Cannae Anniversary

[P.Clodius]

This will be the battle that showed Rome was not the only power. At the zenith of power they were stopped, not in the Middle East, not in Gaul, but in Italy.

When who was stopped, Rome?

[Primus Pilus]

This will be the battle that showed Rome was not the only power. At the zenith of power they were stopped, not in the Middle East, not in Gaul, but in Italy.

When who was stopped, Rome?

 

Indeed, despite Roman aggression in the 1st Punic War, the battle of Cannae (and the 2nd war) was because of Hannibal's invasion. Whatever may or may not have happened if Hannibal hadn't invaded, Carthage was the aggressor in this case.

[FLavius Valerius Constantinus]

Well my classic/Latin teacher also provided the fact that the Punic War also decided who would combat Greek/Hellenic influence/power.

[WotWotius]

Well my classic/Latin teacher also provided the fact that the Punic War also decided who would combat Greek/Hellenic influence/power.

 

So are you suggesting that if the Second Punic War resulted in a Carthaginian triumph, we would have seen many Punic-Macedonian wars?

 

My gut feeling is that this would not have happened; Macedon and various Greek city states had been long term allies of Carthage

[Dominus Rex]

Perhaps Carthaganian power would have spread to Asia minor or into Eygpt had Hannibal won.

[caldrail]

This will be the battle that showed Rome was not the only power. At the zenith of power they were stopped, not in the Middle East, not in Gaul, but in Italy.

 

I think that if it had not been for Hannibal, Carthage would not even be a famous ancient power. Carthage was blessed by the great military mind of Hannibal. Then again when you go against Rome, I don't care who you are, the chances of winning are basically none.

 

ROMA INVECTA!

 

 

Erm... No. Rome lost the war more than once. However, we should not forget that politics was as important then as today. If your soldiers can't keep the enemy at bay, then lets cut a deal with them before they wreak havoc. Have we got enough gold?

 

Admittedly some cultures really don't care much for talking - yet even the huns did.

Edited August 5, 2006 by caldrail

[Gaius Octavius]

This will be the battle that showed Rome was not the only power. At the zenith of power they were stopped, not in the Middle East, not in Gaul, but in Italy.

 

I think that if it had not been for Hannibal, Carthage would not even be a famous ancient power. Carthage was blessed by the great military mind of Hannibal. Then again when you go against Rome, I don't care who you are, the chances of winning are basically none.

 

ROMA INVECTA!

 

 

Erm... No. Rome lost the war more than once. However, we should not forget that politics was as important then as today. If your soldiers can't keep the enemy at bay, then lets cut a deal with them before they wreak havoc. Have we got enough gold?

 

Admittedly some cultures really don't care much for talking - yet even the huns did.

Rome lost battles more than once. Hannibal never won wars. Rome did not treat with Carthage, save to lay down the rules of the road.

Edited August 5, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[Quintus]

Rome lost battles more than once. Hannibal never won wars. Rome did not treat with Carthage, save to lay down the rules of the road.

 

 

 

Mabey this is irrelevant, but I remember something about Rome having to make an unfavorable peace with the Samnites way back when, and what about Mithridates?

Edited August 9, 2006 by Quintus

[Gaius Octavius]

Maybe this is .

 

After Brennus and his mob did their work on Rome and he declared "Woe to the vanquished!", I believe that the Romans had a little tete-a-tete with his crowd and enforced a significant reduction of their population. This put an end to that particular 'war'.

Phyrrus, after licking his wounds from all of his victorious battles, shrewdly came to the conclusion that he should turn tail and return home. Better a decent retsina than another 'victory'. So much for that particular war.

 

The 'war' ain't over till the last 'battle' is decided.

 

Cannae was a great lamentable defeat, but the only thing that it decided was the Romans' great noble courage.

 

Such as Sun Tzu and Maccheavelli held that a war was won BEFORE it was commenced. Hannibal (nor did the likes of Hitler) did not consider this little bit, but only his oath. The economics of the business were against him, thus his stars were crossed, but he didn't know or consider this. Zama was his, and his nations, just reward. Then, after all, how could he have known that a better captain would have presented his credentials and meddled in affairs.

 

In my opinion, 'battles' should never be confounded with 'wars'.

Edited August 9, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[Kosmo]

I think that the internal politics of Carthage are very important in the grand picture. As much as the romans the carthaginians feared succesfull generals and were not sure if they want Hannibal to win the war. Maybe they considered that Barcid rule was a price to high to pay for winning the war and they did not do much to reinforce Hannibal that was acting independent as a warlord and not as a carthaginian general.

Another point it's that Carthage was never a major expansionistic military power. They were defeated many times by greeks of Sicilly, Pyrhhus etc.

The most important lesson it's that the simpathy of the conquered people it's very important. If the italians would have turned against Rome that would have been the end of it. But this was something that romans knew well already.

I think that the roman decision to fight at Cannae was a sound one because you don't win a war by leting the opponent destroy your country. To wait was very risky as he could get reinforced and establish a secure supply line. This did not happened, maybe for the political reasons that I mentioned. We should remeber that many changed their attitude to Hannibal after Cannae and he got the simpathy of the most important cities of S. Italy and Sicilly (the price was the end of hellenism in the West).

The romans had to face him in the field sometime, but the error was that they did not trained for his brilliant envelopement tactics that they faced before.

What should fave been the lesson of Cannae, the need for a strong roman cavalry, was never understood.

Edited August 11, 2006 by Kosmo

[Spartan JKM]

Great thread! May I add some stuff?

 

There is no question Cannae was an abject failure for Rome that day, and the legionnaires who fell suffered horribly because of the reversion to the stiffness of the phalanx. Final victory over Hannibal would become a powerful source of pride for the subsequent generations of Rome, and it was sweet justice for Rome that many of the Cannae survivors formed the core of Scipio's victorious army in Africa.

 

I do not believe the Second Punic War was a personal war for Hannibal. He was simply ready for war when it broke. He was a general in the service of Carthage. Hannibal recieves much praise and criticism, and a remark from the great Helmuth von Moltke ('the Elder') carries much weight,

 

"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled...to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted."

 

Hannibal's grand strategy to defeat Rome was as brilliant as it was audacious. His strike into Cisalpine Gaul, which the Romans deemed an impossible task, was a classic display of attack is the best defence. I am certain he knew the risks, and he never wavered from the only strategy that would have worked - that of detaching Rome's allies from her, thus reducing by as much as half her material and military strength, including the maritime units. No foreigner could have known, with in-deep thoroughness, the intricate nature of the Roman federation, which was a complex amalgam of peoples throughout Italy who didn't necessarily carry a universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' with regards to their Romans masters; what had a Latin from Clastidium have in common with a Samnite, or a Greek from Tarentum or Locri? Remember, as Livy tells us (Book 23.5 and 24.47), the Romans were perplexed that disaffected allies would choose to side with 'foreigners' and 'barbarians' against a people of Italy like themselves. Hannibal's diplomatic work must have had some validity.

 

We can never be completely sure his war was a fanatical 'war of revenge'. That he was ready when war broke out is what we are sure of. The wrath of his father did not completely absorb him; Hannibal was also rubbed upon by the sensible sense of diplomacv of his older brother-in-law Hasdrubal, whom he immediately succeeded. Hannibal's actions throughout his career do not witness any acts of gratuitous cruelty, and none of his decisions were reached by any tempestuous behavior on his part. Interestingly, the one man of action in antiquity who perhaps matches him in possessing such a determined yet composed temperament was his eventual conqueror, Publius Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus. Anyway, his insistence that Carthage make peace after Zama (Polybius 15.19) does not suggest a fanatic. He could have skillfully organized a stiff resistence within Carthage itself, in which the Romans would have been forced into a long, grueling siege, which would have taken years.

 

Moreover, before the upheaval at Saguntum in 219 B.C., his campaigning in northwest of Iberia, in which he achieved a smashing Alexandrian-style victory over a tribal army numbering about 100,000 men (according to Livy) on the banks of the Tagus, could have been nothing more than the continuation of the prosperous empire-building begun by his father and brother-in-law. No doubt he hated Rome, and if they began jostling against Carthaginian interests here in Spain, which had they did begin to do, he wouldn't back down to their admonishments. Not because of any wrath or megalomania on his part, but because backing down over Saguntum, whom Rome never came to help once he besieged them (perhaps indicating they were bluffing all along), but because he had an acute understanding of Rome's imperialistic nature, which involved the fact they wouldn't have ceased with Saguntum. It would have been merely the thin edge of the wedge. If the Roman challenge over Saguntum was not taken up it would not only cause irreparable damage to Punic prestige amongst the Iberian peoples, but would also ruin all the work of the past two decades which renewed Carthage's prosperity. When should he have fought? What if New Carthage followed, or Gades, or Utica?

 

Polybius tells us in Book 3.33, "...next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resisit the Romans if he himself happened to be be absent..., which possibly suggests he was not yet totally decisive about invading Italy. Thus, we cannot be absolutely certain he would have invaded Italy if the Romans had chosen to turn a blind eye regarding Saguntum.

 

Hannibal had informed himself that he could count on allies in the regions which Rome had fought a desperate war against the Celts as recently as 222 B.C. The area of northern Italy could serve as a viable starting point of operations, with an excellent source of abundant recruiting material, upon Rome's lands to the south, once he quickly established himself there. The founding of two new Latin colonies in the Po Valley in around 220 B.C. (Placentia and Cremona) certainly influenced Hannibal's thinking that trouble could be stirred up, as indeed turned out to be the case. His preparations which preceded his departure from New Carthage included sending envoys to the Alpine regions through which he intended to pass. As Polybius tells us in Book 3.34, "...He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans...". Though it was dearly bought in losses, the crossing of the Alps was a tremendous strategic success, as it could not have been chosen at a better time; Hannibal knew he had to move quickly, as a victorious war in Italy would have been improbable later on. The Romans had indeed recently aflamed the Cisalpine Celts, mostly the Boii. But the power of the Gauls was not yet broken (the Insubres were subjugated). Hatred of the Romans was extreme, and Rome had scarcely begun to establish themselves in these 'conquered lands' centered around the Po. Hannibal's initial success on the Ticinus, and more so at the Trebbia galvanized the Gauls to a common cause. But the Gauls had a legitimate beef with Hannibal, as they noticed he was more concerned for the lives of his African and Iberians, using them as pawns to be sacrificed to his tactical choices. They certainly paid the heaviest price for victory against the Romans. But their expecations lay in trampling the ager Romanus itself, and under him they probably saw their best chance, especially in the prospect of booty. Hannibal knew he had to get moving soon to keep them under his leadership, but he also had to get a message across to Rome's allies that would be very clear from afar - that he wasn't in Italy to directly attack them. It's too bad for Hannibal's cause the Celts of northern Italy didn't come charging down upon Roman territory after Cannae. The force sent north under one Lucius Postumius didn't seem to work in creating a diversion, as they destroyed his force in the late winter/early spring of 215 B.C. To what point can we sustain Classical historians' suggestions that the Gauls were a fickle, wiseless people?

 

Hannibal wisely concluded that the only way Rome could be checked (at the least), and for Carthage's hegemony to be ensured, was to break the Roman confederation up and Rome to be isolated from a significant portion of her alliance with the peoples of Italy, even if they didn't actively join Hannibal in arms. A defensive war fought in Spain, or taking personal command in Sicily when the island became an important theater of the war, however long drawn out, would do nothing more than make Rome's allies feel weary. They would never turn against Rome until they could be assured that a rebellion was plausible, and this only applied to the ones whose loyalty was less-reconciled, most notably in the south, where Hannibal spent the rest of his time after Cannae. This is why he disposed his battle-lines at Cannae the way he did - to achieve a battle of annihilation, not just a subtle victory. This is what would induce the allies to listen, if Rome was shown to be threatened significantly. That he failed in the end, even after achieving a dissolution of the confederacy by 40%, illustrates why the dour Romans became, well, whom they were - a people that would dominate the western world for the next 7 centuries. His entire strategy to bring Rome down was based on flawed valuation, but it was inevitable, as he couldn't have known the granite solidarity of the core of Rome's confederation, the Latin colonies, which had never been tested, except sporadically and not as thoroughly against Pyrrhus 6 decades earlier. But Hannibal certainly believed he could do it, and he came very close. There is no reason to think added pressure on Rome after Cannae with more forces at his disposal would have compelled the Romans to come to the table. The solidarity of the confederation had nothing to do with the folly of Carthage's generals in Spain and Sicily, where the Romans flat out beat them, despite being vastly outnumbered, and in Sicily, where nepotism ruined a resurging Carthaginian effort under a brilliant cavalry leader named Muttines, who was personally sent to Sicily by Hannibal in 208 B.C.

 

Regarding the important factor of seapower, well, the easiest way for Hannibal to reach Italy would indeed have been by the sea, which would have avoided the losses he surely expected to incur on the overland march. It would have been much quicker, too. He couldn't known exactly the strength of Roman seapower, but he must have known it was superior now to Carthage's. Rome had 220 quinqueremes in commission in 218 B.C., 60 under Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder) in the north, ready to strike at Spain via Massilia, and 160 under Tiberius Sempronius Longus, in the south, ready to strike Africa from Sicily. The figures we have from Polybius and Livy for the Carthaginian naval strength illustrate how inferior they were to the Romans, in terms of quantity: Hannibal had 50 quinqueremes in Spain, but only 32 were fit to put to sea (Livy 21.22), along with 5 triremes. Livy tells us (21.49) that 20 vessels were sent to raid Italy, 35 were sent to western Sicily, and Polybius tells us (Book 3.96) 70 were sent to Sardinia in 217 B.C., but part of these were probably from the squadrons sent to Sicily mentioned by Livy. Basically, it looks like Carthage had 100 or so fewer ready warships at the beginning of the war. According to Livy (Book 21.17 and 21.22), the Romans knew this, and Hannibal's dispositions to safe guard Africa and Spain with the prudent cross-posting of roughly 35,000 troops, which would weave solidarity between disparate troops from Spain and Africa in the testing times ahead, indicates he knew it too.

 

Sure, it's possible he could have slipped through, as 'control of the sea' hardly carried the same definition as in modern times. A Carthaginian fleet did reach Sardinian and Pisa in 217 B.C., as Bomilcar did to Locri in 215 B.C., and as Mago did to Liguria in 206 B.C. But these were smaller detachments than his army of Italy, and being caught at sea by a superior Roman fleet would have meant the end of his campaign - actually, this would have meant it never really began! Such an attempt would not have been a calculated risk, but a foolish one. It was not that Hannibal was some landlubber who didn't understand seapower; he understood it all too well, as his undertaking to procure Naples, the closest major port pointing directly southwest to Carthage in a straight line just west of Sicily, as his first priority after Cannae, indicates. He knew the Carthaginian navy was a broken reed by 218 B.C., a fact vividly realized when Bomilcar failed to even fight a numerically inferior Roman fleet (for the only time in the war) off the southeast tip of Sicily. If Bomilcar had fought and won, which was a distinct possibility (the Carthaginians were still probably better seamen and, as we have stated, the corvus was no longer in use), Syracuse would have been at least received ample supplies, as the Roman naval forces would have been scarce in the harbor, and he had 700 merchant ships with him, thus raising the siege would have been practicable. Sicily could have been recovered as a whole for Carthage. Roman apologists, understandably, scoff at all these 'what-ifs' of the 2nd Punic War that could have gone Hannibal's way, but they seem plausible to me. However, Rome was indeed always going to win in the very long run. Events such as what happened off cape Pachynon in 212 B.C., along with Hasdrubal Barca's victory in Catalonia against Ganeus Scipio in 215 B.C., or his victory over Gaius Claudius Nero at the Metaurus in 207 B.C., would merely have delayed Rome's dominance of the Mediterranean. As we look back, they were unrelenting in colonizing and expanding, and were never accustomed to involuntarily drawing away due to fear. Hannibal's subtleties were simply watsed on such a resilient state, whose bonds with her subjects made up a form of nationhood far superior than where Hannibal came from. But he realized this fully only after he applied such a stern test. Perhaps only the Soviets of WWII have been so pummelled initially yet able to hang on for final victory.

 

Many critics of Hannibal seem to allude that he could control the whole Carthaginian war effort; he must be held responsible for engineering this war, though he didn't technically break any treaties and the Romans actually declared war, but his ultimate failure was a result of the force of circumstances. I think he made all the best decisions in the exigencies of the moments.

 

His failure to take towns meant he couldn't win them over, or detach from Roman suzerainty, not that he couldn't siege strongholds. What good would assaulting towns, except for a means of punishment etc., achieve? Certainly not the appeasement he hoped for. In all the towns of Italy there existed a conflict between the ruling nobility (loyal to Rome) and the commons. Hannibal's attempt to foster a democratic cause, thus detaching these towns, particulalry in Campania, was the astute thing to strive for. If not for the stout intervention of Marcus Marcellus at Nola, Hannibal might have won over the town, as there were indications of the popular party wanting detachment from Roman rule, in this very important city, which commanded a main route near Capua.

 

Now, for the issue about the Barcid 'palapinate', if we can call their faction as such, it is incorrect to think of them as viceroys in Spain independent of the Carthaginian government. Yes, they opposed the policy of appeasement favored by the home government, but Hannibal, as well as his father and brother-in-law, were not military entrepreneurs/adventurers akin to the likes of Memnon of Rhodes or Quintus Sertorius, or later ones such as Albrecht von Wallenstein or Raimondo Montecuccoli. They were generals of a Republic, and their policy had to take account of the views they completely didn't share with the Carthaginian sphere of aristocrats who held the power and final decision-making. Hannibal did indeed send to Carthage for instructions at the onset of the Saguntum problem, and they indeed refused to give him up to the Romans, thus certainly authorizing him to take steps he saw fit. Actually, Appian tells us that Hannibal demanded the Saguntines and local tribes whom they were at odds settle their dispute. But it didn't materialize, and Carthage became commited to war, one they were willing to risk for the sake of their interersts in Spain. This could only be saved by Hannibal's grand plan to defeat Rome in her own yard. Again, there was definitley much enmity on the part of Hannibal concerning Rome, but the 'wrath of the house of Barca' and 'the revenge of Hannibal' perhaps belongs to Roman historiography which attemts to obscure the extent to which the Roman seizure of Sardinia and her interference in Spain drove Carthage to war. Please don't misunderstand me; the Romans were certainly not unilaterally the 'bad guys' in this great conflict. Their interests and security were threatened, so they felt, by Carthage's new found prosperity. The Massiliotes and Saguntines clearly preferred a Roman to a Carthaginian friend, and the Romans, an expanding state, couldn't ignore such valuable 'friends' located in strategically important locations. In the broad scope, however, and though Hannibal's attack on Saguntum precipitated the war, which was carried out with his full knowledge of the consequences, we must conclude (or decide) that, being that attack and defence have a meaning in such a tussle between two powerful states relativley close to each other, the balance of aggression, in my opinion, must be ascribed to Rome.

 

Polybius makes it clear the allies were wavering just before Cannae, and makes it clear in Book 3.106 that the Senate ordered Gnaeus Servilius to avoid battle with Hannibal, and to train and condition the new recruits, as they were convinced their recent losses to Hannibal were the result of raw levies. They were ready for this upcoming great battle at Cannae.

 

The Roman strategy after Cannae entailed a huge sacrifice in men and money on her core allies, not to mention a level of indomitability few peoples could sustain, and the strain it caused took quite a toll by 209 B.C., when much of Etruria was on the verge of revolt, and 12 of the 30 Latin colonies were bled white, unable to meet their quota to the Republic in arms and men. These unsettling situations among the allies were exactly the primary elements Hannibal hoped to achieve to break the federation. He simply couldn't quite achieve it enough. Who knows what added pressure with Hasdrubal's arrival could fostered in 207 B.C. It still may not have been enough.

 

We must rely mainly on Livy for the war beyond Cannae until Polybius' works re-appear in the African campaign, and even if he exaggertaes the scale of some of these smaller battles, Hannibal clearly destroyed Roman forces twice around Herdonea (212 and 210 B.C.). Livy credits Marcellus with a victory over Hannibal at Numistro in 210 B.C., but Julius Frontinus credits Hannibal with the victory here. The clashes around Canusium were doubtless tactically won by Hannibal: a victorious army does not 'billet' for months after a battle, and with Hannibal subsequently holding the field and successfully raising the siege of Caulon a far off distance in Bruttium, in a relatively short time; nor does one's government scourn a commander for 'twice having his army cut to pieces' if he had won even a stalemate (Livy Book 27.21). Regardless of the absurdity that Livy would intimate a defeat of Hannibal, then construe more light to the contrary with his subsequent narrative, the words are there. Hannibal fought a battle with Nero near Grumentum, which seemingly ended with Hannibal maneuvering to give Nero the slip while positioning himself awaiting news of Hasdrubal's situation. It's certainly all debatable, and depends on what one wants to believe. We'll never know for sure.

 

Actually, a bit of trivia: Tiberius Sempronius Longus and Gaius Flaminius, the losers at the Trebbia and Trasimene, are deemed by some to have been horrible generals. But they had some success during their tenures. If we can sustain Livy, Longus defeated a Carthaginian force under one Hanno near Grumentum in 215 B.C. (Book 23.37), and Flaminius achieved success before the Second Punic War, leading his army across the Po in 223 B.C., defeating the Insubrian Gauls. How horrible could they have been?

 

As for Varro at Cannae, the People did not elect him and Aemilius Paullus as consuls, and didn't provide them with a huge force, to wait it out amongst the hills watching and hampering the dreaded invader Hannibal, if the opportunity arose. Attempting to seek a decisive battle was hardly a foolish move, and any waiting around would result in a loss of morale. The attritional strategy of Fabius, though quite astute, had failed in whole; Hannibal marched where he wanted and when he wanted, and moved faster than Fabius' army. If the Romans would not face him, he would plunder and destroy what he didn't need or couldn't carry, and appropriate everyhting else. Hannibal's breakout at the Ager Falernus against Fabius was a mastepiece of stratagem. Unlike Alexander, Hannibal did not come to Italy to conquer, but to ensure the prosperity of his own people; his strike into Italy was a classic example of, again, attack is the best form of defence.

 

The Romans headed to Hannibal's position carefully, heading along the coastal plain, eliminating any chance of a terrible ambush. Livy describes an elaborate plan of Hannibal's to ambush them, and when Roman intelligence knew of this, he was compelled to make a dash for Gaul with his cavalry, abandoning his infantry. In view of Polybius' silence, this is unlikely. Hannibal needed a great victory to forward his political goal here in Italy, and judging by his tactical conduct displayed at Cannae, he was confident of victory. A few days before the Battle of Cannae, Varro took command and marched eastwards towards Hannibal's position. He bested an attacking party of Hannibal's upon his van, in which he disposed some cavalry in support of his foot. Varro had showed discretion in his leadership, but many feel Hannibal was doing what he had done to Sempronius Longus at the Trebbia: attacking his forces and withdrawing, ostensibly being beaten, thus whetting an inexperienced commander's appetite for increased action.

 

Anyway, Paullus has been credited by Roman historiography for refusing the challenge of Hannibal's for battle due to unfavorable ground on August 1, but Varro, in command the day before, was obvioulsy just as willing to wait. On August 2, Varro was ready to fight, as the morale of the men wouldn't increase with more harrassing from the swift-moving Numidians, and Hannibal's superior cavalry would make foraging easier for the Carthaginian side. Many constantly stress the suitability of the flat terrian for Hannibal's cavalry on the banks of the Aufidus River, but we shouldn't discard the fact that the Roman infantry required level ground to take advantage of their sheer weight of numbers. After both he and Paullus decided not to fight on the left bank, Varro chose to engage Hannibal in full on the right bank of the Aufidus. Hannibal remarked to his men that the left bank was perfect cavalry country (Polybius Book 3.111), but Varro clearly saw that on the right bank the ground rose steadily from the sea, and with a raised area along the river bank. It still provided good terrain for cavalry, but provided more hope for infantry. Varro deserves credit for spotting this, and there is no reason to believe Livy that Varro ordered the army to deploy for battle without consulting Paullus, who clearly was more or less in agreement, if we can judge by the movement.

 

We are a little more sure of Hannibal's enemy's size than that of Alexander's at Gaugamela, but not without uncertainty. Basically, the Romans had 80,000 infnatry and more than 6,000 cavalry to face Hannibal's 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. As with Darius III against Alexander at Gaugamela, Varro's plan was simple and based on prior experience; in defeat, the 10,000 Roman infantry in the center at the Trebbia smashed throught Hannibal's center, and the vanguard broke through amid the disaster at Trasimene. Varro was not unjust in his confidence that the Roman legions could repeat this, but this time via a huge offensive battering ram. Varro and Paullus knew full well they were not going to outfight or maneuver Hannibal's cavalry, but by placing themselves personally at the helm of the two cavalry units, they clearly hoped to uphold enough spirit to hold their ground as long as possible while the infantry crushed Hannibal in the center. Regardless of what happened on the wings, crushing Hannibal in the center would decide the outcome; much of his cavalry would certainly get away, but would soon be in trouble wandering around hostile land after Hannibal's defeat, and Rome resurgent.

 

Varro chose the field, hoping to nullify Hannibal's superiority in cavalry on ground impracticable for enemy horses to ride around them, and with the sea at their backs, no ambush could be implemented upon them from behind. Hannibal no longer had any elephants, which he used efficaciously at the Trebbia, the river was on his left and uneven ground on his right. Varro's plan was not subtle, but anything more sophisticated would have been counter-productive with such a huge force. He has been severely criticized for substituting flexibility for power, but a shorter front with more depth allows for a smoother marching order with so many men; a deeper, narrower deployment allows for the army in whole to move quicker and maintain order more easily than a wider formation. Varro needed his superior numbers of foot to come into play, and the battlefield was limited. For what he was attempting, the narrower front with deeper ranks was the best formation.

 

Please don't misunderstand me, fellow posters; Gaius Terentius Varro was a moderate commander at the very, very best. I just don't think he was completely incompetent. It was simply his misfortune he went up against one of the greatest battlefield commanders of all time that terrible day on August 2, 216 B.C..

 

Regarding Cannae, it can be concluded that every tactical masterpiece was probably the result of supreme generalship on the part of the winner and some form of crude management by the loser, but I do not agree that with Cannae it was more the latter. It is incredible what Hannibal achieved here. The amazing 'reverse-refusal' he administered with his infantry maneuver constituted a giant trap. His center was deployed in a convex manner, so as to entice the advancing Romans (aggressive by nature) to attack them, and the placing of 2 strong blocks of African infantry on either wing and further back meant not only would the enemy tend to suck into the center, but if things went amiss fugitives from his Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they could bunch and slow the Roman advance - even if they didn't want to. Hannibal personally commanded the center, as he intended his troops at this point to stage one of the most difficult maneuvers a unit could be asked of by their commander to pull off in battle - they were to fall back under the pressure of the Romans' advance, but not break. In these battles of antiquity, most of the casualties were suffered as the defeated fled in rout. Of course, those who fled first had the best chance of getting away.

 

For an army to fight effectively, particularly under these circumstances, each soldier had to trust that his comrades would not leave him in the lurch. This paramount level of trust was tested to its fullest when their battle line started to bend backwards. This was an amazing display of leadership at the helm of polyglot contingents. Hannibal's unusual placing of the more numerous shock cavalry on the confined flank near the Aufidus River, with the Numidians on the other side, actually slightly outnumbered by the Roman allied cavalry, meant that the Roman contingent would most likely be checkmated by the maneuverable Numidians, while the heavy cavalry would dispose of the Romans easily on their side, and be available for other tasks. Varro, the Roman consul, should be at least credited for realizing the right bank of the river was less suitable for cavalry, but Hannibal came up with an answer. The only way to significantly seduce Rome's allies was to destroy Roman armies, not just best them. No victory could have been greater for this purpose. But in the long run, Cannae simply cemented the loyalty of Rome's core allies - something nobody could predict without applying such a test. Part of Hannibal's genius lay in his ability to transcend the traditional ability of many soldiers of Iberian and Gallic heritage etc.

 

With the great struggle with Hannibal, Rome produced a corporate heroism of contributors - Fabius, Nero, Marcellus, and Scipio were the main commanders that achieved the greatest Roman successes. But the likes of Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), Gnaeus Scipio, Marcus Silanus, Gaius Laelius, Tiberius Fonteius, Titus Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Valerius Laevinus, Titus Otacilius Crassus, Quintus Naevius Crista, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 213 B.C.), and Appius Claudius Pulcher, all contributed greatly for Rome to finally win in the end. In all, Rome had better commanders, and outnumbered Carthage by about 6 to 1 in total manpower reserves. She also had command of the sea, which Hannibal was initially able to circumvent. The Romans successfully played the Greeks of each other, thanks mainly to the Aetolians, were triumphant in Sicily, and thwarted the Carthaginians on the Iberian Peninsula from getting to Italy, despite the efforts of Hasdrubal Barca, and no thanks to the lack of co-opertaion of the other commanders, who failed dismally to vanquish the Romans at the Ebro in 211 B.C. when they had just 9,000 beleaguered soldiers hangin on. The Carthaginian navy failed to take advantages off Cape Pachynon, the south-east tip of Sicily, when Bomilcar actually had a superior fleet than the Romans (no mention of the corvus at this time). Hannibal has to be held accountable for something, as he engineered this great conflict, but these significant Carthaginian reverses were simply not his fault.

 

Lastly, I do not agree with the story of Hannibal's 'oath' - to the point it clouded his judgment. That story, if not altogether apocryphal, came from Hannibal himself, told to Antiochus III of Syria to convince the Seleucid king of his hatred of Rome, and within the context of trying to convince the king that Rome could only be defeated by fighting them within Italy; part of Hannibal's grand strategy against Rome, which many critics seem to miss, was that he planned to fight the war not in which Carthage relied on her resources and the Romans on theirs, but increasingly he would fight Rome with her resources, while depleting her reserves in manpower by detaching her allies, even if they didn't join his cause for Carthage directly. It's a mistake to assume he was banking on Italian peoples joining him in arms. As Livy tells us, Book 34.60,

 

"...Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms..."

 

Just a point of view, and I hope I didn't ramble too much. I find this historical chapter fascinating.

 

Thanks Spartan JKM

Edited September 16, 2006 by Spartan JKM