Did Caesar Ultimately

[P.Clodius]

He never filched a dime from the province

 

HAHAHAHA, oh to live in an idealistic world...!

[FLavius Valerius Constantinus]

Edited for mistake, wrong Cato.

Offtopic: Is it me is that 50% of this topics posts belong to Cato.

Edited December 21, 2005 by FLavius Valerius Constantinus

[P.Clodius]

I think you may be getting mixed up with Cato Major of Carthago Delenda Est fame, the persecutor of Scipio A. He wrote a book about aggriculture and was vocal about morals, etc...

Edited December 21, 2005 by P.Clodius

[FLavius Valerius Constantinus]

Oh, then I am wrong. All this time, I thought you guys were referring to Cato Major. Major mistake sorry. Well then my comments are null and void.

[Germanicus]

Well then my comments are null and void.

 

Thanks for clearing that up.

[Gaius Octavius]

To V's origianl topic.

England, France, Germany, Russia and Italy became 'republics' (in essence) and still lost their empires.

A question: What is a 'republic'; a 'democracy'? Does a 'democracy exist? and if so, where?

Edited March 22, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[M. Porcius Cato]

England, France, Germany, Russia and Italy became 'republics' (in essence) and still lost their empires.

So what? By becoming republics, they lasted longer and were more prosperous than they were when ruled by kings. Just taking England as an example: trace the whole course of British history and look at when Britain commanded the greatest resources and achieved the most. Was it in the 400 years prior to the Glorious Revolution (1288-1688) or in the 400 years after (1688-2088)? Or, if you think that progress is some sort of metaphysical law (a foolish notion if ever there were one), just look at the rate of change in wealth and power before and after the Glorious Revolution.

 

Republics are not immortal, of course, they require eternal vigilance for their upkeep, but they deliver better returns than any other system because republics distill the best of each of the lesser forms of government--democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy.

 

 

A question: What is a 'republic'; a 'democracy'? Does a 'democracy exist? and if so, where?

 

See Polybius.

[Gaius Octavius]

The original point was that the Empire would NOT have fallen had it been a republic. The 'form' of government does not determine whether an empire falls or not. Some chap has propounded a '400 Year' theory of empires, much as if one could determine the precise date of its formation and therefor the precise date of its fall. That's so much twaddle.

If 'republic' were the answer, then the nations cited would still have empires.

Edited March 22, 2006 by Gaius Octavius

[M. Porcius Cato]

If 'republic' were the answer, then the nations cited would still have empires.

 

Not true. The reason republics lose their empires is because they don't extend the republican system to new territories. The nations cited simply weren't republican enough.

 

If Britain, for example, had bothered to include Americans in Parliament in proportion to its numbers, the whole "no taxation without representation" cry would never had gained traction. In contrast, the British did a comparatively better job of incorporating Wales into the republican system (such as it was), and they enjoyed relatively greater security from Wales. Granted, the extension of republican rights (franchise, common law, right to appeal, etc) is not the only factor determining how securely a territory is held (e.g., weak federal powers make even republics susceptible to civil war), but it is a very powerful factor.

 

There is a reason the Italian provinces were so loyal to Rome for so long--they had nearly the same rights as Romans themselves. If Rome had extended Italian rights to all its provinces (rather than relying on governors and martial law), the republican system would have secured the non-Italian territories to Rome through the bond of common interest. To the degree that the system was not extended, there was a commensurate decrease in the incentives for locals to engage in self-help against external threats and to see their interests as intertwined with the city of Rome.

[caldrail]

I've been searching through the topics for a while and haven't seen a topic discussing this.

 

In my oppinion Gaius Julius Caesar ultimatly signed the Empires death warrant. My reason for this is that:

 

Towards the end of the empire, the emperors became increasingly scared of being overthrown by a popular general and often due to this fear had the most promising generals killed.Therefore if Caesar hadn't overthrown the republic, the generals would not have been hunted down as traitors but have been given consulships in which to expand the empire and bring Roman rule to barbarian nations; also as a republic, in my oppinion Rome would have been in a better position to deal with invading hordes.

 

Thanks.

 

Generals of the late republic were powerful individuals. They were wealthy, they had legions, and supporters in the senate. Rome was a furiously competitive society so inevitably there could be only one. Funny thing is I don't think Caesar actually wanted to eliminate his rivals as such - remember how upset he was when the egyptians handed him pompey's head. Once the generals felt they were powerful enough to ignore or contravene Rome's laws and customs it was clear that a single ruler was going to emerge, because none of them could bear to let anyone else rule them.

 

No, I don't think Caesar signed that warrant. Augustus stabilised the empire for many years until the rest of his family decided to continue the roman tradition of political superiority at all costs. It was this murderous and bitter infighting that brought Rome to brink of disaster many times.

 

As a republic Rome would have failed against the barbarians even faster than it actually did. Why? Because the senate had always chosen political appointees to military command and chosen badly time after time. With the invading hordes, Rome had run into a force that had exactly the same advantage they had - a huge reserve of recruits. Rome could no longer play a waiting game as they had with say, Hannibal, or perhaps Spartacus. I know that bad choices were still made during the empire - Quintilius Varus for instance - but the central command of the empire had something going for it when a strong leader was at the helm.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Generals of the late republic were powerful individuals. They were wealthy, they had legions, and supporters in the senate.

And why was this true of the late republic but not early or middle republic? The reason is that (1) Marius opened up the legions to people with nothing to lose and everything to gain by blindly following their general, and (2) the general could support his legions out of his own purse. If the senate had kept their power of the purse (e.g., by retaining the sole authority to mint coins that were legal tender), they would have gone a long way to prevent Marians and Sullans from acquiring personal armies. I agree that Caesar didn't create this system, however.

 

No, I don't think Caesar signed that warrant. Augustus stabilised the empire for many years until the rest of his family decided to continue the roman tradition of political superiority at all costs. It was this murderous and bitter infighting that brought Rome to brink of disaster many times.

The Julio-Claudians weren't the only ones jockeying for power through court politics. Every imperial household did the same. The reason is that the Octavian regime provided no mechanism for accession and destroyed the distinction between the public treasury and privy purse. Consequently, the stability of the government was isolated to sporadic lulls between constant civil wars. During the Principate, around 50% of all emperors were violently deposed or died of unnatural causes. In contrast, only about 5% of consuls attained power through extraconstitutional means.

 

As a republic Rome would have failed against the barbarians even faster than it actually did. Why? Because the senate had always chosen political appointees to military command and chosen badly time after time.

This is simply not true. Rome expanded far more during the republic than during the principate, and against far more advanced enemies. As a republic, Rome defeated not only Carthage, but also attained the advanced civilizations in the east. During the principate, it failed to conquer any enemies as sophisticated. Moreover, during the principate, the military commanders were also "political appointees"--if an emperor thought a general was too great, he'd have him axed. I think even Augustus did this when he announced that a certain general was simply no longer his friend, leading the whole (servile) senate to turn against the general and leading shortly thereafter to the guy's suicide. Same basic pattern in the life of Agricola, wasn't it?

[Gaius Octavius]

Ave Vespason:

Please don't think me rude, but your logic doesn't hold water. You argue from the particular to the general. A no-no. You might just as well have concluded that it was all Cain's fault

[M. Porcius Cato]

Ave Vespason:

Please don't think me rude, but your logic doesn't hold water. You argue from the particular to the general. A no-no.

 

Of course one can argue from the particular to the general. It's called induction--without it, there would be no science.

[caldrail]

Generals of the late republic were powerful individuals. They were wealthy, they had legions, and supporters in the senate.

And why was this true of the late republic but not early or middle republic? The reason is that (1) Marius opened up the legions to people with nothing to lose and everything to gain by blindly following their general, and (2) the general could support his legions out of his own purse. If the senate had kept their power of the purse (e.g., by retaining the sole authority to mint coins that were legal tender), they would have gone a long way to prevent Marians and Sullans from acquiring personal armies. I agree that Caesar didn't create this system, however.

 

No, I don't think Caesar signed that warrant. Augustus stabilised the empire for many years until the rest of his family decided to continue the roman tradition of political superiority at all costs. It was this murderous and bitter infighting that brought Rome to brink of disaster many times.

The Julio-Claudians weren't the only ones jockeying for power through court politics. Every imperial household did the same. The reason is that the Octavian regime provided no mechanism for accession and destroyed the distinction between the public treasury and privy purse. Consequently, the stability of the government was isolated to sporadic lulls between constant civil wars. During the Principate, around 50% of all emperors were violently deposed or died of unnatural causes. In contrast, only about 5% of consuls attained power through extraconstitutional means.

 

As a republic Rome would have failed against the barbarians even faster than it actually did. Why? Because the senate had always chosen political appointees to military command and chosen badly time after time.

This is simply not true. Rome expanded far more during the republic than during the principate, and against far more advanced enemies. As a republic, Rome defeated not only Carthage, but also attained the advanced civilizations in the east. During the principate, it failed to conquer any enemies as sophisticated. Moreover, during the principate, the military commanders were also "political appointees"--if an emperor thought a general was too great, he'd have him axed. I think even Augustus did this when he announced that a certain general was simply no longer his friend, leading the whole (servile) senate to turn against the general and leading shortly thereafter to the guy's suicide. Same basic pattern in the life of Agricola, wasn't it?

 

As for the the late republic, I agree with what you say, however that situation hadn't evolved overnight. The decline of the senate allowed powerful men to basically cock a snook at them. Inevitably someone was going to march on Rome and Sulla did that. Caesar also did so because he felt he had no other option - to back down at that stage was to invite disaster for him.

 

I merely used the julio-claudians as an example. Under Augustus things went pretty much ok, although I dare say a lot of scheming went on behind the scenes. Augustus used to wear a breastplate under his toga didn't he? The lessons of Caesars fate had not been lost on him, and even though he was in a powerful position its obvious he never felt completely safe. Rule by the consuls worked better because you only got the job be being voted in. Now the mechanism may have been biased and corrupt, but you had to show you were worthy in some way before the senate gave it to you. To me its clear that Rome would never have had a stable government because too many people wanted to run it. The ruler had power. Real power. They could dictate someones destiny and cash in, but there were always those who wanted that power for themselves. This was the drawback to an immensly competetive society - Nobody wanted to be a loser. With strong or popular leaders this anarchy was pushed to one side yet throughout the empire it seems there was always disaffected individuals plotting to bring that leader down. I actually think the real success of Rome was to survive in spite of itself.

 

The principate would have ground to a halt anyway. Like an expanding balloon it required too much puff to blow the empire any bigger. The sheer size of the empire meant that rulership was only possible by the initiative and competence of local government. As Diocletian admitted, the empire was too big for one man. The legions as always were laws unto themselves. Time and again they decided their general was to be emperor. So, in the late empire, we still see generals as power brokers in their own right. Also, don't forget that the Varian Disaster cut deeply into roman confidence - it changed their foreign policy. Rome was learning to colonise the wilderness rather than annexe other cultures, but after that crisis they would never do so again. I absolutely agree wholeheartedly about the envy causing a generals downfall. Not just Agricola - Stilicho too, and I'm sure you can think of others. But isn't that the curse of the powerful general? If Domitian had allowed Agricola to complete the conquest of scotland and return in triumph, was there anything to stop him arriving with a few legions at his back? In the principate we see a balance between ruler and general. Augustus, as I've mentioned, was more paranoid than most people realised, and very careful not to let another generation of Pompey's and Crassus's ruin him. So - if this the case - then surely my point was valid in the first place? That generals were appointed on a political basis rather than military capability?

Edited March 26, 2006 by caldrail

[Gaius Octavius]

Ave Vespason:

Please don't think me rude, but your logic doesn't hold water. You argue from the particular to the general. A no-no.

 

Of course one can argue from the particular to the general. It's called induction--without it, there would be no science.

 

 

M. P. Cato:

Are we arguing science here or politics?