Battle Scenarios

[Legionnaire]

I doubt tyhe legion of that era is flexible enough to divide as you suggest.

 

Other than Scipio at Ilipa, can anyone recall fancy tactics employed by the legions? I can't (though that's not to say there aren't any).

 

Whilst the later legions were quite flexible in their formations, that seems to have been used to aid reinforcement of the line and so on rather than fancy flanking.

 

Form them up and leave them to it generally worked very well for the Romans, attempts to tinker (eg Cannae possibly) generally didn't work out too well. The better Roman commanders used their reserves well, the superb ones (eg Caesar at Pharsalus) used there reserves in unexpected ways. But Roman infantry could be trusted to break almost any foe in head on collision (Hannibals centre was destroyed in each of his victories). To my mind, it's the poor Samnites who need to do something clever (like laying down their arms and pleading for terms- I'm prepared to be generous...)

 

Hannibal's centre was destroyed in his victories, such as at Cannae, with the purpose of trapping the Romans. Yes, the legions were able to completely destroy Hannibal's infantry head on, but by doing so, they effectively defeated themsleves by exposing their flanks and rear to attack. If the legions were more flexible - if a commander employed the more flexible maniple system rather than the rigid phalanx formation, the Romans would have experienced greater success on the battlefield at this time in history.

 

The use of a more adaptable formation is exactly what I am proposing for this situation. The phalanx and its powerful frontal assaults are perfectly adapted for open field warfare but are utterly useless in valleys or mountainous regions.

 

In The Histories, Polybius describes the difference between the Roman Maniple and the Macedonian Phalanx, which essentially becomes the difference between a flexible and an inflexible strategy of attack:

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

 

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

 

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

 

Thus, if I commanded a Roman legion, I would pursue a more open, "fancy" tactic: remember, the Romans adopted the maniple formation during warfare with other Italic tribes - including the Gauls and the Samnites.

[Furius Venator]

The maniple (and later cohort) were certainly flexible in a sense but my point is that that flexibility was more in the nature of allowing rapid reinforcement of weak spots in the line rathe than meaning they they could wander about the field at will paying little heed to the overall cohesion of the legionn of which they were part.

 

Further, my impression of 4th century Roman legions (it's not my main field) is that they were less flexible than the legions of the Punic Wars, I may be wrong. But if the legions were in a phalanx like formation at Cannae I'll eat my copy of Livy. That's to digress though.

 

'The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, '

 

Polybius demonstrates exactly what I'm saying. The flexibility of the maniples is that they are not all committed. The 'gaps' in the Roman formation allow the phalanx to become dislocated and the reserve maniple fall on the flanks of the unit that has 'breached' the open roman line. He's not talking about the walking round the sides of then enemy formation, rather describing the effect of the three line 'chequerboard' formation.

[Gaius Octavius]

Please don't misunderstand me, you could obviously give orders as you pleased. All I meant was that the troops might well not have the training to follow them through correctly. I don't think heavy infantry, especially the Romans of the 4th century are mobile enough to do as you suggest. and I don't think that battles are exactly 'mobs hacking away' either., but I take your point, simply saying, 'Form line of battle chaps and get after them!' isn't what we consider good generalship, so obsessed are we with flash tactics. I'd far rather win in grand, sweeping style so future historians could marvel at my adroit handling of troops. But, if your putting me in command of a Roman legion (of any era) I'm going to stick to tried and tested (I'd rather be boring than defeated).

 

How will you maintain communication with your subordinate commander who has half your force and is perhaps a mile away?

 

Defeated like Vaus? I wouldn't be thinking of history - just winning. The Romans did have a signal system. And messingers. Troopers can and were trained. By heavy armor, do you mean dismounted medieval knights?

I realize that this is a chess game. All the moves are on the board, but I am not telling Germanicus my future moves. He will see.

[Furius Venator]

By heavy infantry I simply mean close order foot. The later Romans likely manoeuvred in quite open order (faster) but closed ranks for combat. I don't think that the legions of this tme were that flexible (though I might be wrong).

 

It's really hard to get formed bodies of men to move at any speed cross country without them losing formation- potentially deadly for troops trained to fight in close order rather than skirmish.

 

I know you could send messengers, but they do take time and pre arranged signals limit the level of communication that can be achieved...

[Gaius Octavius]

Please don't misunderstand me, you could obviously give orders as you pleased. All I meant was that the troops might well not have the training to follow them through correctly. I don't think heavy infantry, especially the Romans of the 4th century are mobile enough to do as you suggest. and I don't think that battles are exactly 'mobs hacking away' either., but I take your point, simply saying, 'Form line of battle chaps and get after them!' isn't what we consider good generalship, so obsessed are we with flash tactics. I'd far rather win in grand, sweeping style so future historians could marvel at my adroit handling of troops. But, if your putting me in command of a Roman legion (of any era) I'm going to stick to tried and tested (I'd rather be boring than defeated).

 

How will you maintain communication with your subordinate commander who has half your force and is perhaps a mile away?

 

Again, if "I" have to use the tactics of the time, what is the point of the exercise?

At some point in time things do change. I am not using or doing anything that was not possible at that time. No tanks or howitzers. Hannibal did not use a phalanx at Lake Trasimine nor Scipio at Zama. "I" am just ahead of them. Someone had to do it first. Why not me? I am not limiting Germanicus.

Scipio found a way to neutralize and defeat Hannibal's elephants at Zama. Should he not have done that because it was not done before?

A long time ago, I read a book by a British officer, I think Liddell-Hart. I think that it was titled 'Greater Than Alexander' (Scipio). He imagined an imaginary conversation betwen Hannibal and Scipio. Scipio asked Hannibal who was the greatest Captain in history? Hannibal answered himself; but the greatest General was Scipio. Liddell-Hart(?) claimed that Alexander fought oriental 'mobs', whereas Scipio fought an organized army. I am not denigrating Alexander, nor was the author.

 

Bring on Germanicus.

Edited April 1, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[Germanicus]

It's really hard to get formed bodies of men to move at any speed cross country without them losing formation

 

I was relying on the above and below to an extent.

 

I know you could send messengers, but they do take time and pre arranged signals limit the level of communication that can be achieved...

 

 

Again, if "I" have to use the tactics of the time, what is the point of the exercise?

At some point in time things do change. I am not using or doing anything that was not possible at that time. No tanks or howitzers. Hannibal did not use a phalanx at Lake Trasimine nor Scipio at Zama. "I" am just ahead of them. Someone had to do it first. Why not me? I am not limiting Germanicus.

Scipio found a way to neutralize and defeat Hannibal's elephants at Zama. Should he not have done that because it was not done before?

A long time ago, I read a book by a British officer, I think Liddell-Hart. I think that it was titled 'Greater Than Alexander' (Scipio). He imagined an imaginary conversation betwen Hannibal and Scipio. Scipio asked Hannibal who was the greatest Captain in history? Hannibal answered himself; but the greatest General was Scipio. Liddell-Hart(?) claimed that Alexander fought oriental 'mobs', whereas Scipio fought an organized army. I am not denigrating Alexander, nor was the author.

 

Bring on Germanicus.

 

 

I think this whole thread is fanciful. Gaius you are presupposing a whole host of factors, as in fact am I. Which army has better morale ? When my larger force and your smaller one clashes - how do you know how my battle line is formed ? How do we know how your second (as I understand it your force is divided into two, not three) force will react to seeing your first taking heavy casualties ? Do my men like me more than yours like you ? If I did take the hill, and you surround me - won't your forces be very spread out ? Where as I can punch through your thin line etc etc.

 

It's all conjecture - I am now bowing out of this thread, largely because I find it as annoying as so many other "what if" threads, which go nowhere and end up going round in circles - as this is beginning to. Armchair generals are just that. But please - have fun.

[Gaius Octavius]

Germanicus, you are so mature and so right. I am going back to Rome.

[Legionnaire]

Germanicus,

 

You are right: much of the discussion on this thread is pure speculation of "armchair generals". However, my purpose in making this thread was not to create another "what if" discussion, but rather to have intelligent debates on the best battlefield strategies and formations as employed by the Romans throughout the history of the Republic and Empire.

 

So, if you want, this could easily become a more academic thread in which specific examples of battles are listed and analyzed and in which we examine the testimony of Roman historians, such as Vegetius in Military Matters:

 

VARIOUS FORMATIONS FOR BATTLE

 

An army may be drawn up for a general engagement in seven different formations. The first formation is an oblong square of a large front, of common use both in ancient and modern times, although not thought the best by various judges of the service, because an even and level plain of an extent sufficient to contain its front cannot always be found, and if there should be any irregularity or hollow in the line, it is often pierced in that part. Besides, an enemy superior in number may surround either your right or left wing, the consequence of which will be dangerous, unless you have a reserve ready to advance and sustain his attack. A general should make use of this disposition only when his forces are better and more numerous than the enemy's, it being thereby in his power to attack both the flanks and surround them on every side.

 

The second and best disposition is the oblique. For although your army consists of few troops, yet good and advantageously posted, it will greatly contribute to your obtaining the victory, notwithstanding the numbers and bravery of the enemy. It is as follows: as the armies are marching up to the attack, your left wing must be kept back at such a distance from the enemy's right as to be out of reach of their darts and arrows. Your right wing must advance obliquely upon the enemy's left, and begin the engagement. And you must endeavor with your best cavalry and infantry to surround the wing with which you are engaged, make it give way and fall upon the enemy in the rear. If they once give ground and the attack is properly seconded, you will undoubtedly gain the victory, while your left wing, which continued at a distance, will remain untouched. An army drawn up in this manner bears some resemblance to the letter A or a mason's level. If the enemy should be beforehand with you in this evolution, recourse must be had to the supernumerary horse and foot posted as a reserve in the rear, as I mentioned before. They must be ordered to support your left wing. This will enable you to make a vigorous resistance against the artifice of the enemy.

 

The third formation is like the second, but not so good, as it obliges you to begin the attack with your left wing on the enemy's right. The efforts of soldiers on the left are weak and imperfect from their exposed and defective situation in the line. I will explain this formation more clearly. Although your left wing should be much better than your right, yet it must be reinforced with some of the best horse and foot and ordered to commence the acnon with the enemy's right in order to disorder and surround it as expeditiously as possible. And the other part of your army, composed of the worst troops, should remain at such a distance from the enemy's left as not to be annoyed by their darts or in danger of being attacked sword in hand. In this oblique formation care must be taken to prevent the line being penetrated by the wedges of the enemy, and it is to be employed only when the enemy's right wing is weak and your greatest strength is on your left.

 

The fourth formation is this: as your army is marching to the attack in order of battle and you come within four or five hundred paces of the enemy, both your wings must be ordered unexpectedly to quicken their pace and advance with celerity upon them. When they find themselves attacked on both wings at the same time, the sudden surprise may so disconcert them as to give you an easy victory. But although this method, if your troops are very resolute and expert, may ruin the enemy at once, yet it is hazardous. The general who attempts it is obliged to abandon and expose his center and to divide his army into three parts. If the enemy are not routed at the first charge, they have a fair opportunity of attacking the wings which are separated from each other and the center which is destitute of assistance.

 

The fifth formation resembles the fourth but with this addition: the light infantry and the archers are formed before the center to cover it from the attempts of the enemy. With this precaution the general may safely follow the above mentioned method and attack the enemy's left wing with his right, and their right with his left. If he puts them to flight, he gains an immediate victory, and if he fails of success his center is in no danger, being protected by the light infantry and archers.

 

The sixth formation is very good and almost like the second. It is used when the general cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops. If made with judgment, notwithstanding his inferiority, he has often a good chance for victory. As your line approaches the enemy, advance your right wing against their left and begin the attack with your best cavalry and infantry. At the same time keep the rest of the army at a great distance from the enemy's right, extended in a direct line like a javelin. Thus if you can surround their left and attack it in flank and rear, you must inevitably defeat them. It is impossible for the enemy to draw off reinforcements from their right or from their center to sustain their left in this emergency, since the remaining part of your army is extended and at a great distance from them in the form of the letter L. It is a formation often used in an action on a march.

 

The seventh formation owes its advantages to the nature of the ground and will enable you to oppose an enemy with an army inferior both in numbers and goodness, provided one of your flanks can be covered either with an eminence, the sea, a river, a lake, a city, a morass or broken ground inaccessible to the enemy. The rest of the army must be formed, as usual, in a straight line and the unsecured flank must be protected by your light troops and all your cavalry. Sufficiently defended on one side by the nature of the ground and on the other by a double support of cavalry, you may then safely venture on action.

 

One excellent and general rule must be observed. If you intend to engage with your right wing only, it must be composed of your best troops. And the same method must be taken with respect to the left. Or if you intend to penetrate the enemy's line, the wedges which you form for that purpose before your center, must consist of the best disciplined soldiers. Victory in general is gained by a small number of men. Therefore the wisdom of a general appears in nothing more than in such choice of disposition of his men as is most consonant with reason and service.

 

However, an academic discussion loses the human factor and it loses touch with reality, as it tends to ignore the effects of the location and environment of the battle.

[Furius Venator]

I can see what you're getting at. But if we're going to play 'let's pretend' (and I think there is no harm in it, and possibly some merit- after all modern armies wargame both theoretically and practically, but they do so under pretty firm rules) then we need to be aware that if we use historical formations in novel ways then a) the troops aren't going to know what's going on and will fear the strangeness and there might be excellent practical reasons for why such novelty was not practised by Roman generals.

 

So you need at least an umpire and that umpire must be both impartial and have a good knowledge of the historical capabilities of the troops in question. You also have to fill the generals in a bit: how long have they been in command, are their men veterans or recruits? What's their morale, what subordinates are available and what is your impression of their capabilities (and their real capabilities might differ from the impression)? etc etc.

 

Which is kind of why I went for 'Line up in the usual way chaps and see those gutless bastards off in the usual way'.

Edited April 2, 2006 by Furius Venator

[Gaius Octavius]

I am back from Rome, this time as a suppliant. I felt that Germanicus was rude. But, that, if so, was no reason for my rudeness. I apologize for my lapse in manners to Germanicus and to all of you.

 

When I was in school, we had exercises of this kind. In particular, North Africa in WWII. The British 'box'; Rommel's use of tanks and artillery. If my all too faulty memory serves, the British never gave it a thought that Rommel could traverse and debouche from the Quatarra(?) Depression with his tanks on their flank and rear. Suprise! Suprise!

 

Sun Tzu and Macchievelli maintained that the battle and war were won before they commenced. I think that the British have held that Waterloo was won on the cricket fields of Eaton. 'What would you have done at the Battle of....', is a valid topic for discussion and not only fun, provided that one pays careful attention to the dialogue.

 

Si vales; valeo,

 

Furius, much of what you say, I feel, is so. Yet, the elements of surprise and novel movements are never eliminated from these 'games'. They most certainly are encouraged and looked for.

[Legionnaire]

Gaius,

 

No apologies necessary. I did not feel attacked; I just felt I had to clarify the purpose of this topic. I had hoped for the scenario to change each time someone responded with their strategy (or at least more often), rather than continuously debating one battle. Otherwise, like Germanicus said, the thread would start to go "round in circles". I thought that this thread would allow for a more lively, creative discussion about the effectiveness of the Roman legions in different settings because often historians like Vegetius neglect to mention the effects of environment on combat. I thought it was an area that was lacking in discussion and analysis.

 

For instance, here are the questions I often found myself asking as I researched the history of Roman warfare:

1. It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites?
   
2. How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visiblity and room to maneuver?
   
3. As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided?
   
4. Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans?
   

[Germanicus]

Seems to me you've got some good separate thread topic there Legionnaire.

[Legionnaire]

Germanicus,

 

I'll try that. One new topic coming up.

 

Thanks.

[Prometheus]

Ok I didn't read all the posts yet and I guess I am not really an expert eventhough I did read art of war and some stuff. Hmm, of course the first thing I would do is make peace. That's probably in my advantage. But let's assue that I want to defeat them, that is the answer the TS wants.

 

 

 

Hmm, I would be thinking about things on a larger scale than the things people mentioned before me. I would really want to know the character of the enemy general, his motives and such. I would also like to know alternative battlefields. My first though was to let them into my territory while I pick a battlefield that is even more to my advantage. It is not clear if this is possible. I guess it isn't now that the armies are already lined up.

 

I also don't know what type of units the enemy has. I guess one could know or find out if one knew more about the samnites.

 

It seems that the main idea would be to have them come to me in the latter part of the day and then just fight them in a straightforward fashion. A hard head on battles on flat plains would be a tactical advantage to the legions, I imagine. But it could turn out to be a very costly battle. It is in no way clear if winning this battle at hight costs would win the war.

 

A lot of detail is missing. I agree with Sun Tzu, as Octavius already pointed out, that the outcome of the battle if already clear before it starts. So when you add more detail it will tell us the outcome and defeat the purpose of any discussion.

 

So really, since this battle is on my border and there is no reason why I should fight now, I would retreat if that were possible. Let them make some mistake and then take thr advantage. Since you did not mention a mistake and since that would ruin any discussion, it seems that this battle will be a bloody one if both forces really want to fight.

 

Really, they could even have that part of my land if they wanted. It would be a waste of men. I would wait for the possibility of a real victory.

 

There is a nice anecdote in my version of Sun Tzu's Art of War that Tu Mu added to Estimates No.24: Pretend inferiority and encorage his arrogane: "Towards the end of the Ch'in dynasty, Mu Tun of the Hsiung Nu first established his power. The eastern Hu were strong and send embassadors to parley. They said: 'We wish a T'ou Ma 's thousand-li horse.' Mo Tun consulted his advisors, who all exclaimed: 'The thousand-li horse! The most precious thing in this country! Do not give them that!' Mu Tun replied: 'Why begrudge a horse to a neighbour?' So he send the horse.

Shortly after, the Eastern Hu send envoys who said: 'We wish one of the Khan's princesses.' Mo Tun asked advice of his ministers who all angrily said: 'The Eastern Hu are unrighteous! Now they even ask for our princess! We implore you to attack them!' Mo Tun said: 'How can one begrude his neighbour a young woman?' So he gave the woman.

A short time later, the Eastern Hu returned and said: 'You have a thousand li of unused which we want.' Mo Tun consulted his advisors. Some said it would be reasonable to cede the land, others that it would not. Mo Tun was enraged and said: 'Land is the foundation of the state. How could one give it away?' All those who had advised doing so were beheaded

Mo Tun then sprang on his horse, ordered that all who remained behind were to be beheaded, and made a suprise attack on the Eastern Hu. The Eastern Hu were contemptious of him and had made no preperations. When he attacked he annihilated them. Mo Tun then turned westward andattacked Yueh Ti. To the south he annexed Lou Fan . . . and invaded Yen."

 

So I see no reason why it would be advantageous to fight that battle now and then. I would withdraw if I could. but like I said before it is not clear what influence that would have. Is the moral of the enemy bad and may it increase if I do so? Will the moral of my troups reduce if I withdraw? Or will it not matter? Is the enemy general arrogant and can I use the point made by Sun Tzu and explained by Tu Mu above? Or maybe I am already famed for my deceptions and the enemy will follow slowly, fearing an ambush of some sort and giving me time to create an advantage.

 

But maybe the border area is of vital importance for some reason. Maybe it is worthless. If the last is true maybe the enemy will go home when I retreat. If so then that means I outright won the battle without a drop of blood.

 

But if there will be a battle here and now. I will probably try to get a head on straightforward battle, which would favour roman heavy infantry, and try to keep my units concentrated and strike at their weakest point until they rout. But in terms of tactics I don't feel so knowledgeable. Maybe they have troops hidden in those lightly forested hills. Maybe I can use them. I think one would need a map for that.

Maybe I have quite a few cretan archers and balearic slingers. If the hills are exactly right I could hide those in those forests and then withdraw my heavy infantry. If they follow they will get into heavy fire and they will be in trouble. In any case they will have a disadvantage and I just turn around the infantry at the right time and I charge full speed. Their troops will already be either in panic, retreat or a desperate charge. It will be very hard for the enemy commander to keep order in his troops. I guess that they will just rout very easily.

Edited April 3, 2006 by Prometheus

[caldrail]

here are the questions I often found myself asking as I researched the history of Roman warfare:

1. It is generally accepted that the phalanx, while almost impenetrable in open field combat, is useless in rougher terrain. Are there any faults in the later Roman formations that could be exploited by warriors adapted to mountainous warfare, such as the Samnites?
   
2. How effective is cavalry in forested areas? Is cavalry support only useful on terrain that is level and that offers a great degree of visiblity and room to maneuver?
   
3. As Arminius' success at Teutoburg Forest demonstrated, the Roman legion was quite to ambush. How could such slaughters be avoided?
   
4. Was the Roman heavy infantry (legionnaires) an effective unit in engaging heavy cavalry units, such as the cataphracts? If not, how could the landscape be exploited to shift the odds in favour of the Romans?
   

 

1 - Any formation in rough terrain in vulnerable because the normal spacing is interrupted. Given that they're clambering over rocks too, a good series of spear/arrow/slingshot volleys would disrupt the unit even further. Stronger in defence I would say, and perhaps the samnites would have local knowledge to choose good ambush locations?

 

2 - Cavalry in forested areas is at a disadvantage, Russel Crowe notwithstanding. Its more difficult to charge because trees are in the way. Its more difficult to ride because you have to avoid branches. The ground is likely to be full of undergrowth and hidden dips hazardous to galloping horses. You could still usefully employ cavalry in lighter forests, and in the event of melee, a cavalryman has the 'higher ground' regardless. Its just that cavalry is so much better suited to a clear path. Hiding your horses in the trees and mounting a swift ambush would be great.

 

3 - Slaughters in the forest are best avoided by prior knowledge. 'Intel', as we like to say these days. Spies, prisoners, deserters, travellers - they all have little pieces of information that an astute commander can use to second-guess his enemies moves. Julius Caesar was a past master at that.

 

4 - The heavy infantry of classical legions would be advised to have their pilum to hand. Not a brilliant weapon for fending off horses, but it would do. Cataphracts are a difficult case though because it depends on whether they have reached charge speed. If so, the longer reach of their lance (kontos?) would definitely prove itself deadly. Once halted, roman soldiers might evade the longer shaft of the enemy and close in, meaning the cavalry then adopt a sword or something instead and a normal melee ensues. Of course, the heavily armoured cataphract can still fight with some defensive advantage here.

Edited April 4, 2006 by caldrail