Hannibal's Invasion Of Italy

[Vespasion]

As i've found this web page to be very factual and i would just like a few of you to confirm all of these facts thanks. Sorry it's so long.

 

 

In November 218 BC, Hannibal crossed the Alps into Italy; to the surprise of the Roman Senate who had expected to engage Hannibal in Spain, the second Punic war began after Hannibal attacked a Spanish city allied to Rome, Saguntum.

Hannibal

Edited November 14, 2005 by Vespasion

[FLavius Valerius Constantinus]

Thanks Vespasion, it's the first time I've actually read one that included information about every single year of the second Punic war. By the way, can you name all the Italian and Latin cities that went over to Hannibal and can you name all the cities Hannibal tried to sieged.

[Vespasion]

I'll try; just need to do some research, i can tell you what cities Fabius and Claudius sieged, too be honest there icons to me, probably my second favorites next to Vespasian.

 

Thanks for the reply,

 

I suppose people saw how long it was and clicked exit.

Edited November 16, 2005 by Vespasion

[Primus Pilus]

Just one thing to note so far... largely a semantics issue really.

 

.., the Senate elected a dictator to stop Hannibal; although this violated the principal of Roman politics that no one man should hold overwhelming power, the senate believed it was justified as Hannibal had a clear path to attack Rome; technically this meant that that the elected mans title was prodictator, however he possessed all the powers of a dictator, the man who received this title was Quintus Fabius Maximus.

 

It was correct that he was named prodictator but not quite for the reasons laid out. He was named prodictator because both consuls were dead. Roman law demanded that a dictator could only be named by the consuls, and since they had both been killed and time was of the essence, a new policy was needed where the Senate could bypass this restriction. The election of a dicator was not a violation of Roman politics as you suggest, it was the manner in which Fabius was appointed which was the issue.

[Vespasion]

Thank you for that correction, as i stated before i want this to be as historicaly accurate as possible, so if I have written incorrect information please do not be hesitant to inform me. By the way here's the final piece of my work, it also includes information about a few besieged cities as 'FLavius Valerius Constantinus' suggested.

 

Claudius and Fabius split armies however it was Claudius who encountered Hannibal first; he deployed in a classically roman offensive manner however Claudius showed some military ability, unlike the other Roman commanders before him. When positioning his troops he did so that the terrain aided his men although there were no huge conflicts between these two commanders there were many skirmishes which thanks to the terrain often favoured the Roman forces.

Claudius unlike his predecessors, kept his army under extremely tight control, the men in the units were not allowed to divert from there columns and the terrain were they camped was always in favour of a defending force; this created further difficulties as one of the main reasons Hannibal had been successful was the incompetence of his enemies and his ability to use the terrain to lure the enemy into an ambush.

Fabius

[Spartan JKM]

Excellent work Vespasion. I share your interest in such a breathtakingly intense crossroad in history. The corporate heroism of the Republic overcame a commander who can be placed alongside any other leader in history; to his misfortune, he came from a state that was not a nation at arms.

 

I would like to add some trivia concerning Fabius Maximus and Gaius T. Varro. As Fabius saw it, Hannibal could be overcome by wearing him down. The Carthaginian's weakness lay in the fact that he needed to plunder, and could only break the Republic by gaining the majority of Rome's allies to his side, or at least relinquish their loyalty to the federation. As long as the allies remained loyal Hannibal's operational ability would become crippled, but every time he achieved a battle victory the faith of the allies would weaken. Fabius' solution was very sound - avoid engaging Hannibal, though his army was larger (not in cavalry), but keep at a distance enough to hang on his rear and flanks, harassing him enough to limit his foraging capacity to gather food and fodder. Local populations were ordered to seef refuge in the fortresses and take with them as much they could their food and animals, and destroy what they couldn't haul with them. Fabius was certain that the longer Hannibal stayed in Italy, cut off from Iberian and Carthage, the weaker he would become. Sure, he was a nuisance, but he could never capture Rome or seduce her allies by this policy.

 

The wisdom of Fabius would not be appreciated until after the disaster at Cannae, as it was the Roman custom to break their enemies' power by direct action on the battlefield. It was very hard to stomach watching this policy of inaction while Hannibal ravaged the countryside. This is where I believe Varro, who would go down as the ultimate scapegoat, had a point. How could Rome keep her allies, people she promised to protect in return for obedience, if she couldn't protect her own people here in the Latin locales of Samnium?

 

Indeed, Fabius took measures to protect Rome should Hannibal march on the city. Walls and towers were strengthened, the bridges over the Tiber broken down, and citizens enrolled for defense. But Hannibal, after making no impression on the Samnite colony of Beneventum (Fabius was watching form the hills), quickened his pace and marched into Campania, specifically the rich ager Falernus plain. By threatening this area tilled by Roman citizens Hannibal figured Fabius would would have to come to battle, or witness fully how Rome could not protect her people. Campanian prisoners (the 3 knights after Trasimene, Livy 22.13.2-3) had already told Hannibal he might win over Capua, as he would a year later. But Fabius would still not be drawn into a major engagement, causing his subordiante, Minucius, and many of his troops to become restive and angry. But Fabius was willing to fall back on the factors that gave him the advantage - inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men. It was now late in the season and Hannibal needed to establish a base where his army could winter and enjoy their spoils. This was risky, as Hannibal would have to escape via 1 of the few passes in the mountains that ring around the plain. He chose to employ the same route he had used to enter,hoping Fabius would not anticipate which pass he would chose to exit from. But Fabius guessed right, who banked on, once Hannibal wintered, blocking the other passes by which he would have to leave. While Hannibal pitched camp in the Falernian plain beneath him, Fabius occupied the same pass with 4,000 soldiers, himself taking a close position on a hill in front of it (in back of Hannibal).

 

Hannibal was seemingly trapped. He could not expect to winter in Campania, since once his army exhausted its supplies it could not stay. He had not a single fortress in his possession, and was encumbered with numerous prisoners and supplies. For all intents and purposes, Fabius had patiently locked him within this Campanian plain, shutting every door and barring every escape route. He had garrisoned Casilinum in Hannibal's rear and secured the other few paths with enough soldiers to block a quick escape before they could be reinforced. The river Volturnus prevented any retreat southwards, and the colony of Cales barred the outlet from the plain. The Carthaginian mad no move as the summer wore on. The Romans, greatly superior in numbers, watched closely from the heights. This was it! The war was over for Hannibal. Or was it?

 

What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals".

 

Livy Book 22.16 - 22.18:

 

....."It now seemed as if Hannibal must be hemmed in. Capua and Samnium and all the rich land of Latium behind them were furnishing the Romans with supplies, while the Carthaginian would have to winter amongst the rocks of Formiae and the sands and marshes of Liternum and in gloomy forests. Hannibal did not fail to observe that his own tactics were being employed against him. As he could not get out through Casilinum, and would have to make for the mountains and cross the ridge of Callicula, he would be liable to be attacked by the Romans whilst he was shut up in the valleys. To guard against this he decided upon a stratagem which, deceiving the eyes of the enemy by its alarming appearance, would enable him to scale the mountains in a night march without fear of interruption. The following was the ruse which he adopted. Torch-wood gathered from all the country round, and faggots of dry brushwood were tied on the horns of the oxen which he was driving in vast numbers, both broken and unbroken to the plough, amongst the rest of the plunder from the fields. About 2000 oxen were collected for the purpose. To Hasdrubal was assigned the task of setting fire to the bundles on the horns of this herd as soon as darkness set in, then driving them up the mountains and if possible mostly above the passes which were guarded by the Romans.

 

As soon as it was dark, the camp silently broke up; the oxen were driven some distance in front of the column. When they had reached the foot of the mountains where the roads began to narrow, the signal was given and the herds with their flaming horns were driven up the mountain side. The terrifying glare of the flames shooting from their heads and the heat which penetrated to the root of their horns made the oxen rush about as though they were mad. At this sudden scampering about, it seemed as though the woods and mountains were on fire, and all the brushwood round became alight and the incessant but useless shaking of their heads made the flames shoot out all the more, and gave the appearance of men running about in all directions. When the men who were guarding the pass saw fires moving above them high up on the mountains, they thought that their position was turned, and they hastily quitted it. Making their way up to the highest points, they took the direction where there appeared to be the fewest flames, thinking this to be the safest road. Even so, they came across stray oxen separated from the herd, and at first sight they stood still in astonishment at what seemed a preternatural sight of beings breathing fire. When it turned out to be simply a human device they were still more alarmed at what they suspected was an ambuscade, and they took to flight. Now they fell in with some of Hannibal's light infantry, but both sides shrank from a fight in the darkness and remained inactive till daylight. In the meantime Hannibal had marched the whole of his army through the pass, and after surprising and scattering some Roman troops in the pass itself, fixed his camp in the district of Allifae.

 

Fabius watched all this confusion and excitement, but as he took it to be an ambuscade, and in any case shrank from a battle in the night, he kept his men within their lines. As soon as it was light there was a battle just under the ridge of the mountain where the Carthaginian light infantry were cut off from their main body and would easily have been crushed by the Romans, who had considerably the advantage in numbers, had not a cohort of Spaniards come up, who had been sent back by Hannibal to their assistance. These men were more accustomed to the mountains and in better training for running amongst rocks and precipices, and being both more lightly made and more lightly armed they could easily by their method of fighting baffle an enemy drawn from the lowlands, heavily armed and accustomed to stationary tactics. At last they drew off from a contest which was anything but an equal one. The Spaniards being almost untouched, the Romans having sustained a heavy loss, each retired to their respective camps. Fabius followed on Hannibal's track through the pass and encamped above Allifae in an elevated position and one of great natural strength. Hannibal retraced his steps as far as the Peligni, ravaging the country as he went, as though his intention was to march through Samnium upon Rome. Fabius continued to move along the heights, keeping between the enemy and the City, neither avoiding nor attacking him. The Carthaginian left the Peligni, and marching back into Apulia, reached Gereonium. This city had been abandoned by its inhabitants because a portion of the walls had fallen into ruin. The Dictator formed an entrenched camp near Larinum. From there he was recalled to Rome on business connected with religion. Before his departure he impressed upon the Master of the Horse, not only as commander-in-chief but as a friend giving good advice and even using entreaties, the necessity of trusting more to prudence than to luck, and following his own example rather than copying Sempronius and Flaminius. He was not to suppose that nothing had been gained now that the summer had been spent in baffling the enemy, even physicians often gained more by not disturbing their patients than by subjecting them to movement and exercises; it was no small advantage to have avoided defeat at the hands of a foe who had been so often victorious and to have obtained a breathing space after such a series of disasters. With these unheeded warnings to the Master of the Horse he started for Rome".

 

Fabius had been outwitted and humiliated, but he alone saw the Romans could not beat Hannibal and refused to be swayed by persuasion or mockery from his decision not to fight a pitched battle.

 

The Senate now resolved on mounting a major offensive to destroy the Carthaginian menace once and for all. Need I expound on this famous campaign in Apulia in July/August 216 B.C.? The elected consuls were Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. They were given command of massive force of 80,000 infantry and slightly under 7,000 cavalry to face Hannibal's 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. There was now no need to continue Fabius' strategy, and such a large force could not be supplied for very long. This army was assembled for teh sole purpose of destroying Hannibal once and for all.

 

It is true that the Roman citizen militia at this time was not composed of the highly disciplined, professional soldiers of later years. But their fighting qualities were no less than that of 'professional' mercenaries of alien armies, as they were trained from youth for war. The disasters Rome suffered at the hands of Hannibal were not due to any lack of quality of her militia, but the genius of Hannibal, the stodgy conceptions of her consuls and the rigidity of her infantry tatcics. Scipio would remedy all this later.

 

The Romans advanced carefully in pursuit of Hannibal as they marched south down the coastal terrain, avoiding any suitable ambush positions. When they cmae to Cannae, they camped near Canusium, about 5 miles form Hannibal's position. The next day, Varro's day to command, the Romans marched out and offered battle to Hannibal. Hannibal attacked the Roman van of heavy troops with some light infantry and nearly all his cavalry, and threw Varro in to some confusion. But Varro prudently supported his line with his own cavalry, among which he interspersed with some velites and a few thousand other legionnaires. The opponents clashed until evening, with Hannibal being bested, leaving the battlefield. But being the Romans had a considerably superior force of line, this was doubtless Hannibal's ploy of whetting an inexperienced consul's appetite for battle. He had done the same thing with Sempronius at the Trebbia. The next day, Paullus did not like the flat terrain, and refused battle. Hannibal was compelled to withdraw, but sent his Numidians acroos teh Aufidus to attack the Roman foragers, cutting off as much water supply for the Romans as possible.

 

On the morning of August 2, Varro had the red vexillum displayed outside his tent - the square Roman flag giving the signal for battle. I'm not going to give an account of Cannae, but I'll give a specific view regarding Varro:

 

Hannibal's masterpiece at Cannae has resonated beyond its age as much as any other in history. The crescent formation. Double-envelopment. The elastically hinged wings of cavalry. Simply brilliant. Of history's great commanders, Hannibal was unique in being essentially defensive in his use of infantry. Even at defeat at Zama, the aging Hannibal, probably suffering from mental and even physical exhaustion, and no longer with a great cavalry force or adept lieutenants, skillfully used his inferior cavalry as a rearguard action to rid the cavalry squadrons of both armies of the field, giving him the advantage in a frontal infantry slogfest. This is conjectural, as the original sources state it was the scattered elephants which caused the rapid flight of Hannibal's cavalry. However, their mahouts were trained to kill them if they became a liability, so it is possible that Hannibal ordered his cavalry to give ground. Remember, it would take longer to turn a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a a defeated enemy off the field, and the Roman and Numidian (Masinissa's) cavalry returned only in the nick of time. Either way, Hannibal's horsemen would not be coming back. He then absorbed Scipio's legions toward his veteran line, which he placed in reserve, thus immediately thwarting Scipio's chances of using his tactics of pinning an enemy's center and sending his rear lines to envelop and crush that enemy. It may have been very fortunate for Scipio, who certainly generaled with great poise that day, that Hannibal's first 2 lines lacked co-operation and began fighting amongst themselves. The superior cavalry arm decided Zama (basically), and Scipio was very prudent to secure these allies before engaging Hannibal. True, luck always plays a factor in these situations.

 

Let's get one thing very clear - Varro was no genius. But I don't think he was the fool everyone seems to make him out to be. remeber, we have the benefit of hindsight, and I doubt anyone before August 2, 216 B.C. could predict what could have happened. Every victory in history which was an illustration of superbly innovative tactics was one with the loser not being more than a moderate commander (I think). Roman writers and historians were, for the most part, either wealthy aristicrats or dependent on the aristocracy - in the case of Polybius, the Scipionic circle. My point, which is simply my humble opinion, when 2 consuls shared command, as was the case at Trebia and Cannae, the patrician was always the 'hero' and the plebeian the 'goat'. Gaius Terentius Varro was a plebeian. Praise has been showered upon Fabius Maximus for his policy of delayed inaction against Hannibal, but Varro's dispute with Fabius, which is what made him so bad in the eyes of the aristocratic writers, was very sensible; indeed, as I sated earlier, Fabius was a nuisance to Hannibal and his army, but Hannibal still marched where and when he wanted, devastaing the countryside and appropriating all the victuals and supplies for sustaining his ends. Varro's argument was how could the Romans expect to keep their federation intact, which relied on promising protection for obediance, if they couldn't protect their own people? Actually, Hannibal was indirectly enriching Fabius and his fellow aristocrats as farmers fled the land and crowded into Rome. Their farms were sold for a mere pittance, and the senators etc. were incorporating them into their already vast estates, known as latifundia, and working them with slaves. Sorry - this really isn't the point, but interesting trivia. Moreover, Fabius' style was not the Roman way. Varro did what was expected of him -be aggressive. Fabius' wisdom, though, was indeed appreciated after the lesson of Cannae. He certainly never 'outwitted' Hannibal, as many seem to feel. It was somewhat the other way around, as evidenced by the breakout at the ager Falernus.

 

Hannibal had constantly outflanked the Romans before and even after Cannae with his cavalry, but here they had him in terrain that prohibited any outflanking maneuver. Much like Darius III at Gaugamela 115 years earlier, Varro's plan was not subtle but, on paper, quite practical. His cavalry was to be purely defensive against Hannibal's horsemen, designed to hold their ground for as long as possible as he crushed Hannibal's vastly smaller body of infantry with sheer weight (the more seasoned infantry were in the center). Both he and Paullus personally commaned the cavalry units, clearly to hold as much tenacity and spirit as possible. What took place on the wings would be of little consequence after an overwhelming victory by a massive concentration of force in the center. He had every reason to be confident; the spearheads of about 10,000 legionnaires had cut away at the Trebbia and, the 6,000 or so of the vanguard at Trasimene. They would now do so in an offensive manner and absolutely destroy Hannibal. True, he was robbing his army of flexibility, but was enforcing more rigidity. He had to bunch the legions together more than usual to create more depth. It must have seemed so simple. As I stated, Varro, a plebeian, has gone done as the ultimate scapegoat, but with such a huge army at his disposal, attempting anything complicated would have been improbable. Again, he was doing what was expected of him. Like Darius III, he went up against a man that day of battle who is to this day considered one of the greatest leaders in military history. Hannibal's cavalry at Cannae achieved shock tactics, as he placed his heavier cavalry in more numbers on one side, and the lighter Numidians on the other; the Numidians and their Roman allied counterparts fought equally against each other on Hannibal's right flank, but the force of Hasdrubal's heavy Iberian and Gallic horse, which outnumbered the Roman cavalry on this side, the Carthaginian left, by more than 2-to-1, quickly put them to flight and, employing incredible order, did not pursue too far and swung about 90 %, rode behind the Roman infantry, and before completely smashing into the allied cavalry, achieved the flight of that allied contingent, who were pursued by many of the Numidians. Hasdrubal then rode into the Romans rear, spelling doom for the poor legionnaires, who were already sucked into Hannibal's envelopment on three sides.

 

We know what happened to poor Varro and his army that dreadful day for Rome, but he displayed admirable distinction in defeat, rallying survivors at Venusia and helping to keep order. He was relatively excused and given posts of command throughout the rest of the war. After the war, he was sent on diplomatic missions to Greece and Africa.

 

Cannae was indeed a lesson in the art of war, as Will Durant, in his The Story of Civilization Vol. III, wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history. It ended the days of Roman reliance solely upon infantry, and set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".

 

But the Romans, wrote Polybius, "...were most to be feared when they stood in real danger.....Though they were now so overwhelmingly defeated, and their military reputation had been destroyed, yet, by the peculiar virtues of their constitution, and by wise counsel, they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy.....but in a few years made themselves masters of the world."

 

Food for thought. Thanks, Spartan JKM

Edited November 21, 2005 by Spartan JKM

[Hamilcar Barca]

That was a lengthy post with some good points JKM. I'd like to add a little something on the character of Varro as well.

 

When we read about Varro and Paullus, we are made to think straight away that Paullus was the righteous steady-headed, cautious commander while Varro was a reckless moron. The fact is there can be no poof that this was just the case. Roman writers like Livy often convey loosing generals to the common demograph of a rash, flippant commander as a means of creating scapegoats for their defeats. It must be remembered that Aemeilius Paullus was a relative to the reverred Lucius Aemilius Paullus, conqueror of Pydna, and his famous adopted son - Scipio Aemilianus, conqueror of Carthage. Republican historians writing during the times of these men would not dare have accused their family names of playing a major role in the defeat at Cannae, or rather would have glorified them. Varro on the other hand was a relatively less important name who could easily been scapegoated.

 

While the descriptions of Varro and Paullus' personalities given by Livy and Polybius may have been true, consideration must be taken into account. Also, the reality may well have been that both commanders were more than eager for battle, and why shouldn't they have been? Livy's narrative of the build-up to Cannae has an impending sense of doom to it but it must be realized that no one prior to this action could have guessed that Hannibal would have been capable of defeating a Roman army twice the size of his own.

[Vespasion]

I've found livy's acounts to be somewhat misleading; so i try to avoid reallying on him. However everyone has there own source which they rely on. Personally when referring to these accounts, i find Polybius to be much less speculated and based more on solid facts.

[Virgil61]

...Varro's argument was how could the Romans expect to keep their federation intact, which relied on promising protection for obediance, if they couldn't protect their own people? Actually, Hannibal was indirectly enriching Fabius and his fellow aristocrats as farmers fled the land and crowded into Rome. Their farms were sold for a mere pittance, and the senators etc. were incorporating them into their already vast estates, known as latifundia, and working them with slaves. Sorry - this really isn't the point, but interesting trivia. Moreover, Fabius' style was not the Roman way. Varro did what was expected of him -be aggressive. Fabius' wisdom, though, was indeed appreciated after the lesson of Cannae. He certainly never 'outwitted' Hannibal, as many seem to feel. It was somewhat the other way around, as evidenced by the breakout at the ager Falernus...

 

We know what happened to poor Varro and his army that dreadful day for Rome, but he displayed admirable distinction in defeat, rallying survivors at Venusia and helping to keep order. He was relatively excused and given posts of command throughout the rest of the war. After the war, he was sent on diplomatic missions to Greece and Africa.

 

Food for thought. Thanks, Spartan JKM

 

I appreciate your well thought out arguments JKM, but I do have to dispute the issue with Varro. The Romans had already lost several armies to Hannibal and Polybius makes very clear in the parapgraph before the election of Varro and Paullus that the Romans understood Fabius prudence, especially after his rescue of Minucius from total defeat by Hannibal. Fabius strategy was appreciated and not only by Paullus but by none other than Minucius who Appian states finally understood his wisdom.

 

You make a good argument about the pressures Varro thought should force him into battle, but the primary responsibility of a good general is to access the tactical situation according to the terrain/position, the enemy, his army's capabilities and finally his own abilities and experience. Varro ignored his position which Paullus found unfavorable, was faced with one of the greatest enemies anyone has ever faced, he had an army where a large number had little or no combat experience and he himself had no military experience, ignoring the advice of his own co-consul who did. His reputation further suffered from the fact that Paullus, who opposed the battle, fought and died alongside plebes, senators and equestrians while he fled the field.

 

To me the evidence is conclusive that Varro had made a serious error and disregarded solid advice. His mistake not only caused a great disaster, it stripped Rome temporarily of an army to defend it.

[Favonius Cornelius]

Just one thing to note so far... largely a semantics issue really.

 

.., the Senate elected a dictator to stop Hannibal; although this violated the principal of Roman politics that no one man should hold overwhelming power, the senate believed it was justified as Hannibal had a clear path to attack Rome; technically this meant that that the elected mans title was prodictator, however he possessed all the powers of a dictator, the man who received this title was Quintus Fabius Maximus.

 

It was correct that he was named prodictator but not quite for the reasons laid out. He was named prodictator because both consuls were dead. Roman law demanded that a dictator could only be named by the consuls, and since they had both been killed and time was of the essence, a new policy was needed where the Senate could bypass this restriction. The election of a dicator was not a violation of Roman politics as you suggest, it was the manner in which Fabius was appointed which was the issue.

 

 

I've always been curious about prorogated offices. So you say he was a prodictator. Does the history literally give the latin form: prodictator? Or is it an assumed thing?

[Vespasion]

I beleive it was an official title; just like consul and so on however i'm unsure so i wouldn't take it as certain. Hopefly this will have answered your question.

[sullafelix]

I've found livy's acounts to be somewhat misleading; so i try to avoid reallying on him. However everyone has there own source which they rely on. Personally when referring to these accounts, i find Polybius to be much less speculated and based more on solid facts.

 

Really? I am no huge fan of Livy myself, but which bits of his punic wars accounts do you find unreliable? As for Polybius he is not exactly reliable himself. His grasp of Roman politics is shaky beyond belief for a man who spent so long at the centre of power. Good general and so his battle stuff is usually pretty bang on, but even some of the figures are a little contentious.

 

Cheers

Sullafelix

[Vespasion]

I've found livy's acounts to be somewhat misleading; so i try to avoid reallying on him. However everyone has there own source which they rely on. Personally when referring to these accounts, i find Polybius to be much less speculated and based more on solid facts.

 

Really? I am no huge fan of Livy myself, but which bits of his punic wars accounts do you find unreliable? As for Polybius he is not exactly reliable himself. His grasp of Roman politics is shaky beyond belief for a man who spent so long at the centre of power. Good general and so his battle stuff is usually pretty bang on, but even some of the figures are a little contentious.

 

Cheers

Sullafelix

 

I'll edit this post as i must do research as the points i found often contradicted each other. Will post my reply on a later date

 

Thanks

[Pantagathus]

Really? I am no huge fan of Livy myself, but which bits of his punic wars accounts do you find unreliable? As for Polybius he is not exactly reliable himself. His grasp of Roman politics is shaky beyond belief for a man who spent so long at the centre of power. Good general and so his battle stuff is usually pretty bang on, but even some of the figures are a little contentious.

 

Cheers

Sullafelix

 

I like Polybius most for many reasons but Livy documents certain details that are either lost from Polybius or that he chose to omit. (At least in Scipio's campaign in Spain). I've found that when Livy was confronted by different accounts in his research (Roman records) he would more than likely tell the reader that and let them decide what range to believe.

[Virgil61]

... As for Polybius he is not exactly reliable himself. His grasp of Roman politics is shaky beyond belief for a man who spent so long at the centre of power. Good general and so his battle stuff is usually pretty bang on, but even some of the figures are a little contentious.

 

Cheers

Sullafelix

 

I'd have to disagree with you on Polybius. His writing is on par with Thucydides in the attention and importance he tries to give to the truth. He may not be perfect but he's among the most accurate of the ancient historians. At one point he devotes a chapter commenting on the importance of research and verification, attacking another historian whose research was negligable. His take on Roman politics was biased but he was dependent on the good graces of Scipio's family.