Legio Loyalty

[PVarro]

So the more I study Roman history, the more the influence and loyalty of legions to their commanders fascinates me. In particular, Legio I and it's loyalty to Pompeius Magnus (Pompey) and later his sons and stepfather, Legio X and it's loyalty to Gaius Julius Caesar, and Legio XIV and it's - not so much loyalty - but outstanding performance against Boudica (and I know I didn't spell that right).

 

The first two I'm wondering how these two commanders received such devotion and loyalty, far above and beyond where other legions would have gone, from their men?

 

And for the third, how did a legion with such a bad track record stand against such overwhelming odds and come out of it to become immortalized?

 

Alright, I must apologize in advance if there's a post that already covers this topic, I promise I looked (through a few pages) to see if I could find the topic anywhere else.

 

PVarro

[M. Porcius Cato]

These are interesting questions. One factor though is undoubtedly simple greed. You back the guy that gets you booty. Even Caesar's oh-so-loyal Tenth ended up in mutiny when Caesar failed to deliver them what they were promised. For his part, Caesar punished the Tenth by disbanding their unit and (more trecherously) using up the troops carelessly in future battles so as not to have to pay them later.

[Kosmo]

The loyalty of some army units to a person was what made possible the empire and what ended the republic. That's what kept an emperor at the purple.

What is also very interesting are the rebellions against the generals in the Late Republic.

[Primus Pilus]

and Legio XIV and it's - not so much loyalty - but outstanding performance against Boudica (and I know I didn't spell that right). ..

 

...how did a legion with such a bad track record stand against such overwhelming odds and come out of it to become immortalized?

 

I'm not sure why you think it had such a bad track record. I suppose that is subjective though. Are you referring to loyalty or performance in battle?

 

Sure perhaps it took a beating at the hands of the Eburones during the Gallic Wars, but consider its performance over the next 5 centuries and your opinion may change...

 

57 BC... Recruited by Caesar and involved against the Nervians

53 BC... destroyed by the Eburones but reconstituted the same year

52 BC... certainly present at Alesia

49 BC... Victory over Pompeian forces in Hispania

48 BC... Defeat at Dyrrachium and victory at Pharsalus

46 BC... Victory in Africa

 

Retirement and eventual reconstitution by Octavian but was not involved in any major engagements of the civil war between the triumvirs

 

Early 1st cent. AD - With Tiberius against the Marcomanni and suppressed the major revolt in Pannonia

Was certainly involved in some of the campaigns of Germanicus after Teutoburg and effectively guarded the frontier for several decades.

 

43 AD - Claudian invasion of Britain

60's AD - Victory over Boudicca

69 AD - maintained its defensive position in the Balkans during the civil war following the death of Nero

70 AD - defeated the Batavian revolt

80's AD - Domitian's Germanic campaigns

101 - 106 AD - Heavy fighting in Trajan's Dacian Wars

160's - 180's - Parthian war of Lucius Verus and Germanic Wars of Marcus Aurelius

193 AD - Supported the eventual winner in the civil war... Septimius Severus

 

The third and fourth centuries are sort of a muddled mess of course, but nothing suggests that anything terrible befell them. The legion successfully maintained Carnuntum and defended the Danube border for about 2 and a half centuries. Perhaps not deserving of military immortality, but certainly not a bad history by any means.

[Favonius Cornelius]

What creates loyalty? Sure greed is a factor, but greed in itself is the tool of a desperate commander, and a double edged weapon at best.

 

What makes loyalty more so in my mind is the situation of any soldier. Soldiers in any time must count on each other to survive. When one man proves himself to his mates in times of battle, that creates a firm bond, a thing that goes beyond any other sort of human relation. Even more powerful is the respect given to a commander who has earned it. To serve under incompetence is the greatest woe, but to really know that your commander has what it takes to secure victory, to believe that your commander is blessed by the gods, ever victorious and fair to all, that sort of loyalty makes men fight in battles simply to be able to say they fought for ___ at the battle of ____.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Victory breeds loyalty for a time, but if victories were enough to secure a permanent loyalty, how do you explain the mutiny of the Tenth?

[P.Clodius]

These are interesting questions. One factor though is undoubtedly simple greed. You back the guy that gets you booty. Even Caesar's oh-so-loyal Tenth ended up in mutiny when Caesar failed to deliver them what they were promised. For his part, Caesar punished the Tenth by disbanding their unit and (more trecherously) using up the troops carelessly in future battles so as not to have to pay them later.

I was unaware Caesar disbanded the 10th. Are you refering to the Quirites incedent?

[M. Porcius Cato]

I was unaware Caesar disbanded the 10th. Are you refering to the Quirites incedent?

 

Yes. First, Caesar disbanded all the troops, promised that the citizens would get what they were promised, but told them that they would have no share in the booty from the African campaigns. Then, when they howled that they wanted to be forgiven and have a chance for the loot, he accepted them, but left the 10th permanently disbanded. Thereafter, Caesar used the mutineers as cannon fodder so he didn't have to pay them anything. As you can see, troops and generals were oh-so-very loyal to each other.

[P.Clodius]

I was unaware Caesar disbanded the 10th. Are you refering to the Quirites incedent?

 

Yes. First, Caesar disbanded all the troops, promised that the citizens would get what they were promised, but told them that they would have no share in the booty from the African campaigns. Then, when they howled that they wanted to be forgiven and have a chance for the loot, he accepted them, but left the 10th permanently disbanded. Thereafter, Caesar used the mutineers as cannon fodder so he didn't have to pay them anything. As you can see, troops and generals were oh-so-very loyal to each other.

You are aware ofcourse that the 10th fought at Thapsus and Munda, battles fought after the incedent you indicate. Perhaps you're mistaken?

[caldrail]

The important point in this thread is leadership, an absolutely vital commodity in the ancient world. Unlike today, total obedience of your troops was not guaranteed. As a general, you would need to inspire and bully your men to go through considerable risk and physical hardship. People like Caesar had a skill in this area. And if Caesar brings you victory, glory, and sackloads of booty - hey - just tell us what to do Julius...

[M. Porcius Cato]

You are aware ofcourse that the 10th fought at Thapsus and Munda, battles fought after the incedent you indicate. Perhaps you're mistaken?

 

Yes, the 10th did fight at Thapsus and Munda, which were after the mutiny. I'll have to double check my source. Maybe he only decimated the 10th? Good catch.

[P.Clodius]

You are aware ofcourse that the 10th fought at Thapsus and Munda, battles fought after the incedent you indicate. Perhaps you're mistaken?

 

Yes, the 10th did fight at Thapsus and Munda, which were after the mutiny. I'll have to double check my source. Maybe he only decimated the 10th? Good catch.

Here's what happened. They mutinied. Caesar had been in Egypt for a while and had just finished the 'Veni Vedi Vici' campaign when he returned to Italy, which had been in Antony's hands. Evidently Caesar's sojourn hadn't sat well with some, and it had allowed his enemies to consolidate centered around Cato and Scipio in North Africa, evidently another campaign was in order.

 

Here's what T. A. Dodge says.

It was nearly two years since Caesar had been in Rome when he again trod the sacred soil. It was time he should return. The Senate was his tool. He had been made dictator, and Antony was his magister equitum, so that the latter during his absence had exercised full sway. But Antony, though officially a good servant, had subjected himself to grave reproach for many breaches of decorum, legal, social and political, and there was widespread discontent. The legions that had fought in Gaul and Greece had not been paid. To be sure they had all agreed to trust Caesar for their largesses until the end of the war, but there was no doubt cause for complaint. The Second Legion refused to march to Sicily; others followed its example. Caesar arrived in the midst of all this tumult. He at once took measures to settle the difficulties. For a while his presence sufficed to restore quiet, but shortly a still graver trouble broke forth. The legions that were stationed near Rome mutinied, murdered a number of their officers, who had tried to appease them, siezed their eagles and marched on Rome. They had conceived the notion that Caesar could not continue in power without them; that they really were the fountain of authority; perhaps perhaps they flatterd themselves that they could gain greater rewards and more speedy payment by their threats. The old legions which had placed Caesar on the pinnacle of fame and power felt that they were, in a fashion, masters of the earth. Under Caesar's sole charge they were tractable and ready; under his lieutenants they had grown self-opinionated and overbearing. Their officers grew to fear them, and acts of violence even against these had become common. The luxury of Campania had done them more injury than all their campaigns, more than Livy alleges that sensuous Capua did to Hannibal's veterans. Grave danger was imminent. A spark mith light a fire in this body of combustble soldiers and inaugurate a reign of terror. Caesra, on learning of their approach, caused the gates of the city to be shut upon them and guarded by some cohorts Antony had at hand; but when the legionaries asked leave to assemble on Mars' field they were allowed to enter without helmets, breastplates or shields, but wearing each his sword. Disregarding the advice of his friends and scorning personal danger, Caesar at once went out to them, and, facing the turbulent, seething mass, asked their leaders what it was they desired. "We are covered with wounds," cried they, "we have been long enough dragged about the world, and have spilt sufficient of our blood. We ask our discharge." "I give it to you," replied Caesar, with chilly deliberateness. He then added that in a few weeks he was going on a new campaign, that he would defeat the enemy with new legions, and that when he returned and triumphed with a new army, they, the old ones, should have all the presents which had been promised them "on his triumph," and unpromised land besides. Expecting nothing less than that they would actually be discharged, and thus forfeit in the glories of Caesar's triumph, ---the one thing to which every Roman soldier looked cravingly forward,--- and awed by the cold demeanor of their great commander, the legionaries at once showed signs of weakening. As Caesar was about to go, the legates begged him to stay and say a few kind words to his veterans, who had shared so many dangers with him. Caesar turned to them again , and quietly addressed them as "Citizens!" (quirites) instead, as usual, as "Comrades!" (commilitones). "We are not citizens," they exclaimed, interrupting Caesar, "we are soldiers!" Their ancient devotion to the splendid chieftain who had so often led them to victory came welling up; the cutting word of quirites, to them who were soldiers first of all, and who had lost all pride in being burgesses of the Roman republic, in an instant changed the current of their purpose. A single word had conquered them whom arms could not; Caesar's indifference was their punishment. They could not bear that he should go to war with other troops. They crowded round him, and begged forgiveness and permission to continue in service and to accompany him withersoever he might go. Caesar, it is said, forgave all but the Tenth Legion, his old favorite, whose mutiny he could not condone. All the ringleaders had a third docked from their largesses, and he threatened to muster out the Tenth. But later the Tenth followed him to Africa, and there did its service as of yore. Still one sees in after days it was no more the Old Tenth of the times of the Gallic War.

 

The accounts of the suppression of this mutiny do not strike one as being as dramatic as Arrian's story of Alexander's suppression of the mutiny of his Macedonians, which threatened to be of even graver danger. But as both are but embellished statements of an actual fact, they can scarcely be compared as a measure of the men themselves. And each case was characteristic. It was certainly a great role for one man to appear before and control scores of thousands by the mere force of his disain and his iron will.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Thanks for that Clodius. The upshot is that Caesar threatened to disband the Tenth, but he didn't. Still, the larger point about loyalty is that it depended very much on the personal attention of the commander. In a sense, this is simply an extension of Onasander's description of what the general's job was:

The duty of a general is to ride by the ranks on horseback, show himself to those in danger, praise the brave, threaten the cowardly, encourage the lazy, fill up the gaps, transpose a unit if necessary, bring aid to the wearied, anticipate the crisis, the hour and the outcome.

[PVarro]

I'm glad to see such a response.

 

To Primus Pilus:

 

You're right, the 14th's history wasn't that horrible. But I was under the impression that the legion had kept an air of cursedness about them since their beginning.

 

And for the loyalty debate:

 

I agree that in some ways loyalty is helped along by greed, but I do agree that it is a double edged sword. When the 10th mutinied, I was under the impression that they were acting more on the behalf of their two sister veteran legions than just themselves.

 

And yes, battle victories - and defeats sometimes - can create loyalty in men. But there have to be other necessities than victories and booty.

 

From what I know, Pompey's 1st was so loyal to him and his sons - in part - because the legion was recruited from a region that the Magnus family had a heavy influence in.

 

Thanks again for all of these replies everyone. I'm using your ideas to help cultivate loyalty in the legions under my control in the RPG Roman Legion. So it's actually relevant to my life.

 

Oh, and the all time worst way to gain loyalty - bribes. Wow, that just never works.

[Guest Agricola]

I thought it was the IX Hispania that was said to be cursed, the one which vanished into Caledonia and was never seen again. Of course, after that people would say it was cursed, wouldn't they?