The Unconquered Frontier

[Neos Dionysos]

Why was this part of Britannia not able to be brought under the Roman yoke? I ask because it seemed that in the late first century their were 3 invasions of the region and culminated with the Battle of Mons Graupius which was an undiputable Roman victory? Was there a reluctance to take this land? Lack of proper troops and logistics? Or the feeling it was not worth the effort? Any comments welcome.

[Pantagathus]

I'm going to paste a quote from Pertinax that comes from a side discussion about the Picti a while back:

 

Oddly enough I was just reading two very sobering quotes about Brittania and Hibernia (and Armenia) -

 

"it was fine and glorious to have acquired them, not for any value , but for the great reputation they brought to the magnificence of Empire" (Florus -chum of Hadrian) and "The Romans have aimed to preserve their Empire by the exercise of prudence rather than extend their sway indefinitely over poverty -stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians" (Appian -on the fall back from the Antonine Wall)

 

So in essence the return on investment just wasn't there.

[Primus Pilus]

Here is another older thread on the subject...

 

Unconquered Scotland (Caledonia)

[longbow]

Agricola pretty much had the North sown up for the Romans after Mons Graupius (Inverness area) but he was recalled by Domitian.Agricola's Legions were needed to reinforce the Danube so they dismantled the fort (Inchtuthil) they had made north of the river Forth and marched back south.

Do you think Domitian really needed Agricola's Legions or did he have another motive for stopping Agricolas campaign?

L

[Pertinax]

Osprey have a good title in the Fortress series-Romes Northern Frontier and the Oxford "Roman Britain" by Salway gives you a lot of detailed information, the maps show how very near Rome came to controlling the whole landmass( though not necessarily the peoples).

[Neos Dionysos]

Here is another older thread on the subject...

 

Unconquered Scotland (Caledonia)

 

 

Sorry, I didn't see the older thread.

 

Perhaps the economic value was not there but surely the ideals? Meaning for propaganda usage and to over glorify the reigning emperor he claims a great victory over the land and expands his popularity, I can see this as the only good reason to take over the region other than establish control and stop raiding, though the walls did help in this.

[Pertinax]

Agricola pretty much had the North sown up for the Romans after Mons Graupius (Inverness area) but he was recalled by Domitian.Agricola's Legions were needed to reinforce the Danube so they dismantled the fort (Inchtuthil) they had made north of the river Forth and marched back south.

Do you think Domitian really needed Agricola's Legions or did he have another motive for stopping Agricolas campaign?

L

Difficult one to call-if we believe Tacitus ,then jealousy was the reason for withdrawal. The revenue earning capability and population density were very much below other "twilight" ares of the Roman map, so as a tactical move it seems not unreasonable. If we are to believe early commentators then the whole colonisation was an exercise in prestige and a demonstration of technological prowess. In another thread I recall a (modern) quote that Caesars initial campaign was as daring as the first moon landing in relative technological and logistical terms. Many Romans actually doubted the existence of such a fabulously remote, inhospitable and homicidally populated land.The constant thread in commentaries is Brittania as a proving ground for martial excellence and courage above all other stations in the Empire.The mining centres were all thoroughly under Roman control, despite the ocassional Brigantian turbulence and although we have the reclaimed lands in the Wash area the land was not a key granary . Scotland would , I suggest be the equivalent of fighting in the Falklands-though with more "hostiles" as natives.There is evidence of traded goods from the land of the Vacomagi-( Elgin-Aberdeen crudely expressed) so Roman "reach" was very long.

[Germanicus]

Do you think Domitian really needed Agricola's Legions or did he have another motive for stopping Agricolas campaign?

L

 

Whether he needed them or not, I think he would have wanted to prevent Agricola from shining too brightly. Tacitus maintains that he wanted Agricola back in Rome, and that Domitian then poisoned him.

[Tobias]

Perhaps the economic value was not there but surely the ideals? Meaning for propaganda usage and to over glorify the reigning emperor he claims a great victory over the land and expands his popularity, I can see this as the only good reason to take over the region other than establish control and stop raiding, though the walls did help in this.

 

The empire could not exist on ideals alone; it would have been impractical for Rome to conquer territory that did not bring home some financial benefit. Now i know a lot of territory was conquered for the very reasons you mentioned above, but again, if the Empire strikes trouble elsewhere and needs soldiers, it has to choose what regions are worth stripping troops from or even withdrawing from altogether (An example being Britain which was eventually withdrawn from by various Emperors because the territory wasn't worth tying up three or four valuable legions that could be deployed elsewhere)

So, in conclusion, the empire could not afford to maintain a presence in territory that did not want to be Romanized and would continue to resist, and that gave little in return for having a presence their. Hence why Scotland would not have been held for long.

[Pertinax]

I have a suggestion harking back to the very first post of this thread -the death of Severus whilst campaigning in the "debatable lands" (as they became) and the ensuing Caracalla/Geta contretemps was perhaps the reason for the Romans failure to finally crush the Caledonii and Maetae. The tribes refused to give battle , an appropriate strategy of course , but Severus was adamant that a policy of extermination would be pursued (the fate of the Ordovices many years previously after stubborn and bloody resistance), his death left Britain as a peripheral issue at the moment that it could have been resolved.

[FLavius Valerius Constantinus]

Just wondering, but did guerilla/hit and run warefare used by the Caledonians

hamper the Roman infantry in any way.

I just remember a discovery channel documentary saying that the Roman patrols had tough times after the Picts decided to no longer do pitched battles.

Edited January 16, 2006 by FLavius Valerius Constantinus

[Pertinax]

The Romans wished to fight a conventional war, as they would win.The situation is a "vietnam" scenario or Normans in Ireland Scenario, avoid the firepower/technology and try not to lose, by not losing (or appearing not to lose) keep your opponent moving from small brushfire to the next till they leave you alone out of sheer irritation, and a desire not to commit expensively trained troops/logistics backup to a marginal area with few obvious resource or taxation returns (vietnam fits the bill on technology if not political weight, Norman Ireland is a similar scenario in terms of potential pecuniary gain). When conventional battles were fought , Mons Graupius is the obvious choice , the Romans annihilated the Caledonii.

The other side of this though is that the next move was the division of Britania into "superior" and "inferior" provinces , the latter with a predominantly Auxiliary troop presence. You fight irregulars with your non-Roman auxiliary troops , getting fighting men away from their own home areas (Sarmatia and Batavia for example to Ribchester and The Wall (Hadrian's)) thus pacifying two areas at one stroke.

I mention Salway as an excellent source on this era in my blog on "Hadrian's Wall" -have a look , though a little dry the scholarship is razor sharp.

 

note: as far as Vietnam goes I wish to mention the book "Hell in a very Small Place" on Dien Bien Phu (Bernard Fall)-this is as regards the French campaign in Cochin China (as was).

Edited January 16, 2006 by Pertinax

[FLavius Valerius Constantinus]

The Romans wished to fight a conventional war, as they would win.The situation is a "vietnam" scenario or Normans in Ireland Scenario, avoid the firepower/technology and try not to lose, by not losing (or appearing not to lose) keep your opponent moving from small brushfire to the next till they leave you alone out of sheer irritation, and a desire not to commit expensively trained troops/logistics backup to a marginal area with few obvious resource or taxation returns (vietnam fits the bill on technology if not political weight, Norman Ireland is a similar scenario in terms of potential pecuniary gain). When conventional battles were fought , Mons Graupius is the obvious choice , the Romans annihilated the Caledonii.

The other side of this though is that the next move was the division of Britania into "superior" and "inferior" provinces , the latter with a predominantly Auxiliary troop presence. You fight irregulars with your non-Roman auxiliary troops , getting fighting men away from their own home areas (Sarmatia and Batavia for example to Ribchester and The Wall (Hadrian's)) thus pacifying two areas at one stroke.

I mention Salway as an excellent source on this era in my blog on "Hadrian's Wall" -have a look , though a little dry the scholarship is razor sharp.

 

note: as far as Vietnam goes I wish to mention the book "Hell in a very Small Place" on Dien Bien Phu (Bernard Fall)-this is as regards the French campaign in Cochin China (as was).

 

I see,yet I can't really evaluate how Vietnam would relate closely to the Roman situation with the Caledonii. Vietnam has political significance in the Cold War unlike the pointless Roman former occupation of Caledonia.

[Pertinax]

the point is as regards different technological capabilities.