Legionary Training - II

[Gaius Octavius]

Same citation as in Part I; pp 69-71.

 

"Tacitus tells how Corbulo overcame similar difficulties with Eastern troops in the winter of AD 57-8. 'Corbulo's major task was to deal with the idleness of his own men; the treachery of the enemy was less of an obstacle. The legions transferred from Syria, demoralized by long years of peace, did not take kindly to the discipline of a Roman camp. It was common knowledge that there were old soldiers in his army who had never been on guard or on a watch, who paid visits to the rampart and ditch to look upon remarkable novelties, who possessed neither helmets nor breastplates, but were smartly dressed businessmen who had done all their service in towns. So he discharged those who were too old or whose health was bad, and called for reinforcements. Recruiting took place throughout Galatia and Cappadocia, and a legion was sent from Germany with its compliment of auxiliary cavalry and infantry. The whole army was kept under canvas, though the winter was so hard that the ground was icebound and needed excavation before tents could be pitched. The cold was so severe that many suffered from frost-bite, and one or two men were frozen to death while on guard. A case was reported of a soldier who was carrying a bundle of logs; his hands were frozen so hard that they became fastened to his load and fell off from the stumps of his arms. Corbulo himself wore little and went about bareheaded. He was constantly with his men both on the march and at their duties, congratulating the hard working and comforting the sick. He was an example to all. When the harshness of the climate and the service became too much for many and they deserted, he looked for the cure in severity. Indulgence was not shown to first offenders, or to second offenders either, as in other armies, but any man who deserted the colours paid for it at once with his life. Experience showed that this course of action was salutary, and better than sympathetic treatment, for there were fewer desertions than in those camps where mercy was shown.'

 

"The recruits are now ready for training in battle formations, the single line, the double line, the square, the wedge and the circle. Vegetius devotes a chapter to describing the usefulness of these.

 

'There is nothing which has proved to be of greater service in action than for the men to learn by constant practice to keep their alloted position in the line, and nowhere to close or to open their ranks disadvantageously. Men packed closely together have no room for fighting and merely get in one another's way. Similarly, if they are too scattered and there is too much daylight between them they give the enemy an opportunity of breaking through. Inevitably, if the line is cut through and the enemy attacks the fighting troops from behind, there is immediate panic and universal disorder. So the recruits should always be taken out to the square and drawn up in line according to the order of the nominal roll in such a way that, in the beginning, they dress in a single straight line without any bends or curves, and with every man separated from his neighbor by an equal and correct distance. Next they must be commanded to form a double line in quick time, and in such a manner that they take their dressing from the file they cover. The third stage is to order them suddenly to form a square. After this the formation should be changed to a triangle. (This they call a "wedge".) The last arrangement has been found to be extremely useful in action. There is also an order to form circles: well-trained troops have steadied themselves in this formation after the line has been broken by the enemy's attack, and they have prevented a mass rout and a serious crisis. If the young soldiers perfect these movements by constant practice they will more easily keep their ranks in real fighting.' "

Edited July 27, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[Pertinax]

"men packed closely together have no room for fighting" , maybe we have a clue here as regards why a few Legionaries could "run down" a much larger non-Roman army. Especially as this remark is prefaced by "nothing has proved to be of greater service [as regards] keeping position".