Romans at Thermopylae

[Pisces Axxxxx]

 

Read this thread I discovered.

 

 

http://historum.com/war-military-history/69199-why-weren-t-later-battles-thermopylae-impressive-greco-persian-one.html

 

I am curious can anyone post details about the Roman battle? Why didn't the Greeks inflict such an impression on the Romans as they did towards the Persians and later Celts as the linked thread states? How were the Romans about to win without suffering the casualties of the Persians and Celts and what did the Greeks lack that they were unable to repeat an impressive last stand like they did with the Persian and Celts (who the Greeks even beaten according to the link)?

[Viggen]

...not sure what battle they refer, but i think just as significant at least for central europe was the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, even though it was a reverse situation where they had massive loss...

[Onasander]

Reason why is two-fold....

 

1) Everyone knows what the Spartans did, and know better now.

2) Most people aren't in a massive rush to get into Greece.....

 

It's important to note the battle was a defeat for the Greeks.... most of the Persian army laid about during the standoff, never seeing the Greeks. It got a lot more hype than the average Persain would of warranted. I personally would of thought little of it had I been a Persian.

[Viggen]

...but it apparently did alot for greek morale, didnt it?

[barca]

They must be referring to Antiochus III failed expedition in Greece. His army was from Syria and armed in the Macedonian Phalanx manner. Whether his actual troops were Greek or Syrian is not clear. It seems to me they were able to hold the pass for a while against the Romans until they discovered the hidden mountain path so that they could outflank them.

 

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_thermopylae_191.html

[Onasander]

No, it didn't give the Greeks a morale boost. A bunch of dead Spartans, however pleasant sounding to the Athenian ears, doesnt fill you with encouragement when they were all that kept the Persians off your back.

 

The DEFEAT at Thermopylae, the razing at Athens would infuriate and incite, and unite..... but it took time. Thats not a morale boost.

 

Now, how we have always approached it since. has been one awesome piece of propaganda, boosting morale in the easily swayed. It undoubtedly has given holding.forces.in bottlenecks more.staying power ever since.

 

But no, a massive, embarrassing defeat that leads to a major defeat cant be honestly described as a moral boost.

[barca]

 

But no, a massive, embarrassing defeat that leads to a major defeat cant be honestly described as a moral boost.

 

It was all so long ago, and it is hard to know for sure what they all were thinking, but looking at more recent history in America, there is no doubt that the humiliating defeat of the vastly outnumbered Texans at the Alamo was a rallying cry which ultimately led to Texas' independence from Mexico.

http://stillcurrent.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/the-alamo-and-thermopylae-a-comparison-in-history/

[Pompieus]

In autumn of 192, at the invitation of the Aetolians to "liberate Greece", Antiochus landed an advanced force (10000 infantry 500 cavalry) at Demetrias in Magnesia and marched to join the Aetolians at Lamia.  Thru diplomacy and military action he managed to take control of most of central Greece (Aetolia, Boeotia, Chalchis, Euboea)  and invaded Thessaly.  Flamininus, Cato and others, with support of the Greek  upper classes, retained the support of Athens, the alliance of Achaea and the good will of Macedon. 

 

In February 191 the consul Manius Acilius Glabrio landed at Appolonia with 2 legions and allies (22000 men).  The mild weather and help from Phillip V of Macedon allowed Glabrio to march over the mountains and drive Antiochus and the Aetolians from Thessaly.

 

Antiochus fell back to Thermopylae, fortified the eastern end of the pass and placed 2000 Aetolians to guard the mountain path that the Persians had used to flank the pass in 480BC.

 

The night before moving on Thermopylae, Glabrio sent a detachment of 2000 men under the ex consuls Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Cato against the Aetolians on the mountain.  Next morning Glabrio's attack was stopped by the Seleucid sarissophoroi (Antiochus' Greek phalanx) at the entrenchment and harried by light troops on the slopes to his right.  But Cato had surprised the Aetolian detachment at the Callidromus pass, driven them off and appeared in the Seleucid rear.  Antiochus retreated to Chalchis, his elephants and the narrow pass slowed the Roman pursuit.

 

See Livy xxxvi.1-.20, Appian Syrian Wars 16-10, Plutarch Cato Major 13.

Edited March 28, 2014 by Pompieus

[Pompieus]

As to the difference in morale effects between the battle of 480BC and 191:

  1  480 was glorified as a sort of "National" defense against alien conquerors. There were Greeks on both sides in 191 and the defenders were asiatics and greeks or macedonians from asia. The Gauls were plenty alien, but they were raiders, not really capable of conquering Greece.

  2 There was no extended defense. The Romans knew their military history and set out to flank the pass at the outset.  Nor was there a fight to the last man as Antiochus retired with what he could save of his force.

 

The comparison to the Alamo is apt.

 

Besides, nobody liked Aetolians.

Edited March 28, 2014 by Pompieus

[Viggen]

But no, a massive, embarrassing defeat that leads to a major defeat cant be honestly described as a moral boost.

...the interesting question Onasander would than be, how come couple of thousand years later we still, know, rember and discuss the battle, if it did nothing at all?

[Maty]

'How come couple of thousand years later we still, know, rember and discuss the battle, if it did nothing at all?'

 

Militarily it did something - it gave the Athenians time to complete their withdrawal from Athens which was actually the point of the whole thing. The Spartans were well aware that this was a suicide mission, which is why only men with sons to continue their family name were sent. The objective was not to win but to slow the Persians for as long as possible, and this was done. So militarily the first Thermopylae was a success. It was achieved heroically and at great personal sacrifice, and without Thermopylae Athens might have been knocked out of the war, and the fifth-century intellectual revolution (an important development in human thought) would not have happened.

 

Secondly it was a morale boost becaise it showed that the Spartans - the top military power in Greece - were committed to the anti-Persian cause. It may be remembered that the Spartans had declined to show up at all for the Battle of Marathon, so the fact that they were prepared to fight and die this time around definitely cheered everyone up.

Edited May 4, 2014 by Maty

[Onasander]

Sorry Viggen for the late reply. Propaganda, complements of the Ancient worlds chief propagandist:

 

Simonides of Ceoshttp://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simonides_of_Ceos

 

It wasnt that big of a victory, if you can even dare call it even that, for later victories made it larger than life; Simonides had the financial motive to make it so. He contracted out to the major greek cities after the war to inflate them. Sparta invaded Asia Minor on this stream. Alexander the Great's Anti-Spartan rhetorical stance as the only ones not coming along mocks the view the Spartans paid Simonides to praise themselves for.

Edited May 24, 2014 by Onasander

[Cynthia]

 

But no, a massive, embarrassing defeat that leads to a major defeat cant be honestly described as a moral boost.

...the interesting question Onasander would than be, how come couple of thousand years later we still, know, rember and discuss the battle, if it did nothing at all?

 

The defeat at Thermopylae took enough time for the information to reach Athens. Initially, the Greek allies had hoped to both block the pass at Thermopylae vs. the Persian army *and* block the Straits of Artemisium vs. the Persian navy; thus a coordinated action.

 

However, as we know from history, a traitorous local told the Persians about the back way up the mountain, and the 300 Spartans died to a man. The length of time (7 days altogether) involved in the *entire* battle, which includes the three-day heroic last stand, was long enough for Athens itself to be evacuated. Thus, when the victorious Persian army came on through, there weren't any Athenians to capture / torture / kill. Poor Persians....

 

Meanwhile, the Persian Army *did* overrun Boeotia, and Themistocles' previous decision (made after learning about the result of Thermopylae) to have the navy fall back to Salamis went forward.

 

I think we can all remember what happened at Salamis.

 

Therefore, to say that Thermopylae as "not that big a victory" or "just a morale booster" is, to my mind, quite an understatement. The delay created by the Spartans' last stand allowed communication to reach Athens. That communication allowed for a critical change of plan, which in turn led to an amazing naval victory for the Greeks.

 

Many military historians believe that Salamis was key in keeping Greece independent and non-Asian in its government. I therefore find it difficult to minimize either encounter.

 

Gratias.

[Onasander]

That so called victory didn't budge Persia from Greece, they stayed for a while..... I am not about to claim the Persian navy had a clue, but the Greek land forces sucked something aweful. Your too effected by Simonides propaganda. 

 

This would be like, claiming Dunkirk as a victory. It's not happening, not anymore. We had too many centuries, millennia, of this damn silliness. Greeks got their butts whooped at Thermopylae, most of the Persian army sat around undoubtedly, the Persian equivalent of the quartermaster was likely losses as all these sitting soldiers were eating his supplies..... but Athens in the end got burned. Do not be confused here. The Persians  on the ground did okay in the beginning. 

 

I just can't for the hell of me figure out what their overall battlestrategy was supposed to be other than going in big and overaweing the Greeks. It suggests severe hubris and lack of understanding of the enemy. 

 

Another factor is..... the Persians might of gotten used to a formulaic path to victory in regards to the tribes of Asia Minor. A aggressive path to consolidating the tribes of Asia Minor really didn't happen until Alexander, and continued through Roman and Byzantine Times..... most people's the Persian encountered would of been nebulous nomads or scattered villages, easily suppressed in a seasonal campaign, more worth their tribute and draft power than geographical control. Considerably less civilized than other border areas. They likely thought very little of the Greeks, seeing them as much the same, just a little better organized. The overwhelming advantages of controlling much of the Mediterranean shoreline and its naval power likely made Greece seem easier than other frontiers.

 

Had they hit Greece more Piecemeal, just seizing Islands and holding them defensively before moving over the Bospherous it would of been cheaper and would of been considerably more difficult for a serious United Greek Coalition to willingly counter. But they didn't. Reveals massive flaws in how they thought, on both sides.

 

One thing is certain though.... Greeks lost at Thermopylae, and the Athenians likely were of high morale hearing the Persians were still conning. Anything but a Greek Victory would of came to my mind had I been a Athenian dragging a wife and child out of Athens, along a road in sheer panic and disbelief, thinking to hide in the mountains, and seeing it burn for days on the horizon.

 

But hey.... propaganda has a selective memory. The Greeks only remember how badass they all were, how cowardly the Persians so obvious after the fact were destined for defeat. They could paint history however they wanted.

 

You can't explain someone like Philip or Alexander the Great.... barbarians who thrived off this unifying Hellenistic propaganda as a excuse to militarize and invade Persia, without understanding that they came from OUTSIDE of the history of the Persian Wars.... they entered pedagogically into the aftermath of the Method. 

 

This would be like Mexico joining in on the current Allied invasion on D-Day celebrations, urging the US and Europe to invade China with it at the head of a coalition.... their enthusiasm would feed less on History, than the culture and possibilities underlining the rhetorical approach to history all Allied countries hold. 

 

Greeks falsely inflated themselves. The lie lead to their own conquest and subjugation, first from the Macedonians, then the Romans. Everyone learned how to partake in this fantasy.

 

All for a few coins for Simonides, like a few coins later tossed to Judas for a similar disservice of equal magnitude.