Rome Downfall Linked To Roman Army?

[Primus Pilus]

I disagree with the earlier postes. There was no real barbarization of the roman army, it simply evolved. The Romans had always relied on forign cavalry, be it barbarians or fellow Italians....

 

...The only real decline in the Roman Army comes from the massive decrease in those willing to join the army.

 

Aren't you are indirectly supporting the notion of barbarization. If Italians and more traditional provincials were seemingly unwilling to join, then clearly the Romans were dependent on "barbarian" recruits to fill the ranks. If the Romans turned to Germanic recruits simply as a means to pacify those particular segments of the population as well as factoring border recruiting proximity into the equation, then traditional recruiting pools were still being ignored even if there were willing volunteers. Either way "barbarization" of the legions in the later period took place whether it was a necessity or not.

 

Perhaps barbarization is a term which occasionally carries an incorrect connotation, but I don't see how we can claim that the later Roman army (in the west of course) was not made up largely of non traditional recruits.

[Pertinax]

May I add a small point? I am struck by the universality of Auxilliae in Brittania at all periods of Roman occupation, I am aware that a backbone of Legions was present but the Auxilliae (certainly at command level) seem to demonstrably "buying into" all things Roman (maybe with a few dietary variants).So I assume that "barbarization" means "foreign non-Italic/non-Romans " not " uncouth irregulars"? I certainly understand the principle of employing warlike peoples to one's own advantadge, to keep them busy and supress the most uncouth of provincials.

[Primus Pilus]

May I add a small point? I am struck by the universality of Auxilliae in Brittania at all periods of Roman occupation, I am aware that a backbone of Legions was present but the Auxilliae (certainly at command level) seem to demonstrably "buying into" all things Roman (maybe with a few dietary variants).So I assume that "barbarization" means "foreign non-Italic/non-Romans " not " uncouth irregulars"? I certainly understand the principle of employing warlike peoples to one's own advantadge, to keep them busy and supress the most uncouth of provincials.

 

Agreed, I've always felt that barbarization of the legions was as much a geographical recruiting issue as it was cultural. Barbarization does not necessarily relate to how we may perceive/define a "barbarian" but it does define the sweeping cultural changes that left Rome reliant upon border populations rather than those who may have had a more traditional vested interest. Barbarization of the legions is not about them becoming an army of Conan style warriors but describes others shifts. Germanics (and others) were still soldiers, and at least prior to the final stages of the west where the armies were mercenary styles led by petty Kings and such, regular traditional training and discipline (though perhaps with differing motivations and intended outcomes) was still a part of the regimen.

 

All IMO anyway.

[Pertinax]

A thought (on which perhaps Virgil may have detailed contemporary knowledge), for any particular trained,fighting cohort what is the likely "combat effective lifetime" (outside of disaster of course) -so over what period does a trained legion become a degraded entity? I realise that unit replenishment and recruiting should mean that any cohort will be effective constantly, but I am trying to hint at what happens when such a renewal process halts? How long can an "ageing" cohort remain combat ready?

[Virgil61]

Agreed, I've always felt that barbarization of the legions was as much a geographical recruiting issue as it was cultural. Barbarization does not necessarily relate to how we may perceive/define a "barbarian" but it does define the sweeping cultural changes that left Rome reliant upon border populations rather than those who may have had a more traditional vested interest. Barbarization of the legions is not about them becoming an army of Conan style warriors but describes others shifts. Germanics (and others) were still soldiers, and at least prior to the final stages of the west where the armies were mercenary styles led by petty Kings and such, regular traditional training and discipline (though perhaps with differing motivations and intended outcomes) was still a part of the regimen.

 

All IMO anyway.

 

An interesting segue on this question is a comment made by Peter Heather in "The Fall of the Roman Empire". He states at least once and maybe twice, that Illyria was a major recruiting ground for soldiers of the late Roman Army and that the loss of it it may have been on Stilicho's mind as he turned to the Goths to supply forces.

[Virgil61]

...so over what period does a trained legion become a degraded entity? I realise that unit replenishment and recruiting should mean that any cohort will be effective constantly, but I am trying to hint at what happens when such a renewal process halts? How long can an "ageing" cohort remain combat ready?

 

That's a good question, thankfully I've never had to face or see the modern day equivalent. I know that there are a lot of modern examples from the second world war on units attrited to the point they were non-combat effective.

 

I suspect if the Roman cohort is under the constant pressure of campaigning and a continued process of attrition at some point you'll just have to merge them with another unit. This actually happened to cohorts and even legions who'd been partially destroyed even in the Principate if I remember correctly.

[Furius Venator]

However the combat stress suffered by the legionaries (battles usually over in a day, no artillery bombardments etc etc) means reasonably few would ever reach the 100-120 days exposure generally regarded as necessary to befin degrading performance.

 

Caesar fought 50 battles, the next most prolific general fought about 30, most far less. Even though soldiers would likely fight more battles than generals, even Caesar's legions would struggle to hit 120 days combat exposure.

 

Amalgamation due to attrition is a rather different thing

[Virgil61]

However the combat stress suffered by the legionaries (battles usually over in a day, no artillery bombardments etc etc) means reasonably few would ever reach the 100-120 days exposure generally regarded as necessary to befin degrading performance.

 

Caesar fought 50 battles, the next most prolific general fought about 30, most far less. Even though soldiers would likely fight more battles than generals, even Caesar's legions would struggle to hit 120 days combat exposure.

 

Amalgamation due to attrition is a rather different thing

 

I was going to address these points, especially your first paragraph but thought better of it because I understood the gist of Pertinax's question to be strictly limited to combat effectiveness.

 

The point you make is interesting in that even during a highly intensive campaign like Caesar's there was ample time for rest and recuperation relative to the horrid effects of trench warfare of WWI for example. The only parallel might be if you were part of the defense of a besieged city, even then the intensity would be less day to day I'd imagine.

[metforce]

I always thought that barbarization of the army was a problem. After much thought I've come to a conclusion the army was not the primary problem but loss of the major cities from direct control of the empire. The western emperors of the late fourth and fifth centuries gave up control of the land and cities to the large barbarian tribes thus depriving themselves of resources (men and materials). This is critical once an area falls outside the direct control of the empire, tax revenues and recruits no longer become available. Majorian was the last emperor to wield any authority outside Italy (he was also the last emperor to take control of the army in the field). He regained control of Gaul and Spain and was poised to wrest Africa from the Vandals when disaster struck. He suffered the same fate as other leaders who failed in the field; deposition and death. Those emperors that followed him, the shadow emperors, never held any authority outside of Italy and were reduced to begging for help from Constantinople.

[caldrail]

Whole units were brought into the late roman army not as auxillaries, but front line units. They weren't organised in the roman fashion, merely a tribe that volunteered for service. As the west drew to a close, it was getting harder to find recruits. Military service was no longer seen as glorious, and it would cause problems for the local economies more than it had in previous times. Hence the increase in thumbless civilians. Hence also the decree that such individuals were liable forservice after all, although I doubt the recruiters bothered with them much except as labourers. The old roman organisation was decaying and a more 'barbaric' style of army was becoming prevalent. That doesn't necessarily mean the late roman army was ineffective, it meant that the army was even more dependent on the skill and leadership of its general and less so on rank-and-file commanders.

[Antonius Miles]

The failure of the army and the Roman state proceeded hand in hand in the empires final century. Constantines final reorganisation downgraded the already pressed frontier troops and consolidated smaller mobile forces near the frontier into larger formation's farther away from the hot spots. That chicken came home to roost after Adrianople when it was some time before new forces could be gathered to bring the Goths into check, even then it was only temporary. The problems of the 3rd century crisis were repeated except this time Rome never recovered her lost provinces. The Eastern half of the empire was literally able to buy itself some breathing space due to greater tax revenues in its area of control. In many cases bribring the barbarians to go west.

It's hard to blame the army itself because it was a tool created by the state not an indepedant entity capable of making it's own decisions. Far to many emperor's crafted a tool to protect themselves and discourage rivals rather than an effective force to defend the empire. Great numbers of trained men and monetary resources were destroyed by rivals fighting over the purple. There were possibly just too many problems with not enough information for anyone to be able chart a clear course. The bureaucratization of the late empire made any effective responses even more difficult, as witness what happened to Stilcho.

Possibly the greatest flaw in the empire that affected the military was that there was never a truly stable method for transfer of leadership. The institutions were just unable to cope with the stresses placed on them.

[Tommh]

It has been argued that once the Republic fell, the Army essentially WAS the state. Imperial power ultimatly came down to the legions. This lack of civilian control had many consequences not the least of which was the tendencys of various Legions to march on Rome to regester their "vote" for a new Emperor, often when the old Emperor was inconveniatly still there.

[Neos Dionysos]

Whole units were brought into the late roman army not as auxillaries, but front line units. They weren't organised in the roman fashion, merely a tribe that volunteered for service.

 

I'm curious to this source, since Ammianus Marcellinus never mentions the Roman Army being in any disorganization, a decline in discipline, weaponry, or equipment and he was a soldier so he was very astute to the conditions of the army.

 

Are you speaking of the foederate forces? Such as the settlements of Visigoths, Franks, Burgandians? I would agree they were as is, and had to come to fight as ordered by Rome as part of thier agreements, but they weren't part of the Roman Army, more so allies than anything.

[caldrail]

Yes, I was generalising somewhat. The late roman army (non-foederate) trained its men differently from the golden-age legions. Gone was the day of close packed heavy infantry. Light infantry were far more prevalent, as were cavalry. It was a smaller mobile army better suited for ambuscades and policing (border patrol dare I say it) than the head-on battle mentality of old. Such a light army is often more difficult to control because they become used to using initiative, and therefore want to do their own thing. Its ironic isn't it? Initiative makes an army flexible but deaf.

[Neos Dionysos]

Yes, I was generalising somewhat. The late roman army (non-foederate) trained its men differently from the golden-age legions. Gone was the day of close packed heavy infantry. Light infantry were far more prevalent, as were cavalry. It was a smaller mobile army better suited for ambuscades and policing (border patrol dare I say it) than the head-on battle mentality of old. Such a light army is often more difficult to control because they become used to using initiative, and therefore want to do their own thing. Its ironic isn't it? Initiative makes an army flexible but deaf.

 

I find that hard to beleive, (of abandoning heavy infantry tactics since heavy infantry continued to be a major force on the battlefield for a couple more centuries). I would agree that the establishment of the limitani was light, and more suited for the policing and ambuscades, but the Field Armies were the Heavy Infantry designed to meet any major threat and defeat it.

 

I'm not trying to be difficult here, I'm just curious, since I have yet to come across the references that Roman Armies, (while different from the Leigons of old), were not heavy infantry at it's core.