The Effectiveness Of The Roman Army

[Legionnaire]

In the Battle Scenarios thread, I asked some of the following questions (others just arose in the process of debate):

1. It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites?
   
2. How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visibility and room to manoeuvre?
   
3. As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided?
   
4. Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans?
   
5. Could the strength of a Roman legion be limited by a dependence on discipline and formation?
   

Historians such as Vegetius in his Military Matters discussed numerous examples of formations:

VARIOUS FORMATIONS FOR BATTLE

 

An army may be drawn up for a general engagement in seven different formations. The first formation is an oblong square of a large front, of common use both in ancient and modern times, although not thought the best by various judges of the service, because an even and level plain of an extent sufficient to contain its front cannot always be found, and if there should be any irregularity or hollow in the line, it is often pierced in that part. Besides, an enemy superior in number may surround either your right or left wing, the consequence of which will be dangerous, unless you have a reserve ready to advance and sustain his attack. A general should make use of this disposition only when his forces are better and more numerous than the enemy's, it being thereby in his power to attack both the flanks and surround them on every side.

 

The second and best disposition is the oblique. For although your army consists of few troops, yet good and advantageously posted, it will greatly contribute to your obtaining the victory, notwithstanding the numbers and bravery of the enemy. It is as follows: as the armies are marching up to the attack, your left wing must be kept back at such a distance from the enemy's right as to be out of reach of their darts and arrows. Your right wing must advance obliquely upon the enemy's left, and begin the engagement. And you must endeavor with your best cavalry and infantry to surround the wing with which you are engaged, make it give way and fall upon the enemy in the rear. If they once give ground and the attack is properly seconded, you will undoubtedly gain the victory, while your left wing, which continued at a distance, will remain untouched. An army drawn up in this manner bears some resemblance to the letter A or a mason's level. If the enemy should be beforehand with you in this evolution, recourse must be had to the supernumerary horse and foot posted as a reserve in the rear, as I mentioned before. They must be ordered to support your left wing. This will enable you to make a vigorous resistance against the artifice of the enemy.

 

The third formation is like the second, but not so good, as it obliges you to begin the attack with your left wing on the enemy's right. The efforts of soldiers on the left are weak and imperfect from their exposed and defective situation in the line. I will explain this formation more clearly. Although your left wing should be much better than your right, yet it must be reinforced with some of the best horse and foot and ordered to commence the acnon with the enemy's right in order to disorder and surround it as expeditiously as possible. And the other part of your army, composed of the worst troops, should remain at such a distance from the enemy's left as not to be annoyed by their darts or in danger of being attacked sword in hand. In this oblique formation care must be taken to prevent the line being penetrated by the wedges of the enemy, and it is to be employed only when the enemy's right wing is weak and your greatest strength is on your left.

 

The fourth formation is this: as your army is marching to the attack in order of battle and you come within four or five hundred paces of the enemy, both your wings must be ordered unexpectedly to quicken their pace and advance with celerity upon them. When they find themselves attacked on both wings at the same time, the sudden surprise may so disconcert them as to give you an easy victory. But although this method, if your troops are very resolute and expert, may ruin the enemy at once, yet it is hazardous. The general who attempts it is obliged to abandon and expose his center and to divide his army into three parts. If the enemy are not routed at the first charge, they have a fair opportunity of attacking the wings which are separated from each other and the center which is destitute of assistance.

 

The fifth formation resembles the fourth but with this addition: the light infantry and the archers are formed before the center to cover it from the attempts of the enemy. With this precaution the general may safely follow the above mentioned method and attack the enemy's left wing with his right, and their right with his left. If he puts them to flight, he gains an immediate victory, and if he fails of success his center is in no danger, being protected by the light infantry and archers.

 

The sixth formation is very good and almost like the second. It is used when the general cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops. If made with judgment, notwithstanding his inferiority, he has often a good chance for victory. As your line approaches the enemy, advance your right wing against their left and begin the attack with your best cavalry and infantry. At the same time keep the rest of the army at a great distance from the enemy's right, extended in a direct line like a javelin. Thus if you can surround their left and attack it in flank and rear, you must inevitably defeat them. It is impossible for the enemy to draw off reinforcements from their right or from their center to sustain their left in this emergency, since the remaining part of your army is extended and at a great distance from them in the form of the letter L. It is a formation often used in an action on a march.

 

The seventh formation owes its advantages to the nature of the ground and will enable you to oppose an enemy with an army inferior both in numbers and goodness, provided one of your flanks can be covered either with an eminence, the sea, a river, a lake, a city, a morass or broken ground inaccessible to the enemy. The rest of the army must be formed, as usual, in a straight line and the unsecured flank must be protected by your light troops and all your cavalry. Sufficiently defended on one side by the nature of the ground and on the other by a double support of cavalry, you may then safely venture on action.

 

One excellent and general rule must be observed. If you intend to engage with your right wing only, it must be composed of your best troops. And the same method must be taken with respect to the left. Or if you intend to penetrate the enemy's line, the wedges which you form for that purpose before your center, must consist of the best disciplined soldiers. Victory in general is gained by a small number of men. Therefore the wisdom of a general appears in nothing more than in such choice of disposition of his men as is most consonant with reason and service.

 

Polybius argued for the dominance of the maniple formation over the phalanx in The Histories:

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

 

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

 

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

 

But how can we ignore the major defeats suffered by the Romans in discussing the effectiveness of the army's organization and tactics?

[caldrail]

Oops. Here's the answer I posted elsewhere.

 

1 - Any formation in rough terrain in vulnerable because the normal spacing is interrupted. Given that they're clambering over rocks too, a good series of spear/arrow/slingshot volleys would disrupt the unit even further. Stronger in defence I would say, and perhaps the samnites would have local knowledge to choose good ambush locations?

 

2 - Cavalry in forested areas is at a disadvantage, Russel Crowe notwithstanding. Its more difficult to charge because trees are in the way. Its more difficult to ride because you have to avoid branches. The ground is likely to be full of undergrowth and hidden dips hazardous to galloping horses. You could still usefully employ cavalry in lighter forests, and in the event of melee, a cavalryman has the 'higher ground' regardless. Its just that cavalry is so much better suited to a clear path. Hiding your horses in the trees and mounting a swift ambush would be great.

 

3 - Slaughters in the forest are best avoided by prior knowledge. 'Intel', as we like to say these days. Spies, prisoners, deserters, travellers - they all have little pieces of information that an astute commander can use to second-guess his enemies moves. Julius Caesar was a past master at that.

 

4 - The heavy infantry of classical legions would be advised to have their pilum to hand. Not a brilliant weapon for fending off horses, but it would do. Cataphracts are a difficult case though because it depends on whether they have reached charge speed. If so, the longer reach of their lance (kontos?) would definitely prove itself deadly. Once halted, roman soldiers might evade the longer shaft of the enemy and close in, meaning the cavalry then adopt a sword or something instead and a normal melee ensues. Of course, the heavily armoured cataphract can still fight with some defensive advantage here.

 

5 - Leadership is so important when structured units are in the field. Romans were strong when well led, but the opposite was true. Men used to obedience and standard moves tend not to think much, initiative is not always appreciated in armies. You might for instance have a unit where the leader hesitates or dies. The men are asking themselves - 'Well are we going to do something or what?' - but the initiative is lost.

[Legionnaire]

caldrail,

 

I belive your assessment of cavalry is quite true. For instance, Caesar described in his account of the Gallic Wars how the Nervii (who will appear again later in this post), who did not use any mounted warriors, repelled cavalry:

...the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye...

 

While I agree with many of your comments, I would like to raise one major objection. In his memoirs of his conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar includes an episode against the Nervii, who were particularly fierce and brave warriors:

After he had made three days march through their territories, he discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp; that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbors, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

 

Having learned these things, he sends forward scouts and centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learned from the prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because they were weak in cavalry, (for not even at this time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can,) in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by them.

 

The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extending to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a [second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and open for about 200 paces at the lower part; but in the upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within these woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet.

 

Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage- trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works.

 

Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill and experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive information from others; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever appeared proper.

Thus, because of their own creativity and intelligence, the Roman soldiers were able to thwart a sudden and terrifying attack. I do not believe that creativity and discipline are opposite or conflicting: discipline does not suppress creativity. The discipline of the Roman army was undoubtedly essential for the execution of complicated formations such as the testudo during the confusion of combat. However, man is a thinking being, and the instincts and nature of humanity are not eliminated by military training and a life of discipline.

[caldrail]

Josephus writes in his 'The Jewish War'

 

"Men trained to fight by the book and to obey orders without question are easily demoralised by innovative and enterprising tactics"

 

That is so true. What you're quoting is an example of leadership. Without it, roman soldiers usually lost despite their other advantages.

 

Julius Caesar was an excellent general without doubt. I suspect his centurions in that action were of a high calibre also.

[Gaius Octavius]

Excellent commentary, gents.

So, just two cents worth. I understand that if a Roman column were charged by cavalry, in a reasonably open area, and the enemy were armed with spears, the Romans would form up into a square. They could easily defeat the charge in this fashion. If the cavalry were armed with arrows, and did not engage the infantry directly, as at Carrae, then the result might be disaster.

It seems that Varus did not use 'scouts' and was much too credulous of Ariminus. "Trust but verify."

[Furius Venator]

The thing with Arminius is that the Germans were generally very loyal indeed. It is unfortunate that Varus trusted 'a bad 'un' but it's hardly rank stupidity.

 

As I've said elsewhere Carrhae was won mainly because the Parthians has an effectivel 'inexhaustable supply of arrowws brought up by camel train'. More generally missile troops could discomfit close order armoured foot and might injure many but they could rarely break them unaided.

[Legionnaire]

Furius Venator,

 

Essentially, the Parthians exploited not only their advantage in terms of situation and available resources but also a potential flaw in the cohort system used by the Romans, in that it could be penetrated by continuous bombardment. How could such a strategy of attack be overcome? Is this an innate weakness in the structure of the Roman legion? The capture of Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital, by Septimius Severus seems to indicate otherwise.

 

 

caldrail,

 

While I agree with your assessment, and Josephus' observation, about fighting "by the book", I'm not sure that this was the absolute nature of the Roman army. I think the flexibility and relative maneuverability of the cohort system, and the innovativeness of the Roman military machine, attest to the importance of creativity in war. Remember: while the Romans may have fought in formation, a formation is only as strong as its soldiers. Rome relied heavily on the legionnaires in many aspects of the empire (construction and maintenance, for example); why not in combat as well? Undoubtedly, discipline and training were fundamental to the success of the Roman army, but the tenacity, skill, morale, and intelligence of the soldiers were, I believe, equally as crucial. This is basically what Caesar says in the passage I quoted.

[caldrail]

Excellent commentary, gents.

So, just two cents worth. I understand that if a Roman column were charged by cavalry, in a reasonably open area, and the enemy were armed with spears, the Romans would form up into a square. They could easily defeat the charge in this fashion. If the cavalry were armed with arrows, and did not engage the infantry directly, as at Carrae, then the result might be disaster.

It seems that Varus did not use 'scouts' and was much too credulous of Ariminus. "Trust but verify."

 

If the romans formed square with spears then the charge wouldn't connect - if they had any sense - it would simply wheel away frustrated. However, as you correctly state, a square formation is essentially immobile and therefore a sitting target for missile fire. Before too long, enough casualties would have broken the defensive value of the square and the survivors might not survive much longer. If they stay, they continue to be whittled down. If they flee, the cavalry are at their backs. This was the problem Rome had when facing eastern horse-archers. They just just didn't fight fair

Edited April 11, 2006 by caldrail

[Gaius Octavius]

Excellent commentary, gents.

So, just two cents worth. I understand that if a Roman column were charged by cavalry, in a reasonably open area, and the enemy were armed with spears, the Romans would form up into a square. They could easily defeat the charge in this fashion. If the cavalry were armed with arrows, and did not engage the infantry directly, as at Carrae, then the result might be disaster.

It seems that Varus did not use 'scouts' and was much too credulous of Ariminus. "Trust but verify."

 

If the romans formed square with spears then the charge wouldn't connect - if they had any sense - it would simply wheel away frustrated. However, as you correctly state, a square formation is essentially immobile and therefore a sitting target for missile fire. Before too long, enough casualties would have broken the defensive value of the square and the survivors might not survive much longer. If they stay, they continue to be whittled down. If they flee, the cavalry are at their backs. This was the problem Rome had when facing eastern horse-archers. They just just didn't fight fair

 

So, we are in agreement.

Edited April 11, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[caldrail]

caldrail,

 

While I agree with your assessment, and Josephus' observation, about fighting "by the book", I'm not sure that this was the absolute nature of the Roman army. I think the flexibility and relative maneuverability of the cohort system, and the innovativeness of the Roman military machine, attest to the importance of creativity in war. Remember: while the Romans may have fought in formation, a formation is only as strong as its soldiers. Rome relied heavily on the legionnaires in many aspects of the empire (construction and maintenance, for example); why not in combat as well? Undoubtedly, discipline and training were fundamental to the success of the Roman army, but the tenacity, skill, morale, and intelligence of the soldiers were, I believe, equally as crucial. This is basically what Caesar says in the passage I quoted.

 

The romans were nothing like as clever as you suggest. Time and again they were slaughtered by a failure of leadership. Take Jerusalem. They were told to build a circumvallation. As they did so, the jews counterattack. The soldiers have left their weapons lying about even in a combat zone. Almost a disaster, and Titus nearly had his officers executed for the humiliation of it. Roman soldiers were taught to fight without question. It was their commanders - the optio's, centurions, tribunes etc, that would make or break a legion.

[Rameses the Great]

I would just like to add something. Saying that phalaxes could not operate on rocky terrain is somewhat skeptical. Remember Greece has rocky and hillly terrain, and they were effective in keeping out the Persians.

[Neos Dionysos]

I would just like to add something. Saying that phalaxes could not operate on rocky terrain is somewhat skeptical. Remember Greece has rocky and hillly terrain, and they were effective in keeping out the Persians.

 

They can't, it has been well documented... yes Greece has MANY mountians and rough terrian, hence why almost all of the battles that are recorded happened on plains, valleys or passes, where the land was flat, and realtively level. I highly suggest you pick up, "The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece", by Victor David Hanson. He is one of the world's leading experts on hoplite warfare...

[roman wargamer]

to me, the phalanx have some good points , but also have weakness ;

 

let's see them, they have deeper manpower and longer line,

 

but once engage , they can not be move rearwards, what's more so ,

that diagonal movement is almost impractical or snail pace to do.

 

then the Roman Hastatus "manipular acies line",

 

have three different independent lines ;

that could be move each other , free from each other's bearing.

 

let's propose that the Hastatus are moving to engage the phalanx:

 

and the phalanx made a thundering contact with the Hastatus manipular acies line,

that almost down the H prior line to the ground that was save only by the touching of the

hastae end stake to ground that stop and impared the phalanx continous move.

 

than the H posterior at the rear area begin to rain them with velitaris,

while the H antepilanus slowly moving to make a right flanking movement

at the left flank of the phalanx that are left open because their light infantry is left behind away,

 

and the phalanx stop because of the threat on their side.

 

when the H antepilanus are heading and making ground to form a left flank linear attack

on the phalanx, the weak side will now be vulnerable to spear thrusting attack.

 

the phalanx light infantry now coming , is also a threat to the right of the H antepilanus,

so the cohors equites legiones are advancing and preparing to couter the threat ,

 

if possible , is to really engage the phalanx light infantry if they will made a move

to try to made a contact engagement in the right flank of the H antepilanus.

 

while the H antepilanus now is making a real threat to the whole phalanx right flank.

 

=======

 

so the phalanx is very strong in the frontal in term of line and deep manpower,

but can not be separated into individual line to counter any flank attack threat themselves.

 

 

while the H manipular acies line are weaker in deep beacuse they act as separated line,

but can defend themselves in any kind of flank attack threat, etheir in right or left side.

 

because they have the H posterior and the H antepilanus to spare in that kind of scenario.

 

 

the phalanx have the positional tactical advantage,

 

but is very vulnerable to the Hastatus strategical movement advantage.

 

so the only answer to that weakness is to always attached a light infantry in etheir side,

which will cause them more men and longer static line that is very hard to manuever.

[Furius Venator]

to me, the phalanx have some good points , but also have weakness ;

 

let's see them, they have deeper manpower and longer line,

 

but once engage , they can not be move rearwards, what's more so ,

that diagonal movement is almost impractical or snail pace to do

 

For once we are in complete agreement.

 

and the phalanx made a thundering contact with the Hastatus manipular acies line,

that almost down the H prior line to the ground that was save only by the touching of the

hastae end stake to ground that stop and impared the phalanx continous move

 

Sadly it was a brief moment of concord...

 

The pilum is no more than 5 feet long. How on earth does 'planting it in the ground' prevent the much longer pike from outreaching it? Or are you claiming that they actually planted stakes like the archers at Agincourt? Either way quote an ancient source who can confirm this.

 

H posterior at the rear area begin to rain them with velitaris

 

Do you mean pila? The effective range of a pila was about 15m. It'd scarcely clear the hastati never mind reach the phalanx.

 

left flank of the phalanx that are left open because their light infantry is left behind away

 

Why?

 

the weak side will now be vulnerable to spear thrusting attack

 

The triarii used spears. they're not engaged yet. Neither principes nor hastati commonly used the spear.

[roman wargamer]

Furius Vanetor Re-Question?

____________________

 

and the phalanx made a thundering contact with the Hastatus manipular acies line,

that almost down the H prior line to the ground that was save only by the touching of the

hastae end stake to ground that stop and impared the phalanx continous move

 

===

 

Sadly it was a brief moment of concord...

 

xxx

 

The pilum is no more than 5 feet long. How on earth does 'planting it in the ground' prevent the much longer pike from outreaching it? Or are you claiming that they actually planted stakes like the archers at Agincourt? Either way quote an ancient source who can confirm this.

 

reply

 

i say it is "hastae" not pilum, as pilum is not a weapon of Hastatus, but of triarii.

 

________________________________________________

 

 

H posterior at the rear area begin to rain them with velitaris

 

===

 

Do you mean pila? The effective range of a pila was about 15m. It'd scarcely clear the hastati never mind reach the phalanx.

 

reply

 

so you do not know what is "velitaris." it is not pila that i say, i said "velitaris."

 

__________________________________________________

 

left flank of the phalanx that are left open because their light infantry is left behind away

 

===

 

Why?

 

xxx

 

reply

 

the phalanx light infantry is in the phalanx rear position, like the H antepilanus, as of that time.

 

___________________________________________________

 

the weak side will now be vulnerable to spear thrusting attack

 

===

 

The triarii used spears. they're not engaged yet. Neither principes nor hastati commonly used the spear.

 

xxx

 

for me , and for the benifit of common reader , spear are the "generalized modern term" use for:

the Hastatus "hastae" or the Triarii "pilae" , which is not use as "javelin."

 

to be specific... the spear i mention... is the H antepilanus "pila." it is called the pila.

 

____________________________________________________________________

Q?

The pilum is no more than 5 feet long.

How on earth does 'planting it in the ground' prevent the much longer pike from outreaching it?

 

 

reply

 

as i said it is not pilum, the Hastatus use the longer "hastae",

and a hatae have a pointed metal spike in the rear end of the stake use for planting it in the ground.

 

i hope my old memory do not fail me.