribution would also be necessary at some point, or maybe the realisation that his first law was on its own inadequate came more gradually. If we knew this, we would certainly have a clearer idea of whether he genuinely hoped to win over the Senate to support his first land law, or whether he had merely wanted to put them in the wrong in the eyes of the electorate." In other words, it isn't clear whether Caesar was a fool or a scoundrel. Well, in my opinion, Caesar was no fool.

 

Rather, the summative verdict of this Campanian law was best put forward by that titan of Roman history, George Long (1864), "This monstrous, this abominable crime was committed to serve a party purpose; and the criminal was a Roman consul ... too intelligent not to know what he was doing, and unscrupulous enough to do anything that would serve his own ends."

 

They just don't write 'em like they used to.