Onasander Posted July 23, 2005 Report Share Posted July 23, 2005 I'm not going to discuss the well ordered victory and defeats where everyone is in a nice clean field moving piecemeal with plently of survivors on both sides, I'm focusing more on my own experiance in training with the US Army as an infantryman and my perspective on 'awareness of your surroundings' in battle. People to this day study battles like Cannae and Andrianople, for deriving tactical and strategic kwoledge to be used in future military aplications. One things I know from losing a mock battle is, you usually don't very well know why you lost it. A example from my first experiance, basic training. It was on the last field excersice we had(FTX), hadn't gotten much sleep the night before, and wasn't going to get any for another 24 hours. We started out on our 14 mile road march, but was diverted on a mission which required us to hike 2 miles down a hill on this sand/gravel road road chewed up by erosion, fill up a bunch of water buckets (20-30 of them) and carry them up the hill back to camp before setting off. Well, it was dark, and we made it down with little injury. One of the Drill Sargents started taking out these big sticks that looked like white dynamite, lit it and then made motion to throw it on the grown. I was the only one paying attention, and got a bad feeling about it, and yelled to everyone the drill deargeant was up to something (thereby breaking some unknown training rule I was unaware of, he's not really there doing what he's doing, he's suppost to be invisible, they forgot to tell us this.) The thing exploded, and we all hit the deck, and looked at the drill sergent with a WTF attitude. He yelled at us it was a simulated mortar round and told us to pick up the canisters and run before they sent more rounds in, which we could clearly see since every sergeant out their seemed like he was lighting one up. I grabbed two and started running frantically up the hill with a the tan color 5 gallon canisters on my shoulders, M16 slapping into my side, moving pass groups in a broken chain of five to ten guys here and there, moving at various speeds, sweating fullspeed heart-pounding uphill. Everthing was greyish blue(nihjt), sweat was coming out of me from every pore, and I was acutely aware of the sand and dirt smeared on the side of my face and uniform, the abrasion on my elbow and hands, the huge, monsterous, uncomfortable boots, waterlogger and getting heavier with everystep, and my cheap helmet that always managed to block my vision and blunt my abilitity to hear. I knew traveling up that road bordered on both sides by forest was a bad idea, but since we didn't have permission to do otherwise, we just kept lugging uphill, and kept having training grenades/mortars thrown at us (with a occasional tossback, though we knew enough not to throw back the mortars). We finally got to the top of that poory maintained crumbling road, and waited for everyone to catch up pulling security. We made it back to camp, where the other platoons were waiting, and then dumped the water, moving on to the next mission, which was pretty much the same thing but on a much larger scale, with different platoons (it was company size), four platoons a company) getting shreaded into smaller squads(four squads a platoon, a squad being about nine guys) -seperated a good tenth mile around a bend of the road from the next two groups, in a failed mission for all (it was designed to fail). Needless to say, it was a ugly retreat, with the dumbest guys trying to take the inititive getting everyone more 'shot' up. Now, I've reflected upon this night, and the many others I've had since then, and now have come to an understanding on two things. First, I really hate my job, something everyone with the job title of Infantry holds in common with me. Secondly, I've come to doubt some of the historical accounts of the great military disasters in history. The first mission I described is pretty much straight foreward; a enemy ambush was set on the hill road, allowing us to pass through unmolested till we got to the waterpoint. Then they called in artillery on us knowing that some would be killed, and the rest would be bewildered as well as disorganized and would have to go uphill on a well defined, though irregually eroded road to get to our location, a perfect time to attack us. So, I cou, when we could lest counter. l can pretty much map out in my brain what the basic battlefield deposition theoretically would look like, but in truth how do I know how many men were supposedly attacking, or their exact locations in the woodline? How many were actually involved... on bothsides? Well, easy. It was a small group of guys (one platoon, about 50 guys) and we each knew who was the guy next to him. We all told each other afterwards the stories of what we seen, and figured it out, putting t impreeven impress the First Sergeant (head NCO over the Drill Sergeants). But, when it came to the second mission of the long night, everyone was confused both during and after. 200+ guys running amuk from four different platoons (mabey more, we kept on hearing that another company was using the training range with us in the simulated battle, but I'm not certain) not really knowing each other that well because of animosities forstered through tradition and instict further blurring everything(this is done to make us more competitive). The guys who got the most praise afterwards appeared from what I saw that night to be mearly the most loudmouth and rash ones who just started ordering people to do stuff when they didn't really know what was going on, and more often than not got more people mangled in the traps. I really don't have a clear mental image of what the basic deposition of the 'battlefield' there was, much less the enemy's tactics, or heck, even ours. Now, to my point. When Rome fough barbarians or nations who's historical records have since disappeared, we can in general rely on the Roman record, if it was a victory, or even a minor defeat. But a major defeat, the kind most diligently studied in the war colleges and universities across the globe? I'm not so sure. With the radical increase of of troops involved in these battlesin comparision to my two examples above, any massacre would leave a couple from this file or that, and the complicated maneuvering that defeated these troops may not of been seen or comprehended by the survivors till it was too late, or mabey even not at all (likely one of the reason's they lost in the first place). It's Sun Tzu's formlessness. How do we know this or that actually transpired in the narrated fashion. To me, it's not even a question of the time gap between the occurance of the battle and the time the history was witten down, which in ancient times often was a good hundred years or more. Nor is it the biases of the historian, his root sources (the witnesses) I guarantee had many more (remember my talking qbout the various platoons anamosities to one another, keeping us from developing a cohert picture of what happened, and how I think it was the bigest idiots who were leading us. Now multiply py perspective against everyone elses, the calculate each one's vendettas and grudges, and you'll get a pretty compliced view of the battle.) And furthermore, what I remember most was the stupidstuff. I knew more about the cut on my and and the weight in my boots than I knew about the enemy. My attention to detail reminds me of the old vets watching Saving Private for the first time... they said it looked exactly as it did on the real V-day invasion. They knew all the details cept for one, where everyone in the battlefield was. I'm telling you, they didn't have a overhead view of the battle, and spent the next 50 years buffing up on it by reading the history books to figure out just what the heck happened. Now imagine the poor roman soldier, survivor, without the modern luxery of Barnes and Noble or the history channel, or even a decent book. All he has is his disorganised memoried and that of his compatriots being doused by alchohol over the years. Did the great defeats really happen the way we think they did? Are we studying the wrong tactics and strtegies? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Primus Pilus Posted July 23, 2005 Report Share Posted July 23, 2005 I would agree that the basic foot soldier would generally never have a clue why a battle was won or lost. They only know their immediate circumstances. To apply that same reasoning to field commander perspectives and the study of warfare would be folly. Unless of course we are studying warfare from the perspective of the 'infantryman'. As an example, we know a great deal about Caesar's campaigns, admittedly because he was the one who wrote it down, but they do paint a fairly broad picture of the battles. His descriptions are not limited in scope by the perspective of small unit engagements even though he does describe some of that. I agree completely that the battlefield can be a confusing cluster of anything and everything. Despite that, we can still understand how a maneuver can win or lose a battle even though we may lack the understanding of the heroics or failings of individuals on the field. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Onasander Posted July 23, 2005 Author Report Share Posted July 23, 2005 I'm not denying the battles of Ceasar, I'm talking about the big battles where Rome didn't come out on top, lost heavy numbers of troops. Rifles allow more spread out formations, the Romans generally would of been more compact, which at first glance would make it easier to understand what was happening around them, but because of the bewilderment factor, and their focus on the inglorious concept of WTF (a powerful force on the battlefield), I doubt even the commanders once the fight came to them and through them knew what was going on outside of thier adreniline narrowed vision. They most likely had theos simple geometical divisions in thier mind like me on my first mission afterwards trying to compute the enemy's formlessness and thier own Chaos. Did they really do a double envelopement at Cannae in the way the described, or was there significatly more to it than the Romans were later able to Rationalize? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
roman wargamer Posted July 24, 2005 Report Share Posted July 24, 2005 I'm focusing more on my own experiance in training with the US Army as an infantryman and my perspective on 'awareness of your surroundings' in battle. --- =your perspective is not the same with the Company CO., Battalion CO, and Regiment CO. the Brigade is the equivalent of the Legion. --- =so how can you compare 50 soldier to 80,000 men battle. ---- People to this day study battles like Cannae and Andrianople, =why because it show that an inferior force can win. by the use of tactic ( position ) and strategy ( movement ) --- A example from my first experiance, basic training. Drill Sargents started taking out white dynamite, lit it and then made motion to throw it The thing exploded, and we all hit the deck, and looked at the drill sergent ...and started running frantically up the hill =it is a simulated ambush --- M16 slapping into my side, =wrong... weapons must be always ready for fire possession. --- moving pass groups in a broken chain five to ten guys here and there, moving at various speeds .. block my vision and blunt my abilitity to hear. We finally got to the top of that road, and waited for everyone to catch up =who is the platoon CO? a Lt. or FSgt. why no platoon formation ? who is the point man/team? . advance team guard ? right and left flank guard teams? rear guard team? why no retreat plan? --- it was company size, four platoons a company four squads a platoon, a squad being about nine guys a squad being about nine guy= 36 men platoon= 8 squads. =again, why no platoon formation??? --- The first mission a enemy ambush was set on the hill road, allowing us to pass through unmolested =why your platoon did not set a security parameter on the road side? ---- till we got to the waterpoint. =your flank or rear become open and unguarded. --- Then they called in artillery ...knowing that some be killed, =where is the standard retreat plan? --- and would have to go uphill =wrong, it is wrong to climb up hill if you are... on the ambush... naturally they will control the high ground. ---- a perfect time to attack us. So, when we could lest counter. =what a perfect one flank ambush. --- The guys who got the most praise afterwards the most loudmouth and rash ones who just started ordering people to do stuff =the right thing to do. --- when they didn't really know what was going on, =everyone do not know what happen. --- and more often than not got in the traps. =but they are trying to keep the platoon on order. ---- When Rome fough barbarians or nations... But a major defeat, the kind most diligently studied in the war colleges and universities across the globe? Did the great defeats really happen the way we think they did? Are we studying the wrong tactics and strtegies? the Roman do the Square Formation on that faithful day. =so it is a Two Flank Attack and Envelopment. --- rad --- =your perspective is not the same with the Company CO., Battalion CO, and Regiment CO. the Brigade is the equivalent of the Legion. --- =so how can you compare 50 soldier to 80,000 men battle. ---- People to this day study battles like Cannae and Andrianople, =why because it show that an inferior force can win. by the use of tactic ( position ) and strategy ( movement ) --- A example from my first experiance, basic training. Drill Sargents started taking out white dynamite, lit it and then made motion to throw it The thing exploded, and we all hit the deck, and looked at the drill sergent ...and started running frantically up the hill =it is a simulated ambush --- M16 slapping into my side, =wrong... weapons must be always ready for fire possession. --- moving pass groups in a broken chain five to ten guys here and there, moving at various speeds .. block my vision and blunt my abilitity to hear. We finally got to the top of that road, and waited for everyone to catch up =who is the platoon CO? a Lt. or FSgt. why no platoon formation ? who is the point man/team? . advance team guard ? right and left flank guard teams? rear guard team? why no retreat plan? --- it was company size, four platoons a company four squads a platoon, a squad being about nine guys a squad being about nine guy= 36 men platoon= 8 squads. =again, why no platoon formation??? --- The first mission a enemy ambush was set on the hill road, allowing us to pass through unmolested =why your platoon did not set a security parameter on the road side? ---- till we got to the waterpoint. =your flank or rear become open and unguarded. --- Then they called in artillery ...knowing that some be killed, =where is the standard retreat plan? --- and would have to go uphill =wrong, it is wrong to climb up hill if you are... on the ambush... naturally they will control the high ground. ---- a perfect time to attack us. So, when we could lest counter. =what a perfect one flank ambush. --- The guys who got the most praise afterwards the most loudmouth and rash ones who just started ordering people to do stuff =the right thing to do. --- when they didn't really know what was going on, =everyone do not know what happen. --- and more often than not got in the traps. =but they are trying to keep the platoon on order. When Rome fough barbarians or nations... But a major defeat, the kind most diligently studied in the war colleges and universities across the globe? Did the great defeats really happen the way we think they did? Are we studying the wrong tactics and strtegies? the Roman do the Square Formation on that faithful day. =so it is a Two Flank Attack and Envelopment. --- rad Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Onasander Posted July 24, 2005 Author Report Share Posted July 24, 2005 so how can you compare 50 soldier to 80,000 men battle. Easiest question, and the keystone of my point: They no longer had supporting support channels to funnel correct, or for that matter, any information to and fro on the greater battlefield than what they could collect from thier five senses, essentially, they became over-glorified soldiers having to change thier focus from leading to fighting like everyone else, and in these catastrophic battles many did not survive, unless they escaped, in which case, I doubt they were paying much attention to the overall battle and would be prone to exagerate and reason the lapses of their whole understanding of causes and effects in the battle. You can fit an half a roman legion in the area 50 riflemen can take up spread out attacking in four man wide wedges, my measurements reflected quite accurate I believe the range that a commander in these circumstances could see. I know why we study these battles, but how do we know if what we are studying is actually what happened without confirming records from the opposition army? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Crantor Posted July 25, 2005 Report Share Posted July 25, 2005 I don't think you can get a completely objective and realistic view of what happened. Historians can recreate an approximation of what may have happened based on the enemy's version (not always objective). Where bodies are found plays a big role in determining what may or may not of happened and where units were arrayed. Survivor's testimony helps as part of what may have happened. Non combatant witnesses also add to the picture. As long as you don't just rely on one source you can attempt to get an overall picture. Assumptions are also used to fill in the gaps but can sometimes be changed as new evidence comes to light. You just have to try and get as close to the truth as possible. I don't think we are relying on lies per se but we might be using erronious info in some cases. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Antonius Miles Posted August 30, 2005 Report Share Posted August 30, 2005 As a former Marine I can sympathize with your experiences. I think for the most part we can trust the historical accounts generally because they like all defeats are similar to your experience. There was no situational awareness. No unit cohesion. No effective leadership. Like in your excercise the defeated side broke and was usually cut down running. That's the purpose of the training to teach you to pay attention and maintain unit discipline. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Marcus_Aurelius Posted September 6, 2005 Report Share Posted September 6, 2005 It is pretty hard to find men like Caesar,Hannibal,Scipio nowadayas mainly because our society is no more based on wars,but be sure that a better trainde army shall always be more likely to win a battle(remember Gaugamela,Pharsalus and the war in Iraq) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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