How did subordinate generals operate in Ancient Warfare?

[Pisces Axxxxx]

In modern warfare today, the highest ranking gneral concentrates exclusively on planning, logistics, and the "Grand Strategy" of a war. It is up to the lower ranking generals to execute the lower levels of warfare such as fighting pitched battles and carrying out operations.

 

In Ancient Warfare, the highest ranking general is portrayed as HAVING COMPLETE COMMAND and carrying out everything from big epic pitched battles to carrying out operations to handling logistics to the Grand Strategy and even PR,negotiations, and counseling the soldiers. This is especially true in movies like Gladiator (where Maximus is shown as doing everything from planning the battle to rallying his men and so-forth) and Spartacus (where Spartacus is portrayed even trying to negotiate his way out of Rome). Some movies like 300 go as far as showing the C-In-C in the frontlines with his troops.

 

Now its not just Hollywood and Popular Media that portrays this. Even History books seem to portray Generals like Alexander the Great and Cyrus of the Persians as micromanaging everything from a tactical battle to logistics.

 

I do read every now and then mentions of them having lower ranking generals-like one book mentions Alexander and his generals preparing before major tactical battles. However even in the articles and books that contain any mentioning of subordinate generals of leaders like Alexander and Leonidas don't put much details into the command of lower-ranking generals and overlooks the, making it seem like the C-In-C like Alexander and Ramses did everything else.

 

As though the subordinate generals were more like the C-In-C's bodyguards or just the elites of his army.

 

What were subordinate generals expect to do in ancient Warfare?If the top man was micromanaging everything, what was the purpose of Caesar having subordinate generals and so forth?

 

Were subordinate generals more like officers who were expected to inspire men but nothing more and were expected to follow the C-In-C's orders with no initiative like Robots?

 

I'm especially curious of how Alexander's generals operated as while the stuff I read neglect the details, they imply Alexander's generals were much akin to advisers in planning.

 

In tactical battles, did such generals just blindly follow orders like many books imply or were they expected to take the initiative?How crucial were they to major victories like Marathon and Plateau?

[caldrail]

The issue of Roman command is subject to incorrect modern interpretation, as many assume the situation was exactly the same as today.

 

In republican times the twin legion consular army used a system of power sharing, in which each general took command on alternating days and the other acted on his orders. This was done primarily to prevent ambitious leaders getting ideas, but the scale of warfare increased to the point where this system could no longer function adequately.

 

It then migrated to a system of legionary legates in imperial times who were pretty much their own masters, subject to imperial or senatorial decree, with the proviso that in the provinces they were seconded to the governor. Thus day to day activities were under legate authorisation (although centurions did all the petty organisation) and military expeditions were either headed by the governor himself as the regional overlord (thus brigading the legions assigned to him and with him on campaign in one temporary army) or acting on orders to complete their objectives as individual formations.

 

The idea of micromanagement is one largely dependent on the character of the commander himself. Some men prefer to delegate, others to take a personal interest. Quite how leaders like Antony and Octavian could micromanage their forces, up to around thirty legions apiece at their peak in the civil war, spread over large areas for practical reasons, is another matter.

 

In imperial times please note that Augutus introduced a small number of tribunes to the legion, who acted as executive officers for ad hoc or assigned tasks.

[Pompieus]

In ancient times subordinate officers were given their orders by the commander in a pre-battle conference, and were usually assigned command of a portion of the army, such as the left or right wing or center, or a detachment on special duty. Communication with the commander once the fighting began was obviously problematic, so subordinates would have to try to carry out the pre-battle orders as best they could in the circumstances. There were, however, examples of subordinates taking the tactical initiative in battle such as Claudius Nero at the Metaurus or the unnamed tribune at Cynocephalae.

 

Ancient armies were usually small, rarely more than 30-40000 men, and logistics was limited to obtaining food and water for men and animals, so administrative tasks were probably informally assigned to the commander's staff depending on his desire to delegate. As Caldrail says, however, it must have been a real problem with the large armies (the largest Roman armies on record) under the assasins of Caesar, Antonius and Octavian.

[caldrail]

it's even less formal than that. The sources mention officers ranging behind the line attempting to rally or spur men on (Roman discipline was not invulnerable) rather than actually commanding troops (which was actually the job of the centurions). In fewer cases, such as Caesar himself, we see mentions of senior officers fighting in the line alongside their men, which again was primarily to inspire the men around them.

 

What this means is that we have real identification of the lack of overall control by one man. Certainly senior officers had authority, but junior officers had considerable freedom (and responsibility) to show initiative and lead from the front.

[barca]

What were subordinate generals expect to do in ancient Warfare?

 

It seems to me that Parmenion played a significant role as a subordinate of Alexander. He commanded the left wing of the Macedonian formations, communicating with Alexander when he was in peril.

[Virgil61]

In modern warfare today, the highest ranking gneral concentrates exclusively on planning, logistics, and the "Grand Strategy" of a war. It is up to the lower ranking generals to execute the lower levels of warfare such as fighting pitched battles and carrying out operations.

 

Theoretically? Yes. In practice not so much. Micro-management from higher ranks is the bane of junior leaders in today's armies.

 

What were subordinate generals expect to do in ancient Warfare?If the top man was micromanaging everything, what was the purpose of Caesar having subordinate generals and so forth?

 

Read his War in Gaul, he'll tell you himself how or why he had to rely on subordinates [especially when not in garrison mode]. Everyone seems to write a lot about Caesar appearing in person on the Roman lines to give soldiers heart but he shows that he's just as apt to depend on junior officers to achieve certain goals [or at least operate with some semblance of tactical/operational competence]. Gaul was a vast area and he needed to trust subordinates to manage legions and cohorts strung out piecemeal over the region.

 

He depended heavily on Labienus as his second-in-command. He spells out how the legion under Labienus' orders flanked the Nervii after defeating their allies & noticing from a distance the Roman line was in trouble.

 

It's political/propaganda aspects aside frankly there's no better snapshot available to us of one general's leadership style, use of subordinates, etc, then Caesar's War in Gaul. If you don't want to spend money on a newer translation the McDevitte one is available for free and still holds up I think and is free on Google books.

[caldrail]

Caesar however does not highlight these 'styles' of leadership as abnormal, other than to boost his own personal standing by showing that he did indeed behave with martial valour. The fact that a general in ancient times fought alongside his men means nothing - that was normal practice in an age when the ability to fight was as important to impress your own troops as much as impress the enemy. That he relied on subordinate commanders is also not unusual - typically an ancient army has already decided how it wanted to fight the confrontation before it began. Deciding during the battle is too late - real time communications were not reliable or even instituted, not even by the Romans, who did no more than rely on passing information by the same means as their enemies.