Legions Major Weakness - Cavalry?

[metforce]

I've just got hold of a very nice book entitled "The age of Fuedalism - 336-1300". It really is a gem of a book (whoever said the dark ages weren't all that dark was right. Although it's a little different to what I'd normally read, more religion and less war than normal, it is fascinating).

 

Anyway, what does Fuedalism have to do with the Roman military? Well, one of the passages in the first section says that Rome's Achille's heal was the cavalry - they simply could not compete with the horse-driven Germanic invaders.

 

I know that Roman cavalry was once thought of as quite primitive(sp), the lack of stirrups being one major factor in this. However, it has been proven that the saddle design they used was sufficiently effective that they could function adequately without stirrups.

 

I believe that Romans still didn't employ cavalry en mass though (I may be wrong). This got me thinking, can any of the experts point to battles towards the end of the Western Empire where the Legions were defeated as a direct result of insufficient cavalry use? Does anyone agree with the author of Fuedalism, that it was their major weakness? (I am as yet undecided).

 

There were also other interesting statements about vikings and such, which raised some questions in my mind, I'll post them in "After hours" later.

 

 

Not sure if the cavalry was Rome's death knell. Most historians point to the Battle of Adrianople as a turning point. It seems clear to me that the heavy infantry of Valens was crushed by the Gothic cavalry. The problem with your question is what battle spelled the end of the Roman Empire? I can't think of any. No Roman emperor died defending the walls in 476, if you accept that date as marking the end of the Roman Empire.

 

That said I do believe the Romans employed barbarian cavalry effectively when needed. If you read Procopius you'll see Belisarius employed Hunnish horse archers to great affect against the Vandals. During the reconquest of Italy Belisarius seized towns and took advantage of the Goths inability to conduct siege warfare to press them to the north even though he was for the most part outnumbered. That was one advantage the Romans always had over the various invaders; they could always hold their towns and regroup later after the invaders had depleted local resources. It was only after this strategy was no longer effective that the empire collapsed in the west.

[M. Porcius Cato]

I've been thinking about this thread for a long time, and re-reading it, it appears that there seem to be three separate issues under discussion: 1) whether Roman cavalry weakness contributed to the fall of the Western empire, 2) whether Roman cavalry weakness was the Achilles' heel of the Roman army (i.e., a critical weakness in an otherwise superb force), and 3) whether the Roman cavalry was the weakest arm in the army.

 

On the first issue, the posts here and elsewhere strongly suggest that the contribution of Roman cavalry weakness to the fall of the Western empire must have been relatively small, espeically given the magnitude of the other problems that the empire faced.

 

On the second issue, the posts here have made it quite clear that there were a number of hypothetical and actual defenses against a superior cavalry force, including the combined use of infantry and various missles. To that one might add the use of entrenchments and caltrops to protect the flanks of the infantry. Thus, although superior mounted troops were a constant source of danger to the Roman army, the lack of an opposing mounted force wasn't technically an "Achilles' heel" (i.e., a fatal weakness).

 

On the third issue, though, the Roman cavalry seems to me to be the weakest part of the army, so much so that Fuller was right to say that Rome fought with a "one-armed army". Roman cavarly tactics were at times ludicrously ill-conceived. For example, at Pharsalus, Labienus had a magnificent number of horse that was sufficient to pre-occupy Caesar's horse, missle troops, detached infantry, and still have enough left over to roll up Caesar's line on the flank. Yet instead of dividing the horse into divisions, each with a specific task and overall obejective, Labienus formed them into a single small-front/large-depth unit, and he led them from behind. In consequence, when the front section broke, the whole cavalry routed, trampling Pompey's missle troops in their wake. Other examples are not difficult to find.

 

The question I have is--WHY was the cavalry so ill-prepared? Were they not trained well? Was the lack of stirrups such a hindrance they couldn't develop better tactics? Did generals disdain to discuss strategy with auxiliary cavarly commanders? What was going on?

[Pertinax]

Having watched re-enactment drills, ( I know that isnt the real thing) I can't believe the stirrup issue is the key issue, a four horned saddle can be used handsfree by a good horseman.Unless the key combat issue is use of a "heavy impact" lance (kontos) with a "full weight" delivery via stirrups. The horsemen ive seen are a flexible arm (with bow/lance/sword) but certainly would be wasted as a heavy impact "mass" (indeed what would be the point of such a deployment unless they were Cataphractii?) As an harassing and interdiction force they would be ideal , the delivery of missiles combined with rapid withdrawal from contact would be very disturbing to infantry.

Poor training might be a specific reply to the particular battle-were these men new recruits?Was the commander ill versed in using combined arms?

As auxilliary cavalry might be non-citizens was the issue of trust involved?

If Gallic and Ubian cavalry were so well trained and admired were they only used against other cavalry or skirmishing troops to affect the "heavy infantry set piece" battle?

 

I havent answered anything here , just musing really, save perhaps for suggesting a "not guilty" on the stirrup front.

[Northern Neil]

I have come across this debate time and again throughout the years, and to me the idea that Romans were deficient in cavalry is a myth. Up to the third century, the Romans scouting cavalry was as good as anyone elses at the time. Again and again the 'superior' cavalry fielded by the Germans and Gauls did them no good whatsoever, therefore there was no need for Rome to field similar heavy cavalry. Perhaps the Romans would have fared better against Persia with more and better cavalry... but then, Persia never realised its aim to reconquer Syria, asia minor and parts of Greece. Their superior cavalry merely maintained the status quo in terms of territory.

 

Later on, the argument is weaker still - Illyrian mounted infantry, and their ability to rapidly mass a force just where the enemy didn't want it, cleared the Balkans and lower Danube of undesireables and aided the revival of the late third century. Coming as they did from territory which had been Roman for centuries, I think we can regard those chaps as 'Roman' in every sense of the word.

 

Later on still, Julian fielded cavalry which was every bit as 'State of the Art' as the Germans (though it is worth pointing out that they nearly came unstuck against unmounted Franks at Strasbourg).

[M. Porcius Cato]

Perhaps the Romans would have fared better against Persia with more and better cavalry... but then, Persia never realised its aim to reconquer Syria, asia minor and parts of Greece. Their superior cavalry merely maintained the status quo in terms of territory.

 

Whether or not Persia realized its aim to reconquer Syria has no bearing on the strength of the Roman cavalry. Yes, Rome defeated many of her enemies. That's a given. But what is the evidence that the Roman cavalry deserves any credit for Roman military success?

[Pertinax]

I presume that the doctrine of "fix and flank" would posit the cavalry as the stike arm and infantry as the anvil (or fulcrum) but both elements are vital. Might I suggest that ,given Roman "killing efficiency" in infantry contact, that the ability to attrite might render the flanking action superfluous and mean that cavalry action wouild be a battlefield coursing action to maximise enemy fatalities.

[Northern Neil]

[quote name='M. Porcius Cato'

 

Whether or not Persia realized its aim to reconquer Syria has no bearing on the strength of the Roman cavalry. Yes, Rome defeated many of her enemies. That's a given. But what is the evidence that the Roman cavalry deserves any credit for Roman military success?

 

Again, I refer to Illyrian mounted infantry and their successes. Julian's successful campaign against the Allemanni and Franks relied largely on cavalry. Cavalry made up half the garrison of Hadrian's wall and other frontiers... and held them for nearly 300 years. Without scouting cavalry, Caesar, Germanicus, trajan and all the rest would have had no 'eyes' for their armies. So on the whole, I believe Roman Cavalry was quite successful.

[Aurelius]

AVE,

 

I implore your opinions on a subject which has been troubling my mind since my discovery of the world of the Roman army. As such, I am limiting my query in the period of the Principate--from 27 BC (Augustus) to AD 284 (Tetrarchy).

 

What were the main weaknesses of the Imperial Roman Legions? Were these inherent flaws or just acquired over time as a due process? Were these weaknesses purely military in nature or did they stem from the political and societal structure of the Empire? Did the increasing barbarization of the army really lead to its decline?

 

I have noticed two distinct schools that address the nature of this problem. One school expresses the inferiority of the cavalry force in the legions, that proved them at a disadvantage to horse-centred peoples such as the Parthians/Sassanids, Alans, Sarmatians,etc. Yet this contradicts the adaptability of the Roman Legions to the hcanging nature of warfare. Another school focuses on the effect of the civil wars and the '3rd century crisis' that inevitably weakened the legions. Which school is to be believed then?Though i must argue that i do not believe the 'cavalry-inferiority theory'.

 

If you have any other perspectives on this matter, please feel free to post your own opinions on the subject. And if you could cite primary or secondary sources to support your statments, the better it would be..Thanks..

[Pertinax]

Aurelius, ive moved your query into this thread where I think it might be at home. Scroll back from this post and you will see quite a debate has been had .

[Antiochus of Seleucia]

Anyway, what does Fuedalism have to do with the Roman military? Well, one of the passages in the first section says that Rome's Achille's heal was the cavalry - they simply could not compete with the horse-driven Germanic invaders.

 

Bah! No such thing! The Romans were always divising new ways to kill. I found this on another Rome-Website and Pertinax can determine the validity of this tactic.

 

REPEL CAVALRY!

[Aurelius]

Thanks, pertinax..lol, didn't knew there was such a post..again,much thanks..

[Princeps]

Looks like quite a good tactic to me, though only really against mounted swordsmen. I don't think their spears would be effective against a lance, and definately not archers. Is there any proof that they used this tactic?

[Pertinax]

Its certainly a standard drill evolution, every re-enactment ive seen has this as a feature. Two things strike me, we know horses will not collide with a "fixed" obstacle so a horseman would have to use reach (spear/throwing spear/kontos) or projectile (arrow/sling) to cause any impact damage, secondly this would tend to reinforce the "fix and flank" maxim to try and roll up a flank , given that forward penetration would be risky. If you have ballistic capability then you have the Napoleonic conundrum, of concentrated infantry being a good target for projectiles , but capable of standing off cavalry.

The use of caltrops and staves is also worth considering, later (3rd C AD infantry had hand scatterable caltrops) tactics versus the Sassanids bear this out.Here are some roughly made and easy to use impedimentia:-

 

http://www.unrv.com/forum/index.php?&a...=si&img=958

[Spurius]

Cavalry is always worth more as a threat than an actual impact. In fact the only time they are really effective is when they charge in on a broken or running enemy. So in essence, you can't turn your back on them.

 

If the legion in question is cavalry poor, then it is in trouble if caught in an open position. The horsemen can keep on their heels any direction they move. The only hope for the legion is to out last (or wait out) the horsemen. This can be painful with horse archers, but the alternative is being wiped out.

 

Staves, caltrops and other pointy objects can deny the ground to enemy cavalry but they also work against you moving too.

If the legion has good cavalry support, then the primary job for both groups of horsemen is to keep their opposite numbers busy. If they can out manouver and scatter their opponents, then cavalry can be used to flank and roll-up the enemy while they concentrate on the roman infantry attack.

 

You could look up tactics in the West Point history series or in a large variety of military history books. Secondary sources are plentiful, but primaries are a bit fewer. I'll get back to you about them.

[Dominus Rex]

As to Roman adaptability, I remember reading (Livy books XXI-XXX on the 2nd punic war) that while the Romans were laying siege to Capua (after Capua went to Hannibal), the Campanian cavalry was far superior to the romans. Then, the Romans adapted and every cavalry man took a partner infantry guy with a spear. After much training, the infantry were able to dismount quickly. Then, when the two opposing cavalry forces met, just before impact the spearmen would dismount and the Campanian cavalry would crash into waiting spearpoints. Thus the romans were able to combing cavalry and infantry.