Single Biggest Contributor To Rome's Collapse

[M. Porcius Cato]

I think the biggest contribution to roman collapse was becoming a conquest state. No nation or state can conquer indefinitely - eventually it becomes impossible to guarantee their own borders and those borders get disproportionately bigger along with conquered territory.

 

As stated, this is exactly wrong. You can prove this to yourself quite easily.

 

To make the math easy, assume a world of 12 equally sized, equally well-populated, square nations in a 3 x 4 grid. In such a situation, what is the best policy for Square Rome, that is smack in the middle of 4 hostile bordering states? In the beginning, Square Rome would have X manpower+resources ("defense units") to defend its 4 borders. That is, x/4 defense-units per border. If Square Rome can take a neighboring territory and its resources, it will have twice the resources (2x defense-units) but not twice the borders since one of those borders was shared by both territories. Thus, by conquering a neighboring territory, Square Rome would have only 6 new border-states and 2x defense-units, thereby giving it x/3 defense-units per border. If Square Rome, then takes another bordering state in our 3 x 4 world, its defense-units per border would be 3x/7. And every additional gain in territory continues to make border security easier and easier until Square Rome has no bordering nations.

 

Clearly, the problem with conquest is not borders getting disproportionately bigger--ceteris paribus, the borders get proportionately smaller.

 

The problem with conquest is that (1) even successful conquest reduces the available manpower and resources of both the conquering and conquered nations, and--most fundamentally--(2) any state with insufficient resources to defend itself (basically all conquered nations) will almost never manage to pay its own way. Thus, rather than Square Rome (in our example) moving from x/4 to x/3 defense-units/border, a real Square Rome would have less than 2x defense-units for its 6 borders.

 

Generalizing this basic analysis to historical Rome, it becomes clear that Roman expansion sometimes proceeded to territories that were poor and had insufficient manpower for its defense (e.g., Gaul) and even expanded to nations that didn't even border newly acquired Roman territory (e.g., Britain), thereby failing to deliver the one benefit of conquest--border reduction.

 

Clearly, no rational analysis would have ever permitted such stupid conquests of Britain and Gaul. But, then, these territories weren't acquired by a rational analysis at all--they were merely stepping stones in the career of Julius Caesar, a man whose victories were always synonymous with defeat for Rome itself.

Edited May 22, 2007 by M. Porcius Cato

[Virgil61]

I've decided to go with mass migrations. If Romans suffered from internal conflicts from within they would have been able to over come these problems and survive, like they did after the age of anarchy in the third century AD.

 

The invasions of the Goths, Huns, Vandals and other barbarians caused to much stress on the empire's borders, and they collapsed, leading to the end of the Western Empire.

 

This seems to be the current conventional wisdom from the newest crop of writing on the late antiquity. Peter Heather, Stephen Mitchell and a few others would agree with this I think. The new mass migrations coupled with an internal crisis of leadership (Honorius comes to mind) leading to a loss of a major recruiting territory (Dalmatia) and bread-basket (N. Africa to the Vandals).

[Northern Neil]

Clearly, the problem with conquest is not borders getting disproportionately bigger--ceteris paribus, the borders get proportionately smaller.

 

This is true with respect to the acquisition of the Rhine- Danube angle, which reduced by two thirds the length of the frontier in that area. However, the acquisition of Dacia actually lengthened the frontier in that region threefold, as the border was so convoluted. The same can be said of Armenia and Mesopotamia. All these territories, acquired under Trajan, protruded from an otherwise straight frontier, greatly lengthening borders disproportionately to their actual area.

 

Clearly, no rational analysis would have ever permitted such stupid conquests of Britain and Gaul. But, then, these territories weren't acquired by a rational analysis at all--they were merely stepping stones in the career of Julius Caesar, a man whose victories were always synonymous with defeat for Rome itself.

 

Again, true in the case of Gaul, but not so with Britain - even Caesar realised a punitive expedition was the best the resources of the Republic could manage. I believe that Claudius was thinking rather rationally when he set out to annexe Britain. The conquest of the fabled island was indeed a feather in his cap, and badly needed proof that he wasn't the fool he seemed.

 

In any case, I do not believe that becoming a conquest state contributed to Rome's collapse, given that the geographical 'shape' of the Empire was much the same in AD 400 as it was in AD 100. If one goes with current thinking of Heather, Ward-Perkins et al even in 350, 200 years after the frontiers had ossified, there was little to indicate that collapse was on the cards.

Edited May 23, 2007 by Northern Neil

[Kosmo]

There are 2 categories of answers

1. "The worm was in the fruit" - the instability of the imperial succesion, overextansion of the empire etc

2. "something happened" - powerfull migrators, economic/demographic decline, christianty etc

 

One problem with the first category of arguments it's that the empire stayed largely the same 400 years and that's a lot of time. The other problem it's the Empire continued in the East (mainly) for another 1000 years. Between the first and the last emperor there are 1500 years. Even admiting for a "byzantine" entity this cannot be dated as a very different thing before the VIII C. If the institutions of the empire were bad how did the exposed East survived and even expanded?

 

The argument that Heather uses, the empire fell because it was not able to defeat his opponents, I see as the strongest one. If the roman empire could have decisevly defeated goths, huns, vandals etc the V C crisis would have ended quicker then that of the III C because in the V C was much less infighting then in the III C. Goths and vandals were later defeated by the roman army and this confirms the answer. The west fell because of military defeats. It was unable to defend his lands and unable to reconquer what it lost. Of course, this was coupled with internal conflicts that flourished in bad times.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Clearly, the problem with conquest is not borders getting disproportionately bigger--ceteris paribus, the borders get proportionately smaller.

This is true with respect to the acquisition of the Rhine- Danube angle, which reduced by two thirds the length of the frontier in that area. However, the acquisition of Dacia actually lengthened the frontier in that region threefold, as the border was so convoluted. The same can be said of Armenia and Mesopotamia. All these territories, acquired under Trajan, protruded from an otherwise straight frontier, greatly lengthening borders disproportionately to their actual area.

The acquisition of Dacia did indeed increase the size of the frontiers, but unlike Britain, Dacia was rich in gold and may have been worth the conquest. The important issue is never border length per se, but proportion of military resources to surrounding enemies. If conquest affects that balance favorably, it is no drain to the empire.

[caldrail]

I accept I was wrong about border length - fair enough.

 

Nontheless Romes position as a conquest state has parallels with other nations and periods. Rome did over extend itself - and I can prove this by the failure of roman government. As a large wealthy empire often does, it becomes a target for the have-nots. You see this happening today and lets be honest, one of the primary reasons for germanic invasion was the possibility of grabbing roman wealth for themselves. I also note that other conquest states suffer similar political problems as Rome did, in that politics becomes ustable under pressure and the economy falters.

 

What I notice about commentators looking at the fall of the west is that they always try to isolate one precise reason for the collapse. I think thats wrong. The seeds of roman collapse were put there simply by absorbing so much territory aggressively. During the pax romana the roman economy was living on borrowed time due to booty, not economic success. I would say that the east/west split advanced the roman collapse somewhat because the money went east. When the western wealth grew scarce, then rome wobbled and its deflation began.

 

Conquest states do this. They expand a little here and there, then get confident, blowing up like a balloon. Its all a question of whether the ballon bursts or deflates, politically speaking.

[M. Porcius Cato]

The seeds of roman collapse were put there simply by absorbing so much territory aggressively. During the pax romana the roman economy was living on borrowed time due to booty, not economic success. I would say that the east/west split advanced the roman collapse somewhat because the money went east. When the western wealth grew scarce, then rome wobbled and its deflation began.

 

I find it very difficult to believe that the wealth of the Roman empire depended very much on the trinkets plundered from barbarians. The whole wealth of Judea was scarcely sufficient to build just the Coliseum in Rome, let alone finance the defense and infrastructure of Judaea itself.

 

Rather, the wealth of Rome derived from the economic specialization and free trade that was made possible by killing foreign kings, wiping out their inefficient armies, and tearing down (metaphorically) their useless borders.

 

I think there is a good case to be made against many campaigns of conquest (Britain, e.g., was more trouble than it was worth--the tin mines could have been seized without wasting 1/4 of the state revenues killing dumb druids and picts), but imperialism per se wasn't the problem. It was irrational conquest that was the problem, and the reason this conquest was irrational is that it was no longer guided by the wisdom of the senate, which had previously been far more intelligent about what was and was not worth acquiring.

[caldrail]

No, not trinkets. Resources - people - animals - all sorts of things. The romans became wealthy and chose to spend that wealth on luxuries and public entertainment in such a way that saw an export of money to all intents and purposes. Their balance of payments was a joke.

[Kosmo]

Romans took measures to stop the gold defict from trade. Laws prohibiting some expansive merchandises and interdictions to export bullion were in place since the early principate. This was not brilliantly efficient but for sure they tried.

 

This deficit to the East was a problem for Europe since before romans and until the Industrial Revolution and beyond. In mid XIX the british had to sell opium, and to fight wars to keep the trade open, to the chinese to ease the deficit that they still had with them.

Before that most of the gold the european empires get from Africa and America was spent in Asia. The pacific tradeline beetween Spanish America and China was a major trade route and sometimes more silver ended in Manila for the China and India trade then in Spain. This happened despite european control of the trade routes and acces to markets. The only periods before when Europe had lees deficit were when the trade routes broke down and when they were penyless.

 

What were roman suppose to do? They tried to improve their political position in regard to the eastern neighbours and to diversify trade routes to avoid one setting a monopoly.

 

Romans spend loads of money on monuments and such, but also on roads, ports, bridges, on trade security, mines, irrigation facilities, etc. This were productive investments. Romans did not only exploit, but invested and developed.

[caldrail]

You make it sound as if there was a master plan from central government to improve and extend roman infrastructure. No. The senate/emperors did support and reward this activity (and yes, they did begin some initiatives themselves), but the bulk of roman development was spurred by local interest. After the augustan reforms it was roman policy to create city states in provinces rather than provide direct rule. These city's were mini-rome's in the making, part of a national franchise whose purpose was to generate tax income for Rome itself. Cities were keen to develop in order to gain concessions, patronage, or even simply get one over their rival city down the road. It was local initiative sponsored by central government.

 

Your point about productive investments is interesting, but roads in themselves are not necessarily going to generate trade and may well be there purely to service the needs of the legions. Further, the need to keep legions busy generated civil engineering work when it may not have been strictly necessary. This all cost money without any particular gain.

 

Also, industries such as mines etc were private enterprise were they not? Therefore if the roman government was a customer there was no profit for them in mining, farming, or quarrying?

 

Roman expenditure was very high. Augustus claimed to have found Rome in brick and left it in marble. That didn't happen by clicking his fingers. It happened because he stumped up cash and persuaded others to do likewise. There is no productivity in this sort of beautification which was done purely to improve Romes majesty. It was a 'feel good' factor for romans to see their city as such a place of wonder. Augustus was making sure that his people saw him as a benign first citizen who generously gave his wealth to the peoples enviroment. On his terms mind, not theirs.

 

The huge cost of staging entertainment is staggering. This was something provided free to the citzens of Rome, and therefore not profitable, apart from securing influence and popularity. Gladiators could each earn more than the average wage of a roman in one appearance, and that if they'd never fought before. An experienced professional would earn more than that. Vivaria held animals for the show. Elephants, lions, tigers, crocodiles, antelope, horses, ostriches - all sorts of beast imaginable kept until required for the venatio, and if you want to know how expensive it was to keep an animal, just ask your local zoo. Its astonishing how much food and water these beasts required. All that is after they had been caught and transported. Professional beast hunters, some of them serving soldiers, caught these animals for profit. They were transported by sea for profit, or if the entertainment was outsie Rome, then also by land to their final destination. There was a network of trade routes which catered for luxuries. Rome was for all intents and purposes a self-sufficient state, yet they spent heavily on foreign goods for nothing other than their own enjoyment.

[Ursus]

Conquest states do this. They expand a little here and there, then get confident, blowing up like a balloon. Its all a question of whether the ballon bursts or deflates, politically speaking.

 

 

I think it's a question of applying a strict cost/benefit analysis to each new acquisition.

 

In the Western Empire the regions around the Mediterranean were reasonably wealthy. They were also relatively Romanized to the degree that most often a full legion wasn't even necessary to keep order. Thus with minimal military overhead, those acquisitions could be considered profitable.

 

The further we get outside the Mediterranean, the less wealthy the regions seem to be. The less Romanized the areas are as well, thus requiring more military overhead (three Legions in the comparitively small land mass of Britannia, for instance). The returns from conquest start to decline and probably become negative once we get to Britain.

 

The Romans though were not guided by accounting principles in conquest so much as cultural ideals - empire without end, bringing "civilization" to far flung barbarians, and bringing honor and glory to the commanders who conquered them. In that sense, conquest for its own ends probably made the Western Empire unstable to begin with. They did not have, and were not interested in, the basic rational analysis employed by every modern company.

 

The Byzantine Empire was, compared to the West, wealthier and in a better defensible position. It was simply more profitable, and thus able to survive longer.

[Noricum]

Being a novice but an obsessive one I agree with the theory that an economic decline was the foremost factor in the collapse of the Roman Empire (Western)

 

It appears that the trade imbalance was just too great to sustain an empire, combined with the other less important issues such as mass migration, disease etc

 

This is such an interesting topic which has obviously exercised thinkers for ages without any real answers

[Centurion-Macro]

I think the barbarians were just too much for the Empire. It is hard to make an Empire, but it is even harder to keep it together.

[caldrail]

Failure to establish a means of succession is often quoted as a reason (I've done so too previously) but in fact you could argue the means of succession had been established by the late empire. The instability of the third century had been overcome after all, and under the Dominate we see a move toward oriental style rulership. However, the political machinations that supported the Caesar of the day most definitely weakened government to the point of disaster in some cases, and in case, the empire was subject to considerable apathy in general.

 

The economic situation was not as bad as often suggested. The late empire was often doing quite well, which was the entire reason the barbarian tribes saw raiding as a profitable enterprise.

 

I think the point that gets lost by the popular image of the Roman Empire is that it had changed significantly. No longer a conquest state, it was increasingly a prototype for the middle ages.