Did Caesar Ultimately

[Primus Pilus]

As your reffered to me in your reply; i feel it is compulsory that i reply:

 

Vespasion, please use the quote feature to reply to the person in question. Without re-reading the entire thread, its difficult to know who you are speaking to.

[sullafelix]

Slightly off topic, but just a pointer about the Cato thing. It is incredible how fast the legend of Cato took off and was appropriated by the heirs of Caesar. The best example I can think of is the fact that he appears on the shield given to Aeneas by Venus in Book 8 of Aeneid, where he appears alongside, Romulus and Remus and the Battle of Actium, and The Sabine Women.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Slightly off topic, but just a pointer about the Cato thing. It is incredible how fast the legend of Cato took off and was appropriated by the heirs of Caesar. The best example I can think of is the fact that he appears on the shield given to Aeneas by Venus in Book 8 of Aeneid, where he appears alongside, Romulus and Remus and the Battle of Actium, and The Sabine Women.

 

Thanks for the reminder--I'd forgotten it entirely. A little further on the hagiography really get rich, with Caesar depicted as some sort of oriental king, enthroned on high with conquered nations paying fealty. First in line ought to have been Roma, because among the nations conquered by Caesar, none were as great as Rome.

[aquila]

Arguments for either side are being presented well, but I do take issue once again with the use of the term genocide to describe Caesar's Gallic war. The term by definition is incorrect, and is used only to sensationalize the argument.

 

OK--you got me. Against the men, women, and children of Gaul, Caesar was merely guilty of stealing, enslaving, beheading, crucifying, torturing, or plain slaughtering thousands upon thousands of innocents, people who posed no threat to Rome whatever, who paid taxes, who engaged in trade, and who were very often baited into opposing her. Caesar's decision that the Gallic tribes could never govern themselves peacably certainly sounds like the opinion of a racist, but technically Caesar was not guilty of genocide.

 

I should also mention that among the conquering nations of the ancient world, Roman conquest (even under Caesar) brought more benefits than brought by other conquerors.

 

Still...Caesar was a very bad man.

 

 

Friend Cato, in another place you asked me to defend Caesar, but by the time I found this one others had made a better fist of it than I ever could. Don't think that I admire Caesar, the principate or for that matter the optimates as benevolent and wise statesmen; my point was and is that in his world Caesar and what followed him were as inevitable as a landslide after heavy rain on a deforested hill. Yes, the Republic should have survived, but it didn't because it was governed - as the world always has been - by imperfect human beings whose limited knowledge left them largely inadequate for the task they set themselves. A fair point, I hope, but you're free to declare me a public enemy and force me across the Muskingum to defend my dignitas and protect my allies in.....well, why not Montana ? Any excuse will do.

[M. Porcius Cato]

A number of other posters, Aquila, have maintained that the Republic was simply "doomed". But to me this seems like a non-explanation for the fall of the Republic. It simply begs the question--how exactly was it doomed? Did it fall due to bad laws? Bad men? Or some interaction of the two?

 

I think it had to be some interaction of bad laws and bad men. Bad laws by themselves can be reformed--as long as there are good men who can make it happen. Bad men by themselves can also be neutralized--as long as the power of the state is greater than that of any single individual. But when good laws cannot be put into effect to check the power of bad men, and when bad laws cannot be reformed due to the powerlessness of good men, the Republic really is doomed.

 

The republic certainly had a number of bad laws that needed reforming. Everyone acknowledges, for example, the inherent danger brought by Marius' military reforms, which had the effect of creating private armies, such as the one wielded by Caesar. The only remedy for this was to deny generals of their access to spoils, especially the granting of land to veterans; however, only Cato and a handful of senators had the foresight to realize this, and they were bitterly (and successfully) opposed by Pompey and by Caesar.

 

Less well-known as an example of a fundamentally and spectaculary bad law were the leges Aelia et Fufia, whose provisions had the effect of putting rural Italians at the mercy of the urban mob of Rome. Briefly, the provisions of the law (from the mid-2nd century) were that no bill could be proposed in the 24 days prior to an election and that no bill could be voted on in the 24 days after an election (the election taking place only in Rome, to which virtually all Italians south of the Po were eligible to vote). This law effectively handed all control to the urban plebs because--not knowing when bills were to be proposed--there was not sufficient time between the announcing of a bill and the voting on it to assemble a large crowd from Italy. In some cases, the rural tribes had no reprsentatives at all present for the meeting of the tribal assembly, and it was in the power of the presiding officer for the tribunitial laws (and common practice) to simply have freedmen and slaves fill in for the Italians. Barring fundamental Constitutional reform, the only possible remedy would be to suspend this law, which the Senate was able to do from time to time, but more often the suspension of this absurd law was vetoed by the tribunes who represented the urban mob over everyone else.

 

This was, by the way, the mechanism by which Cicero was exiled, and the same mechanism had the potential to exile any of the good men who might have saved the Republic. And this might have happened to all of them but for the check on the power of the tribal assemblies that was present in the centuries, which was the (rarely used) mechanism that finally allowed Cicero to return to Rome (probably the only vote in the centuries for 20 years). So, even with the absolutely disproportionate power wielded by the urban mob--a power that ultimately led to the Social Wars, the Republic was still not doomed. While there was a mechanism in place to destroy the Republic, this mechanism could have been dismantled over time through normal politics.

 

But normal politics came to an end with the first triumvirate and ALL politics came to an end once Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

 

There is a persistent myth that Caesar had to march on Rome to save his own life--that his opponents in the Senate would have had him executed for treason. This myth completely misreads the actual law and practice of the day. While it is true that people charged with crimes against the state once had their fates determined by the voters in the centuries and tribal assembly, this practice was long gone by the time Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Caesar, like Milo, would have been tried in the Forum, with all his supporters--and veterans--present. At least during the republic, the only restriction on the lawyer's freedom of speech was the lawyer's own courage--because the mob too was free to heckle and to intimidate (see again the case against Milo).

 

Had Caesar not taken up arms against Rome, his fate would have been to face trial for his illegal adventures in Gaul and (probably) his earlier illegal rapine against a Roman ally in Spain. The charge against Caesar would have had a clear precedent in the case of the rapaciously corrupt Verres, who is the proper model for judging what fate might have awaited Caesar. Briefly, Verres was guilty as sin, and despite having jurors--like the senators Nasica and the Metelli--in his pay and despite the brother of the defending attorney also serving on the jury, the prosecution (led by Cicero) succeeded in its case by appealing to these senators' fear of the people, who as always loved the trials and in this particular case greatly influenced the outcome. Under circumstances like these, it is hard to imagine how Caesar could have been successfully prosecuted unless the case against him were even stronger than it was against Verres--even if the jurors were all packed by Catonians, they would have been risking their lives had they attempted to exile Caesar.

 

Thus, from the standpoint of the law, of its practice, and of his own standing among the plebs, Caesar had absolutely nothing to fear if innocent (and probably nothing to fear if guilty). If, on the other hand, Caesar were guilty, and the case against Caesar were actually stronger than the case against Verres--so strong that (in the worst case for Caesar) a jury of all senators were willing to face their deaths to see him exiled, Caesar would have to have been a complete monster. Thus, in either case, Caesar was not justified in crossing the Rubicon.

 

What doomed the republic, therefore, was not simply that its voting was corrupted by the urban mob, or simply that there were private armies, or simply that there were men (such as Ceasar) who had delusions of grandeur--none of these alone had ever been sufficient to destroy the Republic prior to Caesar. It is testimony to Caesar's ability (in a manner of speaking) that he was able to summon simultaneously the power of the mob, the power of a private army, and the power of his own megalomania to his purposes--for these were the very ingredients necessary for building a perpetual dictatorship out of the shaky elements of a fixable Republic. That many of us live in republics today and still admire Caesar--well, I can only shake my head in disbelief.

[Tobias]

I must say, although i have little time for Cato and the other Optimates, it would have been extremely interesting to see Caesar meeting the Optimates in a clash of wits and legal skill. However, it's hardly unfair to say that the Boni would not allow Caesar to have a fair trial; Pompey eventually had the Senatus Consultum Ultimatum in effect, and i have little doubt that he would use that to rush Caesar through a staged trial, strip him of all his powers and force him into exile, or use it to proscribe him.

Edited December 16, 2005 by Tobias

[M. Porcius Cato]

I[t] would have been extremely interesting to see Caesar meeting the Optimates in a clash of wits and legal skill.

Yes, for the good of Roman literature (and the good of Rome), a Caesar-versus-Cicero debate would have been vastly more interesting! Unfortuntately, Cicero's speech--like his defense of Milo--probably would have never seen the light of day given the violence of the mob at that time.

 

However, it's hardly unfair to say that the Boni would not allow Caesar to have a fair trial; Pompey eventually had the Senatus Consultum Ultimatum in effect, and i have little doubt that he would use that to rush Caesar through a staged trial, strip him of all his powers and force him into exile, or use it to proscribe him.

 

Right...I think that's populare paranoia. Pompey didn't have Caesar declared hostis until after all his efforts for peace had been exhausted, and when the Senate voted on a resolution that both Pompey and Caesar give up their commands and lay down their arms, the vote was 370 pro - 22 anti. Think about this a second. If 370/392 senators are willing to go that far to avoid a civil war--and proscribing Caesar would be a sure path to civil war (ask Brutus and Cassius)--even the worst case scenario for Ceasar (a trial by a randomly-selected number of the senate) would have in all likelihood (94%) led to acquittal. Heck, even if the jurors weren't randomly-selected, it would have been tough to get a conviction. Moreover, it isn't even clear that the jury would have been composed of senators--Pompey himself had opposed this move when Verres was up for trial.

[Germanicus]

I think it had to be some interaction of bad laws and bad men. Bad laws by themselves can be reformed--as long as there are good men who can make it happen. Bad men by themselves can also be neutralized--as long as the power of the state is greater than that of any single individual.

 

Do you think allowing the lower classes into the legions was a bad law reform ?

 

I agree that "bad" men as you put it were largely responsible, although I don't classify them as bad. But there was a kind of inevitability about it when you think about it.

 

Polybius describes the senate and it's control over the treasury as what kept would be powermen in check in the republic. But with the increase in lands, and governors for them, and their need to act somewhat autonomously, and control money in their provinces etc etc. To a certain extent the span of territory outgrew a republic more suited to the city state it was founded in. As such I do believe that the republic was "doomed" without serious reforms that were never even attempted or mooted by either side in politics.

 

Mistakes were made by many lawmakers, and most, well maybe most, with the best of intentions.

 

The conflict between Caesar and the Boni sounded the death knell, Augustus closed the coffin, but the disease began well before these characters walked the stage.

[M. Porcius Cato]

Do you think allowing the lower classes into the legions was a bad law reform ?

By itself, of course not--but if the major compensation for these legionaries came from what they could expect from passage of a lex agraria, you've got yourself a client army that is more loyal to the political fortunes of a general than to the fortunes of the state.

 

Polybius describes the senate and it's control over the treasury as what kept would be powermen in check in the republic. But with the increase in lands, and governors for them, and their need to act somewhat autonomously, and control money in their provinces etc etc. To a certain extent the span of territory outgrew a republic more suited to the city state it was founded in. As such I do believe that the republic was "doomed" without serious reforms that were never even attempted or mooted by either side in politics.

 

Nothing here spells the 'doom' of the republic--only the need for solid, practical reforms. It certainly wasn't the case that there were no reforms in response to (and even in anticipation of) crises.

 

At the same time, however, some reforms were a disaster. For example, the need for autonomy that you cite Germanicus strongly suggests that provincial commands should be given to those with substantial 'executive' experience, which is why the governance of important provinces were only given to those who had served as consul and their tenure was subject to review by the senate, whose members had magisterial experience and were thus not so easily hoodwinked. This wise precedent was broken by Marius, who bamboozled the popular assembly into overruling the senate's extension of Metellus' provinicial command in Africa and into giving it to Marius himself. (Yet another rotten Marian innovation, btw).

 

Furthermore, the whole idea that Rome was too big to govern as a republic dissolves upon examination. While it is certainly true that holding all referenda in Rome would place the possession of a large territory in conflict with voting rights (see my earlier post), there were already systems in place that didn't present this conflict. For example, the representative voting system in Macedonia didn't have this problem, and the import of this system would have allowed the republic to grow arbritrarily large. The resistance to this, however, came from the champions of the urban plebs, who wanted all the power for themselves and none for the rest of Italy.

 

This xenophobic attitude of "Rome for Romans" was already in the decline (hence provincials like Cicero could be consul) during the Republic, suggesting that far from being doomed, there was much hope for changing attitudes to lead to much needed reforms.

[Germanicus]

Nice post Cato, you didn't even call my argument "irresponsible"

 

I suppose Marius really paved the way for those Provincials like Cicero.

 

So your opinion is that the Republic was sick, but that it could have recovered had it not been for Caesar, and you have indicated in previous posts (at least one I believe) that yes, other players could have averted disaster even then by not prosecuting Caesar, but you feel they couldn't do that because it would have broken the law.

 

I am aware that there were reforms in response to crisis in the republic, food crises, external threats etc. But obviously not the right ones, like the major overhaul that I believe was required, and have difficulty seeing produced and pushed by those oligarchs with power in the Roman Republic.

[M. Porcius Cato]

So your opinion is that the Republic was sick, but that it could have recovered had it not been for Caesar, and you have indicated in previous posts (at least one I believe) that yes, other players could have averted disaster even then by not prosecuting Caesar, but you feel they couldn't do that because it would have broken the law.

Yes--that's an accurate summary of my opinion.

 

I am aware that there were reforms in response to crisis in the republic, food crises, external threats etc. But obviously not the right ones, like the major overhaul that I believe was required, and have difficulty seeing produced and pushed by those oligarchs with power in the Roman Republic.

 

I think it's important to get an accurate picture of the political faction that opposed the populares. Some of them were old plebean supporters of Sulla, who had acquired their wealth through his proscriptions. For them, the status quo was to be defended, because they benefitted personally from exploiting provincials. These were the old guys. The new optimates were led by Cato (who was quite a bit younger than Caesar and Cicero, though you wouldn't know it from the HBO series), who was constantly haranguing the old folks for their rotten corruption. His chief political program wasn't the reform of domestic policy, but making sure that Romans weren't out making new enemies for Rome and fattening themselves through unlawful activities in the provinces. Being a senator, this makes sense because he hadn't much control over the bills for domestic reform that were brought to the people.

 

In contrast, the populares did not seem to have a comprehensive program for provinicial administration, for them it was merely a stepping stone for gaining power in Rome itself. Some of their proposals were progressive and would have stabilized the Republic (the reforms of L Caesar much earlier for example), but some of them were simply opportunistic power-grabs (those of Catiline and Clodius for example). Again, deriving their power from their complete control of the tribal assemblies, their concern to preserve the supremacy of the urban mob was in their immediate political self-interest, so most of their proposals concerned policies dealing with their political base.

 

The moderates--who shifted from faction to faction--were the ones that tipped the balance between the party of Cato and the party of Caesar. They were generally not members of the city aristocracy or the urban mob, but prominent citizens from Italy. Being weaker politically due to the election laws, they made alliances opportunistically (hence Cicero could fawn over Caesar at one moment yet oppose him the next), but they were keenly interested in the foreign policy of Cato and making sure that the urban mob didn't sacrifice the farms of Italy to its gluttony. Their chief power came from their influence in the selection of consuls, who had tremendous power in influencing the fate of competing ideas.

 

Thus, I don't think there was a monolithic opposition to reform, but competing agendas for reform. Given more time, more reforms would have been forthcoming as the moderates tipped the balance one way then the next. But even in the time they had, the magistrates of the Republic faced terrible foes and created a magnificent foundation that would later serve as the model for our modern-day republics. So, doomed--I don't think so.

 

(BTW, I think it's really important to purge oneself of the tendency to think of all opponents to Caesar as "for the rich" and of the populares as "for the poor"--it completely distorts clear-thinking about this period, and it contributes to cynicism about the prospects of the republic. There is a hack who wrote a terrible book called "The Assassination of Julius Caesar," and his simple-minded reading of this period has been favorably reviewed here, but after reviewing more substantial works on this period written by actual classicists, I intend on subjecting that book to a hatchet job.)

[aquila]

A number of other posters, Aquila, have maintained that the Republic was simply "doomed". But to me this seems like a non-explanation for the fall of the Republic. It simply begs the question--how exactly was it doomed? Did it fall due to bad laws? Bad men? Or some interaction of the two?

 

I think it had to be some interaction of bad laws and bad men. Bad laws by themselves can be reformed--as long as there are good men who can make it happen. Bad men by themselves can also be neutralized--as long as the power of the state is greater than that of any single individual. But when good laws cannot be put into effect to check the power of bad men, and when bad laws cannot be reformed due to the powerlessness of good men, the Republic really is doomed.

 

The republic certainly had a number of bad laws that needed reforming. Everyone acknowledges, for example, the inherent danger brought by Marius' military reforms, which had the effect of creating private armies, such as the one wielded by Caesar. The only remedy for this was to deny generals of their access to spoils, especially the granting of land to veterans; however, only Cato and a handful of senators had the foresight to realize this, and they were bitterly (and successfully) opposed by Pompey and by Caesar.

 

Less well-known as an example of a fundamentally and spectaculary bad law were the leges Aelia et Fufia, whose provisions had the effect of putting rural Italians at the mercy of the urban mob of Rome. Briefly, the provisions of the law (from the mid-2nd century) were that no bill could be proposed in the 24 days prior to an election and that no bill could be voted on in the 24 days after an election (the election taking place only in Rome, to which virtually all Italians south of the Po were eligible to vote). This law effectively handed all control to the urban plebs because--not knowing when bills were to be proposed--there was not sufficient time between the announcing of a bill and the voting on it to assemble a large crowd from Italy. In some cases, the rural tribes had no reprsentatives at all present for the meeting of the tribal assembly, and it was in the power of the presiding officer for the tribunitial laws (and common practice) to simply have freedmen and slaves fill in for the Italians. Barring fundamental Constitutional reform, the only possible remedy would be to suspend this law, which the Senate was able to do from time to time, but more often the suspension of this absurd law was vetoed by the tribunes who represented the urban mob over everyone else.

 

This was, by the way, the mechanism by which Cicero was exiled, and the same mechanism had the potential to exile any of the good men who might have saved the Republic. And this might have happened to all of them but for the check on the power of the tribal assemblies that was present in the centuries, which was the (rarely used) mechanism that finally allowed Cicero to return to Rome (probably the only vote in the centuries for 20 years). So, even with the absolutely disproportionate power wielded by the urban mob--a power that ultimately led to the Social Wars, the Republic was still not doomed. While there was a mechanism in place to destroy the Republic, this mechanism could have been dismantled over time through normal politics.

 

But normal politics came to an end with the first triumvirate and ALL politics came to an end once Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

 

There is a persistent myth that Caesar had to march on Rome to save his own life--that his opponents in the Senate would have had him executed for treason. This myth completely misreads the actual law and practice of the day. While it is true that people charged with crimes against the state once had their fates determined by the voters in the centuries and tribal assembly, this practice was long gone by the time Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Caesar, like Milo, would have been tried in the Forum, with all his supporters--and veterans--present. At least during the republic, the only restriction on the lawyer's freedom of speech was the lawyer's own courage--because the mob too was free to heckle and to intimidate (see again the case against Milo).

 

Had Caesar not taken up arms against Rome, his fate would have been to face trial for his illegal adventures in Gaul and (probably) his earlier illegal rapine against a Roman ally in Spain. The charge against Caesar would have had a clear precedent in the case of the rapaciously corrupt Verres, who is the proper model for judging what fate might have awaited Caesar. Briefly, Verres was guilty as sin, and despite having jurors--like the senators Nasica and the Metelli--in his pay and despite the brother of the defending attorney also serving on the jury, the prosecution (led by Cicero) succeeded in its case by appealing to these senators' fear of the people, who as always loved the trials and in this particular case greatly influenced the outcome. Under circumstances like these, it is hard to imagine how Caesar could have been successfully prosecuted unless the case against him were even stronger than it was against Verres--even if the jurors were all packed by Catonians, they would have been risking their lives had they attempted to exile Caesar.

 

Thus, from the standpoint of the law, of its practice, and of his own standing among the plebs, Caesar had absolutely nothing to fear if innocent (and probably nothing to fear if guilty). If, on the other hand, Caesar were guilty, and the case against Caesar were actually stronger than the case against Verres--so strong that (in the worst case for Caesar) a jury of all senators were willing to face their deaths to see him exiled, Caesar would have to have been a complete monster. Thus, in either case, Caesar was not justified in crossing the Rubicon.

 

What doomed the republic, therefore, was not simply that its voting was corrupted by the urban mob, or simply that there were private armies, or simply that there were men (such as Ceasar) who had delusions of grandeur--none of these alone had ever been sufficient to destroy the Republic prior to Caesar. It is testimony to Caesar's ability (in a manner of speaking) that he was able to summon simultaneously the power of the mob, the power of a private army, and the power of his own megalomania to his purposes--for these were the very ingredients necessary for building a perpetual dictatorship out of the shaky elements of a fixable Republic. That many of us live in republics today and still admire Caesar--well, I can only shake my head in disbelief.

 

Well put. I'd add only minor points : on the subject of Caesar facing trial, I refer back to a point I made in

another forum, that the possibility or probability of uncontrollable violence between street proxies held risks for Caesar's strategy. Fear of assassination notwithstanding (he would have been much better guarded than Drusus) Caesar's primary concerns will have been political : his victories had made him more popular than anyone else, the opposition was still largely fragmented and tainted in popular eyes by a century or more of

clumsy and sometimes venal policy and he'd made considerable efforts to recruit members of the middle and upper classes to his cause, both to broaden and deepen his network of allies and I suspect to blunt any optimate suggestion that the monied classes would regret allying with him; his later refusal to cancel all debts shows that he caved in to populist demands only when it suited him. Had there been rioting in the streets and sacred precincts during the spectacle of the trial Middle Rome's deepest instincts would have kicked in : Pompeius and the Senate would have garnered acclaim (and support) for crushing the violence while Caesar and his partisans would have been blamed for the property damage and loss of innocent life,

regardless of whether or not they'd been foolish enough to order it.

 

Ultimately a trivial consideration, if he considered it at all, but better for him to skip the intro while he could claim optimate intransigence, march on Rome with a feared and battle-hardened legion and rely on his reputation for generalship, invincibility and luck to buy him time and space. The alternative, after all, was to have his reputation and record attacked in public, where his scribes wouldn't have had a monopoly on recording his exploits; had he then fled to his legions and called them to arms it might have looked like the last throw of a desperate and guilty man and the optimates would have been able to hold up their tacit or real victory to the cautious centre and Caesar's weaker partisans; if it doesn't already exist perhaps a new thread looms on how the legions and the populares would have reacted to his assassination in camp.

 

At the end of the day I can't quite agree with you that Caesar ultimately ruined Rome, and believe me I do

feel for what could and should have evolved over the past two thousand years if only intellect had won out

over the sword and the myth : I live in a Europe where every little corner of the continent and its islands is still projecting itself as something special rather than part of a single community. While we must blame the criminal for the crime, we must also be severe with those who allow criminality to flourish, and there is blame to attach to all classes in the Republic in the century or more before Caesar's rise. Could good and

wise men have rescued the Republic ? Yes, if only there'd been more of them, or at least one with Caesar's

stature among the Roman people. Unfortunately Scipio Africanus Major was long dead.

[Germanicus]

There is a hack who wrote a terrible book called "The Assassination of Julius Caesar," and his simple-minded reading of this period has been favorably reviewed here, but after reviewing more substantial works on this period written by actual classicists, I intend on subjecting that book to a hatchet job.)

 

As you are undoubtedly aware - I wrote the favourable review. I am however also aware, and made the point in the review that Parenti writes from one, biased perspective. Most of his other books give a Michael Mooreish treatment to their subjects too, and are not concerned with Ancient Rome. I have no doubt that there are other, more in depth studies of the period and events that I have yet to read, that provide different points of view.

 

As to your hatchet job, I look forward to reading it - it is what you're best at after all. (This is not a negative thing either - your posts always make me think, which is why I like this forum).

 

With regard to your comments re Optimate/Populares - what do you think either side was for ? Or are you just argueing that this can't be distilled down to such a simplistic treatment ?

[Virgil61]

.. There is a hack who wrote a terrible book called "The Assassination of Julius Caesar," and his simple-minded reading of this period has been favorably reviewed here, but after reviewing more substantial works on this period written by actual classicists, I intend on subjecting that book to a hatchet job.)

 

Michael Parenti is a "hack"? You may not like his politics, and I suspect that 's your real beef, but calling him a hack is pure hyperbole.

 

Cato I think you're trying too hard to make the past shoehorn into a vision of the principles you think the U.S. was founded on. Unfortunately it was never the idyllic Republic the founding fathers thought it was, it was usually a far uglier affair.

 

...(BTW, I think it's really important to purge oneself of the tendency to think of all opponents to Caesar as "for the rich" and of the populares as "for the poor"--it completely distorts clear-thinking about this period, and it contributes to cynicism about the prospects of the republic....

 

Perhaps not 'all' opponents to Caesar, most of them certainly. The opponents to the optimates (which I think is what you meant, not populares) weren't always strictly 'for the poor', but they tapped that deep-seated frustration with the optimates that characterized the history of the Republic since the struggle for the orders through the Gracchi and on down to this era. You can't tap frustration if it ain't there.

 

...Thus, I don't think there was a monolithic opposition to reform, but competing agendas for reform. This is in direct contrast to the history of the Republic. The populares/optimates divide characterized it's history.

 

Competing agendas for reform?

 

 

As you are undoubtedly aware - I wrote the favourable review.

 

I wrote an equally favorable review and he is aware. It's called baiting.

Edited December 17, 2005 by Virgil61

[Tobias]

when the Senate voted on a resolution that both Pompey and Caesar give up their commands and lay down their arms, the vote was 370 pro - 22 anti.

 

That resolution was defeated because Pompey had no damn intention of giving up his powers. Pompey was being completly manipulated by the Boni, and any chance for Caesar to escape unprosecuted or with some mediocum of power remaining was solidly, insanely and jealously opposed by the Boni, and yes, mainly by Cato.

In my opinion, and with no personal offence intended to you M Porcius Cato, Cato was one of the worst things to happen to the republic. Steadfastly jealous and insanely biased against Julius Caesar, he, backed by the Boni and the-by-that-stage puppet Pompey, refused almost all logical courses and options offered by Caesar and others to stop him from crossing the Rubicon. Cato and the Boni forced Caesar to cross the Rubicon. They had no intention of letting him escape unprosecuted and exiled and stripped of all powers at least. They were doing this because Caesar demonstrated to them that he was better then them in every way; politically, militarily, intelligence wise etc. He showed the Boni to be the size they really are; he deflated the puffed-up opinions they had of themselves. Cato and the Boni of Caesar's time deserve no thanks for their "contribution" to the Republic.

I regret that it came to this, but i'm sick of the Boni being made to look as if they were golden defenders of the Republic and that Caesar was a tyrranical monster.

Let the dice fly high!

Edited December 17, 2005 by Tobias