Imperatores Victi

[M. Porcius Cato]

Personal honor and political authority drew the aristocrats of the Republic to compete intensely at outdoing one another in service to the res publica. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that Roman commanders who lost battles would suffer at the polls. But did they?

 

Not according to Imperatores Victi, by Nathan Rosenstein:

etween the disaster at the river Allia, which culminated in the sack of Rome by the Gauls, and the outbreak of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar as many as ninety-two commanders of varying ranks sustained defeat in battle against the foreign enemies of Rome, survived, and returned to the city having achieved no subsequent victory to offset the earlier loss. Fifty-eight of these men may, with some degree of certainty, be said to have been seriously defeated by the enemy. Taking all these men as a group and those badly defeated as a subgroup, one might expect to find clear indications that members of one or both labored thereafter under a severe handicap in competition with other aristocrats. But surprisingly, none can be discovered. The most obvious test to determine the harm a military defeat could do to a general's political career is to ask how well such men did in later contests for election to high public office. Here no correlation between a lost battle and defeat at the polls can be established. Out of all these imperatores victi, roughly a quarter to a third (between twenty-six and thirty-three) went on to hold another elective magistracy, whereas of the fifty-eight who suffered major defeats, about the same proportion (between seventeen and twenty) won subsequent elections.

 

Much more of this remarkable book is freely available from the University of California Press website.

[Virgil61]

Personal honor and political authority drew the aristocrats of the Republic to compete intensely at outdoing one another in service to the res publica. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that Roman commanders who lost battles would suffer at the polls. But did they?

 

Not according to Imperatores Victi, by Nathan Rosenstein:

etween the disaster at the river Allia, which culminated in the sack of Rome by the Gauls, and the outbreak of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar as many as ninety-two commanders of varying ranks sustained defeat in battle against the foreign enemies of Rome, survived, and returned to the city having achieved no subsequent victory to offset the earlier loss. Fifty-eight of these men may, with some degree of certainty, be said to have been seriously defeated by the enemy. Taking all these men as a group and those badly defeated as a subgroup, one might expect to find clear indications that members of one or both labored thereafter under a severe handicap in competition with other aristocrats. But surprisingly, none can be discovered. The most obvious test to determine the harm a military defeat could do to a general's political career is to ask how well such men did in later contests for election to high public office. Here no correlation between a lost battle and defeat at the polls can be established. Out of all these imperatores victi, roughly a quarter to a third (between twenty-six and thirty-three) went on to hold another elective magistracy, whereas of the fifty-eight who suffered major defeats, about the same proportion (between seventeen and twenty) won subsequent elections.

 

Much more of this remarkable book is freely available from the University of California Press website.

 

Excellent find. Even Publius Terentius Varro, who was responsible for one of the most infamous defeats in history at Cannae (against the advice of his co-consul Lucius Aemilius Paulus) was hailed as some sort of savior and held a proconsul job afterwards.

[Primus Pilus]

A very exciting dynamic. It may be interesting to research how many of those men who won further election after their defeats actually offered themselves as candidates. If 26 to 33 of the reported 96 actually won elections, did the remainder meet defeat or simply not run as a result of dismal public support? Additionally how many of those badly defeated above and beyond the 96 did not return either as a result of death in combat or later suicide.

 

Just some thoughts I hope are answered within the book at first glance.

[M. Porcius Cato]

A very exciting dynamic. It may be interesting to research how many of those men who won further election after their defeats actually offered themselves as candidates. If 26 to 33 of the reported 96 actually won elections, did the remainder meet defeat or simply not run as a result of dismal public support? Additionally how many of those badly defeated above and beyond the 96 did not return either as a result of death in combat or later suicide.

 

Just some thoughts I hope are answered within the book at first glance.

 

What I love about Rosenstein's books are the appendices, which are typically gold mines. This book is no different. Appendix I lists all 96 magistrates, how they were defeated (and the source material), and what offices they held next. Glancing at the list I didn't see any suicides, but there was the occasional exile (which plenty of Romans suffered for much less than military defeat). Take a look.

 

It's clear that magistrates weren't simply give carte blanche to mess up. Some DID suffer for losing. But very many were cleared of any wrong-doing. My favorite example might be Postumius Albinus, whose troops were forced to walk beneath the yoke at the Caudine Forks. Postumius himself suggested that the senate hand him and his colleague over to the Samnites in an attempt to abrogate the treaty that they had been forced to accept; the Samnites refused them, and though Albinus did not attain further office (having already been consul), he did enjoy great fame thereafter.

[Furius Venator]

What a great little article.

 

It seems significant that the Romans viewed war, and especially battle, as a chancy business at best. Defeat doing one's duty would be better than not serving in command at all.

 

I did wonder if the presence of Hannibal skews the data somewhat, a good number of the generals considered must have lost to the Carthaginians, and the Second Punic War was unusually disaster ridden for Rome I think.

 

I might check through if I've time.

 

It would appear not, Hannibal was responsible for the defeat of 8 of the men (handily beaten by Spartacus who sent 12 Romans about their business) and Spanish and Gallic tribesmen seem to have been responsible for about ten defeats each, about the same number as Carthage.

 

Sicilaian slaves seem to have been bad news too, inflicting half a dozen defeats, more than Mithradates.

Edited June 22, 2006 by Furius Venator

[M. Porcius Cato]

Rosenstein's argument is that failed commanders weren't invariably punished at the polls because the people had the belief that if the gods were against you, nothing you could do would bring you victory. Of course, since the gods were generally for Rome, the people believed, they would ultimately prevail.

[Spurius]

...

 

What I love about Rosenstein's books are the appendices, which are typically gold mines. This book is no different. Appendix I lists all 96 magistrates, how they were defeated (and the source material), and what offices they held next. Glancing at the list I didn't see any suicides, but there was the occasional exile (which plenty of Romans suffered for much less than military defeat). Take a look.

 

.....

 

I agree about Rosenstein's appendices. I'm in the middle of obtaining his book on the mid-Republic "Rome at War : Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic (Studies in the History of Greece and Rome)" which I will be reviewing here (hopefully). Here's the Amazon link for it.

 

I also had him as a professor and his lecture style is similar to his books, you gotta look at the edges for the gold to understand his main point. I took his course from the founding of Rome to late Republic/Early Empire. It was like a survey course in scope but he managed to put a lot into it.

 

Now with your link I have more to read.