Morality And Killing

[Pertinax]

I wonder if what we are turning over in this thread ,is in fact, the concentration of killing on any given battlefield by elite units who are by inclination and training more able to kill? The SS units moving into France at the head of the German assault were in constant demand for their aggressive and effective intervention, hence suffering heavier casualties themselves (Quarrie " Hitler's Samurai") though it should be noted less casualties than badly lead wehrmacht units.

Or is the whole equation that only a few will seek to kill in any situation, so get them together as an effective unit? Chicken and egg paradox.

[Furius Venator]

The findings of Wigram and Marshall are quite clear. In any unit good or bad only 25% maximum can be relied upon. These studies included elite units such as US paratroopers but excluded special operations forces. It is possible that in some special forces units this proportion rises. But not in organisations as big as for instance the Waffen SS or the British Commandos.

 

Better training, discipline and above all leadership will get the 'sheep' who make up the bulk of any unit to actually participate in some way. Firing their weapons for instance. Modern armies are much better post-Wigram/Marshall at actually getting their men to open up on the enemy. But it's still the same 20-25%who will actually aim at a target.

[Pertinax]

Interesting stuff FV. I just wonder what happens in counter insurgency operations? I presume even less effective contact given the fluidity and uncertainty of urban counter terror ops.

 

OK another angle then -do effective leaders ,who are adaptable and "dynamic" (an overused word ,I apologise) make the difference on a strategic and tactical level in what must always be a clash of "equally ineffective" combatants (Monash, Lawrence, Wingate, Caesar?)? We know inflexible commanders are ,literally , the kiss of death..(Crimea, Franco-Prussian, 1 WW )?

 

I was hoping other members would get drawn in but no luck so far..must be me rambling on again..

Edited April 4, 2006 by Pertinax

[Furius Venator]

Command at platoon level is key. Subalterns and sergeants must get their men fighting (even if it's only firing in the vague direction of the enemy with their eyes closed. Good training helps but the officers and ncos must tell most of the men what to do.

 

As regards higher command, good leaders have an impact. But it's more in the nature of 'conducting' the battle (in the sense of conducting an orchestra), knowinhg the likmitations of your troops and ensuring that you have local superiority of force at critical points.

[Virgil61]

...OK another angle then -do effective leaders ,who are adaptable and "dynamic" (an overused word ,I apologise) make the difference on a strategic and tactical level in what must always be a clash of "equally ineffective" combatants (Monash, Lawrence, Wingate, Caesar?)? We know inflexible commanders are ,literally , the kiss of death..(Crimea, Franco-Prussian, 1 WW )

 

I have to agree with Furius, officer and NCO leadership in the 'line' units is the key. At company level and below is where the rubber hits the road.

 

It's also from these leaders that you push that 25% rate of weapons being aimed up as high as possible. You pound it into their heads that all weapons point out and engaged. Even off-target metal flying towards the enemy accomplishes something. Sergeants watch their teams, Staff-Sergeants watch their squad, Sergeants First Class watch their platoon and so on. It's where you train your soldiers not to all rush to one wounded soldier during a firefight, it sounds cold but you lose more weapons firing down-range and endanger your position. One or more men down, only one man helps. If a medic is available it's his game.

 

I'll be curious to see what the data shows in combat in Iraq. My gut feeling is Regular Army and Marine units will generally have better combat effectiveness than the National Guard and Reserves.

[Pertinax]

So in terms of martial efficacy we seem to be developing an argument that: if a person of reasonable intelligence finds himself in charge of an army with fully capable NCO's , who feel personal loyalty to both unit and CinC , you'd better get out of the way.Sounds a little like Gaius Julius Caeser.

Looping back to my first post on the Civil War the "retreiving" of casualties was mentioned as a major "alternative" to loading/re-loading a weapon as an act of participation (and bravery) but an avoidance of killing.

Virgil-I was reading about Marine units "response to ambush" in (Vietnam) combat, am I correct in saying the essential activity was to put out fire (almost regardless of direction)? That now makes sense in relation to your sending of any munitions in the right general direction.

[Furius Venator]

A direct consequence of the Wigram/Marshall findings was that the number of men firing increased dramatically in Korea, and again in Vietnam, as training of officers and ncos improved. It was observed in WWII that one never heard Brens and Spandaus firing at the same time. The mere act of firing, however inaccurate, kept the enemy suppressed.

[Virgil61]

...

Virgil-I was reading about Marine units "response to ambush" in (Vietnam) combat, am I correct in saying the essential activity was to put out fire (almost regardless of direction)? That now makes sense in relation to your sending of any munitions in the right general direction.

 

I'm not sure about the tactical response of the Marines in 'Nam but it sounds similar to what we trained our company to do in Iraq. Lead flying down-range makes the enemy keep his head down no matter how inaccurate, unless it's a fanatic, and then he'll be dead anyway. More time spent on the firing range, coupled with battle drills helps soldiers by learn by sheer rote to instinctively draw a bead on the target. The very act of firing one's weapon becomes associated with lining up the sites on the target--not always foolproof but effective nevertheless. In a lot of situations suppresive fire gets used but crew-served weapons then come into play or something bigger like a 25mm, air support, M1, etc., and determine the battle.

 

I do know that supporting the Marines, their standard procedure and directive in ambushes in 2003/04 was for all units involved to counter-attack rather than drive-through (depending on mission of course). The only time I drove-through an ambush was one ill-timed but urgent trip to Baghdad airport from the eastern suburbs with only two humvees and four soldiers. I kid you not, the only d*mned time that humvee stalled was exactly when my driver sped up to pull out of it.

 

Now this, this is how it's done! True story.

Edited April 5, 2006 by Virgil61

[Gaius Octavius]

Aside from killing and wounding, the German SS murdered their opponents. The regular army units did not like to serve with them beause they would become subject to Allied 'justice' at the front. They were not treated very kindly when captured.

At one time it was taught that it was better if an enemy were wounded rather than killed, because it took at least two men out of the battle,

[Pertinax]

Virgil -the "true story" is very good , thanks for posting.

 

GO , was the idea of "maiming" in a European theatre context (ie;conventional ground war versus large scale communist infantry/mech forces? Was there not also a relationship to lowish velocity rounds as a potential ballistic norm?

 

Point here as well-if you have a gladius ,you are going to aim to kill, directly: if you have a weapon designed to cause trauma (and you know that ) will you use it? Id reiterate a point ive mentioned previously, we know the actual out and out killing potential of the pilum/gladius/scutum combination was unmatched for centuries and that the "theatricality" of many new gunpowder weapons was their main belligerent focus (some say the tank is a sort of lethal theatrical device to terrorise as much as to destroy) , now I assume pur ballistic weaponry can be made to produce any desired effect but actual inflicted fatalities have dropped massivley on dispersed battlefields.

[Virgil61]

...

At one time it was taught that it was better if an enemy were wounded rather than killed, because it took at least two men out of the battle,

 

That's why causalty SOPs (standard operating procedures) need are so important and need to be emphasised. Even as recently as 1998 during JRTC training at Fort Polk medical observers saw soldiers concentrate disproportionate efforts on wounded to the detriment of the tactical situation.

 

Combat first-aid needs to be trained, litter-teams need to be designated (preferably the 1SG's responsibility--company SM to Brits), the medic or a designated combat medic course trained soldier should be the only one treating wounded and so on. The key is the soldier knows that if he's wounded he'll be taken care of and that other soldiers understand the need to concentrate on the immediate mission.

[Furius Venator]

but actual inflicted fatalities have dropped massivley on dispersed battlefields.

 

 

Quite the reverse I'd say. The losing side suffered heavily in ancient battles but the winners usually had casualty rates of 5% or less, exceptionally as many as 15% (but that is really rare). The defeated might lose half their force, but most of these casualties were inflicted once the battle proper was over (during the pursuit).

[Pertinax]

FV I know what you are saying, and I dont disagree -but I was suggesting heavier casualties in the whole episode of the engagement including the rout of the broken side-Boudiccas revolt being our best known for uneven fatalities in pitched battle.

[Primus Pilus]

FV I know what you are saying, and I dont disagree -but I was suggesting heavier casualties in the whole episode of the engagement including the rout of the broken side-Boudiccas revolt being our best known for uneven fatalities in pitched battle.

 

Mons Graupius would qualify as well... 10,000 Caledonians to 360 Romans (or so Tacitus tells us). But that sort of massively uneven rout was fairly common in ancient battles. At least they were reported as such.

[Pertinax]

and.. both those battles were "resolved" (or the rout was triggered by) the first pilum wave into an enemy provoked to attack over disadvantageous terrain -ok not that simple but the first pilum shock to break forward momentum did the key psychological (and I imagine physical) damage.