Some Questions About Ancient (and Medieval) Warfare

[Furius Venator]

I understand your nice theoretical system. But that's all it is, a theory.

 

What's your reference for this?

 

And you still do not address the mechanics of how this nice drill was applied in action.

 

Some points:

 

A street fight is not a battle.

 

My point is exactly that men could not fight for prolongued periods. This would give rise to lulls in the fighting during which the troops may heve replenished/swapped their front ranks.

 

Modern military battle order has damn all to do with Roman tactics.

 

You are describing the Romans grounding their spears like pikes. This is highly irregular. What's your source and why do you assume that, if it ever happened, it was a regular occurence.

 

Whether or not you have been nearly killed is neither here nor there. I am fully prepared to believe that you are a very brave man who would never countenance running from the enemy. The plain fact is though that men in battle flee. And in ancient battles they fled well before losing 10% of their strength. The casualty figures speak for themselves.

[caldrail]

Human beings are social animals. We prefer to be in groups when things get heated. If your group is turning and going away, usually so do you regardless of courage. There have always been exceptions of couse.

 

Morale in battle depends on many things. Your state of mind, how aggressive you are, who the enemy is, your physical health, the state of your equipment, the weather, your position, your numbers, support in flanks and rear, our current fitness, your understanding of the whole picture.

[roman wargamer]

Q? And you still do not address the mechanics of how this nice drill was applied in action.

 

reply

 

if i will answer you in a very detailed mannner, the book i dream of writting will now be realize.

that is why i claim copyright to all my reply.

 

you have to do your own study of the Roman Legiones yourselve.

so you could distinguished "hastae" from "hastula" or the "pilae" of the triarii.

the very name of the soldier will immediately signify position and location in the battlefield.

 

Praefectus Castrorum control the left flank of the "main agmen."

Legatus Legionis control the center of the "main agmen."

Tribunus Laticlavius control the right flank of the "main agmen."

 

 

Q? A street fight is not a battle.

 

reply

 

i have been in the center of a battle many times between soldier and muslim seperatist at our city.

i know the different between street fight and military battle.

 

 

Q? My point is exactly that men could not fight for prolongued periods. This would give rise to lulls in the fighting during which the troops may heve replenished/swapped their front ranks.

 

reply

 

NO!!!, if you are the ONE who retreate, the whole army might presumed it you are losing the battle,

or you are already escaping.

 

granting without conceding,

 

"This would give rise to lulls in the fighting during which the troops may heve replenished/swapped their front ranks."

 

here is the problem???

 

How are you going to March Forward the thousand fresh men in the front liner position,

in an "intact" organizational structure and not lost their proper function and position,

and still without effecting a chaos and disorientation in the men you will pass by???

 

if you have no pre-arranged battle drill formation march. practiced before the war.

 

...ask a military drill master, even a fire team have a pre-arranged battle formation.

 

 

that is the difference of the Romanus Legiones,

the enemy do not have a system how to rotate the rankand file of the front line,

 

the Roman have a pre-arrange battle formation perfected by constant practiced,

for almost a years before they where send to war.

 

when the whole "primum acies" Hastatus manipular lines was badly battered,

and when they are still "intact" and still a figting line...

... a "signa ad triariros redisse" will be given to let them reorganised behind the triarius line,

and the battle will fall in the shoulder of the veteran "triarii manipular line."

 

please most of my example was only means to clarify a part scene, not the whole battle situation.

 

Q? Modern military battle order has damn all to do with Roman tactics.

 

reply

 

most military historian will concede that modern military organizational structure...

... was adopted from the Roman Legio.

 

Q? You are describing the Romans grounding their spears like pikes. This is highly irregular. What's your source and why do you assume that, if it ever happened, it was a regular occurence.

 

reply

 

you need to learn by yourselves, any available martial arts, study it , like boxing.

in boxing, you have a minimum distace of 4 feet between opponents, they are unarmed.

much more if the fighter have arms like sword it will be around 6 feet.

 

here is my explanation on that,

 

when a Hastatus Prior milites advanced to prepare to make a contact to the enemy,

( please take note that the Hastatus Antepilanus was still in the front )

 

the centurio prior will select and decide the right place as the line,

and then will do the battle formation line, and take the active battle form,

normally in the south paw stance, shield in forward position for the front line men,

the second line men will put their shields in the head as coverage as also the last men.

the longest spear "hastae" will be protruded in the form of "hastea kiliing field",

it mean means that from the shields and outward around 4 feet,

you can not come forward without being maimed by the pointed stake of the pilanus.

 

detailed explantion;

 

they will hold it in slightly horizontal diagonal way towards the enemy,

and the end of the stake is resting in the ground, "resting in the ground",

to ease the weight of the hastae, and have a very strong stopping effect if somebody impacted it.

help them have a solid and stable stand, left foot at front and right foot in the rear,

and the hastae act also as a balancer or support cane, while the shield rested also on the ground.

 

Q? I am fully prepared to believe that you are a very brave man who would

never countenance running from the enemy.

 

reply

 

their is no soldeir i know who are my friend or relatives who claim they are brave,

it is the courage to face death and act the right way to defend one selves,even very nervous,

with the belief that by defending you will have a higher chances of surviving.

 

even the Roman military maxim say's let a defeated enemy army have a escaping gaps,

otherwise they going to fight to death for survival to save one's life.

 

Q?

 

The plain fact is though that men in battle flee. And in ancient battles they fled well before losing 10% of their strength. The casualty figures speak for themselves.

 

 

yes!!! to foreign army it really happen, but it is differnt with the Roman.

in common Roman Battle case, melee only happen after the the Triarii and Legio Signifire colapse.

so it almoat means 70% of the Legiones lines already colapse. and not 10 or 30 percent.

 

for in some case, a loss battle can still be won by the veteran Triarii courage to contnue to fight.

 

in J. Caesar some battle, he do many "retreate" ( rotation of lines) but still won the war,

while the enemy vigorously and continously attack the backwarding rotating line,

until the enemy was finally exhausted, and Caesar counter-attacked the enemy without let-ups.

from the behind the line fresh reserved men of second and the main agmen of the legio.

 

in one of the most notable example was battle when he say's " I come, I see , I conquer."

 

Romanus Legiones means of rotation or relieving front liner Prior to Posterion line or vive versa,

do not indicate any literral meaning of retreate or withdrawal,

 

but to let fresh men to take the active fighting and the tired men to rest and reformed themselves.

 

like the cornu say's, "ad signa convenire".

 

you have to learn the elementary of Romanus Legiones Military, to begin with ,

like i do myself more than 20 years since i begin researching ,

 

with the primary purpose of "understanding" it, but never to question the writer lacking.

 

English in not my primary language, so most regular member forgives me on wrong choice of words.

[Furius Venator]

So you claim that the Roman soldier was unique in history, able to sustain 70% losses and still fight on. Interesting.

 

Funnily enough, I have looked at the legions and their operations, and perhaps with an eye more cynical than yours.

 

You claim then that a Roman unit NEVER retreated for tactical purposes in case it gave rise to a general rout, then later that Caesar often used tactical retreats. Which is it to be?

 

Modern military tactics involve units in very open order (by ancient standards) overcoming their enemies by firepower, largely that of indirect fire weapons. The Romans fought in close order and forced the issue at close quarters. You should know this...

 

Good luck with your book anyway.

[caldrail]

Roman soldiers able to withstand 70% casualties? I don't think so. All armies fall apart after 30%. However - there are certain circumstances when higher casualties are taken

 

Unable to retreat, self-sacrifice, and very strong leadership are the only three that come to mind immediately. All are unusual, even for the romans.

[roman wargamer]

Q? Roman soldiers able to withstand 70% casualties? I don't think so. All armies fall apart after 30%. However - there are certain circumstances when higher casualties are taken. caldrail

 

 

Q? So you claim that the Roman soldier was unique in history, able to sustain 70% losses and still fight on. Interesting. Furius Venator

 

reply

 

first , i am looking from a general or legatus point of view , not at individual soldier.

so i am always talking on "individual acies line" and not or never on individual man.

 

see the example explanation;

 

"when the whole "primum acies" Hastatus manipular lines was badly battered,"

and the manipular lines is still "intact" they are immediatelly " signa referre"

 

"and when they are still "intact" and still a figting line..."

but the strenght already fall below an effective active fighting manipular line

"

... a "signa ad triariros redisse" will be given to let them reorganised behind the triarius line,

and the battle will fall in the shoulder of the veteran "triarii manipular line."

 

===

 

here the 3 line of the primum manipular acies have lessen active combat capability,

and could already be considered by the cohors tribunus as loss lines,

but there are not literally all are already dead, but already a loss lines;

 

=30 percent cohors disability.

 

if the situation worsen , it will lead to the Roman doing a O square defensive formation.

 

But please take note, the "Secondus Agmen" is still not in "Batlle Engagement",

 

nor the Main Agmen which is alway held in reserved , for the finalle that will tip the whole battle.

 

_________________________________________________________________________________

 

Q? You claim then that a Roman unit NEVER retreated for tactical purposes in case it gave rise to a general rout, then later that Caesar often used tactical retreats. Which is it to be? Furius Venator

 

reply

 

"in J. Caesar some battle, he do many "retreate" ( rotation of lines)"

i am talking of "rotation of lines" and not literral reatreate or withdrawal of the whole army.

 

Q? "in case it gave rise to a general rout"

 

here is the classic example of what i mean from a Romanus Legiones point of view.

 

battle of munda from unrv

 

" Pompey's men seemed to have viewed this as a general retreat by the one man who knew Caesar so well, and panic was the result "

 

Neither army was able to gain an advantage and both sides likely shifted from moments of sheer panic to believing victory was imminent. The exhausting battle was taking its toll and both commanders left their strategic overview positions to join their men in the ranks. Caesar himself later told friends that he had fought many times for victory, but Munda was the first time he had fought for his life. Finally after an epic struggle, Caesar's 10th began to make the difference.

 

Positioned on Caesar's right wing, the 10th started to push back Pompey's wing. Pompey countered by moving forces from his more secure right wing to reinforce the precarious position on his left. Caesar, however, pressed his advantage and sent his cavalry hard against Pompey's now weakened right. Dio Cassius adds that Caesar's ally, King Bogud of Mauretania now came up and threatened Pompey's camp. Labienus, in command of Pompey's cavalry, recognized the threat and broke off from the main battle with his cavalry to secure the camp, but this seemed to have dire consequences. Pompey's men seemed to have viewed this as a general retreat by the one man who knew Caesar so well, and panic was the result. To this point, both sides had likely lost about 1,000 men each, a relatively high figure and indicative of the difficult fighting, but the actions of Labienus sent Pompey's army into all out fight. Caesar's army overwhelmed the retreating enemy and was merciless in its zeal to end the war. Up to 30,000 men were slaughtered in the carnage, including Labienus, but Gnaeus Pompey managed to escape. Still, it would turn out to be the final major battle and victory of Caesar's career, and one that effectively ended land based resistance.

 

 

Q? Modern military tactics involve units in very open order (by ancient standards) overcoming their enemies by firepower, largely that of indirect fire weapons. The Romans fought in close order and forced the issue at close quarters. You should know this... Furius Venator

 

reply

 

if you will going to talk battle with a regimental commander, you will going to see what it mean,

"if you lost your battle line , you will lost your battle."

 

fighting tactic and strategy in the battle fields never change;

medieval era or even the late modern era;

 

until after the invention of the machine gun.

 

until now if you will going to see it from a general point of view, it never change.

 

but i concede you have a very good argument.

[Furius Venator]

I hate to be pedantic (well ok actually, I quite enjoy it) but modern infantry tactics bear no relation to those of the Roman army. For a start, the Romans did not utilise 'fire and movement', did not rely on 'heavy' weapons and command control was far more rudimentary.

 

I know withdrawals COULD be interpreted as routs but it does not follow that this was always so. Further, if the enemy have been driven off (temporarily) then troops can be replaced on their original position, there is no need to withdraw before their supports have come up. It is precisely the withdrawals whilst under enemy pressure that are most susceptible to becoming routs and precipitating panic amongst reserve formations. In your system troops are ALWAYS withdrawing whilst engaged, in mine seldom if ever. So your system seems more likely to give rise to panic...

 

I do not dispute that front line units were relieved. I do dispute that this occurred whilst they were engaged in hand to hand combat.

 

Could I please request that you don't keep telling me that I need to study the Roman army and its organisation. I have done so for a number of years (perhaps more than twenty...). Nowhere have I come across the Romans using their pilas as pikes in the manner you suggest.

[Spurius]

I'd like to add some information here, it's available at the Digital Attic 2.0. This bit is from "The Military Affairs of Ancient Rome & Roman Art of War in Caesar's Time " by Lt. Col. S.G. Brady.

 

"THE BATTLE

 

"After the signal to advance had been given by the bugles (signa inferre), the first line of the three moved forward with even step (certo gradu) until five or six hundred feet from the enemy. Then the bugles blew the signal to attack. The men advanced at double time (concursu), the first two ranks with javelins poised in their right hands (pilis infestis). When within range, these two ranks delivered their deadly volley. The next three ranks hurled their javelins over the heads of those in front. Then as the enemy was met, there followed a series of hand-to-hand individual conflicts, sword duels, repeated again and again since whenever a front-rank man fell, he was pulled back and the man behind replaced him. Men exhausted or slightly wounded would retire and be relieved by fresh men. The five rear ranks then took the place of these fallen or exhausted men, or perhaps increased the number of the attacking troops.

 

"When the first line as a whole had done its best and become weakened and exhausted by losses, it gave way to the relief of fresh men from the second line who, passing through it gradually, pressed forward one by one, or in single file, and worked their way into the fight in the same way. Meanwhile the tired men of the original first line, when sufficiently rested, reformed and re-entered the fight. This continued until all men of the first and second lines had been engaged. This does not presuppose an actual withdrawal of the first line, but rather a merging, a blending or a coalescing of both lines.

 

"Thus the enemy was given no rest and was continually opposed by fresh troops until, exhausted and demoralized, he yielded to repeated attacks. Sometimes the onset of the first ranks was sufficient to put the enemy to flight. For this reason the, best marksmen with the pila and the best swordsmen were put in the forward positions. The standard-bearers were not in the front ranks, but were kept behind the good men of at least the first two ranks who were perhaps called "antesignani". (emphasis mine- Spurius)

 

"There was at times a natural tendency to close in, probably from the right, the exposed flank (latus apertum) to the left, and this necessitated commands to open ranks and extend intervals (laxare manipulos). For this and other reasons the first cohort on the right of the line had the best men in the whole legion. But the readiness and steadiness of all troops, officers and men, in sudden emergencies showed the excellent tactical training they had received. Battles were won by these persistent attacks, and the Gauls, once defeated, suffered heavy casualties, being mostly cut down or captured and sold as slaves. "

 

The same place makes comparasions between FIELD ARTILLERY and HEAVY MACHINE GUNS correctly or incorrectly.

 

The Attic also has some Vegetius there too.

[Furius Venator]

'Men exhausted or slightly wounded would retire and be relieved by fresh men. The five rear ranks then took the place of these fallen or exhausted men, or perhaps increased the number of the attacking troops'

 

And nowhere does he describe how this occurred, he merely states it as his opinion.

 

'Then as the enemy was met, there followed a series of hand-to-hand individual conflicts'

 

This I agree with, as I suspect that most front rankers were barely engaged.

 

'When the first line as a whole had done its best and become weakened and exhausted by losses, it gave way to the relief of fresh men from the second line who, passing through it gradually, pressed forward one by one, or in single file, and worked their way into the fight in the same way. Meanwhile the tired men of the original first line, when sufficiently rested, reformed and re-entered the fight. This continued until all men of the first and second lines had been engaged. This does not presuppose an actual withdrawal of the first line, but rather a merging, a blending or a coalescing of both lines. '

 

This presupposes a complete break down of the units formation, an intermingling of ranks and the disintegration of files. This might have happened. Still sheds no light on how they actually pass each other given the lack of room.

 

'"There was at times a natural tendency to close in, probably from the right, the exposed flank (latus apertum) to the left'

 

This of course directly contradicts the Greek experience as described by Thucydides etc where units tended to drift RIGHT to protect their shield side. Perhaps the Romans were different.

 

'and this necessitated commands to open ranks and extend intervals '

 

which would not be possible whilst engaged. Much more likely done to allow reforming when the unit was unengaged but perhaps in proximity to the enemy.

[Spurius]

Well, as far as I know, no surviving or translated ancient texts actually have details on how the manouvers actually were carried out. It is all implied, so you have to make a judgement call on what you believe is possible. I, of course, could be wrong about the paudacity of primary or secondary sources.

 

Now then, here is my take on the subject:

 

1) Battles were fluid and most did have ebb and flows where close combat was not continuous up and down the line. In fact, where it was recorded as being nearly continuous by historians, there were always remarks about great numbers of casualties on both sides. This makes me believe that most replacement of ranks occured during these lulls.

 

2) If it were necessary to replace while fighting, maybe this passage under the "Evolutions" chapter by Vegetius could shed some light:

 

... They should learn to dress in a straight line and to keep an equal and just distance between man and man. They must then be ordered to double the rank, which they must perform very quickly, and instantly cover their file leaders. In the next place, they are to double again and form four deep. And then the triangle or, as it is commonly called, the wedge, a disposition found very serviceable in action. They must be taught to form the circle or orb; for well-disciplined troops, after being broken by the enemy, have thrown themselves into this position and have thereby prevented the total rout of the army....

 

Especially with the "orb", this passage implies that these formation frontage changes are expected to be made while in combat. So here is my supposition on how it could work-

 

The legion is fighting normally with a double frontage. The enemy is not withdrawing either by weight of numbers or stubborness. The command to double frontage again comes down and the fresh legionaires doing the extra doubling. Then the tired and wounded ones could move back into the rear leaving the original double frontage formation intact. The good pilum throwers and sharp swordsmen could create enough of a space to carry this out with minimal problems, but even without them the evolution should be close to instinctive.

 

Also, if the fighting was indeed too intense for replacement even with a double-double frontage...you get the high casualties. Of course, unless the opposition are disciplined troops, the enemy is suffering even higher rates of loss. They are probably pressed too close to use their weapons effectively.

 

Again, just my take on the issue...I haven't really put any deep thought into this.

Cheers!

[Furius Venator]

You are correct, it's a judgement call. Nonetheless some things are trotted out (even by professional historians and soldiers) without having been thought through hence my numerous postings.

 

Vegetius wrote a theoretical manual, there's little evidence to suggest his ideas were ever used. Myself though, I suspect the gist is right, the manoeuver had to be carried out quickly because the enemy might be very close though not actually engaged.

 

Can you name an ancient battle where the winners suffered more than 10% casualties, there aren't many. Usually the winner suffered less than 5%, often much less. Of course the 'lightly' wounded in the victorious army might not be counted in their casualties as they would return to the ranks quite swiftly.

 

What is interesting is Caesar in his Gallic wars describing men as being too closely grouped to fight properly. It is unclear though whether he means that centuries were too close together so they could not manoeuver or individuals were too closely packed to use their weapons properly (in testudo agains javelins?) or both.

[Kosmo]

In regard of the question of formation depth: if we might think that roman used deep formations for easy manouvering the greek phalanx never manouvered because was a continuous line and they had even deeper lines. So, I don't think that is the reason.

And ther is no info about changing position from back to forward in a greek or macedonian phalanx.

 

Summary: Why were so deep the formations

-the back acting as a reserve changing the contact line

-to have a large mass for pushing

-to keep the contact line from withdrawing

-to manouver sideways easy.

My opinion it's for options 2 and 3.

 

And I don't understand how they had deep and wide gaps in the line if they don't take a square (or ovo) formation because the flanks of the manipuli will be opened to attack. Maybe the gaps were small so only few enemies will dare to enter between the formations.

Edited March 30, 2006 by Kosmo

[Furius Venator]

It is IMPOSSIBLE to manoeuvre very wide formations over any distance of ground without them losing all order and cohesion. Not difficult, impossible. Even the Greek Phalank must have maintained intervals between separate units or it could not have advanced without falling into hopless confusion. In the eighteenth century, professional armies were drilled to as near perfection as we are ever likely to see. A frontage of about four or five hundred men seem the maximum that could be manoeuvered, narrower frontages move faster, much faster the narrower they get.

 

 

A 'simple' advance is a manoeuvre. And far more difficult than one might think if one is to maintain cohesion. Even Greek phalanxes advanced! Thus the phalanx must have maintained intervals between units.

 

Where is there any reference to ANY troops pushing each other with their shields, other than the highly contentious assertions of Hanson et al that this was the hoplite party trick. Napoleonic columns formed deep for manouever and shock (the 'weight' of a column so lamentably misinterpreted by Greek historians).

 

 

Units form deep mainly for manoeuvre and steadiness. Hence good troops, well drilled can form as thin as three deep whereas untrained levies tend to be formed very deep indeed.

 

Note that the Spartans tended to form thinner than other Greek nations. They'd be insane to do so if there really was a Greek version of the rugby scrum about to commence. They did so because they had very high morale and so did not need numbers of back ranks to give morale reassurance. They also marched very slowly and in time to music and in better order than other Greek states.

 

Now gaps between units might be thought to increase the risk of flank attack. But for the enemy to manoeuvre (even just to counter charge) he must maintain intervals too. If an interval was large enough for an enemy unit to penetrate it would be very dangerous. A gap of perhaps twenty yards, perhaps even more would not allow penetration. Of course the Roman chequer formation did leave big gaps between units, but each gap was covered by a unit of the rearward line.

[caldrail]

Q? Roman soldiers able to withstand 70% casualties? I don't think so. All armies fall apart after 30%. However - there are certain circumstances when higher casualties are taken. caldrail

 

yes I said that. There are such circumstances, mostly when the soldiers involved have no other choice. As I mentioned before, human beings are social animals and warfare is an aspect of that. When you're in the line and men are falling about you stone dead or screaming in agony, you instinct is to move away from danger, to return to the safety of the herd. With humans this occurs quite soon. Most military units are finished before 30% casualties are reached (some run away as soon as the fighting starts).

 

Now it has to be said that the roman legions were well trained and aggressive. But they weren't arnold schwarzeneggers either. I do not believe that a roman unit would ordinarily fight until 70% causalties. By that stage, the unit is more than two thirds empty and being cut to pieces because they cannot support each other. After 30% losses in close combat the casualty rate increases dramatically. In cases where romans did fight until 70%, then they had some reason for it. Were they pressed against a wall? Were they closely supported? Were they attacking, not defending?

[Kosmo]

You have good arguments, but the greeks before Epaminondas never made any battlefield manouvers. Just deploy one army in front of the other then charge. This is how famous battles, like Marathon and Plateea were fought.

The romans before Scipio were in the same situation as it's proven by their battles against more agile adversaries like Pyrrus and Hanibal.

With no battlefield manouvers this deep formations have little use.

 

So, the only argument for deep formations is morale and is hard to say anything about it pro or contra because it's hard to compute it.

 

The columns were not used often in Napoleon era, but the main reason for their use was to reduce the frontal exposure to enemy fire and to allow more soldiers to make fast bayonet attacks on a small portion of the enemy thin fire line.

Because it was exposed to enfilade fire it was rarely used and never popular as being the head of the column was very dangerous. A classic example of it's use it's the assault on the bridge in Arcole where the flanks of the column were covered by a high road and the swamps.